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Series Preface 1
Series Preface 
“Cognitive perspectives in tool behavior” is a series of volumes dealing with tool behavior 
in animals, fossil hominins and modern Homo sapiens. The papers of this series focus on 
cognition, but may use data of different origins and various approaches – from archaeology, 
paleoanthropology, primatology ethology, technology, psychology, neurology, or 
philosophy. Tool behavior is not exclusively human, but its development plays an important 
role in human evolution; today humans live in a   permanent symbiosis with tools. Material 
manifestations of tool behavior make up the major part of the archaeological record. They 
are invaluable evidence not only of past people’s actions, but also of their perceptions, 
thoughts, cultural performances as well as cultural capacities. The aim of the series is to 
broaden our understanding of tool behavior in all hominin and non-human species, its 
different manifestations, and the corresponding cognitive prerequisites. With the collection 
of data and approaches from various disciplines, the “cognitive perspectives in tool 
behavior” will help us learn more about an important part of human behavior, gain better 
insights into cognitive constraints, and set them into an evolutionary frame. 
“Cognitive perspectives in tool behavior” is published electronically as an open source 
series on the tobias-lib server of the University of Tübingen library. The volumes are 
accessible worldwide and can be downloaded for free as pdfs. The intention is to spread 
academic theses and studies with comprehensive documentation, which would otherwise not 
be published, would be very limited in distribution and/or very expensive to access.  
The series starts with the habilitation thesis of Miriam Noël Haidle on “How to think tools? 
A comparison of cognitive aspects in tool behavior of animals and during human evolution”. 
Future volumes will include “Das Werkzeugverhalten von Schimpansen. Kognitive 
Flexibilität, Variabilität und Komplexität” (“Tool behavior of chimpanzees. Cognitive 
flexibility, variability, and complexity”) by Regine Stolarczyk and “Das Werkzeugverhalten 
von Orang-Utans. Kognitive Variabilität, Flexibilität und Komplexität” (“Tool behavior of 
orang-utans. Cognitive variability, flexibility, and complexity”) by Julia Schuster. Volumes 
in languages other than English include an extended English summary. 
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Author’s Preface 
The basis of this volume is my habilitation thesis from 2006. It took quite a long time and 
very dedicated translators (Susanne Wilhelm/Archaeoplan and Dr. Iris Trautmann/ A und O 
- Anthropologie und Osteoarchäologie) to translate the text into English.  A further delay of 
publication was caused by the necessity to set up the publishing platform “Cognitive 
perspectives in tool behavior” on tobias-lib with the University of Tübingen library .  
The study presented here represents the state of references up until 2006. In the meantime, 
important work has been published on the evolution of human cognition (e.g. the theme 
issue “The sapient mind: archaeology meets neuroscience” of the Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society of London B 363 (2008) edited by Colin Renfrew, Chris 
Frith and Lambros Malafouris, and the proceedings of the Wenner Gren Symposium 
“Working memory: beyond language and symbolism”  in Current Anthropology 51/S1 
(2010) edited by Thomas Wynn and Frederick Coolidge) as well as on animal and hominin 
tool behaviour, which has not been included  in this volume. Although this volume is 
partially outdated, it is nevertheless important to publish because  
 it introduces new theoretical and methodological approaches to cognitive aspects in 
tool behavior, 
 it is the basis of further studies using the problem-solution distance as a cognitive 
marker and cognigrams, or effective chains as  methods for assessment and 
comparison of this cognitive aspect in tool behavior (Haidle 2009, 2010, Haidle & 
Bräuer 2011, Lombard & Haidle in press, Schuster 2009, Stolarczyk 2009), 
 it provides a comprehensive compilation of data about animal tool behavior up to 
2006, 
 and it presents comparisons of tool behavior in animals and in human evolution not 
published elsewhere. 
The underlying research was financially made possible by a position at the University of 
Tübingen funded by the Margarete von Wrangell program of the State of Baden-
Wurttemberg 2001-2004, a follow-up position as assistant professor at the University of 
Tübingen, and a Feodor Lynen scholarship of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation at 
the Institut for Antropologi, Arkæologi og Lingvistik, Afdeling for Forhistorisk Arkæologi 
of the University of Århus, Moesgård, Denmark. A number of colleagues, friends, and 
family members supported the work with critical questions, discussions, proof reading, and 
confidence. The work is dedicated to my partner Jürgen Bräuer and my Danish family Berit 
Eriksen and Normann Nielsen who always believed in the project and spent months 
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focusing on the microscopic details. Any remaining problematic parts are only due to the 
fact that I didn’t listen carefully. 
Haidle, Miriam Noël 2009. How to think a simple spear? In de Beaune, Sophie A., 
Frederick L. Coolidge & Thomas Wynn (eds.), Cognitive archaeology and human evolution. 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 57-73. 
Haidle, Miriam Noël 2010. Working memory capacity and the evolution of modern 
cognitive capacities - implications from animal and early human tool use. Current 
Anthropology 51/S1, S149-S166.  
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Prolog
The group wakes in the trees. Its members stretch and yawn. The night before, the sleeping 
nests were quickly prepared by twisting together subtle branches and adding some soft 
leaves for padding. Each animal, with the exception of the mothers and their infants, slept 
alone in their nest, which are now abandoned. Some leaves serve as the first meal of the day, 
while others gather the last over-ripe fruits from a small tree and eat them. The group slowly 
gathers on the forest floor and leisurely strolls away. As they roam, the animals meander in 
loose groups. Once in a while they gather around an abundant fruit tree. When they reach 
the river, the thirsty individuals bend down to drink the water. The group rests in a nearby 
clearing. A young female sits behind a reclining older male and uses her nimble fingers to 
louse his side. Two young individuals are romping about while another young individual 
climbs a low branch to watch them. A young male of lower status noisily tears leaves from a 
branch. It tries to attract the attention of the others. A female breathes heavily through her 
stuffed nose. She plucks a blade of grass and tickles herself until she sneezes. Around 
midday, the group becomes restless and hungry and moves on towards the Pandanut trees. 
The group has been coming here for years. Broken nut shells are scattered among anvil and 
hammer stones that were left here, underneath the tree, from the last visit. Older females 
begin cracking the very nutritious nuts while the smaller individuals watch. Older children 
take stones and nuts and practice cracking the nuts, which seldom works. An older male 
rubs his back against a tree trunk. When darkness falls, the members of the group gather 
near a group of loosely-spaced trees. The sleeping nests from that morning are forgotten, it’s 
time to build new ones … 
After the family gets up in the morning, the bedding is fluffed up and stowed away for the 
day. While the young woman is brushing her teeth she looks into the mirror and notices the 
dust and chalk stains on the counter. It needs to be cleaned with vinegar cleaner. The man 
heats water in the boiler in the kitchen to prepare tea. He adds milk from the refrigerator to 
the tea in his ceramic cup. He fills a bowl with cereals and a fruit yogurt, the small child 
spreads the content across the kitchen table with his spoon. The smoked ham tastes even 
more intense on a piece of warm buttered toast. After rinsing plates and silverware, the 
family pulls on their jackets and grabs their bags. Outside on the steps, the man remembers 
that he forgot his umbrella and needs to take out the trash. The bus driver impatiently waits 
for the stragglers, who present their bus tickets. At the day nanny’s house, the child plays 
with cars and has already forgotten its parents. The woman buys a kilo of a new kind of 
apple at the market. The old market woman wraps the salad in newspaper. In the office, the 
woman opens the window, sorts her mail and blows her nose with a fresh tissue. She turns 
on the computer. A note on the wall reminds her to buy some flowers for a friend, who 
invited them over for dinner for that evening. But first, she has to prepare the tuna salad, 
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change her clothes, get her child ready and put on her mascara. She glances at the clock just 
as the man opens the door with his key. Thanks to the car, they arrive just in time. After 
dinner they play a game with the children and drink a glass of wine. Back home, they 
prepare the beds for the night. He forgot to call his parents today … 
Prolog 11
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I Basic Principles 
1 Introduction 
Objects define our (modern) humanity. They surround us day and night and are available for 
action. As tools, they extend our corporal abilities and act as expressions of our cognitive 
capabilities. They are devised and manufactured; we use them all the time. We search for 
new objects that solve existing problems or create unforeseen needs. Objects define the 
modern professional life: industry and craftsmen produce them, trade distributes them, 
services use them, administrations could not function without them, artists and scientists 
create them. And objects define daily life: tooth brushes, spatulas, shopping bags, toilet 
paper, pencils, photographs, cough drops, potted plants, computers, plastic dinosaurs, books, 
cell phones, boxes, candles, extension cords, socks, shells as souvenirs…. Objects make up 
our world.  
Objects are naturally occurring items or artificially made artifacts that subjects – humans 
and animals – act with. They serve as tools in the widest sense: they are used to do 
something. As part of an activity they are the material expressions of cogitation, especially 
the ability to think outside the box. The making and use of objects is always tied to a goal 
that cannot be achieved directly, but only by means of a medium: the need for enhancement 
of individual faculties is perceived, and an object – not just any, but one that fits the 
challenge – is found or devised to answer the problem, as in the case of a chimpanzee child 
that is not allowed to touch its newborn sibling and instead uses a twig to prod it and pick up 
its scent from the twig. Object or tool behavior is a particular aspect of behavior that is 
based on causal connections and – at least partially – considerations thereof. 
Although the use of tools in the animal kingdom is widespread, it is by no means universal. 
Only certain species of snails use stones as counterweights to righten themselves, only a few 
birds, like the Woodpecker Finch, search for thorns and trim them in order to dislodge 
insects from inaccessible knotholes. California sea otters use stones to chip abalone off the 
ocean floor and then to open them; they also use kelp to anchor themselves while they rest. 
Other objects are not employed in their natural habitat. Orangutans and chimpanzees fashion 
suitable objects to solve certain problems, like a sponge made of leaves to soak up water 
that would be difficult to access otherwise, and then transfer this solution to other applicable 
tasks, like bodily hygiene or the wiping up of tasty leftovers. They possess group-specific 
tool inventories for play, hygiene, food acquisition and intimidation display, and thus 
approximate human object behavior. Contemporary human behavior – whether in an 
industrialized Western European society or among hunter-gatherers in the south of Thailand 
– is characterized by the constant use of objects or tools. The solution of common problems 
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and challenges, and, in extension, human life, without the presence and aid of utensils is 
inconceivable. Humans are intrinsically linked to objects.  
Physical features like bipedalism, significantly reduced body hair in combination with 
numerous perspiratory glands, a very large brain in relation to overall body weight, and 
hands with opposable thumbs capable of a powerful precision grip all allow for a biological-
taxonomic differentiation of humans from the average representative of other contemporary 
species. Manifestations of intellectual particularities like language, art, religion, and highly 
differentiated social behavior facilitate a more precise perception of the special nature of 
humans. The distinct use of objects demonstrates their peculiar integration into the 
environment: not only living in it, but creating their own world. With the aid of instruments, 
humans enable themselves to solve problems that they could not solve by their individual 
capabilities alone. Humanity is not characterized by physical and intellectual traits alone, 
but only becomes comprehensible through its unbreakable bond to inanimate objects, which 
through use become part of actions and thus of the human world. The connection between 
the consciously acting human subject and an object is established by means of cognitive 
processes, where the object, as a tool, becomes a temporally limited extension of the subject. 
Before they can be used, however, objects have to be separated from their natural 
environment and perceived as possible implements: a twig ceases to be just another part of a 
bush, but instead becomes, as opposed to other twigs, a suitable raw material to fashion a 
termite fishing device. 
The rudiments of this intensive tool behavior already exist in chimpanzees and orangutans, 
who are closely related to humans, but the symbiosis with objects, so typical of modern 
humans, constitutes a species-specific cognitive feature. The evolution of tool behavior is 
therefore an excellent approach to a deeper understanding of human cognition, since not 
only basic elements shared with other species can be compared, but also typically human 
characteristics. Unlike language, art and religion, which as expressions of human cognition 
seem to appear out of the blue, tool behavior allows the study of similarities and differences 
to determine the character and degree of distinctiveness of this aspect of cognition in 
humans. 
In addition, tool behavior has left manifold traces in form of stone tools, wooden artifacts, 
pottery shards and metal implements. The artifact inventories of earlier human populations 
constitute direct attestations of the development of this part of human thinking (fig. 1).  
Yet, even the earliest stone tools and bone splinters used provide direct evidence of the 
perception of useable objects in the environment and the mode of extension of individual 
capabilities. Every archaeological site provides new artifacts to be used as primary sources, 
which in turn assert, challenge or add to previous studies in the development of thinking 
with objects. So far, archaeological finds from a time range of 2.5 million years allow the 
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reconstruction of changes in the use and production of objects and their comparison to tools 
used by modern humans and animals. Therefore, both objects and object behavior hold a 
key position in the study of human cognitive evolution, not only because of their potential 
significance, but also because of their abundance as a source. 
Fig. 1  The development of human object thinking, as illustrated by a series of toy figurines 
(Bullyland 1999). From left to right: Australopithecus with stick, Homo habilis with stone tool 
and bone, Homo erectus in loincloth with hand-axe and fire, Neanderthal with fur boots and 
clothing, mammoth tusk and a knife at his belt, and modern human with elaboratly sewn 
clothing, jewellery, knife and complex tools in form of spear and atlatl (spear thrower). 
Human cognition is reflected in many characteristics and there are, accordingly, many 
different scientific disciplines that explore it. The concepts behind the fundamental notions 
of human and cognition are equally varied, which is why this first part on basic principles is 
designed to provide an overview of approaches to, as well as a framework of definitions of, 
the subject.  
The second part deals with previous studies on the evolution of human cognition. 
Evolutionary epistemology, neuroanatomy and genetics constitute the phylogenetic 
perspective, which is primarily concerned with the biological basics of thinking. Linguistics 
and psychology generate models of the development of the human organization of thinking,  
which, apart from phylogenetic considerations, also incorporate the importance of 
individual, i.e. ontogenetic, development. The third dimension to be considered in the 
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evolution of human cognition is represented by the historical and cultural potential that is 
studied primarily in psychology, primatology and philosophy. Finally, the second part will 
discuss how tool behavior can contribute to our understanding of the acquisition of 
cognitive capabilities and the development of the typically human cognitive space with its 
three dimensions of phylogeny, ontogeny and culture. 
The third part explores the means previously employed to comprehend the evolution of 
human thinking and the cognitive background to object behavior on the basis of 
archaeological artifacts. It starts with an excursion into the history of archaeological theory 
and then proceeds to discuss, by means of eight models, the potential and limitations of 
archaeological approaches to the study of the development of the human mind. 
The fourth part consists of a detailed study of the progressive development of human 
thinking, and expands to incorporate problem-solution-distance as a neutral, species and 
period independent basis of analysis, which applies to animal as well as human tool 
behavior. Following its discussion and the definition of the concept tool, as used in this 
study, is a short review of previous comparative studies on animal and human tool behavior. 
Then the database, containing an almost complete survey of tool usage in animals, is 
presented as the basis of the comparative study on problem-solution-distance, and the 
method of breaking down the problem-solution-distance is explained with the help of 
thinking-process charts. Following a general survey of animal tool behavior, various action 
chains in animal behavior are instanced. Numerous archaeological examples, broken down 
in a similar fashion, then help to understand the further development of problem-solution-
distance as one aspect of human cognitive evolution. 
The concluding discussion delves further into the question of which mechanisms drive and 
influence the development of tool behavior, the problem-solution-distance in particular, and 
the underlying planning capability. The synopsis of conclusions from this study offers a re-
interpretation of the seemingly slow progress of tool development during the Old and 
Middle Palaeolithic and the “explosive” expansion of tool inventories at the start of the Late 
Palaeolithic, when modern humans appeared 40.000 years before present. Biological as well 
as cultural factors are responsible for the exponential increase of object behavior, which 
under close scrutiny can already be detected in the early phases of human cultural 
development and which continues to increase after the appearance of modern man. 
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2 Humans: A Matter of Definition 
The discussion of the evolution of human thinking is awash with discrepancies between 
different approaches, due to the wide range of topics studied and unresolved questions about 
their interrelation. The first ambiguous point in the debate of human cognitive evolution 
concerns the central object of study itself: humans. The question “What is a human being?” 
already troubled ancient philosophers. Plato defined humans as bipedal beings without 
wings featuring wide, flat hand- and toenails (Becker 1993: 7). He employed a few 
anatomical features to distinguish average humans from average representatives of other 
living species known to him. Other combinations of physical features can be used to classify 
modern humans: the almost complete absence of body hair, the prominent chin and the 
vertical  forehead, the generalized upper limbs represented by hands with pronounced fine 
motor skills, the distinctive shape of the foot resulting from bipedalism, and many more. 
However, these anatomical-morphological features fall short of explaining the essence of 
being human. 
The Dutch anatomist Louis Bolk chose a physiological approach to explain the 
“quintessence of man as an organism” (Bolk 1926: 4). He did not see hairlessness, loss of 
pigmentation, the recessed face below the cranial vault, the shape of the pelvis and the 
position of the foramen magnum caused by upright locomotion, the substantial weight of the 
brain, the shape of hands and feet, and the more ventral position of the female genitalia as 
primary physiological features of humans, but as enduring fetal conditions, typical for 
primates. For Bolk, the essence of humans lay in the slow progress of development during 
individual life, with a markedly prolonged childhood and adolescence and an equally 
emphasized post-reproductive  stage. He explained the fetalization of shape as the result of 
the hormonally triggered  retardation of development (ibid.: 11–13). Bolk deduced the 
extended growth phase during childhood not only through comparison of modern humans 
and primates, but also from his research into the second dentition in Neanderthals (ibid.: 
20). Contemporary palaeoanthropological studies increasingly confirm a retardation of life 
stages. Both the postnatal development of the brain in Homo erectus (Coqueugniot et al. 
2004) and the odontogenesis in Homo erectus, Homo antecessor, Homo heidelbergensis and 
Neanderthals (Dean et al. 2001; MoggiCecchi 2001; Kelley 2004; Ramirez Rozzi & 
Bermudez de Castro 2004) indicate a significantly accelerated maturation in comparison to 
modern humans. Additionally, a prolonged life span after the menopause as early as in 
Homo erectus is currently under discussion (O'Connell 1999). 
A third category of characteristics, besides anatomical and physiological aspects, tries to 
detect the essence of typical human existence within human behavior and its underlying 
intellectual attributes. Already Aristotle did not classify humans through physical 
characteristics, but saw them as zoon logon echo: the being that possesses language. More 
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encompassing and remarkably vague is the view of ethologist Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1995: 
822), who cites a whole array of characteristics, but marks none as sufficiently distinctive. 
He describes humans as political, talking, artistically creative, tool using, thinking, rational, 
playing, anticipatory and cosmopolitan beings, whose curiosity remains in evidence far 
beyond its usual stage during infancy and adolescence, as in other animals. 
Tool use, tool manufacture, visual arts, music, science, and the domestication of plants and 
animals are for the greater part not exclusive but typical aspects of human behavior. Karl 
Jaspers adds philosophy as a further “characteristic trait of man” (1997: 124), and conceives 
being human as “freedom … and transcendence” (ibid.: 57). Another typical trait of modern 
humans is their extraordinary adaptation for culture. Paul Alsberg pushes this argument to 
the extreme by viewing the human evolutionary principle of “elimination of the body” in 
contrast to the physical adaptation in animals, thereby inferring the absolute exceptional 
position of humans and placing them in their own world, apart from the world of plants and 
animals (1922: 426). He finds evidence for the elimination of the body in tool production, 
and regards the ability to make fire as a conclusive distinction between humans and animals 
(ibid.: 281). Whether the human mind or one of the characteristics rooted therein fully 
justify an exceptional position of humans, or whether one follows Max Verworn (1915: 34), 
who stated that “all intellectual evolution … exclusively [consists of] an ever detailed 
definition of the associative life under the selective factor of experience, and the current 
product of this evolutionary process is our modern intellectual culture,” is still as much 
under dispute today as it was at the beginning of the twentieth century (see Müller-Karpe 
2001a; 2001b; 2001c; Müller-Karpe et al. 2005). 
It is only in combination with language and distinctive tool behavior that the human 
adaptation for culture creates the “freedom” emphasized by Jaspers in terms of a greatly 
enlarged sphere of action. The expanded ability for action becomes apparent in the extended 
attachment of value and the subsequently enhanced detection of problems, the creation of a 
distinct world, the increasing temporality of human life owing to an extended access to the 
past by means of the memory, and the extension of plans for the future. Together with the 
diversity of human life circumstances it affects the multifaceted expressions of behavior. 
Humans employ very varied sustenance strategies, ranging from meat-rich to exclusively 
vegetarian diets. To this day, hunter-gatherer lifeways exist alongside transhumant herders, 
simple agrarian and artisanal societies, and industrialized economies. Human social 
behavior is very complex: humans live in nuclear or extended families, are patriarchically or 
matriarchically organized, trace their descent through their mother or their father, and 
maintain various political systems. Their diverse methods of communication culminate in 
“language,” which allows for the transmission of complex events, as well as individual 
desires, elaborate lies, plans for the future, utopian dreams and fantastic ideas — often 
exclusively mental constructs. Languages are as affected by culture as the artifactual 
equipment of, for example, a traditional Massai or a Swedish farmer. Whereas capacity for 
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culture in other species is uncommon or only rarely observed and always controversial, 
humans are very malleable in terms of cultural influences, for example through teaching. 
Additional characteristics of all humans living today are intellectual culture constructs, such 
as religion, fine arts, music and poetry. Apart from abstract, planning and reflexive thinking, 
which also exists in animals to a greater or lesser degree, it is symbolic thinking, i.e. the 
mental creation of representations, that forms the necessary basis for the development of 
these exclusively human intellectual systems. 
All typically human characteristics and behaviors mentioned so far refer to the modern 
representatives of our species. However, already the concept of modern humans is highly 
variable. In relation to present-day contexts, it describes an individual that is part of the 
individualized and computerized knowledge-based society which emerged during the 
twentieth century. In an anthropological context, which comprises all contemporary forms 
of human existence and distinguishes them from earlier forms, “modern humans” represent 
anatomically modern human beings that can be traced as far back as the upper Pleistocene; 
their behavior shows a complexity at least equal to the minimum potential observed in 
subrecent groups. Anatomically modern humans, as defined by their skeletal structure (see 
Lieberman et al. 2002), are attested through skeletal finds for at least 100,000 years — or 
even ca. 160,000 years, if predecessors like Homo sapiens idaltu from Herto, Ethiopia, are 
included (White et al. 2003). Artistic-religious expressions and the use of symbols, which do 
not occur until later and are observable from ca. 35,000 years before present in different 
areas of the earth, are often quoted as markers of mental modernity (e.g., Klein 1995; 
Mithen 1996; Otte 2001: 91–97). 
However, the beginnings of modern humans are not uncontested (see Brooks & McBrearty 
2000; Balter 2002; D'Errico 2003; Henshilwood & Marrean 2004; Mellars 2005). Although 
it is generally assumed that the creators of the first undisputed art and jewelry during the 
early Upper Palaeolithic were anatomically modern humans, there are several factors that 
challenge their exclusively Homo sapiens sapiens provenance. The use of pigments and 
simple jewelry, such as notched and perforated teeth, are known from indisputably Middle 
Palaeolithic, and thus probably Neanderthal, contexts (e.g., White 2001). Likewise, bone 
tools as indicators of modern behavior increasingly occur already during the late Middle 
Palaeolithic (D'Errico et al. 1998; D'Errico 2003). Additionally, the previously postulated 
hiatus in stone tool technology between the late Middle Palaeolithic and the very early 
Upper Palaeolithic, or Aurignacien, where the earliest art appears, seems to be vanishing 
(see Teyssandier 2004). Furthermore, there are no undisputedly anatomically modern fossil 
finds in central Europe that can be dated without doubt to older than 31,000 years before 
present and are associated with early Upper Palaeolithic artifacts (Henri-Gambier et al. 
2004; Wild et al. 2005). Thus, the oldest anatomically modern human bones in Europe, from 
the Petera cu Oase cave in Romania, which date to ca. 35,000 BP, are so far not associated 
with any archaeological finds (Trinkaus et al. 2003). The redating of older skeletal finds like 
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the Vogelherd individual Stetten I from previously estimated 32,000 years to the post-
glacial periods (Conard et al. 2004; see alsoTerberger et al. 2001; Wild et al. 2005), in 
association with dating problems concerning the early Upper Palaeolithic strata (Richter et 
al. 2000; Conard & Bolus 2003), further fogs the issue to the extent that the exclusively 
Homo sapiens sapiens origin of Aurignacien innovations has changed in status from 
conclusively proven fact (Mellars 2005) to one well-founded hypothesis among others 
(D'Errico 2003). Another pivotal problem lies in the evaluation of prehistorical behavior, 
which is dependent on the researcher's position: a lot of findings from the time of several 
tens of thousands to million years ago are highly fragmentary and open to different 
interpretations. Which archaeologically detectable characteristics are necessary to define a 
human being? Which feature of a characteristic suffices for a classification as human? And 
is what we find archaeologically yet enough to detect this characteristic feature? 
For example, when the use of symbols is taken as a characteristic of modernity, the question 
to be answered is: At what point do decorations have to be considered symbols, and when 
do artifacts not necessary for immediate subsistence become art? Do the ca. 35,000 year-old 
radial and almost rectangular carvings on bones from Bilzingsleben (Mania & Mania 1988; 
1999; Steguweit 2003) qualify as symbolism? Does the reworking of arm- and neck-lines on 
a chunk of tuff from Berekhat Ram / Golan that naturally resembles a rough female shape 
constitute 280,000 year-old artistic behavior? Do the decorations on pieces of pigments or 
the perforated snail shells from 75,000 year-old strata at Blombos Cave, South Africa, 
represent any symbolical meaning? Or is it not until the magnificent naturalistic 
representations of animals from the glacial period between 35,000 and 30,000 years before 
present — in sculptures like the ivories from the Swabian Jura (Holdermann et al. 2001; 
Conard 2003) and wall paintings from the Grotte Chauvet (Lorblanchet 2003) — that we 
find the earliest evidence of symbolical thinking? Besides, the singling out of specific 
features like symbolism as demarcations of modernity is rather arbitrary: Would not other 
criteria, such as the introduction of agriculture and animal husbandry, the artificial 
production of new materials like metal, glass and pottery, or the use of electricity or 
computers be just as conceivable? 
The most common definition of modern humans combines anatomical with mental 
modernity, which is expressed through symbolical behavior. The beginnings of this 
modernity are predominantly seen as originating in Europe at the onset of the Upper 
Palaeolithic, and it is assumed, owing to their symbolical expressiveness, that its agents 
possessed the same cognitive potential as present-day humans. This assumption is based on 
the basic equation of late Palaeolithic with modern hunter-gatherer groups and the 
acceptance of widely identical cognitive capabilities amongst present-day humans in 
general. However, whether hunting and gathering societies that are separated by up to 
40,000 years of development can in fact be equated, whether the differentiation of human 
lifeways in the post-glacial period merely constitutes an expansion of cultural 
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characteristics, and whether the evolution of the human genetical cognitive potential stopped 
sometime between 100,000–40,000 years before present, can not be proven thus far. 
The definition of “modern human” considerably restricts the concept of man. For a long 
time biological species, including humans, were viewed as the static product of creation, 
their characteristics and distinctions clearly defined and segregated. However, with the 
advent of the evolution theory, this groundbreaking philosophical idea that emerged during 
the nineteenth century, their development and thus their interrelationship based on descent 
became a distinct possibility. The discovery of fossil human remains in the Neanderthal near 
Düsseldorf and their interpretation as an ancient human life-form by Johann Carl Fuhlrott 
and Hermann Schaafhausen, which culminated in their classification as the distinct human 
species Homo neanderthalensis (King 1864), finally opened the door to an extended concept 
of humans.  
Nowadays, there are twenty possible fossil species clustered around anatomically modern 
man, classified as real humans (genus Homo) or hominids (subfamily Homininae): ten of 
these species alone were only discovered or classified after 1990 (fig. 2).  
The group of currently known or classified fossil hominids consists of direct ancestors of 
modern humans, whose identification as such is difficult, and their descendants that came to 
evolutionary dead ends. Since the genetic relations among the classified species are mostly 
unresolved, the use of phylogenetic trees is more and more abandoned in favor of graphs 
that illustrate the probable timespan for each species as a bar (see also Wood 2002: 134). 
Research is mainly focused on the search for morphological forms that are, or can be 
interpreted as, closely associated to the evolution of anatomically modern humans, such as 
the recent discoveries of Homo antecessor (Carbonell et al. 1995), Kenyanthropus platyops 
(Leakey et al. 2001), and Sahelanthropus tchadensis (Brunet et al. 2002). The assignation of 
mental capabilities and the tracing of human cognitive evolution are hampered by 
inconclusive correlations between human fossils and artifacts.
There is no universal definition of humans. In 1758, when the tenth edition of “Systema 
naturae” by Carl von Linné, which forms the basis of modern taxonomic classification, was 
published, there existed but one representative of the human species: Homo sapiens; further 
classification and definition seemed unnecessary. Thus, the definition of humans can be 
applied to modern man, with all inherent problems discussed earlier, as well as a whole 
group of human ancestors, actually exceeding the timespan of the first appearance of the 
genus Homo ca. 2.5 million years ago. This present study takes up the extended definition of 
humans. Its primary aim is not the identification of absolute markers for human actions, 
which would allow for the clear distinction between “full-fledged humans” and primates 
displaying certain anatomically human traits. Such a distinction is static by definition and 
impedes the reconstruction of evolution (see Whiten 2005: 53). Rather, the analysis of 
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material remains of actions, such as stone tools, wooden objects, bone, antler and ivory 
tools, is used to trace the development of human cognition and the resulting expanded 
capabilities of action, which originate from the final common ancestors of great apes 
(especially chimpanzees) and humans. The study of the cognitive potential of the great apes 
as our closest living relatives allows for – with reservations – an approximation of the 
intellectual potential of our common ancestors ca. 6 million years ago. 
Fig. 2 Possible ancestors of modern man, Homo sapiens sapiens. The species under 
current discussion are displayed with their approximate range of dating (bar). Since the 
actual line of descent among the different species is unclear, only morphological groups are 
indicated here: gracile australopithecines as Australopithecus afarensis, robust 
australopithecines (pr paranthropines) as Australopithecus robustus, and representatives of 
the genus Homo as Homo sapiens sapiens.  
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3 Primates as Cognitive Approximation 
Early on in the twentieth century, their close physical resemblance to humans raised the 
question of just how much similarity existed between the behavior and intelligence of the 
great apes and our own. Psychological testing of captive animals with sophisticated setups 
was expected to provide insight into a primal form of human intelligence (Köhler 1963: 1), 
although its implications for the cognitive ability of prehumans in the palaeoanthropological 
sense were not considered. Even today, only a minority of primate studies explicitly models 
the development of humans or human thinking. Yet, as our closest living relatives, primates 
– especially chimpanzees and bonobos – per se act as models of original human ecology and 
capabilities and their ensuing behavior (Yamakoshi 2001: 548; McGrew 1992: 62–63; e.g., 
Matsuzawa 2001). Questions regarding the adaptive significance of tool use in the 
acquisition of food, for example, can be checked through primate models (Yamakoshi 
2001). The use of primate models typically proceeds on the simplified assumption that the 
mental capabilities of modern humans which differ from those of primates developed within 
the hominine branch after its split from the primate line. Possible parallel development of 
various cognitive characteristics, e.g., in chimpanzees and humans, after the split is not 
considered. Human particularities are summarily viewed as autapomorphous human 
characteristics, despite the lack of accurate data about the independent development of 
comparative species. 
Although already Yerkes and Yerkes in 1929 (pp. 529–80) drew systematic analogies of 
behavior between the great ape species and between pongids and other apes, models of 
species-specific cognitive systems that incorporate the independent mental evolution of the 
different primate species are rare. The available amount of data for such models is – despite 
enormous progress during the last thirty years – still small, and this shortcoming serves the 
continuous equation of primate behavior with original behavior, which only perpetuates our 
distorted view of our common ancestor's behavior. Yet, despite these restrictions, evidence 
for the cognitive capacities of great apes and apes, like problemsolving and tool behavior, 
culture, language skills or learning, allows for at least an approximation to the origins of 
typically human thinking. 
Studies on Primates in Captivity 
There are three methods for studying animal intelligence: controlled experiments in 
captivity, observation of groups in captivity without specific scope, and observation of 
populations in the wild with or without additional provision of food. Studies in captivity 
offer insight into the cognitive foundations of various behavioral patterns and allow the 
study of behavior that would be difficult to observe in the natural habitat. Experiments are 
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conducted under controlled conditions, so that the impact of changes in the environment can 
be monitored. They enable the study of long-term individual developments through repeated 
set-ups and an approximation to the cognitive potential of the species under study. The 
amount of data thus obtained can be expanded to allow statistical analysis and direct 
comparison of different species. At the same time, the advantages of the artificial 
environment in controlled experiments have to be weighed against the disadvantages of 
laboratory research: the constricted setting with non-species-specific challenges, the 
artificial stimulus through controlled environment and designated problems as well as 
limited possibilities of solution all compromise the significance of the results when 
compared to actual species-specific behavior. 
Already at the beginning of the twentieth century behavioral studies of captive great apes 
became very popular in several countries (see Yerkes & Yerkes 1929: 582–86; Goodall 
1986: 7–8). Their origins lie in private preserves like that of Mrs. Abreu in Cuba or in the 
primate group established in 1910 in Santa Barbara, California, by G.V. Hamilton. The 
latter provided Robert Yerkes with an orangutan for his first study on rational behavior in 
primates (Yerkes 1916); he later repeated similar studies with a juvenile female chimpanzee 
and a bonobo (Yerkes & Learned 1925). On Tenerife, the Prussian Academy of Sciences 
(Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften) maintained a research station between 1912 and 
1918, where Wolfgang Köhler (1963) studied tool use in the solution of different problems 
on captive chimpanzees. The department of zoopsychology at the Darwin Museum in 
Moscow started experiments in the intelligence of primates in 1916. After World War I, the 
French Institut Pasteur opened a primate station in Kindia, French Guinea, that conducted 
mainly medical experiments. In 1924 finally, the Department of Psychology of Yale 
University in New Haven, Connecticut, began building a habitat that combined outdoor 
observation, breeding programs and an experimental laboratoty. Long-term observations 
and experiments, especially on chimpanzees and gorillas, were carried out here (Yerkes & 
Yerkes 1929). This research facility later spawned the Yerkes Primate Laboratory in Florida 
and the Yerkes Regional Primate Research Center in Atlanta, Georgia. In addition to these 
exclusively primate studies, comparative experiments with young chimpanzees and children 
were also conducted early on (see Goodall 1986: 7–8; Kohts 1923; Kellog 1931). 
Since the 1960s, research on primates in captivity has again reached a new high. Language 
learning programs with great apes have been intensified and psychological tests in the 
laboratory and on captive populations were systematized (see Goodall 1986: 8–9). Besides 
studies on problem-solving and cultural behavior, communication capabilities and various 
learning processes (see Nielsen et al. 2005), the best known examples of primatological 
studies on cognitive approaches are the mirror tests conducted by Gordon Gallup (1970; 
1975). A first experiment tested the reaction of several primates to their reflection. While 
chimpanzees proceeded from social displays directed toward the reflection to self-directed 
responses with the aid of the mirror within a few days, several species of macaques hardly 
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perceived the reflections as their own, even after weeks. In a second experiment, 
chimpanzees were marked with a red spot on their brow and ear while anesthesized. In 
absence of a mirror the chimpanzees rarely touched the mark, but when confronted with 
their reflection, they touched the marks on themselves repeatedly. Generally, these tests are 
seen as evidence that, unlike other primates, chimpanzees, orangutans (Lethmate & Drücker 
1973), as well as gorillas (Patterson & Cohn 1994, cited in Byrne 1996) recognize their 
reflection as a portrayal of themselves, and thus possess self-awareness. However, in a 
critical discussion of the mirror tests Heyes (1994) questions the deduced interpretation as 
self-awareness and offers other and simpler cognitive explanations. Controlled and 
comparative studies such as those mentioned above are only possible in captivity. They 
allow insight into the potential and certain areas of the cognitive abilities of animals that 
could hardly be discovered through the observation of primate groups in the wild. 
Field Research on Primates in the Wild 
Studies carried out on animals in their natural environment gather data that complement the 
results obtained through research in captivity or the laboratory. As early as 1930, Henry 
Nissen initiated the first long-term field study on chimpanzees in French Guinea, which 
lasted two and a half months. But it is only since the 1960s that systematic long-term 
behavioral studies of wild populations of chimpanzees (e.g., Goodall 1986; Boesch 2000; 
Nishida & Hiraiwa 1982), bonobos (e.g., Kano 1992), gorillas (e.g., Fossey 1989), 
orangutans on Sumatra and Borneo (see Fox et al. 1999: 99), as well as macaques, baboons 
(e.g., Strum 1983a; 1983b) and other primates, prevailed over short-term studies, which had 
dominated the field until then (De Vore 1965). Today, results from different groups are 
increasingly connected via the formulation of distinct problems (e.g, Whiten et al. 1999; 
Schaik et al. 2003), in order to gain a better overview of species-specific cognitive 
capabilities and to be able to track differences in the ways the primate populations employ 
them. 
Observations in the wild yield insights unobtainable in captivity, such as natural group 
composition, its stability and possible developments, feeding habits, and preferred 
environment – if not restricted by humans. Additionally, field research conveys information 
about the range and variety of problems perceived by different species. Group-specific 
differences help to detect various modes of behavior, such as traditions, and – in rare cases – 
enable to trace the diffusion of innovations. Natural food and object behavior points to 
selection criteria for food and raw materials, as well as their handling. Patterns and 
flexibility in the use of territory and through seasonally changing behavior are affected by 
the perception and the species-specific internal view of the environment. In cases where the 
current habitat proves insufficient to solve a specific problem, a detailed mental map of the 
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territory faciltitates the use of opportunities within the surrounding area in a selective, and 
thus planned, manner (see Boesch & Boesch 1984b).  
The time-consuming habituation of wild animals to humans, on the other hand, restricts the 
gathering of data, and the diversity of the natural environment and of the behavior limits the 
possibilities of analysis. After nine years of research, with an average of nine months in the 
field, Boesch and Boesch (1990: 87) describe these dificulties: 
“Habituation to human observers was a slow process and only after 5 years were we able to 
follow by sight some of the males. We did not carry out artificial provisioning, but tried to 
follow the chimpanzees by their vocalizations, making visual contact whenever possible. It is 
at present still difficult to follow some of the timid females. Knowing the females seem to be 
the keenest tool users, it is not surprising that it took us years to have a fair idea of the 
variety of their tool use. For instance, females practise ant dipping mostly at the rear of a 
party and always interrupted it when we approached. We saw this behavior for the first time 
in autumn 1987, i.e. 8 years after observations started. Similarly, in 45 months of initial 
observation, Goodall saw ant dipping only once, although it is common in Gombe.” 
Observations on populations in the wild are typically opportunistic and not directed towards 
a specific behavior; reports therefore remain largely anecdotal. Only rarely a certain type of 
behavior has been researched as systematically as the nut-cracking employed by the 
chimpanzee population in Taï National Park, Ivory Coast, where – amongst others – sex 
differences and the transport of raw materials could be analyzed in detail (Boesch & Boesch 
1981; 1983; 1984a; 1984b). Experiments, such as those carried out on wild chimpanzees by 
Matsuzawa et al. (2001) in their field laboratory in Bossou, where raw materials and food 
are provisioned, provide an alternative approach to specific data surveys. As the particular 
circumstances of observation, regarding, for example, the lack or frequency of specific 
behavior, often vary widely, direct comparison of different groups – let alone different 
primate species – is difficult, if not impossible. Thus, both studies in captivity and 
observations in the wild only allow limited conclusions about the cognitive capabilities of 
primates. The combination of both approaches, however, makes it possible to trace the 
outline of their intellectual power, which finds its expression in tool use, capacity for 
culture, communication and learning ability. 
Tool Use and Tool Manufacture 
For a long time, the use of natural or artificially altered objects as tools has been regarded a 
typically human characteristic and was considered to denote “intelligent” behavior, a trait 
that was mostly denied to animals. Although primatological research was focused on tool 
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use among primates from the start, its results passed largely unheeded until the 1960s. 
Individual casual observations of primate tool use in the wild – such as the use of hammer 
stones among capuchin monkeys (Gonzalo Fernandéz de Oviedo 1526 in Urbani 1998 in 
Ottoni & Mannu 2001), the throwing of branches at trespassers among howler monkeys 
(Dampier 1697; 1705 in Becker 1993), the opening of shells among macaques (Carpenter 
1887), or the nut-cracking with stones among chimpanzees (Savage & Wyman 1843–44 in 
Beck 1980) – reach as far back as the sixteenth century, and are, as the example of 
Abyssinian baboons cracking the pits of fruits with the help of stones shows (Schweinfurth 
1902: 302), repeatedly attested. Studies on animals in captivity equally attested early on that 
primates use tools and are able to reach individual solutions to problems (Yerkes 1916; 
Köhler 1963; Yerkes & Yerkes 1929; Guillaume & Meyerson 1930; 1931; 1934). 
Already in the 1920s, Wolfgang Köhler (1963) developed a model for the cognitive 
interpretation of tool use and manufacture among primates, based on his experiments at the 
research station of the Prussian Academy of Sciences on Tenerife. He recognized tool use as 
an extension of the principle of thinking outside the box, that is, of achieving a goal 
indirectly. Simple experiments, where an object was placed behind a fence and was not 
accessible by direct but only indirect means, showed that such tasks could be solved by 
infants, chimpanzees and dogs, but not, for example, by chickens (ibid.: 8–10). An indirect 
solution, which required the use of an actual intermediate, like a piece of string by which the 
target object could be pulled within reach, could only be achieved by primates and humans 
(ibid.: 18). In his experiments, Köhler observed various forms of simple tool use in the 
solution of a problem by means of readily accessible objects (ibid.: 22–40). At the same 
time, he discerned playful interaction with objects without necessity, where earlier tool use 
might lead to its playful repetition, and playing around with objects could end in tool use 
(ibid.: 49). He illustrated the seamless transition between object play and tool use, but would 
only accept test problems of his devising as real problems. Problems perceived by the 
animals themselves, which led them to use sticks as levers, spoons, digging sticks, probes, 
weapons or missiles, to drape objects on their body as some kind of adornment, or to paint 
parts of their environment with clay they had moistened in their mouths, were interpreted by 
Köhler not as problems, but as play (ibid.: 50–71). 
While Köhler already characterized tool use as an indirect action, the elements of which 
seem irrelevant to the achievement of the goal when viewed separately, but become 
meaningful only in context, tool manufacture to him meant a progression in the use of 
indirect means (ibid.:71–72). Not only does manufacture require the use of a material 
intermediate (tool), but the actual goal has to be pushed aside for a while in favor of a 
different goal (tool manufacture). Additionally, the task cannot be associated with any given 
object, e.g. a stick, but the object – the stick – has to be visually separated from the branch 
of a tree (ibid.: 75). In his experiments, Köhler was able to observe the manufacture of tools, 
such as the snapping off of branches, the joining of several pipes for extension, and the 
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sharpening of tools, as well as the construction of box stacks (ibid.: 96–123), and problem 
solution by indirect means via independent intermediate solutions. In the latter experiments, 
the problem was unsolvable with aid of the directly available tools alone, but these tools 
could be used to attain an object that would lead to a solution. This combination of tool use 
was only achieved by the more apt test animals (ibid.: 124–33). Although Köhler addressed 
the issue of tool manufacture among chimpanzees as early as 1921, the universally accepted 
opinion remained that tool use was a predominantly human characteristic, while tool 
manufacture was exclusively so. Primates were granted perceptual thinking, while 
conceptional thinking was seen as typical for humans (Oakley 1963: 1–2). 
Tool behavior not initiated by humans only attracted greater attention through the 
observations of Jane Goodall (1964) among chimpanzees (pan troglodytes) in Gombe, 
Tanzania. In the following decades, reports of tool use and manufacture among chimpanzee 
populations in the wild increased (e.g., Jones & Sabater Pi 1969; Nishida 1973; Sabater Pi 
1974; Teleki 1974; Nishida & Hiraiwa 1982; Boesch & Boesch 1981; 1983; 1984a; 1984b; 
Sugiyama 1985; Goodall 1986). Long-term studies on Sumatra and Borneo finally yielded 
proof of complex tool behavior in orangutans (pongo pygmaeus) living in the wild (e.g., van 
Schaik et al. 1996; Fox et al. 1999; van Schaik & Knott 2001; Fox & Bin' Muhammad 
2002), which for a long time had been known only from zoo animals or through experiments 
(e.g., Lethmate 1976a; 1976b; 1977a; 1977b). Since the spontaneous and varied tool use of 
pygmy chimpanzees, or bonobos (pan paniscus), had already been observed in captivity 
(Jordan 1982), it was only a matter of time before tool use could be reported from bonobo 
populations in the wild (Hohmann & Fruth 2003), exceeding the use of sticks for play or of 
leafy branches as rain shelter (McGrew 1992: 47; Ingmanson 1996). Tool use among 
gorillas (gorilla gorilla) has so far been mostly attested in captive animals (Boysen et al. 
1999; Parker et al. 1999; see Appendix).  
Comparisons between great ape species, as well as between great apes and other primates, 
have been drawn early on: Robert and Ada Yerkes (1929: 577) noticed that primates display 
only the most basic tool use, which is quite common among the great apes and occurs there 
with an additional tendency towards tool manufacture. While tool behavior among gorillas 
is not pronounced, not even in captivity, it is part of the common behavioral repertoire in 
orangutans and chimpanzees (ibid.: 550). However, indications of species-specific 
specializations in the qualitative characteristics of tool behavior are still few and far 
between. Unlike chimpanzees (pan troglodytes), who primarily use tools in the context of 
food acquisition, tool use among bonobos (pan paniscus) mainly focuses on the avoidance 
of physical discomfort or social interactions with members of the same species (Ingmanson 
1996). So far, gorillas (gorilla gorilla) have only rarely been observed to exhibit tool 
behavior in their natural habitat, but their complex behavior in dealing with the defenses of 
their food plants has been noted, as well as frequent intensive observing behavior (Byrne 
1996; 1999). While tufted capuchins (cebus apella) develop very varied tool use in 
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captivity, their behavior during experiments is often irrelevant to the solution of the 
problem. Observations indicate that they lack a mental image of the probably adequate 
solutions, which leads to heavy experimenting with every possible alternative, even 
nonsensical ones. Other than the great apes, they do not seem to be able to comprehend 
imitation or the interaction of cause and effect (Visalberghi & Limongelli 1996). 
Gen Yamakoshi (2001) believes that ecological reasons are behind the varying degrees of   
tool use among the great apes. In a study of several wild chimpanzee populations, he noticed 
that the animals mainly consume fruits, leaves, and herbs, and that tools are typically used to 
obtain resources that are difficult to reach, such as social insects, honey, algae, and nuts 
(ibid.: 542–43). Tool use seems to facilitate the procurement of additional food resources 
during the seasons when fruits are sparse. In this process, the adaptive importance of tool 
use is not found in the more effective exploitation of preferential seasonal food resources – 
as posited by Parker and Gibson (1979) – but in the circumvention of the seasonal dearth of 
the main food supply through the supplementation of other, harder to reach, but plentiful 
food resources (Yamakoshi 2001: 550). Yamakoshi attributes the lack of tool use among 
bonobos and gorillas to the absence of seasonal periods of dearth in their respective habitats 
(ibid.: 551). 
The most important cognitive difference between humans and chimpanzees, except for 
language, following White (1942), Köhler (1963), Osvath and Gärdenfors (2005), amongst 
others, lies in their mode of thinking, which in primates is closely tied to the present, 
extending very little into the past or the future. Especially the limited future impairs tool 
manufacture: the preparation for a future goal not only requires the imagination of proper 
planned actions, but also the “imagination of certain extraneous circumstances in the near or 
further future” (Köhler 1963: 196). In his observations of tool manufacture among 
chimpanzees, Köhler noted that an actually perceivable goal facilitated the process, while 
the limited present interest in future rewards detracted from the manufacture of tools for 
future use (ibid.: 196–97). While the basis for actions in chimpanzees lies solely in 
perceptions, human actions can also be triggered by conceptions (ibid.: 200). Köhler 
identifies this lack of conceptional thinking as the main reason for the general absence of 
cultural development among chimpanzees (ibid.: 192).  
Capacity for Culture 
In reaction to Jane Goodall's early observations of tool-using and –manufacturing 
chimpanzees in the wild, which rendered the concept of “tool manufacture” as a defining 
human trait obsolete, Holloway (1969) proclaimed culture to belong exclusively to the 
human sphere. This statement, however, is strongly dependent on the definition of culture 
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and cultural behavior. While some scholars define culture as a tradition in terms of a 
specific behavioral pattern that is shared by two or more individuals of a social unit, retained 
over a longer period of time, and transmitted to new users partly by socially assisted 
teaching/learning procedures (see Whiten 2005: 53), other definitions of cultural behavior 
are much more exclusive. Lethmate (1991: 134) distinguishes several discipline-specific 
culture principles, and defines culture from the viewpoint of primatology as behavior that 
(1) is not exclusively attributable to ecology, (2) is shared by many members of a group, (3) 
is handed down through generations, i.e., forming a tradition, and (4) is not transferred 
genetically, but socially. He finds indications of all four conditions amongst chimpanzees, 
although many details remain unclear to him, owing to the limited availability of data (ibid.: 
137–38). McGrew (1992) specifically studies the material culture of chimpanzees and 
establishes eight criteria for cultural actions, which are partly congruent with Lethmate's. In 
his opinion, all of the following criteria have to be met in order to identify culture beyond 
doubt: innovation, social transmission to other individuals, standardization and persistence 
of behavior, dissemination amongst groups, tradition spanning generations, not induced by 
subsistence, and natural occurrence without, or only with very little, human influence (ibid.: 
76–79). Following McGrew, no single population shows a behavioral pattern where all eight 
criteria are met, but they all appear individually within the context of tool behavior among 
chimpanzees.  
Wrangham et al. (1994) collect various indications of chimpanzee culture, but only Whiten 
et al. (1999; 2001) succeed – by systematic comparison of seven populations studied on a 
long-term basis – in separating 39 behavioral patterns with cultural background from a 
possible pool of 65. In contrast to earlier studies, a quantification of behavior within a given 
group was also attempted. Customary behavior is prevalent within the population, habitual 
behavior can at least be observed among several important individuals on a regular basis. 
Other categories include rare behavior, existing behavior with unknown frequency, absent 
behavior due to ecological circumstances, absent behavior, and no information. The so-
called geographical approach of Whiten et al. (1999; 2001) defines behavior as cultural if it 
occurs customarily or habitually within at least one group, but is absent in at least one other 
living under similar ecological circumstances. If the absence of a certain behavior can be 
attributed to ecological causes in each case, it is eliminated from the list of indicative 
cultural markers. In this way, Whiten et al. establish the basis for an ethnography of 
chimpanzees. Like humans, but unlike other animals, chimpanzees exhibit not only 
individual behavioral patterns, but whole systems of behavior that are group-specific and 
passed on culturally. In chimpanzees, Whiten and Boesch (2002: 38) recognize the 
beginnings of the cumulative cultural process that culminates in modern humans. 
Motivated by the example of chimpanzees, an attempt was made to identify culturally 
induced behavior in orangutans. Van Schaik et al. (2003) compared six populations studied 
under long-term conditions on Borneo and Sumatra according to the criteria established for 
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chimpanzees by Whiten et al. (1999). They identified 19 of the 36 studied behavioral 
patterns as very probable cultural variants; for a further five, ecological explanations could 
not be completely ruled out. Unlike in the studied chimpanzee populations, van Schaik et al. 
found among the orangutans a significant correlation between the geographical distance 
between groups and the percentage of differences of all customary or habitual local variants. 
This statistical relationship backs the hypothesis that innovations within individual groups 
are transmitted to other groups through social contact. Additionally, a significant 
relationship existed between the percentage of time spent in the company of independent 
individuals and the number of subsistence-related customary or habitual behavioral patterns. 
This indicates that orangutans also learn socially from other group members than just their 
mother. Other suspected causes of greater variation in cultural behavior, like a higher need 
of innovations due to less favorable ecological conditions or ample opportunity for playful 
exploration of the environment due to enough spare time, however, proved to be statistically 
not significant. Therefore, van Schaik et al. (2003: 105) conclude that “the presence in 
orangutans of humanlike skill (material culture) pushes back its origin in the hominoid 
lineage to about 14 million years ago, when orangutan and African ape clades last shared a 
common ancestor, rather than to the last common ancestor of chimpanzees and humans.”  
Communication and Capacity for Language 
The development and extensive use of language are significant characteristics of human 
cognition. The requirements for modern human phonetic language can be divided into three 
distinctive groups: the capability to communicate, language competence, and the capacity to 
vocalize (see Haidle 2004). Capability for communication involves the awareness of one's 
own motivations – “What do I want to communicate?” – as well as an awareness of the 
communication's context: for example, that “apple” has a different meaning than “orange,” 
i.e., a differentiation between categories A and B. Additionally, an awareness of possible 
knowledge gaps of the counterpart is required, as well as the knowledge that these gaps can 
be bridged. Capability for communication is an integral part of social intelligence, the 
development of which, during the course of human evolution, cannot be deduced directly 
from archaeological or fossil finds, but has to be approached via primate models. Besides 
the social competence for communication, an individual willing to develop language needs 
specific physical characteristics in order to be able to communicate. The neurological 
requirements for the generation, perception and comprehension of language elements, or 
analogous signs, are subsumed under the concept of capability for language. The primate-
specific use of sign systems can be correlated with their brain anatomy and, thus, serve as a 
comparison for the functions of human brain areas. Vocalization, on the other hand, defines 
the capability to consciously produce different sounds, which is essential for spoken 
languages, but irrelevant for sign languages. Primate experiments on communication mainly 
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focus on the capability for social communication, as well as the perception and 
comprehension of language elements, without comparisons to the anatomy of the human 
brain. 
First experiments with spoken language were conducted by Keith and Cathy Hayes between 
1947 and 1953 on the female chimpanzee Viki. In order to not only gain insight into the 
comprehension of language, but also to find out more about the capabilities for the use of 
language as a communication device and the combination of terms or simple grammatical 
rules, spoken language was subsequently replaced by various sign systems. Thus, laboratory 
animals were able to express themselves even though they were lacking vocalization skills. 
Allen and Beatrice Gardner (1969), for example, taught the female chimpanzee Washoe 
between 1966 and the end of the 1970s more than 130 signs of the American Sign 
Language. David and Ann Premack communicated with Sarah in an artificial language, the 
elements of which were composed by abstract pieces of plastic that differed in form, color, 
size, and surface texture. Duane Rumbaugh taught the female chimpanzee Lana Yerkish, a 
system of 25 symbols arranged on a computer keyboard, with which she was able to control 
parts of her environment, such as food, drink and entertainment through music and videos, 
by correctly phrasing her wishes (see Goodall 1986: 11–12). 
The most impressive capability of communication through human sign systems so far was 
exhibited by the bonobo Kanzi. Sue Savage-Rumbaugh was working on language programs 
with bonobos and chimpanzees, teaching Kanzi's mother to use a computer keyboard that 
displayed various symbols – so-called lexigrams. While efforts with the adult bonobo 
mother amounted to little, her son, without being taught himself, was able to acquire –in 
passing and just by his mere presence during the experiments – a vocabulary of over 120 
signs that were not limited to the designation of objects, but also could indicate actions and 
relationships. Moreover, Kanji showed the capability to deceive and to express wishes, thus 
using the lexigrams outside the physical context of their original meaning (Savage-
Rumbaugh et al. 1986; 1993). As a result, the lexigrams can be considered “words” with a 
conventional link to associated thoughts (see Deacon 1994: 130). On occasion, Kanzi and 
other probands also combined multiple signs repeatedly in a significant manner (Savage-
Rumbaugh et al. 1986; 1993). 
This evidence of syntactic structures in multi-word expressions, a kind of proto-grammar, is 
indicative of Kanzi's capacity for language (Savage-Rumbaugh & Lewin 1998:189). 
Linguists consider grammar to be an essential element of language. However, following 
Savage-Rumbaugh and Lewin (pp. 180–81), the model of modern language structure has to 
be deemed inapplicable to earlier stages of development. Instead of the existence of 
regularities in form of grammatical rules in other stages of development, they stress the 
importance of the capability to invent rules in the first place. These rules, which can differ 
considerably from our present ones, mirror the adaptation and behavior of primates and 
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early humans, which in turn can vary from the adaptation and behavior of modern humans. 
Besides the actual use of signs in communication, Rumbaugh et al. (1986) also emphasize 
the importance of comprehension capability. Even though an ape is not capable of speech, 
the capability to understand language is considered the cognitive equivalent of 
accomplished language acquisition. The comprehension of sounds and the breaking up of 
phonetic sequences are prerequisites for language production. In children, comprehension 
precedes active speech in the single-word as well as the sentence stage (Savage-Rumbaugh 
& Lewin 1998: 191–92). The singularity of comprehension lies in the decoding of the 
counterpart's intent. While an individual producing language knows what it thinks and wants 
to say, comprehension involves not only the separate perception of short phonetic groups, 
but also the inference of the counterpart's intention and the informative value of the message 
(ibid.: 199). To explain the existence of a certain amount of language capability in 
chimpanzees and bonobos without the development of a simple proper language system, as 
well as the evidence for the rather late appearance of language within human evolution, 
Savage-Rumbaugh and Lewin (pp. 277–78) postulate that the cognitive foundations of 
language are actually an adaptation for purposes other than language, such as, for example, 
the planning of future actions, the manufacture of tools, or empathy with another individual. 
The analysis of laboratory experiments is complicated by the fact that, while chimpanzees 
and bonobos can learn to use signs in a language-like manner, the necessary constituents for 
these interactions are provided by fully language-capable humans. However, the tests still 
attest relatively advanced communication capabilities in at least some individuals. The 
capacity for language is also partially evidenced: the simple use of a limited set of symbols 
can be learned. Whether and how the development of a proper primate signs system is 
possible, though, has to remain an open question. Additionally, the vocalization among great 
apes is severly limited in comparison to humans. 
Research on wild vervet monkeys discovered a species-specific vocal sign system that is 
based on several acoustic modes of communication (Seyfarth & Cheney 1991). On seeing 
predators, they vocalize different alarm calls depending on the specific kind of threat, 
whether eagle, leopard or snake, which trigger different and appropriate reactions from the 
group as a whole. When encountering another group of their own species, they react with 
two different vocalizations depending on whether mere presence is acknowledged or threats 
are issued. Several experiments proved that the alarm calls contain distinct information and, 
consequently, are to be considered semantic signals. Vervet monkeys showed the same 
reactions to calls replayed through hidden loudspeakers without the presence of predators or 
when the length or volume of the calls had been changed. Habituation experiments with 
chatter vocalizations indicate that these as well are not mere acoustic stimuli, but 
information carriers. The typical vocalizations, however, are innate. Their correct use – 
when they are to be uttered and the proper reaction to them – is learned by imitation; active 
transmission through positive feedback for correct calls or correction in case of improper 
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reactions does not occur (Seyfarth & Cheney 1993: 130). In contrast to the laboratory 
conditions of language experiments with great apes, research on vervet monkeys in the wild 
provides information on the species-specific use of communication and language 
capabilities and on the transmission of a behavior, that is, on the form of learning 
characteristic to this species. 
Different modes of learning 
The study of learning competence and behavior originated in developmental psychology, 
where research with children expanded into research on primates. Experiments that 
compared the learning processes and capabilities of children and primates in reaction to 
identical stimuli were already conducted early on (e.g., Kohts 1923; Kellog 1931). Besides 
these attempts to trace learning behavior within the development of particular individuals, 
systematic studies on learning in primates were also conducted, which are closely linked to 
the study of tool behavior. Early research focused on the individual learning process and 
lead to the differentiation of trial-and-error learning, which is frequent in animals, from 
rational learning. First experiments on differences in the mental capacities of great apes and 
humans were conducted by Wolfgang Köhler (1963) on captive chimpanzees at the research 
station of the Prussian Academy of Sciences on Tenerife in 1914–1916. In his study on tool 
use in the solution of various problem situations, he found, in addition to trial-and-error 
learning, indications of rational considerations as the basis of tool use in chimpanzees – a 
point of view he shared with Robert Yerkes (Yekes & Learned 1925: 38). Köhler considered 
the spontaneous occurrence of coordinated proper solutions for complex tool problems, as 
well as the postulated animal comprehension of critical relationships, to be attributes of 
rational thinking. These attributes, as well as the assumption of rational thinking as an 
independent learning process, were later challenged, since – amongst other things – rational 
thinking is highly dependent on previous experiences (see Beck 1980: 158–62).  
Recent research on learning in primates focuses on the modes of knowledge transmission in 
individual groups, which figures prominently within the discussion of cultural behavior in 
primates (see Beck 1980: 162–77; Sunita et al. 1985). Tomasello (2002: 37, 40–47; see 
chapter 9) distinguishes the following as possible learning modes for group-specific 
behavior: physical contact with a learning situation in the group-specific environment, 
increased stimulation, imitation and emulation, and learning based on the effects of behavior 
of other individuals without comprehension of their behavioral strategies. Additional to 
frequently repeated social interactions, which can lead to ritualized behavior between 
individuals, imitation and active teaching are further forms of knowledge transmission. 
Teaching among wild chimpanzees has only been observed in connection with the nut-
cracking with hammer and anvil prevalent in the group from Taï National Park, Ivory Coast 
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(Boesch 1991). While Caro and Hauser (1992) consider all behavior that assists the learning 
process of another individual as teaching, Boesch and Tomasello (1998: 601) distinguish 
between the deliberate facilitation of learning, as occasionally witnessed among 
chimpanzees, e.g., when mothers position whole nuts for cracking for their children, and 
active teaching, which so far has only been observed twice (Boesch 1991). 
Matsuzawa et al. (2001) consider the learning of nut-cracking in the Bossou group, Guinea, 
especially founded in the spontaneity of the child, coupled with the mother's high tolerance, 
where the stimulus for learning does not spring from the resulting availabilty of food, but 
from the imitation of the mother's actions. The importance of a playful, stress-free situation 
for a successful learning process is stressed by van Schaik et al. (1999). General or specific 
stress during the possible learning situation may be accountable for the fact that chimpanzee 
children did not make any progress in fishing for termites for years after their mother had 
died (van Lawick-Goodall 1971 in Beck 1980: 172) or that the very effective throwing of 
canisters for purposes of intimidation by one male chimpanzee in Gombe was not taken up 
by others in the group (van Lawick-Goodall 1971 in Beck 1980: 177). 
The critical age for learning to crack nuts is between three and five years, according to 
Matsuzawa et al. (2001: 563); Tomasello et al. (1987: 182) have observed the first use of 
tools among wild chimpanzees between the ages of four and six. However, the process of 
learning can already start earlier, as the example of termite fishing demonstrates. According 
to Beck (1980: 174), young animals below the age of two years were not observed probing 
termite hills. They do, however, play with tool-like objects next to their termite fishing 
mother, observe the fishing processes of other animals and eat a termite every now and then. 
After the age of two, they probe termite hills with unsuitable tools that are either too short, 
too long, too thick, too flexible, too bent, etc., or they probe not deep enough, not long 
enough, or extract the probe too fast or too clumsily. Three-year-olds already fish with 
longer objects and more patience, but their choices of tool and technique are still inadequate. 
Typical four-year-olds choose and use fishing tools like adults; while their yield is good, 
they still spend less time at it. The behavior of five- to six-year-old chimpanzees is 
indistinguishable from adult behavior. While termite fishing and the use of leaf sponges are 
already practiced at the age of two and mastered at the age of four, first beginnings of ant 
fishing are not observed before the age of four, its mastery not before the age of seven (Beck 
1980: 174–76). 
Juveniles learn through the observation of their peers and older individuals. Adults are much 
more conservative and manifest a dislike of innovations; a transmission of knowledge to 
older individuals, as occasionally evidenced in humans, does not occur among chimpanzees 
in the wild (Huffman & Quiatt 1986; Matsuzawa et al. 2001). Similar observations were 
made by Tomasello et al. (1987) during behavioral laboratory experiments on captive 
chimpanzees. In their opinion, learning does not result from the exact imitation of a 
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behavioral strategy, but through emulation, i.e., the observation of the tool-solution-
relationship and the general handling of the tool that then results in own experiments with it. 
While primatologists consider a behavior a cultural marker if it is habitual and handed down 
through generations in at least some populations of a species, but its lacking in others is not 
due to genetical or ecological factors (e.g., Whiten et al. 1999; Matsuzawa et al. 2001: 557), 
psychologists attach great importance to the mode of transmission of handed-down behavior 
(Boesch & Tomasello 1998). In this context, Tomasello (2002; see chapter 9) distinguishes 
individual modes of learning within the social context from social modes of learning. 
Individual modes of learning within the social context entail a learning process geared to the 
environment or surrounding events without the comprehension of other individuals as 
intentional agents. These modes of learning repeatedly create knowledge anew and 
individually; the knowledge of several individuals is not accumulated. By contrast, social 
modes of learning (imitation and teaching), which are based on the perception of others as 
acting intentionally, the knowledge of other individuals can be accessed and expanded upon, 
leading to an accumulation of knowledge. According to Tomasello (1990: 289; 2002), this 
cultural learning, as opposed to individual learning, only occurs in humans. Recently, 
however, various experiments have yielded evidence that chimpanzees imitate as well as 
emulate, and are able to switch between both learning strategies according to situations 
(Horner & Whiten 2005; Nielsen et al. 2005; Whiten 2005). Considering the duration of the 
learning processes to acquire various tool behaviors in young animals (see above), a 
combination of different learning mechanisms that are equally dependent on the individual 
learning history has to be assumed. 
Primates as Basis for Understanding Human Cognition
Primate studies are centered on very variable modes of behavior, observed primarily in the 
great apes, that are geared towards specific situations and, thus, defined as intelligent. 
Implicitly, they are used to derive a picture of a common ancestor with humans, whose 
flexibility and adaptiveness equally expresses itself in tool use, limited capacity for culture, 
basic communication capability, pronounced ability to learn, and complex social behavior. 
The results of primatological research complement archaeological findings concerning the 
cognitive accomplishments of early humans. Field studies on the great apes in particular are 
crucial, despite their limitations mentioned above, since they allow insight into the possible 
diversity of behavior that does not leave traces in the material record. Even our knowledge 
about tool behavior has been expanded with help of primate data, recording potential tools 
made of organic material, which are not preserved archaeologically, and various possible 
uses that cannot be derived from the artefacts themselves. The discussion of capacity for 
culture in the great apes and of the modes of non-genetical transmission of innovative 
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behavior greatly expands the mainly technologically oriented archaeological research in tool 
and culture development. 
Thomas Wynn (1990) criticizes the fact that the primatological approach to the 
understanding of the development of human thinking is largely restricted to the description 
of behaviors and their adaptive context, discounting their evolutionary implications. Using 
tool use as an example, Wynn illustrates that zoological and primatological publications 
often only anecdotically describe unexpected observations without interpretations or theory. 
Systematic studies on different aspects of a behavior, like nut-cracking among west African 
chimpanzees (Boesch & Boesch 1983) or group differences in termite fishing between the 
two chimpanzee groups in the Mahale Mountains (Uehara 1982), are less frequent. In spite 
of the distinct increase of systematic analyses of primate behavior in the wild since 1990, 
the lack of their incorporation into the dicussion of the evolution of human characteristics is 
still very much in evidence, although exceptions (e.g., Parker & Gibson 1979; McGrew 
1992; Tomasello 2002) certainly exist. Primate studies provide insight into the behavior of 
our closest living relatives; explicit and comprehensive theories about the cognitive context 
and background to behaviors and their development are typically not their focus of research. 
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4 Cognition: A Matter of Definition 
The previous chapter introduced primates as the cognitive approximation to humans. Tool 
use and production, capacity for culture, communication capabilities and learning processes 
are  manifestations of primate cognition. But what is “cognition?” The term can be loosely 
translated as “knowledge” or “perception;” cognitive action is a behavior routed in 
perception. For a long time, only philosophical epistemology dealt with human cognitive 
abilities, trying to define “knowledge” as opposed to “beliefs” and “truths,” and posing the 
question whether and how secure knowledge can be acquired. The beginnings of cognitive 
science, which Francisco Varela describes as the “scientific analysis of perception and 
knowledge in all their dimensions and workings,” are found in the first half of the twentieth 
century. Predominantly implemented in artificial intelligence and information processing, 
cognitive science expanded the focus of cognition from humans to other organisms and to 
anatomical, neurobiological and neuropsychological studies on the biological basis of 
thinking processes and the structure of the mind, as derived from behavioral studies. 
Basic cognitive models compare intelligence to computing processes and equate thinking 
with information processing. The brain is considered the hardware, with a central processing 
unit and various data storage facilities, making it a knowledge creating device that has 
evolved in adaptation to the given environment of a species. Analogously within the 
metaphor, the structure of the mind as the largely innate organization of thinking processes 
is compared to the software. While the software's functioning is attuned to the physical 
level, its structure is independent from it. Functional models of cognition therefore deal 
primarily with the architecture of the mind, while its neurobiological basis is considered 
separately (Cela-Conde & Marty 1997: 328) 
The origin of these so-called cognitivistic models (see Varela 1990: 37–53) is found, on the 
one hand, in the phylogenetical considerations on the evolution of human cognition as put 
forward by Konrad Lorenz and subsequent evolutionary cognition theorists. On the other 
hand, these ideas stem from research into artificial intelligence and cognitive psychology. 
Owing to their relatively simple implementation in mechanical systems – from which they 
are partially derived – cognitivistic models are very popular in cognitive sciences. 
Information units classified as “symbols,” physical representations of the facts to be 
processed, are processed according to rules that are comparable to a syntax and obtain their 
meaning through this grammatical structure. Varela (1990: 44) subsumes this prevalent 
direction of research under the cognitivistic paradigm, “the brain processes data from the 
outside world.” However, these approaches to the understanding of (human) thinking 
present serious problems. Since neither symbols representing single aspects of the 
environment nor adult structures of  thinking processes are directly available at the time of 
birth, the question is just how a cognitive system is able to build complex memory patterns 
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from its basic structure and contacts with the environment. For example, how does the 
undifferenciated cognition of a child obtain adult expert knowledge? On an even more 
fundamental level, the notion of symbols as representative information units has to be 
challenged, since neither physical units as raw materials for information processing in the 
brain nor syntactic rules can be detected. 
For that reason, connectionistic or emergence models (see Varela 1990: 54–87; Cela-Conde 
& Marty 1997: 328) offer general awareness models of an analogous structure of brain, 
mind, and computerized information processing. Furthermore, they define cognitive 
capabilities as developmental processes: Humans are not born with full-blown cognitive 
capabilities, but have to activate and expand their genetic potential in the course of their 
individual development. A cognitive organism not only incorporates the present reality into 
its established cognitive apparatus, imaging it therein, but also organizes itself through 
interaction with the environment. Thus, a mass of unspecific neurons are transformed into 
structures of neural networks by connections that change according to their frequency of 
activation. In these models, cognition is not predetermined by the components of the 
cognitive apparatus, but rather emerges from the system properties that are superordinate to 
the individual unspecific elements, i.e., the connections. In connectionistic systems, it is not 
the symbols that function as information carriers, but the complex sub-symbolic activity 
patterns which form the network. The processing of symbols, for example in language, 
seems to be but one – highly limited and specialized – form of cognition. The emergence of 
neural networks and, thus, the cognitive capability mainly depends on the prevailing 
environment and the problems faced during the development of an individual. 
However, connectionistic models also oversimplify the process of cognitive development in 
assuming that individual environment and problems are externally imposed benchmarks. 
Maybe the greatest cognitive achievement of living creatures is the detection of problems 
within a vast environmental framework. “These problems are not given, but enacted, 
brought forth by a background” (Varela 1990: 90). Thus, cognition not only effects the 
solution of any given problem, but serves to outline the problem in the first place, separating 
it from its obscuring context. Only if the external environment could be equated – however 
minimally – with the distinct world of an individual could this environment be represented 
or imaged in the cognitive process of this world. Yet, the world of an individual is not 
purely objective or independent from the experiencing subject. The brain does not process 
objective informations gathered by perception, but actively construes them (Cela-Conde & 
Marty 1997: 335). Already the perception of, for example, a pedestrian on the sidewalk has 
to be considered the active formulation of a hypothesis about the informational unit 
“pedestrian,” and not as the mere mirroring of the surrounding reality, where the pedestrian 
would be lost in the white noise of all simultaneous visual information. While a cognitive 
organism relates to its environments, it generates its own inner world by combining single 
parts of this environment with its own memories, experiences, and evaluations. Therefore, 
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cognitive characteristics can never be perfectly attuned to any given environment; they 
remain the result of historical sequences of viable actions that generate regularities (Varela 
1990: 116). Consequently, scientific cognitve models of “bringing forth a world” (Varela 
1990: 88–121) consider cognition to be the capability to construe sense and meaning, and 
where informational units are not composed by any given order, but by individual 
regularities. 
The different approaches to cognitive capabilities within cognitive science trace the three 
dimensions of the evolution of human cognition. The first dimension is phylogenetic; it 
corresponds to the evolution of the anatomical structure of the brain, its cerebral functions 
on the cellular level, and the organization of the mind. Although the acquisition of 
individual cognitive abilities is explained by emergence models, the structural physical and 
psychological foundations of the evolution of this cognitive apparatus remain a phylogenetic 
problem. The following chapter will present approaches to the evolution of the human brain 
from the fields of evolutionary epistemology, neuroanatomy, and genetics, as well as 
models for the organization of thinking processes. The second dimension in the evolution of 
human cognition is ontogenetic; it is predominantly studied in cognitive psychology. Its 
basic and still most popular approach is the – much criticized – stage model by Jean Piaget 
(see chapter 8), which already entails the beginnings of another dimension. This third and so 
far largely neglected dimension is historical-cultural. Human cognitive reference points are 
not generated over and over again on a completely individual level. Rather, the construction 
of the world is dependent on a cultural basis that has been influenced by the history of the 
society, the group, and the different subgroups to which a certain individual belongs. 
Approaches to the evolution of the cultural construction of the world are found in 
developmental psychology and in the philosophy succeeding Heidegger. 
The particular mode of the evolution of human worlds also has its foundations in biology, 
and thus unites all three dimensions to form a single space. Humans as cognitive beings do 
not evolve in a single dimension, but simultaneously as biological species, as individual, and 
as part of a culture shaped by historical processes. All three dimensions are necessary to 
understand human cognition, none of them suffices alone. Only the combined study of those 
three evolutionary strands will enable us to comprehend the particular process of how 
humans learned to extend their capacity to act through cognition. 
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II The Evolution of Human Thinking 
5 The Evolution of Human Thinking as Phylogenetic 
Problem: Epistemological Background 
The first attempts to approach the cognitive capacity of humans as an evolutionary question 
from a philosophical perspective date back to the nineteenth century. Evolutionary concepts 
were already being discussed in several fields of study, when in 1853 Auguste Comte developed 
his history of human cognition in three societal stages. In his opinion, theological, fictitious 
knowledge, which had dominated antiquity through the Middle Ages, gave way to first 
cognitive steps in a metaphysically abstract and anarchical stage of transition. From early 
modern times on, this transitional stage exhibited attempts to incorporate scientific insights into 
the existing theological systems. The most progressive and modern stage was reached with the 
emergence of positivism and academic thought and was grounded exclusively in empirically 
proven facts. In true evolutionistic manner, Comte viewed his evolutionary sequence of 
cognitive capacity as the further development of the hierarchies prevalent in the animal 
kingdom, with a tendency towards evermore complex and perfected characteristics. 
As early as 1891, the palaeontologist H. Potonié (1913) concluded that Darwin's theory of 
evolution could not only be applied figuratively to the development of the mind but also had to 
be adaptable to the physical bases of mental processes. Likewise, the anatomist and prehistorian 
Max Verworn (1915) regarded the complete history of human culture and ideas as a 
phylogenetical problem that could be solved through the study of its neuronal foundations and 
prehistoric research. He interpreted human thinking as becoming progressively distant from 
actual sensory input. Verworn postulated an era of the sensory-impressionistic mind, where the 
mental development of humans equated that of the higher animal species and object use, but not 
tool production, was possible. This was followed by an era of the  naive-practical mind, which 
comprised tool production and culminated in “naive aesthetical actions” that included concepts 
of form, tool types, and artistic expressions relating to nature (ibid. 39–40). Towards the end of 
the Palaeolithic, he assumed the transition to an era of the theorizing mind, which is 
characterized by the mental confrontation with the self and its environment: life, death, body, 
mind, past, future, invisible powers, and the origins of animals, plants, heaven, earth, the sun 
and the stars. This era was subdivided into a first, dogmatic-speculative, phase, which itself was 
divided into a stage of mythical-religious conjecture that extended until the Iron Age and a stage 
of scholastic-rational conjecture that started with the ancient philosophers. It is only with 
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Renaissance that the second phase of the theorizing mind begins – a phase of critical-
experimental thinking, where conjectures and theories have to be validated rationally through 
experiences and scientific experiments (ibid. 41-44). 
During the first half of the twentieth century the question of the evolution of human cognition 
was expanded to include the biological phylogenetic history of mankind on the basis of 
ethological and biological studies. In the spirit of Auguste Comte, the question was referred to 
philosophy under the assumption that empirical and scientific answers could be found. The 
ethologist Konrad Lorenz (1941) was the first to take up the challenge of answering 
philosophical questions by biological means, in his paper on “Kant’s Doctrine of the A Priori in 
the Light of Contemporary Biology.” There and even more explicitly in his later work “Behind 
the Mirror: A Search for a Natural History of Human Knowledge” (1973), Lorenz combined 
cognitivistic models of cognition (see chapter 4) with evolutionary ideas, ontogenetic elements 
and cultural aspects, and from that combination developed a theory of the biological and 
phylogenetical basis of human cognition. 
Konrad Lorenz: Essay of a Natural History of Human Cognition 
Like all organic systems, humans gather information and adjust to their environment; life and 
evolution are therefore, after Lorenz (1973), cognitive processes by themselves. Information 
about the external environment is imprinted into a living system: each adaptation constitutes a 
gain of knowledge. With each intake of information the cognitive apparatus changes in order to 
increase the chances of further gains of energy or knowledge in the genome, as well as in 
individual cognition, and to align the direction of development with the environment. The gain 
of new information expands the action radius of a system. On the one hand, the gathering of 
information can happen on a short-term basis and without storage in simple closed systems, 
which do not allow for further adaptation but only for the functioning of already adapted 
structures. Instinctive actions – species-specific fixed action patterns that are executed without 
the involvement of receptors after being initiated by key stimuli – as well as appetitive behavior, 
the search for stimuli that trigger instinctive actions, are based exclusively on phylogenetically 
acquired information and thus form an individually unchangeable framework of behavior. Open 
systems, on the other hand, allow for the execution of the most appropriate of several behavioral 
options because of individual, externally induced modifications. They are the foundation of 
practice, habituation and imprinting, an irreversible fixation to a stimulus situation. Besides an 
open program, learning through success or failure requires a memory of the program's process 
and a relationship between the process and success by means of receptor feedback, but the 
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process itself does not necessarily have to be a rational one. For example, the trigger for 
building nests in jackdaws is innate, as is the typical action for securing structural elements of 
the nest, the so-called tremble shoving. When using specific suitable materials, the tremble 
shoving ends orgastically; thus, the jackdaws learn which materials return enforced feedback 
(ibid.: 128). 
Curiosity behavior constitutes, after Lorenz (ibid.: 195–203), a further expansion of adaptive 
capabilities. Since curiosity behavior can activate all inherited behavioral patterns and permits 
their testing against an object, for example in play, the characteristics of different objects in the 
environment can be learned. Thus, for curious creatures the environment is not formed by innate 
trigger mechanisms but can be actively explored, since the phylogenetically inherent programs 
are exceptionally open. In these situations, appetitive behavior is generalized: it is the learning 
situation itself that provides motivation, instead of the search for a specific situation that will 
trigger the stimulus. Lorenz considers self-exploration a special form of curiosity behavior. The 
simultaneous perception of an action through hands and eyes and the exploration of a similar 
body during play transform the own body into an object that is comparable with other objects. 
Thus, a new option of objectification and reference to the environment is created: grasp turns 
into comprehension. While Lorenz considers the effects of self-exploration and the development 
of a subject in contrast to surrounding objects exclusively among humans, present knowledge 
suggests that these results are also applicable to the great apes, and maybe to other species as 
well (see the experiments by Gallup 1975). 
Besides language, the accumulation of supra-individual knowledge, the assessment of the 
probable outcome of individual actions, and responsible morals, Konrad Lorenz considers 
abstract thinking to be the epitome of hominization. The roots of abstract thinking are found in 
various cognitive partial functions (Lorenz 1973: 157–215) that are not all exclusively human. 
One of those fundamental aspects is the abstracting perception of an object in different 
situations, or conception of categories, which enables initial and repeated recognition of 
patterns. These patterns allow the transfer of experiences to other situations. Additionally, 
rational actions and imagined simulations of actions define human thinking. Furthermore, 
humans are capable of random movements that can be activated at will, where new, as yet 
unlearned motion sequences can be assembled from small motor units. Feedback from random 
movements and curiosity behavior are the foundations of knowledge gain through active 
exploration of the environment in humans, and the transmission of knowledge among 
individuals of our species is very pronounced. While the great apes, for example, acquire an 
understanding of a situation by observing others and subsequently try to solve the problem 
themselves (emulation), only humans and some birds are capable of reconstructing motion 
sequences as exactly as possible for the sake of reconstruction alone, i.e. to imitate them. 
5 The Evolution of Human Thinking as Phylogenetic Problem: Epistemological Background 44
Random movements, as well as the monitoring of external and self-perception, are 
preconditions of imitation. Although knowledge traditions have been observed in animals, 
Lorenz considers them to remain exclusively object-oriented as opposed to human traditions. 
The lack of an object of tradition, such as cats as feared predators among jackdaw populations, 
during only one generation can already easily break the chain of tradition. Only abstract 
thinking in combination with spoken language renders traditions object-independent, according 
to Lorenz. 
Cumulative, object-independent traditions lead to the transmission of acquired characteristics, 
both vertically, bridging generation gaps in both directions, and horizontally, extending to non-
related members of the same species: the supra-individual storage of knowledge is not anymore 
restricted to the genome, but increasingly occurs as culture in the mind of humans (ibid.: 228–
30). According to Lorenz, cultural evolution progresses through transitions, similar to the 
evolution of species, but different in that inventions and parallel developments occur frequently, 
whole complexes of characteristics are transferable to other cultures, and cultures can easily 
merge again. The foundations of a culture's development capability lie in the equilibrium 
between invariance and adaptability. The accumulation and inheritance of knowledge require 
adherence, further development requires gradual reduction of knowledge (ibid. 255–61). 
Habituation, imitation, and the development of rites and symbols lead to the restriction of 
variability and thus to control. Through their own creation of a surrounding world of objects, 
humans limit their experience of a human-independent, extra-subjective reality (ibid. 285). This 
restricting tradition is balanced by curiosity, which is a typical human trait and persists into 
adulthood. 
To explain the particularity of the human mind, Lorenz introduces the term “fulguration” to 
denote emergence in evolution (ibid. 48–55). He defines fulguration as the fusion of previously 
independent subsystems into a new integral system that displays some completely new 
properties which cannot be ascribed to the functioning of the subsystems. With this device of 
evolutionary theory, Lorenz posits the evolution of humans from animal ancestors, including the 
appearance of new, exclusively human properties, especially in cognition (ibid. 64, 223). As an 
example, he refers to the linguistic symbolism of true “word languages,” which, in his opinion, 
evolved from the fulguration of the vague symbols of cultural ritualization and conceptual 
thinking (ibid. 302). 
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Evolutionary Epistemology – The End of Philosophical 
Epistemology? 
Evolutionary epistemology, which equates thinking and cognition with biological functions of 
the brain, constitutes the strictly biological continuation of Konrad Lorenz's biological-
philosophical approaches to the evolution of human cognitive abilities (see Irrgang 2001). 
According to this concept, the description of the physical structures of cognitive faculties can 
explain the evolution of cognition. This cognitivistic approach is best explained by contrasting 
some general assumptions of philosophical epistemology and evolutionary epistemology (Table 
1). 
Their main difference lies in their respective definitions of knowledge (ibid. 36). While 
evolutionary epistemology generally equates knowledge with the objective gain of information, 
or “intelligence,” and looks for the evolution of cognitive capabilities, philosophical 
epistemology perceives knowledge as the rationalized understanding of an object through a 
subject; it investigates the process of how an individual attains factual knowledge through 
perception and how this knowledge is validated. In contrast, evolutionary epistemology 
reconstructs the development of information acquisition and processing without referring to a 
perceiving subject, thus taking an exclusively observational approach. 
Evolutionary Epistemology  Classical Epistemology  
Knowledge = Gain of Information Knowledge = Substainable Comprehension
Evolution Application
Competence  Execution
Subject-free cognition  No cognition without subject
Observer perspective Participant perspective
Objective: Reconstruction Objective: Argumentative Justification
Scientific-empirical approach  
C
O
G
N
IT
IO
N
 
Metaphysical approach 
Table 1  Comparison of approaches to “knowledge” and cognition. 
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Since evolutionary epistemology is not based on a unified model of biological evolution, 
multiple evolutionary approaches are applied (ibid. 50–79). Different processes, such as 
mutation, selection, random genetic drift, and the self-organization (autopoiesis) of organisms 
have been recognized as evolutionary factors, the attributed importance of which is contingent 
upon the theoretical approach under consideration. Generally, adaptation – the adjustment of an 
organism to its environment or ecological niche – is considered to set the pattern for evolution, 
but its exact nature is still under debate. If it were an optimization of adjustment caused by 
selection, better adapted organisms would benefit in terms of survival and reproduction. 
According to the concept of autopoiesis, the important factor is the preservation of the 
adaptation: if adaptation is homeostasis, i.e., an adjustment of equilibrium, adapted organisms 
survive – there are no better adapted organisms. When adaptation is viewed as the open co-
evolution of organism and environment, the inherent dynamics of evolution prevent complete 
adaptation. Selection can take different forms: internal, external, stabilizing, directional, 
disruptive, hard, and soft; its scope, whether on a genetic, cellular, or individual level, or within 
populations or species, remains unclear. 
The example of evolutionary epistemology, which set out to solve philosophical questions of 
cognition by purely biological-evolutionary means and has failed doing so (cf. Löw 1983; 
Irrgang 2001), illustrates the limitations of cognitivistic models. Although evolutionary 
epistemology expands our knowledge of the evolution of human cognition during phylogeny 
and the cognitive capabilities of non-human beings, it has to be complemented by other 
approaches, such as Jean Piaget's connectionistic studies. These place more emphasis on the 
construction of world views as cognitive actions, as opposed to viewing cognition as a portrayal 
of reality enhanced by evolutionary processes. Following Irrgang (2001: 38), evolutionary 
epistemology should be further developed into an evolutionary cultural anthropology dealing 
with the specifically human form of intelligence as interaction with nature and culture, thus 
closing the gap between the ontogenetic evolution of cognitive capabilities and the individual 
development of cognitve capabilities during ontogenesis. A prerequisite for this development is 
the reconstruction of the evolution of the cognitive apparatus, which in its last stage – 
hominization – has until now remained largely speculative, as well as a more detailed 
differentiation between pongid and human cognitive apparatus than evolutionary epistemology 
has employed so far. 
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6 The Evolution of Human Thinking as Phylogenetic 
Problem: Anatomical, Neuropsychological and Genetic 
Basics 
The course of human evolution (fig. 2) led to numerous physical changes. The earliest evidence 
indicating upright walking in the hominid family comes from the 6-million-year-old fossil finds 
of Orrorin tugenensis (Senut et al. 2001) and Sahelanthropus tchadensis (Brunet et al. 2002; 
Zollikofer et al. 2005). Around 4 million years ago, early australopithecines already displayed 
distinct skeletal adaptations to bipedal locomotion. However, up to and including Homo habilis, 
hominid individuals were small in stature, with long muscular arms, robust and curved 
phalanges, a pelvis with big iliac wings and small acetabula, short femora, and long, curved 
tarsal phalanges (McHenry and Coffing 2000). This group of early hominids, which walked 
upright but still displayed numerous adaptations for climbing trees, also displays a marked 
sexual dimorphism in body height. 
From 1.8–1.6 million years before present on, Homo ergaster, the early African form of Homo 
erectus, shows a reduced sexual dimorphism, while at the same time clearly increasing in 
physical height. The bodily proportions correspond to those of modern humans, with long and 
robust legs and shorter arms. The chest is barrel-shaped, the pelvis, with its smaller iliac wings 
and larger acetabular diameter, resembles modern ones, and the phalanges of hands and feet 
have straightened. From these data, Henry McHenry and Katherine Coffing (2000) posit that a 
number of far-reaching physical changes took place  between 2.5 and 1.8 million years before 
present. The fossil remains of Homo rudolfensis may turn out to be the connecting link between 
australopithecine (including Homo habilis) and human physique; however, so far only few 
postcranial skeletal remains of this species have been found. 
Increase in Brain Size 
Apart from changes in the musculo-skeletal system, it is mainly the increase in brain size that 
characterizes human physical evolution. It is evidenced by the measured or estimated internal 
cranial capacity of a few relatively well preserved individuals (fig. 3 and Table 2). 
The earliest hominids for which measurements could be taken from reconstructed skulls date to 
3.2–2.5 million years before present (MA). According to McHenry and Coffing (2000), as well 
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as Tobias (1995), the cranial capacity of these australopithecines averages at 450 cm3 or below, 
which is barely higher than the average modern chimpanzee brain size. There is no discernible 
trend in evolution between Australopithecus afarensis, Australopithecus africanus, the late, 
gracile Australopithecus garhi, and the early, robust Australopithecus aethiopicus. However, 
beginning with 2 million years before present, the absolute brain capacity begins to increase. 
According to McHenry and Coffing, the robust forms Australopithecus boisei and 
Australopithecus robustus also resemble each other in relation to their slightly increased brain 
volume, while Tobias (1995) only notes a minimal increase in Australopithecus boisei. 
Additionally, Falk et al. (2000) base their similar assessment of no significant acceleration in 
brain development in this group on new brain volume estimates of several individuals from all 
three robust australopithecine (resp. paranthropine) species. Although the brain volume of all 
Homo habilis individuals that could be estimated is higher than that of the australopithecines, its 
601 cm3 are still considerably lower than the 763 cm3 of the approximately contemporary Homo 
rudolfensis individual KNM-ER 1470 (ibid.). 
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Fig. 3 Increase of mean cranial capacity in cm
3
 (after Ruff et al. 1997; McHenry and Coffing 
2000; Falk et al. 2005). 
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Species Individual Cranial capacity (cm³) Ref. 
Pan troglodytes ∅ ca. 400 1 
∅, n = ? 438 1 
Australopithecus  afarensis 
∅, n = 3 413,5 2 
∅, n = ? 452 1 
∅, n = 6 440,3 2 A.  africanus 
∅, n = 7 451 4 
A.  garhi BOU-VP-12/130 450 1 
A.  aethiopicus KNM-WT 17000 407 1 
∅, n = ? 521 1 
∅, n = 7 463,3 2 A.  boisei 
∅, n = 6 452 4 
530 1 
A.  robustus SK 1585 
476 4 
Homo  habilis ∅, n = ? 612 1 
H.  rudolfensis KNM-ER 1470 752 bzw. 736 1, 6 
H.  ergaster ∅, n = ? 871 1 
Lower Pleistocene Homo 1,8-1,2 MA ∅, n = 5 914 ± 45 3 
Lower to early Middle Pleistocene
Homo 1,15-0,6 MA
∅, n = 7 856 ± 52 3 
Middle Middle Pleistocene Homo 
0,55-0,4 MA
∅, n = 12 1090 ± 38 3 
Final Middle Pleistocene Homo 0,3-
0,2 MA
∅, n = 17 1186 ± 32 3 
Upper Pleistocene Homo 0,15-0,1 MA ∅, n = 8 1354 ± 41 3 
Qafzeh / Skhul ∅, n = 6 1501 ± 45 3 
Late Neanderthals 75-36 kA ∅, n = 14 1498 ± 45 3 
Early Upper Paleolithics ∅, n = 15 1517 ± 30 3 
H.  floresiensis LB 1 380 bzw.417 5, 6 
Late Upper Paleolithics 21-10 kA ∅, n =  1466 ± 35 3 
H.  sapiens ∅ 1349 3 
Table 2. Brain volume of different hominids. Cited after (1) McHenry and Coffing 2000, (2) 
Tobias 1995, (3) Ruff et al. 1997, (4) Falk et al. 2000, (5) Brown et al. 2004, (6) Falk et al. 2005. 
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While both McHenry and Coffing (2000) and Ruff et al. (1997) note a distinct increase in brain 
volume for Homo ergaster and other Homo specimens during the Early Pleistocene, between 
1.8 and 1.2 million years before present, the values derived from individuals between 1.15 and 
0.6 million years appear to be stagnant. It is only during the middle of the Middle Pleistocene 
(550,000–400,000 years before present) that the measurable fossils exhibit an increase in 
estimated brain volume. In the early anatomically modern humans from Skhul and Qafzeh, the 
brain volume peaks at 1500 cm3, a volume they share with the late Neandertals and early Late 
Palaeolithic individuals. After the last cold maximum, the late Late Palaeolithic populations 
show a slight but steady decrease in volume – a continuous trend that results in the average 
modern brain volume of 1349 cm3. Ruff et al. (1997: 175) consider it to parallel the decrease in 
mean body weight. This general evolutionary trend is offset by the 2004 discovery and 
description of the species Homo floresiensis. This miniature human species lived on the 
Indonesian island of Flores until maximal 13,000 years ago and possessed an estimated brain 
volume of 380 cm3 (Brown et al. 2004) or 417 cm3 (Falk et al. 2005). 
Direct comparison of the average brain volumes of different species bears numerous risks. The 
small number of fossils sufficiently preserved to allow the measurement of their endocranial 
volume severely limits the comparative assessment of increases in brain size during the course 
of human evolution; in case of incomplete preservation, measurements or estimates can differ 
considerably (cf. D’Amore et al. 2001: Table 1). On the small basis of chance discoveries, the 
actual range of variation and the average values of one species cannot be determined. In case of 
changing species assignations of individual fossils (e.g. from Homo habilis to Homo 
rudolfensis) the classification with one group or the other will distinctly change the respective 
range of variation and average values. Coincidentally, varying proportions of the male to female 
ratio in classifiable fossils will additionally raise or lower the average brain volume, especially 
in species with a marked sexual dimorphism. Finally, the mean absolute cranial capacity of a 
species is highly dependent on its average body weight. This last problem can theoretically be 
counterbalanced by the calculation of the encephalization quotient. 
Encephalization Quotient 
There exist different established ratios of cranial volume or brain weight to body weight for 
different taxa of contemporary species. Generally, the ratio of brain weight (E in mg) – as a 
variable dependent on cranial volume – to body weight (P in g) can be expressed by the 
allometric regression formula E = k × Pa or logE = logk + a × logP, where the exponent a and 
the coefficient k vary for different taxa. From the respective approximate equations for certain 
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taxonomic categories, expected values of average brain weight or cranial capacity for a species 
can be derived with the help of this species’ mean body weight. Thus, in order to be able to 
compare cranial capacities independently from body weight, the expected cranial value 
(endocranial volume, brain volume or brain weight, Eexp) according  to body weight needs to be 
put in relation to the actually observed value (Eobs). This is exactly what is expressed by the 
encephalization quotient (EQ): EQ = Eobs × Eexp. 
From the regression formula established for placental mammals, Eexp = 58.99 × P
0.76 (Martin 
1981: 57, formula 6, E in mg, P in g), McHenry and Coffing (2000: 127) developed the formula 
for the encephalization quotient EQ = Eobs × (11.22 × P
0.76), with E in g and P in kg. The 
calculation of the EQ for different fossil hominid species is based on the estimated average body 
weight (Pexp) and the brain weight (Eobs) established through measured or estimated cranial 
volumes. 
In contrast to the absolute values of brain volume, McHenry and Coffing (2000) observe a 
relative increase in brain weight already at the beginning of human evolution; according to their 
calculations, Australopithecus afarensis already exhibits a distinctly increased value of 2.5 
compared to modern chimpanzees (EQ = 2.0), which were used as an approximate equivalent of 
a common ancestor. The authors also note a continuous increase from Australopithecus 
africanus and Australopithecus boisei through Australopithecus robustus. Within the early 
Homo species with Homo rudolfensis (EQ = 3.1) and Homo ergaster (EQ = 3.3), Homo habilis
stands out with a comparatively high value of 3.6. McHenry and Coffing (ibid. 137) attribute 
this fact to the marked gracility of Homo habilis, compared to the two other, heavier forms, 
although the use of the encephalization quotient should have eliminated this bias. Just as with 
the absolute values, there are hardly any changes in the EQ to be perceived for the period 1.8 to 
ca. 0.6 millions years before present. It is only during the Middle Pleistocene that a further 
increase can be detected, again parallel to the increase in absolute cranial capacity, leading to an 
EQ of 4.8 among the late Neandertals. Finally, the EQ value culminates in the early 
anatomically modern humans of Skhul and Qafzeh as well as early Late Palaeolithic Homo 
sapiens sapiens specimens, with an almost present-day value of 5.3. 
However, the seemingly more precise values of the encephalization quotient – as dependent on 
body weight – also contain possible sources for errors. Apart from the basic problems 
associated with the development of regression equations, which are listed in Deacon (1990: 
201–9), the application of different equations leads to varying EQ results (see Table 3). 
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Species  Sex Body 
weight
P (kg) 1
∅ Brain 
weight E 
(g)2
Brain 
weight 
E (g)3
EQ after 
McHenry 
& Coffing4 
EQ after  
McHenry  
& Coffing5 
(EQ) after 
Martin 
(13)6 
IP after 
Bauchot & 
Stephan7 
CC after 
Hemmer8 
Pan troglodytes ∅ 45 395  2,0  1,6 10,8 33,6 
A. afarensis ∅ 37 434  2,5  2,1 13,4 38,6 
min f 29 342 2,4 2,0 12,3 32,8 
max m 45 540 2,7 2,2 14,8 45,9 
A. africanus ∅ 36 448  2,7  2,2 14,1 40,1 
min f 30 424 2,8 2,4 15,0 39,6 
max m 41 508 2,7 2,3 14,7 44,1 
A. boisei ∅ 42 514  2,7  2,3 14,7 44,4 
min F 34 494 3,0 2,5 16,1 44,8 
max m 49 537 2,5 2,1 13,9 44,8 
A. robustus ∅ 36 523  3,0  2,6 16,4 46,8 
min F 32 523 3,3 2,8 17,7 48,1 
max m 40 523 2,8 2,4 15,4 45,7 
H. habilis ∅ 35 601  3,6  3,0 19,2 54,2 
min F 32 503 3,2 2,7 17,0 46,3 
max m 37 661 3,8 3,2 20,4 58,8 
H. rudolfensis ∅ 56 736  3,1  2,6 17,5 59,5 
min F 51 736 3,3 2,8 18,6 60,8 
max m 60 736 2,9 2,5 16,8 58,6 
H. ergaster ∅ 61 849  3,3  2,8 19,1 67,3 
min F 51 712 3,0 2,5 18,0 57,6 
max m 66 1035 3,8 3,3 22,2 80,6 
1,8-1,2 Myr BP ∅ 62 890  3,5  2,9 19,9 70,3 
1,15-0,6 Myr BP ∅ 58 835  3,4  2,9 19,4 67,0 
0,55-0,4 Myr BP ∅ 68 1057  3,8  3,3 22,3 81,8 
0,3-0,2 Myr BP ∅ 66 1148  4,3  3,6 24,7 89,4 
0,15-0,1 Myr BP ∅ 68 1307  4,7  4,0 27,6 101,1 
Skuhl - Qafzeh ∅ 67 1444  5,3  4,5 30,8 112,1 
class. Neanderta. ∅ 76 1442  4,8  4,1 28,3 108,7 
early Upper Pal. ∅ 67 1460  5,3  4,6 31,2 113,3 
H. floresiensis          
min F ? 36 375 2,2 1,8 11,8 33,6 
max f ?  16 410 4,4 3,6 21,5 44,2 
late Upper Pal. ∅ 63 1412  5,4  4,6 31,2 111,2 
H. sapiens 
(Mc&C 2000) 
∅ 54 1350  5,8  4,9 32,9 110,1 
H. sapiens (Ruff 
et al. 1998) 
∅ 58 1302  5,3  4,5 30,2 104,5 
Table 3 Brain weight indices for different hominid species.  
(1–4) after McHenry and Coffing 2000: 127 and 137, and Ruff et al. 1998. Homo floresiensis after 
Brown et al. 2004 and Falk et al. 2005. 
(5) computed after McHenry and Coffing 2000: 127; EQ = E × (11.22 × P
0.76
), E in g, P in kg. Based 
on Martin 1981: formula 6 (allometric regression equation brain/body weight for general mammals): 
EQ = E × (58.99 × P
0.76
), E in mg, P in g. 
(6) EQ computed according to McHenry and Coffing 2000: 127 from Martin 1981: formula 13 
(allometric regression equation brain/body weight for mammals with long gestation period and high 
birth weight): EQ = E × (107.15 × P
0.72
), E in mg, P in g. 
(7) IP computed after Bauchot and Stephan 1966; 1969; cited in Stephan 1972: 158 (based on 
regression equation brain/body weight for insectivores): IP = EQ = E × (42.855 × P
0.63
), E in mg, P in 
g. 
(8) CC (cephalization constant) computed after Hemmer 1971, cited in Leutenegger 1973 (based on 
regression equation brain/body weight for primates): CC = E × P
0.23
, E and P in g. 
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Fig. 4 Comparison of different encephalization quotients for hominid groups (in relation to Pan 
troglodytes = 100), based on values and formulas from Table 3. The placement of species 
along the x-axis generally follows the established chronology by first appearance. The 
calculations for Homo floresiensis were placed next to their closest corresponding values in 
order to illustrate the enormous differences of the results and their ensuing interpretation. Thus, 
the minimal values (with an estimated maximal body weight of 36 kg) are still lower than those 
of Australopithcus afarensis, while the maximal values (with a minimal body weight of 16 kg) 
range with those computed for typical Late Pleistocene specimens. 
Figure 4 illustrates the observed brain weight and computed EQ values after equations by 
different authors in relation to the value of Pan troglodytes = 100. While McHenry and Coffing 
(2000) employ an equation generally valid for placental mammals (Martin 1981: 58, formula 
[6]), the use of an equation for mammals with long gestation period and high birth weight 
(Martin 1981: 58, formula [13]) yields slightly elevated values. If an equation developed for 
insectivores is used, as suggested by Bauchot and Stephan (1966; 1969; cited in Leutenegger 
1973), the relative progression of the encephalization quotient resembles the one charted for 
formula (13) in Martin (1981). A marked difference is visible in the results derived from a 
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formula by Hemmer (1971, cited in Leutenegger 1973), which was specifically developed for 
use with primates that are closely related to human ancestors. Overall, the curve shape closely 
resembles the one derived from absolute brain weight values. The values after Hemmer for all 
gracile species up to Homo habilis are somewhat higher than the absolute brain weight, while 
those for the more robust and heavier Homo species are somewhat lower. 
When comparing closely related species, the use of a very generalized equation leads to an 
overestimation of encephalization for species with a low body weight and an underestimation 
for species with a high body weight (Leutenegger 1973: 10; Martin 1981: 59–60). While in the 
more generalized mammal formulas (McHenry and Coffing 2000; Martin 1981: formula [13]) 
the gracile Homo habilis clearly rises above the heavier forms of Homo rudolfensis and Homo 
ergaster in encephalization quotient, the application of the insectivore formula after Bauchot 
and Stephan (1966; 1969) results in almost identical values for Homo habilis  and Homo 
ergaster. If the formula for pongids after Hemmer is used, the degree of encephalization for 
Homo habilis is lower than that of Homo rudolfensis, which in turn is eclipsed by the value for 
Homo ergaster. Thus, the remarkably high EQ value for Homo habilis, as compared to Homo 
ergaster, after McHenry and Coffing (2000: 137) may be the product of the application of an 
equation less suited for hominids. 
The exceptional position of Homo floresiensis as the evolutionary result of an isolated insular 
population is mirrored in its values for absolute brain volume as well as the different computed 
EQs (see Table 3 and fig. 4). If a high body weight of up to 36 kg and the lower brain volume 
estimate of 380 cm3 (Brown et al. 2004) are assumed, all possible equations for the EQ lead to 
the same result: the value is always close to the chimpanzee values and never reaches those of 
Australopithecus afarensis. A lower body weight of 16 kg (ibid.) and the higher brain volume 
estimate of 417 cm3 (Falk et al. 2005), however, yield astonishing results. While the EQ of 
Homo floresiensis after the pongid formula (Hemmer 1971) only resembles that of 
Australopithecus boisei, the application of the more generalized formulae raises the EQ to a 
level corresponding to late Middle Pleistocene Homo individuals. On the one hand, this may be 
the result of overestimated encephalization in a low-weight species owing to the use of more 
generalized equations; on the other hand, though, it may be that the formula for placental 
mammals is more suitable in case of isolated evolution with possibly “special allometric 
constraints” (Falk et al. 2005: 245) than an equation developed exclusively for pongids and their 
relatively uniform evolutionary progression. The morphology of a virtually generated 
endocranial cast of the Homo floresiensis specimen LB1 certainly puts this individual in close 
proximity to classical Homo erectus finds, with several clearly advanced features (Falk et al. 
2005). 
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The comparison of encephalization quotients only permits to chart the evolution of the brain on 
a more generalized level; the evolutionary stage of the brain of a single species cannot be 
deduced directly from the EQ values. The mean body weight does not constitute a fixed 
standard, its development is just as variable as that of the brain weight. Thus, a higher EQ can 
be explained by a concomitant high increase in brain weight and a slow increase in body weight 
(Deacon 1990), while a lower EQ may be the result of a minor increase in brain weight 
concomitant with a higher gain in body weight, as Byrne (1996) has discussed for gorillas. 
According to Maciej Henneberg (in Aiello and Wheeler 1995: 213), the encephalization of the 
species Homo is possibly not the result of a disproportionate increase in brain size, but rather 
owed to the fact that the body weight did not increase proportionally as expected: “It seems that 
this general ‘structural reduction’ of the human body is responsible for our large encephalization 
quotient.” This relative decrease in body weight, coupled with the resulting decrease in 
efficiency, may have been brought about by the externalization of physical functions, as 
witnessed for example in tool use. 
Additionally, when computing the encephalization quotient of fossil species, the expected brain 
volume cannot be established through observed body weight, but has to be extrapolated from 
other features, such as the surface areas of the first mandibular molar, a vertebra section, or the 
femoral diameter; from these measurements the expected body weight is estimated with the help 
of yet another allometric regression equation. In individual cases, the expected body weight can 
differ considerably from the actual body weight, which in the case of male gorillas, for example, 
lies an average 25.6 % above the estimated weight, while at the same time being an average 
26.9 % lower in female gorillas (Smith 1996: 453). Apart from this margin of error in the 
relation between brain size and the features that the estimated body weight is based upon, this 
method of estimating the brain size is also subject to the problem of accumulating confidence 
intervals (ibid. 456). 
The unknown extent of sexual dimorphism in fossil species affects the evaluation of the EQs in 
various ways. The difference between male and female individuals according to their estimated 
body weight can vary considerably from the dimorphism detected in actual body weight, so that, 
for example, an overestimation of female body weight can lead to the underestimation of female 
EQs (Smith 1996: 455). In extreme cases, like the markedly dimorphic orangutans, female 
individuals exhibit an EQ 1.5 times higher on average, based on observed body weight, than the 
males (ibid. 453). Additionally, the sexual dimorphism expressed in the features used to 
estimate body weight, like the surface area of the first mandibular molar, can differ from other 
features, such as body or brain weight, thus further complicating the relation between these 
features and the brain weight (ibid. 460). Finally, the variables applied in the comparison of 
EQs during the course of hominid evolution are not differentiated by sex; rather, average body 
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weight, derived mean brain weight, and a small sample of measured cranial capacities, not 
differentiated by sex, are employed. Since the expected brain weight and, thus, the EQ vary 
according to the body weight used in the calculation, the percentage of male to female 
individuals is crucial, especially in species with a marked sexual dimorphism (cf. Table 3). 
D’Amore et al. (2001) tried to circumvent this problem of uncertain sex determination by 
employing statistical means when dealing with samples, assuming a Gaussian distribution of the 
basic population. However, Ipña and Durand (2001) have conclusively demonstrated that 
sexually dimorphic features constitute basic populations that result from two Gaussian 
distributions and, as such, cannot be treated as a normally distributed basic population. 
Despite the undeniable theoretical advantage of assessing the evolution of brain size in 
hominids with help of the encephalization quotient, which mathematically eliminates the 
influence of body weight, several basic methodological problems can not be ignored; these are 
especially prevalent when EQ comparison is used with fossil material. The problems with the 
raw data, discussed above in relation to absolute brain size, also come into play when 
computing EQs. Considering the similarity of the values for observed brain weight and the 
computed encephalization quotients after the pongid formula by Hemmer in figure 4, it becomes 
clear that brain weight constitutes an approximation of the evolution of hominid brains which is 
not really improved by the use of methodologically problematic EQ calculations. Only in 
exceptional cases, like that of Homo floresiensis, which do not follow the general trend of 
hominid evolution, can an approach with help of an allometric equation, such as that developed 
for placental mammals, possibly yield more informative results. 
Despite these problems, the study of species differences in brain volume and encephalization 
quotient cannot be completely disregarded – especially if the methodological problems are 
taken into consideration. Like other physical features or their derivations, they can indicate 
morphological variability and serve as a statistical basis for species comparison, sexual 
dimorphism, and intra-species variation (Holloway 1972: 191), as showcased in Rightmire’s 
study (2004) on the differentiation between Homo erectus and Homo heidelbergensis. The 
cognitive basis for the interpretation of the encephalization quotient as an indicator of a greater 
or lesser potential for intelligence is still largely missing – although tentative evidence for a 
very cursory correlation exists (Deacon 1990: 195–201). For the time being, however, a close 
correlation between brain size and intelligence still has to be rejected as misleading, as 
Holloway notes (1972: 191). 
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Energy for Brain Growth 
Despite all criticism regarding the base data and their ensuing interpretation, it is an undisputed 
fact that during the course of hominid evolution the size and volume of the brain increased in 
absolute values as well as relative to body size. Since, in resting state, the relative basal rate of 
the brain’s metabolism in relation to its weight is nine times higher than the average rate of all 
other tissues, Leslie Aiello and Peter Wheeler (1995) discuss the various ways in which energy 
for the growth of energy-consuming brain tissue can be gained. Studies on living primates 
showed no correlation between a higher basal metabolic rate and increased encephalization. 
Since there is also no decrease in the basal metabolic rate of other body tissues to be detected, 
Aiello and Wheeler consider the reduction of the relative mass of other organs as the probable 
source of the energy needed. 
Energy-wise, the heart, kidneys, liver, and gastro-intestinal system are equally demanding as the 
brain. A comparison of the weight of different organs between an average human of 65 kg and 
an average primate of the same size shows similar values for heart, kidneys, and liver, but a 40 
% smaller gastro-intestinal tract in humans. Thus, the co-evolution of a smaller gastro-intestinal 
system could compensate the energy needed for increased brain growth. However, smaller 
intestines and simpler stomachs, like those of carnivores, depend on small amounts of easily 
digestible and high-energy food. Aiello and Wheeler conclude that high-quality food constituted 
an indispensable precondition for the disproportionate brain growth during human evolution, 
regardless of the selective advantages of a relatively bigger brain. The authors interpret the 
barrel-shaped torso and narrower pelvis of Homo ergaster – as opposed to the funnel-shaped 
torso and wide pelvis of the australopithecines – as first indicators of a smaller gastro-intestinal 
system; this would chronologically coincide with the first general increase in EQ, 
approximately 2 million years before present. They associate the second significant increase in 
EQ, which took place towards the end of the Middle Pleistocene, with the use of fire by archaic 
Homo sapiens, which may have lead to improved digestion due to heated food. Wrangham et al. 
(1999) consider boiled tubers with a high starch content to be the probable high-energy food 
source that promoted brain growth as early as in early Homo ergaster, 1.8 million years before 
present. 
Maciej Henneberg (in Aiello and Wheeler 1995: 212–13) puts the augmented energy demand 
caused by a bigger brain into perspective. After his calculations, the increase in size from an 
average primate brain to the modern human brain – assuming equal body size – only accounts 
for 10.5 % of the basal metabolic rate in resting state and for 5.8 % during moderate physical 
activity, such as, for example, a 45-minute walk. Slightly longer resting phases would, in his 
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opinion, suffice to compensate for the higher energy demand. Wrangham, Jones, and Leighton 
note (ibid. 216) that the basal metabolic rate does not constitute the minimal energy needed for 
the preservation of all physical functions, just as the organs’ share in the basal metabolic rate 
cannot be equated with their minimal demand. Thus, the increased energy demand of the brain 
could also have been met by a reduced basal metabolic rate of all organs without the need for 
their reduction in size. Additionally, the authors do not consider Aiello and Wheeler’s basic 
assumption, namely, that the metabolic rate of organs changes in relation to their size, as proven 
at this point. 
The relevance of Aiello and Wheeler’s model calculation is, after Henneberg (ibid. 213), 
difficult to evaluate, since the base data is also derived from models, such as those of a typical 
primate or human, and, thus, does not include the full range of possible variations. Katherine 
Milton notes (ibid. 215) that different segments of the intestines can easily adapt to changed 
conditions in connection with the food supply during one lifetime. The gastro-intestinal system 
of humans from non-industrialized societies, which has to process less easily digestible food, is 
distinctly bigger than assumed in Aiello and Wheeler’s model. To conclude, the question 
whether the augmented demand of energy for brain growth during the course of human 
evolution was indeed compensated by a reduction of the gastro-intestinal tract, has to remain 
open. The fact that such a reduction was primarily facilitated by more easily digestible and 
high-energy food, which was obtained through the use of tools and an enlarged perception of 
the environment, highlights the possibility of reciprocative intensification in the co-evolution of 
the brain and object behavior. 
Anatomy of the Brain and Neuropsychology 
The absolute and relative increase in brain volume is a distinct but only quantitative 
development in the evolution of the human brain. Studies on natural and artificial endocranial 
casts of fossil hominids also try to trace changes in the relative size of partial regions of the 
brain, which possibly resulted in qualitative consequences. While the Bulbus olfactorius, which 
processes olfactory signals, was reduced in relative size, the cerebellum and especially the 
neocortex underwent a distinct increase in relative size (Eccles 1993: 87). However, Dean Falk 
notes (1980: 98–99) that, while the human neocortex is approximately three times the size of 
that assumed for a non-human primate of the same size, its observed volume is not significantly 
larger than the expected volume for human brain size. The increase in brain and neocortex 
volume obviously occurred at the same time. Human encephalization is interpreted as the result 
of an increase in postnatal brain growth (ibid. 100). 
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An increase in brain development after birth is also suggested by studies on the Mojokerto child 
(Perning 1) from Java (Coqueuniot et al. 2004), dated to ca. 1.8 million years before present. 
While macaques exhibit about 70% of their adult brain volume at birth, primates are born with 
40% and humans with only 25% of their respective average adult brain size. During the first 
year of life, the human brain grows to 50% of its adult size; in a 10-year-old is has reached an 
average of 95%. The brain of the great apes, by contrast, already exhibits 80% of its future 
volume after the first year of life. The Homo erectus child from Mojokerto, which was 
estimated to be about one year old, possesses a calculated endocranial volume of 72–84% 
compared to an adult Homo erectus – a percentage that still lies well within the range of modern 
primates. Brain growth that more or less occurs after birth also has consequences for the 
development of cognitive capabilities: the development of the brain and its neural structures is 
increasingly subjected to influences derived from increased interaction with the environment, 
which during the course of human evolution was gradually enriched by cultural elements. In 
this, Coqueuniot et al. (2004) see the possible precondition for the evolution of spoken 
language; nevertheless, other brain functions and structures may also have changed with the 
extended interaction with the environment during the growth phase. 
Neuropsychological studies have shown that different areas of the brain are responsible for 
specific functions. Animal experiments demonstrate the importance of the phylogenetically 
older parts of the brain, such as the limbic system or the hypothalamus, for emotional behavior. 
The functional differentiation of the cerebral cortex in contemporary humans is conveyed by 
studies on brain function failure, either congenital or acquired through disease, accidents, or 
surgery, as well as specific experiments with healthy test persons. By linking locally 
circumscribed brain lesions to psychical impairments or specific activation patterns associated 
with certain activities in healthy test persons, psychical-physical contexts can be derived. While 
new imaging techniques, such as computer and magnetic resonance imaging, can accurately 
pinpoint the localization of specific lesions, the association of psychical functions with clearly 
circumscribed regions of the brain has to remain cursory, since the lesions themselves often 
differ considerably in their individual extent and history (Sturm and Hatje 2002: 2–20). 
So far, neuropsychological studies have shown a – possibly gender-related – functional 
asymmetry of the cerebral hemispheres, which can also correspond anatomically to a more 
pronounced left-sided development of the Wernicke and Broca language areas (Hartje 2002). 
While lesions of Broca's area, located in the posterior region of the parietal lobe, primarily 
affect pronunciation capabilities, damage to Wernicke's area, situated in the posterior region of 
the parietal and the anterior region of the temporal lobe, will result in impaired language 
comprehension (Huber et al. 2002). The term apraxia describes a defective selection of 
locomotive elements or their implementation in the wrong context or sequence. Its ideomotor 
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variation occurs when the language-dominant hemisphere is damaged; the results affect the 
facial muscles as well as movements of the extremities on both sides. A lesion causing the 
ideatoric variant will be located in the temporo-parietal region of the language-dominant 
hemisphere. This variant  constitutes a conceptual dysfunction and affects the sequential 
organization of movements in the purposeful interaction with objects (Poeck 2002). 
The visual perception of optical information transmitted by the optic nerve takes place in the 
occipital lobe. The perception of objects is achieved in three stages: After the initial 
differentiation of the coherent object from other objects and the background, typical features of 
this momentary perception have to be filtered out and connected with the semantic memory, 
which resides in the basal temporal lobe. The final denomination of an object is obviously only 
possible if the knowledge of this object’s significance can be activated. All three stages appear 
to be organized independently of each other (Goldenberg 2002). The perception of space, which 
is located in different regions of the frontal and occipital regions of primarily the right 
hemisphere, has to be differentiated from spatial cognition, which includes mental 
manipulations of space, such as rotation, mirror-imaging, or changes in scale, and is situated in 
the parietal and parieto-occipital regions of both hemispheres, as well as the so far not exactly 
localized spatial-constructive capability to assemble a shape from individual elements and the 
capability for spatial-topographical orientation (Kerkhoff 2002). Auditory perception and the 
comprehension of meaningful environmental noises and spoken word units are primarily 
located in the temporal lobes of both hemispheres; lesions can affect the perception of noises 
and words independently from each other (Engelien 2002). 
The main seat of the so-called “executive functions,” which are especially developed in humans, 
is, besides other minor cortical and sub-cortical regions, the prefrontal cerebral cortex. This 
term subsumes different cognitive processes, such as problem solving, categorization, mental 
planning, and the initiation and suppression of actions. Generally, the functions of the frontal 
brain are viewed as the most accomplished integrative achievements of humans; their 
explanation has been the focus of several cognitive models, which, however, have remained 
rather generalized and abstract. The prefrontal cortex includes areas that experienced different 
phylogenetic developments and seem to be part of anatomically separate cortico-subcortical 
networks (Karnath and Sturm 2002). Thus, from a phylogenetic perspective the integration of 
different partial functions and different anatomical and neurological sub-areas into one class of 
functions, which is located in a single area of the brain, has to be rejected. 
The phylogenetic importance of the connection between psychical and, especially, advanced 
cognitive capabilities and certain regions of the brain noted in modern humans is by no means 
unambiguous. Impairments of reading, writing, and arithmetic capabilities (alexia, agraphia, and 
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acalculia, respectively) caused by brain lesions demonstrate that new functions, which cannot be 
specifically fixed phylogenetically, can be integrated into existing functional areas of the brain 
through extension or redesignation. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the functions 
of damaged brain regions can be taken over by others. The underlying reasons may be 
structural; be it that a partial neuronal system is still able to execute the functions of the whole 
system (redundancy model), or that a specific function is controlled by multiple brain regions 
(multiple control model). However, the slow recovery of damaged functions rather suggests 
dynamic reorganization models. The model of functional substitution proposes that neuronal 
subsystems can over time assume the responsibilities of other, damaged subsystems; thus, while 
a task is not executed in an identical manner, the functional result still stays the same. The 
plasticity model, by contrast, is based on the generation of nerve cells from adjacent, 
undamaged tissue. Training and practice will not only lead to a considerable expansion of 
healthy regions, but also result in the regeneration of damaged areas (Hartje and Sturm 2002: 
45–50). Based on these observations and models, the deduction of specific functions for 
different brain regions remains a hypothesis to be used cautiously. 
When comparing an average primate brain, theoretically enlarged to human size, with that of a 
real modern human, differences of sometimes considerable dimensions can be observed in the 
individual cerebral cortex regions (Deacon 1994a: 123). While the areas responsible for 
processing auditory input, located in the superior part of the temporal lobe, are slightly bigger 
than expected for modern humans, it is the area of the prefrontal cortex that is especially 
noteworthy, since it is twice the size assumed for a typical primate. Liebermann et al. (2002) 
ascribe the relative increase in size of the temporal and frontal lobes of the brain to two 
autapomorph modern human features: the spherical brain case and the recessed face. After Falk 
et al. (2000), this increase is already visible to some extent in the morphology of 
Australopithecus afarensis, though not in the robust australopithecines or paranthropines. 
Among other functions, this part of the brain is responsible for the planning and organization of 
actions through the setting of objectives and decision-making. Other regions of the cerebral 
cortex, such as the premotor, somato-sensory, and visual cortex, display size values much lower 
than expected; the relative percentage of the premotor cortex differed most notably, with a 
reduction to 35% of the expected size. Detail studies of small cortex areas show, however, a 
distinct enlargement of the Brodmann area 6, which appears to be responsible for the control of 
complex motor actions that are crucial in the use of objects, compared to primates (Eccles 1993: 
119). Nevertheless, Eccles concludes (ibid. 87): “The evolutionary development of the brains 
seems to be quantitative rather than qualitative. This even applies to the cerebral cortex, whose 
histological structure remains largely unchanged.” 
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Of special interest to the study of changes in the human brain are two brain areas that are 
connected with language formation and language perception; they are considered especially 
important for the evolution of language capability and, by consequence, of specifically human 
cognition. Broca's area, which controls vocalization, is situated in the lower posterior region of 
the parietal lobe; in humans, its layout is asymmetrical, with the part located in the left 
hemisphere generally larger. Wernicke's area in the lower part of the parietal and the upper 
region of the temporal lobe is situated between the various centers for sensory input, such as 
seeing, hearing, and feeling. It is responsible for the naming of objects and the perception of 
language, as well as probably for associations that span different brain regions. In the modern 
great apes, only small precursors of both language centers could be detected. However, in 
chimpanzees, bonobos, and gorillas, the Brodmann region 44 of Broca's area, which is of crucial 
importance for the production of language, displays an asymmetry with a dominating left 
hemisphere, similar to that in humans. This asymmetry can be associated with the production of 
gestures and accompanying vocalization and may constitute the point of origin of the evolution 
of language systems in humans (Cantalupo and Hopkins 2001). 
Owing to the insufficient preservation of fossil finds, endocranial casts have not permitted the 
evaluation of the Broca and Wernicke areas in Australopithecus afarensis to this date (Tobias 
1995). Later Australopithecus africanus individuals from Sterkfontein and Makapansgat 
generally display a bulge in the region of Broca's area, but – with the exception of one 
individual – remain flat in the region of Wernicke's area. The endocranial cast of an 
Australopithecus robustus from the South-African site of Swartkrans also possibly exhibits a 
bulge in the region of Wernicke's area; but it is only with Homo habilis that Philipp Tobias 
(1987; 1995) observes a distinct bulge in both brain regions. Owing to the different 
configurations of the Broca and Wernicke areas, Tobias (1995: 42) reconstructs a hypothetical 
Australopithecus robustus who possibly used vocalization as a means of communication, if only 
infrequently. Homo habilis is assumed to have possessed the neural structures on which 
language is based (Wilkins and Wakefield 1995); Tobias (1995) even assumes a form of spoken 
language as an essential part of the behavioral repertory of this species. He also theorizes that 
the evolution of language capability may have already taken place in the predecessors of the 
robust australopithecines and early Homo specimens. 
The connection of the Broca and Wernicke areas with language formation and language 
perception is well established by clinical and pathological indicators as well as activity analysis 
through PET scans. Nevertheless, Wilkins and Wakefield (1995) remark that the interpretation 
of fossil endocranial casts contains more problems than simply proving the specific 
development of one brain region. For example, the centers may have evolved for purposes other 
than language, such as complex manipulative actions. Thus, the original function of these brain 
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areas may have been substituted with or extended to language functions at a later, unknown 
date. Keeping this possible restriction in mind when studying endocranial casts, it can be stated 
that Homo habilis and probably also Homo rudolfensis possessed the neuronal basis for 
language from about one million years before present onwards. How exactly these brain areas 
were used, however, has to remain an open question. Generally, Deacon assumes (1994a: 123) 
that specifically human cognitive features do not stem from completely new structures, but 
rather from a reorganization of neuronal connections and an expansion or reduction of existing 
structures. 
A Genetic Foundation of Language? 
While from an anatomical perspective the evolution of the human brain is increasingly viewed 
as a process of general enlargement in size coupled with the reorganization of existing 
structures, lately genetic considerations have entered the field in order to explain individual 
cognitive areas, such as human language capability, independently from the general 
development. Based on a family study (Lai et al. 2001), the FOXP2 gene was identified as 
associated with language formation – through minute movements of the mouth and lower face – 
and language comprehension. Since such minute oro-facial movements are specifically human 
and do not appear in the pongids, Enard, Przeworski et al. (2002) studied mutations in this gene 
during the course of evolution by comparing humans, chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans, 
macaques, and mice. The results demonstrate that after the split from the common evolutionary 
branch with chimpanzees, two mutations of amino acids occurred in humans, at least one of 
which could have had functional consequences for human language capabilities. Enard et al. 
estimate that this mutation took place during the last 200,000 years. It is, however, not clear 
whether the specifically human mutations in the FOXP2 gene are indeed directly related to the 
evolution of human language capabilities. While the differences between humans and primates 
were observed on the very gene responsible for speech impairments, they were still situated in 
different areas than the mutations in the speech-impaired individuals. 
The Regulator Hypothesis: Increased Gene Activity in the Human 
Brain 
Other than the targeted search for genes that cause specifically human behavior like language, 
there exist approaches that try to explain the general enlargement of the human brain and the 
specific mode of human thinking on a more generalized genetic basis. Since 98.7% of the 
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genetic sequences of humans and chimpanzees are the same, Mary-Claire King and Allan 
Wilson developed the so-called regulator hypothesis (Enard, Khaitovich et al. 2002: 340) in 
1975. It postulates that differences in gene activity – the rate at which the formation of RNA 
and proteins is triggered by genes – are responsible for differences in brain morphology, 
behavior, and cognition (Pennisi 2002: 233–35). New studies on blood, liver, and brain cells of 
humans, chimpanzees, orangutans, and mice now show that all areas – blood, liver, and brain – 
possess species-specific patterns of gene activity with quantitative and qualitative differences. 
But while within the primate group the qualitative (gene differences) and quantitative (amount 
of RNA and proteins produced) differences in liver, blood, and brain are balanced, the human 
and chimpanzee brain samples showed distinct differences. Compared to the qualitative 
variations, the quantitative differences in both RNA and protein production were up to six times 
higher in humans. It follows that the gene activity of the human brain increased tremendously 
during its evolution (Enard, Khaitovich et al. 2002: 340–42). How and when exactly this change 
occurred is still unclear. 
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7 The Evolution of Human Thinking between Phylogeny 
and Individual History: The Organization of Thought
Information on the functioning of the mind is as ambiguous as that on the anatomical, 
neurobiological, and genetic foundations of human thinking. Approaches to the organization of 
the human mind are primarily based on psychological research; while the different models may 
show individual ties with neuroanatomical research results, these connections are not explicitly 
investigated in detail (cf. Cela-Conde and Marty 1997). 
During the first half of the twentieth century the Standard Social Science Model emerged, which 
summarily assumes a general, inherited intelligence and a mind rather malleable by different 
learning processes (Tooby and Cosmides 1992: 24–31), without specifically trying to explain its 
evolution. This model is elaborated upon in approaches centered on the learning process, such 
as Jean Piaget’s step model of the ontogenetic evolution of intelligence, which will be discussed 
in a later chapter. Starting with the 1950s, and inspired by the emerging cognition sciences and 
information technologies, approaches to a modular structure of human thinking and attempts to 
explain its evolution arose from the fields of linguistics and developmental psychology. 
Language as a Mental “Organ” 
Based on his deliberations concerning the genesis of human language capability, Noam 
Chomsky was among the first to hypothesize that the human mind at birth is not a homogeneous 
and undifferentiated structure but rather a jigsaw puzzle of many different cognitive structures 
or mental organs with different properties and principles (Chomsky 1980). Analogous to other 
physical organs, such as an arm or the heart, Chomsky considers the basic structure and design 
of these mental systems as mostly predisposed by rules and representations. Just as in the 
individual development of the body, there exists a species-specific biological heritage that 
governs the mode and limits of the growth of mental units, such as language or the use of 
arithmetic systems. The final structure, as well as its integration into the system or the mind, is 
largely predetermined by a genetic program. 
Learning, which constitutes the development of the mental organs, is defined by Chomsky as 
the growth of cognitive structures along genetically predefined paths, initiated and partially 
shaped by the environment. Just as humans possess the ability to see, so they carry with them an 
innate basic knowledge of, for example, language, which is then fine-tuned through experience. 
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This basic knowledge is, after the modular model, an innate mental structure and not to be 
confused with the independent ability to make use of this knowledge. 
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Fig. 5 The structure of the mind after Chomsky (1980), exhibiting innate cognitive structures 
with specific properties and principles. According to this model, humans – as opposed to the 
great apes – possess both modules necessary for language capability: a conceptual system of 
object reference and grammar comprehension. 
Human language capability is structured, after Chomsky, into grammatical language 
comprehension on the one hand and a conceptual system on the other (fig. 5). This general 
system of object reference, which is crucial for the overall comprehension of the environment 
and does not constitute a special language capability by itself, is also common in the great apes 
and enables them to use elementary symbolic communication. By contrast, Chomsky recognizes 
the grammatical ability to identify and process language patterns as a universal and innate basic 
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structure exclusive to humans. As a typical domain of the modular model, the grammatical 
comprehension of language involves diverse and complex mental structures, which develop 
under only minimal influence from the environment. 
Multiple Intelligences 
In extension of Noam Chomsky’s linguistic approach, the developmental psychologist Howard 
Gardner postulates the existence of multiple mental capabilities or intelligences, which he 
characterizes as the ability to solve real problems and – based on the foundation of new 
knowledge – detect or create problems (Gardner 1991). It follows that, just as in the case of 
grammatical language capacities, other mental capabilities are innate as well. The flexible 
individual implementation is adaptable or modifiable by the natural or cultural environment as 
well as practice, so that different cultural circles can influence the specific focal points of the 
individual intelligences. 
Gardner sees the basis for the identification of the different intelligence domains in their 
independence from other modules. He detects indicators of this independence in the isolated 
impairment of specific abilities after brain injuries, as well as the occurrence of widely varying 
emphases in the case of musical or mathematical prodigies or idiots savants. Additionally, he 
postulates that the modules possess fundamental operations or data processing mechanisms that 
are tailored to their individual perception components; language intelligence is differentiated 
into phonetics, syntax, semantics, and pragmatics, while musical intelligence is split into 
melody, rhythm, and timbre. The ontogenetic development of the individual capacities is 
supposed to be distinct from each other, but Gardner also does detect indicators of a 
phylogenetic evolution. Besides indicators of an autonomous capability glanced from 
experimental psychology and psychometry, Gardner postulates that the last indicator of human 
intelligence is found in its general openness to organization by means of cultural symbolic 
systems, such as words, numbers, shapes, gestures, and rituals or religious systems in the widest 
sense. On the basis of these indicators, he preliminarily postulates six different intelligences: 
linguistic, musical, logical-mathematical, spatial, physical-kinesthetic, and intra-/interpersonal 
(fig. 6). 
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Fig. 6 The organization of the human mind after Gardner (1991) with at least six 
independently evolved intelligence domains. 
While Gardner characterizes the individual intelligences as units that develop independently 
from each other and can also be furthered independently, he still considers them to be 
interactive and building on each other. He rejects Jerry A. Fodor’s assumption (1983) of a 
central unit furnished with general capabilities, such as perception and memory, that bundles 
information from different domains, such as language and visual or musical analysis, in order to 
formulate hypotheses, make decisions, or solve problems, as mere speculation. In contrast to his 
domains, which can be studied through experiments, he views a central unit as too cross-linked 
to be recorded empirically. Nevertheless, he views certain cognitive operations, if not spanning 
different domains, at least as occurring throughout different modules. The phenomenon of 
‘common sense,’ i.e., the ability to solve problems intuitively, rapidly, and in a sometimes 
unexpectedly precise manner, occurs, after Gardner, primarily in the interpersonal, physical, and 
spatial domains. Originality, the ability to develop important, novel mental products, is 
frequently observed in children; in adult individuals, even talented ones, it is mostly restricted to 
one module. The metaphoric capacity to perceive and find analogies searches for patterns in 
different domains and then establishes connections between them. Metaphoric thinking is very 
common in children of preschool age; later in life it is often relegated to the background. While 
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originality and imagery are primarily displayed during childhood, a final ability to synthesize – 
wisdom – is generally associated with advanced age. Following Gardner, these few multi-
domain operations are not sufficient to postulate the existence of a central intelligence unit. 
After Gardner, human thinking is based on genetics and shaped by culture. While he does not 
subscribe to the scenario of a phylogenetic evolution of linguistic, musical, and logical-
mathematical intelligence, he considers the personal intelligences to be the result of closer and 
extended mother–child relationships and communal hunting of boys and men. The most detailed 
statements are to be derived from tools in use, which, after Gardner, constitute the common 
products of spatial and physical-kinesthetic intelligence, and the use of which requires three 
prerequisites: sensorimotor maturity, the play with objects, and stimulation by the perception 
that the environment can be manipulated. The purposeful invention of new tools, i.e., other than 
through trial and error or improvisation, additionally requires, according to Gardner, logical-
mathematical intelligence in order to perceive the given problem and to establish theories about 
necessary actions and minimum expectations of the result. While lower primates use tools only 
rarely and almost never in an inventive manner, simple tools are common among the higher 
primates, especially chimpanzees. Although Homo habilis invented the cutting edge in stone 
tools, in a more general sense he never surpassed the capabilities of his predecessors. And while 
bifaces allowed for more precise and powerful cutting among Homo erectus, the more than one 
million years that passed between the appearance of these two species do not show any other 
progress, after Gardner. It is among Neandertals that he sees the first indicators of symbolic 
behavior in burials, and he acknowledges their use of habitations with functionally 
differentiated areas, fire, and big game hunting. The explosion of tool behavior, however, which 
also included new symbolic capacities, more precise tools, tools to manufacture other tools, a 
great variety of raw materials used, and the use of different tools for different purposes, he 
associates only with the appearance of modern man, 40,000 years before present (ibid. 201–2). 
Cognition as a Set of Highly Specialized Adaptations 
While Howard Gardner’s model of multiple intelligences was primarily inspired by studies on 
aptitudes in modern humans and developed as a counter theory to the hypothesis of a general 
intelligence on the individual level, John Tooby and Leda Cosmides (1992) arrive at their model 
of different mental competences via evolutionary psychology on the population level. In their 
opinion, cognition can be equated with the processing of information, the problem solving 
mechanisms of which are organized functionally and evolved through selection. Thus, the 
cognitive structures of the human brain have to be viewed as biological adaptations that were 
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selected according to their possible use in the solution of permanent problems among the 
predecessors of modern humans. 
The great and typically human mental flexibility is explained by Tooby and Cosmides not as an 
arbitrary variability or absence of limits in a system that simply spans domains; rather, 
increasing degrees of freedom within the system, or new dimensions of possible variations, 
exponentially increase the number of alternative possibilities, so that the existence of a general 
intelligence unit would quickly lead to problems during the process of decision-making. If the 
range of situations that have to be processed by a cognitive mechanism is very wide, these 
situations will only exhibit few recurring characteristics. Thus, the possibility to adapt the 
mechanism to the situation lessens, which consequently reduces the number of given problem-
solving strategies. If, however, the problem areas were narrowed down, the number of possible 
problem-solving strategies would increase. Additionally, the flexibility in Tooby and Cosmides’ 
model can be increased by single, domain-spanning mechanisms, such as learning. 
Tooby and Cosmides employ “evolutionary functional analysis” (1992: 73–77) to identify 
biologically adapted information processing mechanisms. The determination of an adaptive goal 
and its relevant constant environmental conditions is followed by the description of the 
organization of recurring characteristics of an organism, which together then form an (expected) 
adaptation (e.g., the eye). Afterwards, the result is rated as to how successful a mechanism is in 
achieving an adaptive goal or biologically relevant results under the given environmental 
circumstances. Tooby and Cosmides summarize the results of their method as follows (1992: 
74): “The better the mechanism performs, the more likely it is that one has identified 
adaptation.” Several cognitive mechanisms and the psychological phenomena grounded therein, 
such as language acquisition, grammar, mimic expressions of emotions, the selection of mates, 
or the incest taboo, have been identified as adaptations by evolutionary function analysis. 
Nevertheless, the method itself, as well as its results, remain controversial, owing to a number 
of basic assumptions that cannot easily be refined (see, e.g., Gould and Lewontin 1979). 
From their model of a modular organization of thinking, Tooby and Cosmides derive a new 
cultural model, according to which biologically founded mechanisms function as triggers for the 
development of a behavior during ontogenesis, which then obtains its specific cultural 
characteristics through environmental influences. Consequently, human culture is not 
indefinitely variable and freely transmittable, but is primarily caused by the highly specialized 
cognitive structure – the meta-cultural framework – and local, temporal, and ecological factors. 
This evoked, adaptive culture is supplemented by a smaller percentage of transmitted culture. 
Thus, culture does not generate and reproduce itself, but is primarily based on numerous 
specialized mental adaptations that make humans capable of culture. Cultural change is caused 
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by new external circumstances that lead to the activation of domain-specific cognitive 
mechanisms, thereby generating new views and purposes. The new ideas are more appealing in 
relation to the new circumstances and therefore spread, while the old cultural beliefs are 
increasingly rejected. 
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Fig. 7 Specialized intelligence domains as biologically adapted information processing 
mechanisms: The cognition model after Tooby and Cosmides (1992). 
Steven Pinker (1994) recognizes this meta-culture, which is rooted in the various assumed 
domains, such as intuitive mechanical, biological, and psychological comprehension, an 
understanding of numbers, mental topographical maps, a feeling for rights and obligations, and 
a sense of family ties, to be equally responsible for human language capabilities. While 
Chomsky does not specify the phylogenetic origin of the “mental organ” language, Pinker 
defines human language capacity and its universal grammatical ability as an instinct acquired 
during evolution. This instinct is supposed to be the basis for domain-specific but universal 
learning mechanisms, parallel to the other mental modules. The evolution of the language 
domain occurred, after Pinker, through the selection of the speakers that were easiest to decode 
and the listeners that were able to decode utterances better than others. He assumes the first 
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indicators of this adaptation to have appeared maybe as early as shortly after the split of the 
chimpanzee and hominid lines, 5–7 million years ago, and independently from the evolution of 
symbolic capacities, such as those exhibited in art or religious behavior (ibid. 352). 
Language as the Foundation of Human Cognition? 
Other than Chomsky and Pinker, Derek Bickerton (1995) does not view human language 
capacity or a universal grammar as one domain amongst others, but rather as the phylogenetic 
root of specifically human thinking. However, he does not see human cognition as divided into 
separate independent domains but as the further development of a central consciousness. 
Following Euan McPhail (1982), Bickerton recognizes only two levels of intelligence in 
animals (1995; fig. 8).  
sensorimotor
stimulus
external
environmental
stimulation
action stimulus
action
online-thinking
Fig. 8 The cognition model after Bickerton (1995) A: Thinking in animals is based exclusively 
on sensorimotor stimuli and tied to a direct context of action. 
Thinking without explicit external stimuli (offline-thinking) is a completely different level of 
intelligence that is found only in humans (fig. 9).  
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Fig. 9 The cognitive model after Bickerton (1995) B: In humans, online-thinking, which also 
occurs in animals, is complemented by offline-thinking, which is based on language and can 
occur without a concrete external stimulus. Language permits mental divisions, connections, 
and reflections of problems that are not subject to a direct context of action. 
It allows for thinking without direct external cause and the anticipatory planning and rehearsal 
of behavior, so that learning can also take place outside an immediate stimulus situation. The 
extended human consciousness is aware of the basic sensorimotor consciousness; it is able to 
analyze and report upon it: humans are capable to reflect upon their actions. This extended part 
of the consciousness works primarily “offline,” but can be short-circuited to the sensorimotor 
input via attention, so that the action and the reflection on its why and how can happen 
simultaneously. Depending on the significance of the situation that is experienced by an 
individual, the attention can be shifted between the basic consciousness, which analyzes the 
relationship between the organism and the surrounding world, and the extended, reflecting 
consciousness. In both forms of consciousness, processes can happen parallel and 
“unconsciously,” but attention can be focused only on one, either external or internal, at a time. 
While the basic, animal consciousness creates a “state of brain” from which reactions result, the 
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reflecting, human consciousness forms a “state of mind” (ibid. 150), which is dependent on self-
perception and self-assessment and influenced by individual experiences not necessarily 
connected to the actual situation. 
Since learning by offline-thinking has become independent from external stimuli or immediate 
observations, the things to be learned can be divided into more abstract components, which then 
later can be reassembled and reused in different situations. Theoretically, offline-thinking would 
lead to faster environmental adaptation via manipulation of the environment in a way that would 
benefit the manipulators. However, Bickerton does not find indications of such manipulations in 
animals or any human predecessors prior to the Neandertals; a fact that he attributes to the 
missing foundation of offline-thinking – language (ibid. 99–100). 
Bickerton defines “language” as a representational system and a species-specific phenomenon 
based on biological foundations that stores information, executes thinking processes, and can 
also be used for communication purposes. Like offline-thinking, language requires brain cells 
that can perform without external input but also function without external output in form of 
motor action. After Bickerton, the evolution of language and offline-thinking began with the 
development of a proto-language, that is, single symbols, such as words or gestures, which in 
the beginning could not be connected or only in a limited way, without grammatical structure. 
Thus, language was initially selected not as a representational system but as a means of 
communication. It was only after abstract concepts for things or actions had reached a certain 
critical mass that a change in the neuronal network enabled the reassembly of individual 
symbols into infinitely variable chains of thought outside an external context; language could 
emerge as a representational system and, thus, offer the free space for the evolution of offline-
thinking. 
The evolution of offline-thinking and, in the following, a reflecting consciousness was, after 
Bickerton, only possible after the emergence of a structured language from the accumulation of 
concepts that constituted proto-language. Animal communication systems are closed, i.e., not 
arbitrarily expandable signal systems that express the immediate situation of the sender or try to 
influence the behavior of the recipient. They typically do not include combinations of units of 
communication, such as systematic relationships (e.g., screwdriver – tool as subcategory and 
topic, respectively), nor are they gradual, that is, e.g., the frequency of alarm calls does not 
increase with the appearance of more than just one predator. Proto-language, an intermediate 
stage between animal communication systems and language, combines only a restricted number 
of syllables and words to form expressions, which, in turn, can only be interpreted in a limited 
manner. Its elements only relate to real categories; structural or grammatical symbols, such as 
conjunctions (but, and, because) are missing. Under adequate training conditions, chimpanzees, 
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gorillas, orangutans, bonobos, sea lions, dolphins, and grey parrots all proved able to acquire 
symbols and connect them to form simple expressions, such as they appear in contemporary 
proto-language during early childhood or in pidgin languages. 
The fact that human predecessors, from Homo erectus to the Neandertals, also communicated 
on the level of proto-language would explain, after Bickerton, why the human brain grew in size 
during the course of human evolution without a parallel, accompanying increase in intelligence. 
He views the enlargement of the brain as connected to the storage of an increasing number of 
pieces of information that could only be connected to each other in limited ways. It was only the 
accumulation of a critical mass of information or symbols that finally caused the “development 
from protolanguage to true language, via the emergence of syntax, which was a catastrophic 
event, occurring within the first few generations of the species Homo sapiens sapiens” (ibid. 
69). Bickerton detects no intermediate stages, neither in the archaeological nor the linguistic 
context. It was a structural change that finally freed the regions of the brain developed for the 
use of proto-language, the performance of which does not result in immediate action, for 
structural, grammatical language and ensuing offline-thinking. This structural change can be 
detected in the archaeological remains of our ancestors, which, after Bickerton, show an 
explosion of intelligent behavior with the appearance of modern humans, after a time of relative 
stagnation that lasted from Homo habilis to Homo erectus. 
Consciousness as Executive Central Authority 
Instead of phylogenetically separately evolved modules in the human mind, as postulated by the 
linguists Chomsky and Pinker and the developmental psychologists Gardner, Tooby, and 
Cosmides, Merlin Donald (2001) only acknowledges, similar to Derek Bickerton, the existence 
of functional networks based on individual development and a more general aspect that forms 
the basis of all conscious mental operations: consciousness. In contrast to Bickerton, Donald 
views the extended human consciousness not as the result of symbolic thinking and language 
but as its precondition. While already Jerry Fodor (1983) interpreted consciousness as a 
domain-spanning central unit of the brain, but only acknowledged its passive reflection of the 
function executed by the subconscious modules, Donald (2001) also assumes an active, 
executive role of the consciousness, namely, the superordinate, independent overview and 
control of individual brain functions. The orientation of the “self” in time and physical as well 
as social space is controlled, maintained, or adapted, so that the object is able to identify itself 
and its position on an autobiographical level of memory. The core function of the consciousness 
is, thus, the continuous updating of knowledge. 
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Through active concentration and selective focusing, the consciousness achieves the 
optimization of the cognitive system. Concentration leads to the appearance of a temporal 
functional network in the brain; frequent repetitions then result in the establishment of 
permanent structures. The conscious control of repetitive actions thus leads to the automation of 
whole chains of actions, such as driving a car, playing the piano, or speaking, where 
consciousness subsequently only interferes under exceptional circumstances. Thus, automated 
behavior is not unconscious behavior but was consciously learned and retrospectively 
automated through everyday use. 
In contrast to Bickerton (1995), Donald (2001) detects the accumulation of criteria for the 
existence of consciousness already in primates, and especially the great apes. These criteria 
include an autonomous model of the world; the perception of complex objects or events as 
units; flexible and adaptive behavior; mental autonomy, which allows for a reaction that is 
independent from external stimuli and can be delayed; the ability to maintain individual 
relationships; the possible change of perspective to empathize with the thinking of other 
individuals. This extended capability of conscious reflection, control, and its ensuing behavior 
constitutes the phylogenetic foundation of human beings. The specifically human adaptation of 
the coordinative and controlling function of consciousness is demonstrated by a whole bundle 
of superordinate behaviors: 
1. Monitoring of success or failure resulting from own actions; 
2. Divided attention, which allows the execution of several tasks at the same time; 
3. Deliberate self-memory; 
4. Internal sequence (e.g., of symbols, such as in language); 
5. Self-perception as the subject in relation to objects; 
6. Practicing of actions, with reflection on past actions and improvements on future ones; 
7. Imitation skills using the whole body; 
8. Imagining the thoughts of others as the basis for own actions; 
9. Teaching, which requires the mutual imagining of the opposites' thoughts, i.e., the 
sharing of thoughts; 
10. Conscious and directed signals, such as gestures; 
11. Symbols; 
12. Accumulation of complex hierarchical proficiencies, like talking or driving a car, that 
mostly proceed automatically and are just monitored by consciousness (Donald 2001: 
132–46). 
After Donald, the special conscious performances of humans are based on a three-phase system 
of consciousness, which is also fully developed in some primates and enables an episodic 
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consciousness in these species (fig. 10). The first phase comprises the selective bundling of 
perceptions into units, caused by external stimuli, so that objects or events can be perceived as 
distinct patterns. The spatial and temporal extent of the bundling process leads to an expansion 
of the consciously perceived world, in which concepts can be developed. In the second phase of 
consciousness, the short-term control of actions forms the basis of a delayed reaction to stimuli 
and, thus, of a commencing autonomy of the subject from the environment. This conscious 
control can either suppress or reinforce actions, which means that limited resources can be used 
in a more flexible manner. The third phase is characterized by the medium- and long-term 
control of actions. Whole chains of actions can be controlled; actions do not need to be triggered 
by external stimuli anymore but can be initiated consciously – the monitoring of actions 
becomes possible.
PHASE 1: 
Selective bundling of perceptions into units; expansion of the consciously perceived world
PHASE 2: 
Short-term control of actions; commencing autonomy from the environment
PHASE 3: 
Medium- and long-term control of actions; 
arbitrary initiation and monitoring of actions
Mimetic Phase: 
Gestural communication
Mythic Phase: 
language, externalization of thoughts,  
narrative mental structure
Theoretic Phase: 
Symbolic materializations, 
thoughts can be treated as 
objects
Animal Consciousness
Human Consciousness
ca. 2 million years ago
ca. 500-400.000 years ago
ca. 40.000 years ago
Fig. 10 The evolution of human consciousness after Donald (2001) 
In addition to these three phases of consciousness, humans are, after Donald, distinctly 
specialized for executive functions (see paragraph on “Brain Anatomy and Neuropsychology”). 
In the course of – exclusively – human cognitive evolution he identifies a further three phases; it 
is the new form of cognition, which is shared among several individuals – i.e., culture – that 
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creates a new reality, parallel to the natural environment and, as such, a new setting for this 
development. The first, “mimetic,” phase after Donald (2001: 262–74) is centered on miming or 
imitative skills, which enable, via the conscious execution of actions, the use of deliberate body 
language, precise imitation, and gestures. Mimetic communication and the social bonds and 
conventionality it promotes are necessary pre-adaptations for language. In order to 
communicate consciously, e.g., through gestures, several motor action areas have to be 
controlled, reflected, and modified over the span of several domains. Attention is focused not 
only on external events, but is increasingly shifted inwards towards the subject’s actions. Brain 
regions that perform executive tasks, such as the prefrontal cerebral cortex, expand during the 
course of evolution. This does not constitute a fundamental qualitative innovation in brain 
anatomy, after Donald, but is merely the result of a progressive differentiation of the primate 
brain. In a cognitive context, the mimetic phase is characterized by an increasingly precise 
control of body movements, which influences communication as well as object use and tool 
production. 
Language, the main characteristic of the second, “mythic,” phase of development after Donald 
(ibid. 274–300), is based on the cognitive and cultural achievements of the mimetic phase. Its 
development can be visualized as, at first, vocal additions to vague mimetic expressions that 
became increasingly specific with the introduction of sounds with designated significance. In 
Donald’s opinion, language is the result of group adaptation and thus a cultural product. It is not 
the basis of consciousness, but only serves as an indicator system for the direction of attention 
or imagination. In order to develop language, the executive functions of the consciousness, such 
as differentiated temporal storage, the ability of multi-focal attention, and the enlargement of 
long-term memory that can be recalled instantaneously, have to be already expanded 
significantly. All consciously controllable brain functions that constitute the precondition for 
language are not restricted to language alone but span various domains. Language, however, 
also drastically changes conscious experience: it differentiates experiences, defines reality, and 
focuses attention. A narrative mental structure creates virtual worlds and changes the perception 
of experiences by allowing the focusing in on details and to view single events within a wider 
context. Language is not the cause of consciousness, but it serves as an intermediary or tool of 
meta-cognition. Through language, ideas can be externalized and viewed or modified like 
objects. They also can become partially independent from personal experience, which enables 
abstract belief as well as public discourse. With the development of language, thoughts are no 
longer isolated within an individual; they always form part of a cultural network that influences 
thinking. At the same time, the collective networks of knowledge within a culture are constantly 
changed by the verbal expression of the thoughts of individuals. 
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Symbols, which characterize the third, “theoretic,” phase of human cognitive evolution after 
Donald (ibid.  305–20), mark a further step in externalization. Symbolic technology constitutes 
an extension of material culture and is specifically centered on thinking, remembering, and the 
imaging of reality; symbols can free the consciousness from biological memory systems. At the 
same time, ideas cannot only be externalized but also materialized symbolically, so that in fact 
they can be arranged, studied, organized, and compared like physical objects. This 
materialization leads to an expansion of mental operations: by separating thoughts from their 
previous context and arranging them in a different order, it can make the un-thinkable thinkable. 
Donald places the transition to the mimetic phase with the first appearance of the species Homo, 
ca. 2 million years before present. Archaeological finds suggest a group-oriented lifestyle, 
where material and cognitive resources were shared. Cultural strategies of remembering and 
solving problems allowed, in combination with mimesis, the consolidation and refinement of 
numerous abilities. The mythic phase in human cognitive evolution begins, after Donald, with 
the appearance of archaic Homo sapiens, between 500,000–400,000 years before present, and 
reaches its climax around 125,000 years before present. In the archaeological context, this phase 
is represented by accumulations of aesthetically pleasing objects, the improvement of shelters, 
and the burial of the dead. Additionally, Donald includes – towards the end of this phase – 
personal ornaments; multi-piece objects and mountings; boats; complex dwellings; ritual, quasi-
symbolic artifacts; and musical instruments. The spread of cultural achievements accelerated 
with language and oral culture. The third, theoretic, phase began, after Donald, 40,000 years 
before present with the appearance of symbols, which, via the conscious externalization of 
memory, allowed the storage of cultural knowledge independently from the achievements of 
individuals (ibid. 261–62). The exploitation of the cognitive potential of symbolic technology 
was a slow process: even after the development of writing in urban settlements, this new 
technology was only used as a mnemonic device or a means of keeping records. It was not until 
later that writing turned into an instrument of reflection (ibid. 306–8). 
After Donald, culture is the crucial factor in the cognitive evolution of humans, since it 
constitutes a necessary precondition for the development of language. In contrast to non-cultural 
beings, cultural individuals do not act and think in isolation: culture is built from the collective 
cognitive activity of many brains. Cultural cognitive communities can be defined as networks of 
knowledge, emotions, and memories; language and symbols are not at the core of culture but 
only its byproducts. Culture does not only focus attention on certain areas and distracts it from 
others, it also influences the executive functions of the brain. Because of the neural plasticity of 
the human brain, special functional networks can be created to serve specific cultural tasks, such 
as writing and reading, for example; these networks influence our way of thinking. Besides the 
genes and the natural environment, deep cognitive acculturation is another important factor in 
the development of the brain – phylogenetically as well as individually. 
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While Gardner (1991) and, especially, Tooby and Cosmides (1992) do not consider individual 
development during life and, thus, the influence of learning processes and culture to be 
significant contributions to the organization of thinking, Donald’s model (2001) places them as 
of utmost importance in the building of neuronal networks. In contrast to the modular models, 
which have to be viewed as cognitivistic after Varela’s definition (1991), the approaches by 
Donald and – to a lesser degree – Bickerton (1995) can be interpreted as connectionistic, where 
cognitive patterns only develop during ontogenesis from undifferentiated neuronal subsystems 
under the influence of a central consciousness and individual external as well as cultural 
influences. One of the most influential models of ontogenetic development of human 
intelligence during the last decades will be presented in the following chapter. 
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8 The Evolution of Human Thinking as an Ontogenetic 
Problem 
Although the research institute, founded in Geneva in the 1930s by Jean Piaget, is called the 
“Centre international d’Epistémologie génétique,” its approach depends only to a lesser degree 
on genetics; its influences come from the fields of biology, sociology, linguistics, logics, and 
epistemology. The basis of the “theory of cognitive development” developed at this institution 
(Piaget 1985) primarily comes from psychological studies on the development of intelligence in 
children. Piaget’s phase theory can be understood as the ontogenetic complement to Konrad 
Lorenz’s phylogenetic hypotheses. Together they form the foundation of evolutionary 
epistemology, although the active, dynamic angle of Piaget’s epistemological approach hardly 
finds use among researchers in this field. 
The assumption, in a connectionistic manner, that mental and brain structures are not primarily 
phylogenetic and already fully formed at birth, but that interaction with the environment plays 
an important role in their development, introduces two possibilities. The empirical view is that 
cognition is grounded in objects and the environment itself. It is created by acts of perception 
that – systemized and coordinated within the subject – form an image of reality and build 
cognitive structures through repetition. Piaget contrasts this approach, which assumes a passive 
subject, with an active role of the subject in the gain of knowledge: to perceive objects, an 
individual has to act on them and transform them through motion, connection, analysis and 
reassembly into different states. Thus, cognition is the result of a process of constructions 
executed by an individual. For example, the knowledge about the permanence of objects, which 
is not perceived during the first few months of life, is experienced in a first step as dependent on 
actions by the subject, and is only later, after a process of decentration, perceived as 
independent from the subject. With the aid of self-regulation, physical experience, information, 
and the coordination of actions all build structures that enable cognition. It follows that 
cognition is neither inherent, nor are the basic structures, such as space, time, and causality, a 
priori given constants that are innate to the subject and completely preformed (Piaget 1985: 25–
29). 
Cognitive adaptation, i.e., the process that builds cognitive structures, is, in Piaget's opinion, 
comprised of two mechanisms, the balance of which changes according to age. His definition of 
assimilation implicates the incorporation of external elements or information into the existing 
structures of an organism. In order to form a cognitive process, assimilation is complemented by 
accommodation, a change in the receptive structures that is brought about by assimilated 
elements. If assimilation outweighs accommodation, object features are only considered in a 
8 The Evolution of Human Thinking as an Ontogenetic Problem 82
way that benefits the current interests of the subject. The mode of thinking is egocentric, such 
as, for example, in symbol or fiction play. However, if accommodation outweighs assimilation, 
the subject characteristically adapts its structures to existing models, such as in realistic 
reproduction or imitation. Delayed or internalized imitation is the basis of figurative thinking. 
Cognitive behavior, by contrast, stems from an equilibrium between assimilation and 
accommodation (ibid. 32–36). 
In Piaget's model of the development of intelligence in children, the interdependency of genetic 
predispositions and environmental circumstances leads to the development of cognitive 
structures during childhood by means of assimilation and accommodation. This development is 
divided into three consecutive stages. In the first, sensorimotor, stage, Piaget distinguishes a 
first phase up to an age of 7–9 months, which is centered on the subject's own body. During the 
second phase, up to an age of 1.5–2 years, practical intelligence is focused on objects and 
adapted to the conditions of space. Assimilation and accommodation are in equilibrium during 
the sensorimotor stage when practical problems that relate to the immediate surrounding space 
are dealt with (ibid. 37–41). 
The second, concrete operational, stage after Piaget is divided into a preoperational phase up to 
an age of 7–8 years and a concrete operational phase up to 11–13 years. The preoperational 
period is marked by the recognition of a qualitative identity of objects that persists even after 
their alteration – a toy building block stays a toy building block even if it has been painted blue. 
Additionally, this phase displays the beginnings of the purposeful mental use of variables, so 
that, for example, the reduction in length of a string of clay after its compression can be 
anticipated. However, reversibility of operations – internalized actions or action plans – as well 
as the conservation of volume in transformations, i.e., that the string of clay is diminished 
overall but just becomes shorter and thicker, is not cogitable at this stage. The expansion of 
thinking to incorporate a further extension of space and to more than the immediate practical 
result leads to a distortion in favor of assimilation during the preoperational phase. Piaget 
considers the intake of information to be closely related to the object, i.e., egocentric, while 
accommodation is incomplete, because it is limited to conditions or figurative aspects of reality 
and does not incorporate conservation. During the preoperational phase, imagination remains 
reproductive and static (ibid. 38–59). 
In the concrete operational phase of Piaget's stage model, children are assumed to be capable of 
abstracting qualities and consider them independently from other characteristics of an object. 
This enables them to execute concrete operations or action plans on objects: ordering things, 
lining them up, establishing relationships and classifications. After Piaget, the synthesis of such 
basic arrangements leads to the development of metric and numeric quantification (ibid. 78). In 
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this phase, the perception of changes in conditions or variables as well as conservation – the 
string of clay that retains the same volume whether it is long and thin or short and thick – is 
possible. From this phase on, assimilation and accommodation affect conditions as well as 
transformations, so that now reversible actions an be generated. After Piaget, this change is 
caused by a cognitive process where the subject-centered intake of information is substituted by 
decentration, so that now the perspective of other subjects or the position of other objects can be 
taken. Children now possess reflective as well as anticipating imagination, which is the basis of 
the mental representation of all transformations (ibid. 38–59). 
In the third, or formal operational stage after Piaget, structures are formed that enable the 
arrangement and coordination of actions, such as classifications of classifications or operations 
on operations. Besides simple abstractions derived directly from the object, which can be 
assimilated directly, the formal operational stage additionally allows abstractions derived from 
operations. During the course of this reflective abstraction, the characteristics of an action are 
extracted on a first level and then transferred to a second level, where the characteristics are 
reconstructed, submitted to additional thought processes, reflected, and reinforced through the 
operation itself. This opens the possibility of not only mentally acting out specific actions but 
also to develop superordinate meta-theories (ibid. 78–80). The beginning of the formal 
operational stage is assumed to take place between 12–16 years of age. Piaget does not consider 
the age range connected with the onset of the different stages of development to be completely 
fixed. Differences can occur from individual to individual, owing to environmental factors that 
can accelerate or slow down the process. The general sequence of the stages, however, is 
considered to be fixed, since they necessarily build on each other (ibid. 44). 
A central but often neglected aspect of Piaget's theory is the active gain of knowledge. It states 
that learning is more than just the perception of the individual environment and its imaging in a 
neuronal network. Instead, the subject interacts deliberately with chosen objects, transforms 
them, and from this interaction builds new operational structures. Human thinking not only 
discovers reality but transforms and enriches it (ibid. 47). 
As factors of cognitive development Piaget notes maturation and experience, which he 
subdivides into practice; tangible experience, which equals the simple process of abstracting 
objects and leads to a mental differentiation of characteristics; and logical-mathematical 
experience, which stems from the interaction with objects and equals reflective abstraction. 
Thus, experience is partially derived from the object and partially constructed within the 
subject. Further factors are the social environment of the subject as well as progressing self-
regulation, which coordinates maturation, experience, and the influence of the social 
environment to form a consistent entirety (ibid. 62–68). Thus, the understanding of the 
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interdependency of thickness and length of a string of clay during its transformation and the 
reversibility of the transformation process is not a problem of perception but depends on self-
regulation. In this case, the coordination of the factors maturation, experience, and social 
environment leads to a new quality of reasoning thought: in addition to conditions, 
transformations now become conceivable (ibid. 74–75). It follows that the cognitive 
development of the individual after Piaget is neither a merely empirical process discovering an 
external reality, nor is it completely determined by genetics. Rather, it is implemented 
constructively, through the interaction of subject and object, in the active development of 
cognitive structures. 
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9 The Third Dimension: The Evolution of Human 
Thinking as Historical Problem 
The influence of the environment on the evolution of human thinking has so far been subject to 
short treatments in the chapter on the organization of thinking and the discussion of ontogenetic 
development. Human environments differ markedly from those of most animals, because they 
were created to a large extent by our species itself. Other than animal environments, these 
actively designed human “worlds” possess historicity, which is the necessary basis for the 
formation of different groups or “cultures” and their continuation. Humans develop cognitive 
faculties not only along genetically predetermined lines or actively and reactively through 
individual interaction with the environment but also based on a foundation that is established by 
social groups and evolved historically and within a constantly changing, shifting, and growing 
framework. 
Cumulative Cultural Evolution through Cultural Learning 
The evolutionary psychologist Michael Tomasello (2002) agrees with the assumption that the 
beginnings of specifically human cognitive faculties stem from a genetic mutation that 
distinguishes us from all other contemporary species. In contrast to Noam Chomsky (1980), 
Howard Gardner (1991), John Tooby and Leda Cosmides (1989; 1992) and several others (cf. 
Barkow et al. 1992), who all promote the development of human cognition from different, 
independent modules that are supposed to have evolved from multiple genetic mutations, 
Tomasello (2002: 23–25) views most, if not all, species-specific human capabilities not as the 
direct result of specific mutations, but as evolved through historical and ontogenetic processes. 
He considers only one biologically inherited capability, namely that which enables the 
perception of members of the same species as intentionally acting beings, to be the source of the 
cultural transmission of abilities and knowledge and, thus, historical development (fig. 11). 
Cultural-historical processes that build on the accumulation and conservation of collective 
inventiveness can happen in significantly shorter intervals than biological adaptations. This 
cumulative cultural development is caused, on the one hand, by the so-called ratchet effect, 
which enables a progressive building up of innovations and, thus, figuratively speaking, the 
collaboration of different individuals in the solution of a problem over a historical period of 
time, and, on the other hand, by interaction through dialog, where several individuals work 
simultaneously and interactively on the solution of a problem (ibid. 54). The conservation and 
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further development of various innovations in different populations leads to sociogenesis, that 
is, the emergence of different cultural entities or groups. 
Fig. 11 The model of cognitive evolution after Tomasello (2002) 
The accumulation of cultural innovations and adaptations is a historical process that is made up 
of many different individual developments. In turn, the development of an adult individual – a 
phenotype – is the result of an individual process that is based on its genetic make-up with 
influences from its physical and social environment. Thus, cumulative cultural development and 
individual developments or ontogeneses influence each other. Following the dual inheritance 
theory, both biological and cultural inheritance are responsible for the development of mature 
phenotypes in humans. The social or cultural environment is a source of influence in two 
important ways: first, as an environment for individual learning by means of objects, social 
interactions, typical learning experiences, and conclusions, and second – especially among 
humans – as a source of active, interceding education (ibid. 97–98). Human ontogenesis is 
characterized by intensive individual and cultural learning. 
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Mode of learning Form of learning Description 
Physical contact 
with the learning 
situation 
Visiting of special environments with the 
group; different environments with 
different possible tasks or problem 
situations 
Stimulus increase Intensified attention to stimuli from the 
environment through observed 
actions by others  
Imitation Reproduction of the behavior of others 
without understanding of its process or 
effectiveness 
Emulation  Result-oriented learning through the 
example of others without understanding 
of 
the behavioral strategy 
Individual learning: 
Individual forms of learning in a 
social context on the basis of 
orientation or events 
within the environment without the 
perception of others as intentional 
actors  no accumulation of 
knowledge. 
Ontogenetic 
ritualization 
Repetitive social interactions shape the 
behavior of those involved 
(e.g., communicative signals) 
Imitation Reproduction of the behavior of others 
with understanding of the behavioral 
strategy 
Cultural learning:  
Social forms of learning on the basis 
of the perception of others as 
intentional actors 
 accumulation of knowledge. 
Teaching Active instruction of the inexperienced by 
the experienced; attention is actively 
directed and focused 
Table 4 Breakdown of forms of learning after Tomasello (2002) 
These two modes of learning, which can be subdivided into different forms of learning (Table 4; 
ibid. 37, 40–47; see also Tomasello et al. 1987), are, after Tomasello, fundamentally different 
from each other. According to his developmental-psychological studies of learning among 
children and chimpanzees, primates only display individual forms of learning; cultural – and, 
thus, historically accumulating – forms like imitation and teaching are restricted to humans 
only. He views the perception of others as intentional actors, which is the result of a genetic 
mutation in the human lineage, as the basis of these cultural forms of learning. 
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Tool use and culture in chimpanzees are, according to Tomasello (ibid. 40–49), the result of 
individual learning, which is controlled by different local environments. Thus, the development 
of behavior is dependent on the environment. Evident learning by imitation only occurs among 
chimpanzees in close contact with humans; active instruction between two animals, that is, 
teaching, has only been observed very rarely and these instances are still under debate. The 
cultural forms of learning are influenced by certain types of social interaction during early 
ontogenesis: if infant chimpanzees grow up in a cultural environment similar to that of humans, 
the specific socialization of attention leads to the development of more human-like capabilities. 
However, even those animals that grew up under these exceptional circumstances only rarely 
develop attention actively. In their natural environment, chimpanzees cannot develop 
capabilities sufficient for human-like cultural actions or a cumulative cultural evolution. 
The capability to perceive others as acting intentionally and to actively establish divided 
attention based on this fact is innate in humans. Still, it is only when children have developed an 
understanding of purposes as opposed to means through sensorimotor actions of their own that 
they are capable, by means of simulation, to transfer their own inner processes to other 
individuals similar to themselves and subsequently perceive them as intentional actors. This 
perception, after Tomasello, is developed in children as early as 9–12 months of age. Combined 
with the division of attention, it enables triadic behavior, that is, interaction within an 
interrelated triangle composed of the child, an adult person, and an object or event, which forms 
the basis of learning by imitation (ibid. 79–92). 
Tomasello traces the specific potential for interactive learning and the cultural evolution it 
facilitates through the example of the ontogenetic development of language. This example 
clearly demonstrates the cognitive consequences of a biological change – the capability to 
perceive others as acting with a specific purpose in mind – with cultural ratchet effect. The 
perception of others as intentional actors in situations of shared attention allows the 
understanding of the communicative intention of others, as well as a reversal of roles in 
communication. Thus, the foundations are laid for the development of linguistic symbols as 
means of communication that actually can be understood intersubjectively. Without this 
perception, only simple signals can be used that do not allow more than the awareness of the 
own communicative role from an own inner perspective. Yet, human communication processes 
enable the experience of perspectives: depending on the viewpoint or situation, a rose can be a 
flower, a thorny plant, or a present (ibid. 128–29). Children thus not only have to learn the 
functional dimension of words but also the culture-specific intentional dimensions that 
correspond to these terms from different perspectives – that is, the conventions within which 
symbols or words are used. The same holds true for objects or actions: functionally, a brush is a 
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brush, but cultural conventions dictate that a hair brush not be used as a shoe brush, a tooth 
brush, or a toilet brush. 
Words are examples of typically human cultural representations of the environment that stem 
from divided attention and the urge to communicate about it. On the other hand, after 
Tomasello, primates internally only possess sensorimotor representations of the environment, 
such as classification, simple causal consequences, and image schemes. Public symbols shared 
within a group can again be re-classified, and cognitive perceptions themselves become objects 
of attention, contemplation, and mental manipulations (ibid. 149–52). Thus, more complex and 
abstract language constructions besides words, such as grammatical constructions, can be 
identified as symbolic units with their own content of significance. 
Conflicting views expressed in a conversation, such as misunderstandings or differences, create 
meta-speech, the voicing of opinion about an expressed view. In order to dissolve such 
situations, the own thinking has to be viewed from the perspective of the dialog partner. The 
ability to talk about their own contemplations and problem-solving strategies enables 
metacognition and self-regulation in modern humans as early as 5–7 years of age. Both 
concepts allow the use of certain rules in the solution of problems, the repression of 
spontaneous action impulses, as well as meta-memory, for example in the form of planning 
strategies. Through actions with objects and interactions with people the individual collects 
implicit, procedural knowledge. The contemplation of actions or processes and the isolation of 
single, function-specific characteristics permit the reclassification of practical knowledge within 
a system of external, cultural representations. During this process, experiences can be 
synthesized and abstracted by means of systematization and categorization (ibid. 201–27). 
Language plays a triple role in Tomasello's model of the cumulative cultural evolution of human 
thinking. Firstly, as the external representation of the environment, language is a product of 
divided attention and the cultural development ensuing therefrom. Like other cultural products, 
it is subject to the ratchet effect and accumulates innovations. Secondly, language as a symbolic 
artifact can act as a means of reflection, where the objects, actions, and events, as well as 
different views and conventions it represents are mentally categorized, rearranged, and acted 
out. Their abstracted form and enlarged content permit language-based reflections to exceed 
reflections based on strictly sensorimotor representations. Thirdly, language is a tool that 
enables the purposeful division of attention and, thus, facilitates the transmission of cultural 
elements in the environment. Therefore, language as a cultural product accelerates the 
accumulation of knowledge. 
Tomasello places the occurrence of the genetic mutation that enabled the perception of others as 
intentional actors somewhere between 6 and 0.2 million years before present; he assumes the 
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development to be a rather short one (ibid. 13). In his view, this genetic mutation all at once 
allowed for the modern cognitive spectrum, which arose in its contemporary form out of a 
historical-cultural process. 
A very different historical-cultural model of human thinking on the basis of biological changes 
emerges from the philosophical approach of Peter Sloterdijk, which is based on deliberations 
first voiced by Martin Heidegger. Here, the historical dimension is not established through a 
single mutation but rather the concurrence of several different factors of development. 
The Domestication of Being 
In all explanations of the human phenomenon, Peter Sloterdijk (2001) generally detects two 
directions of approach: on the one hand, the mainly philosophical attempt to understand the 
human being on the assumption that the being to be explained has always existed in its present 
form, and, on the other hand, the mainly scientific way of explaining human evolution, where 
the actual human nature is only considered in an unsatisfactory manner. He confronts these 
extreme approaches with a history of hominization where the hominization of pre-humans was 
paralleled by the evolution of our world as we know it. Sloterdijk argues that humans cannot be 
simply assumed in order to find their traces in pre-human stages of evolution, just as the world 
as it appears to contemporary humans cannot be considered immutable. Humanity's exceptional 
position is therefore tightly linked to an easing of environmental pressures and constitutes the 
result of various processes. 
Sloterdijk characterizes the environments of different animal species as a surrounding sphere of 
biologically relevant circumstances and conditions. Within these relevance spheres, the actual 
openness to the world, that is, the part within which thinking and interaction take place, is 
confined to only a small section of the environment (ibid. 162). In contrast, contemporary 
humans have pierced the biologically relevant environmental sphere; they discover the world 
beyond the, for them, biologically significant aspects and create their own, new elements. 
Sloterdijk defines their basic situation as “Being-in-the-World” as opposed to the animal's 
“Possessing-Environment” (ibid. 173). Humans rise above the environment into a self-created 
and constantly expanding world. Between those two extremes of animal Possessing-
Environment and modern human Being-in-the-World, Sloterdijk assumes spheres of 
intermediate worlds that emerged during the course of human evolution. He sees the main 
reason for rising above the environment and, thus, the possible development of humans, in the 
concurrence of four principal mechanisms: insulation, body elimination, neoteny and 
transference. 
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Sloterdijk views insulation as the possible limiting factor in selection pressure, which directs the 
evolution of species to biologically advantageous courses through competing phenotypically 
effective mutations. In large social groups – and, thus, also in humans – a buffer of 
environmentally well-adapted individuals can lead to the development of a kind of internal 
climate. Within the group, and protected by the cooperation of these individuals selected by the 
environment, less well-adapted individuals were also able to survive. Thus, insulation lowers 
threat and adaptation pressure levels for individuals living in the middle of the group, a fact that 
enabled, for example, a longer childhood phase and individual development time leading to an 
extended ontogenesis that partially allowed non-adaptive development (ibid. 176–78). 
The second necessary precondition for hominization after Sloterdijk is body elimination. This 
principle, which Paul Alsberg (1922) noted as the fundamental difference between humans and 
animals, describes the dissociation from nature through tool use, which eliminates the need for 
physical adaptation. Sloterdijk considers the picking up of a stone or other hard materials like 
wood or bone as the primal scene in the bursting of the environmental sphere from an 
evolutionary perspective and, thus, as the beginning of being human. The use of objects leads to 
a reduction of physical contact with parts of the environment and enables positive evasion as an 
alternative to flight and avoidance. In order to cause an environmental change, the actor has to 
notice an opening in the surrounding environmental sphere, where the intended product can be 
perceived as the result of own actions. Within this window also appear the first manufactured 
tools that quasi make humans the co-producers of the opening. The breaking up of the 
environmental sphere and the accompanying distance from nature intensify during the course of 
human evolution: Pre-humans become more active and expansive, their range increases, which 
leads to an interaction between cultural achievements and the channeling of human gene flow 
(Sloterdijk 2001: 179–87). 
Neoteny, the third fundamental factor of hominization after Sloterdijk, builds on the two 
mechanisms mentioned above. Insulation, as postulated, influences selection. It is not the fittest 
in the fight against the environment but the most successful in exploiting the advantages of the 
surroundings that gains a selection advantage within the group. Thus, aesthetically 
advantageous and cognitively prolific variations can spread, as displayed in human neoteny – an 
increasing infantilization that already Louis Bolk (1926) recognized as an essential 
characteristic of the human organism. Birth in increasingly premature condition and the further 
delay of maturation into adulthood lead to an extended childhood period. The typically human 
neotenous body with high cognitive potential becomes possible through the technical control 
over the environment, which creates a kind of incubator. To stabilize and expand this distance 
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from the environment in the long term, control has to be exerted not only over the present but 
also the future environment, i.e., provisions have to be made (ibid. 187–93). 
The fourth mechanism in hominization, after Sloterdijk, is transference. The ability to draw on 
memories and routines enables humans to transfer familiar solutions to new situations. Thus, 
strange, so far inaccessible and rather deterring conditions can be turned into variations of 
known ones (ibid. 207–9). The range of solvable problems can thus be expanded considerably 
by the development of just one new solution. 
After Sloterdijk, the classical dichotomous classification into thoughts and things, mind and 
matter fails with regard to the characterization of cultural phenomena, such as tools, symbols, 
laws, or customs. Rather, he regards these cultural phenomena as a third quality situated 
between those two poles. The thinking process is incorporated with inventories, where it can be 
relocated and further processed. Cultural elements are composed by mental and material 
components and, thus, constitute objectified reflections or information (ibid. 217–18). While the 
animal environment is of a purely material nature and remains separated from the inner 
perceptions and thoughts of individuals, the created “world” is characterized by the 
intermingling of thoughts and objects. 
In his approach, Sloterdijk describes the evolution of the human mind and thinking as a 
fundamentally biological process that is complemented by the generation and functioning of 
(material) culture. It is based on large social groups that, through insulation, provide the 
opportunity for prolonged childhood periods and not necessarily adaptive developments. Within 
these circumstances, parts of the environment can be perceived beyond their biological 
relevance and cultural elements – artifacts – can be manufactured and tested. The transference 
of known problem solving strategies to so far untouched parts of the environment further 
extends the human world. Objects that are used as tools in the solution of problems accompany 
and facilitate this specifically human process of development. Their use leads to a reduced 
selection pressure on specialized physical attributes as well as to an expansion of the range of 
operations into situations that so far could only be met by avoidance or flight. While the animal 
environment rather resembles a backdrop with only few manageable elements, humans 
increasingly extract components from this background and start to interact with them during the 
course of human evolution. The environment as backdrop within which animals act is, thus, 
progressively opened into the world with which humans interact. Within the separate elements 
of this human world, material aspects are linked to thoughts. This opening process, which leads 
from a purely material environment to a world that combines mind with matter, is self-
reinforcing through the interaction of its four basic mechanisms. 
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10 Humans – Thinking – Objects 
Everyone recognizes a human being, even though it is difficult to define by means of individual 
characteristics. Physical attributes are easier to identify but they do not describe the essence of 
humans.  Criteria of the mind, however, are very diverse and its products may vary according to 
cultures. Whether humans get assigned an absolute exceptional position within or even outside 
the animal kingdom based on these anatomical, physiological, genetic, and mental attributes or 
are considered another animal species in a circle of closer and farther relationships lastly 
remains a matter of definition that cannot be conclusively decided by arguments alone. 
Even more difficult than to answer the question “What is a human?” – where at least the 
diversity of our modern world's population can be brought up as a reference – is to find a 
response to the question “When do humans first appear?” The sources to consider are limited to 
rare and fragmented fossil remains that constitute the compendium of a small selection of 
physical features as well as the material products of the cognitive abilities of early human 
populations – which in turn are limited to the small percentage that has been materialized, 
buried, preserved, rediscovered, and recognized as mental products. Taxonomically, the 
beginnings of being human can be pinned down through physical attributes – any specimen that 
can be identified as belonging to the species Homo is human. However, the term “human” can 
be stretched to also include our last common ancestors with chimpanzees and bonobos, or even 
incorporate these primates within the human species (Homo; Cela-Conde 1998; Wildman et al. 
2003). On the other hand, “true” humans can also be limited to anatomically modern Homo 
sapiens sapiens displaying modern symbolic behavior, which begins to occur more frequently 
starting around 40,000 years before present. The phylogenetic depth of humans is even more a 
question of selection and interpretation of data and the significance that is assigned to their 
interpretation than the distinction of contemporary humans. 
Analogous to the various definitions of humans, cognition also is portrayed in different ways. Is 
thinking a process that is structured functionally along innate lines and then adapted to specific 
neuronal conditions? Do the anatomical structure of the brain and the organization and 
functionality of the mind constitute relatively independent units that can be compared to the 
hardware and software of a computer, as cognitivistic models suggest? Are cerebral functions 
on the cellular level synonymous with thinking processes, the network structures of which only 
develop during the course of human life, as connectionistic emergence models postulate? Or is 
neither of these models sufficient to explain human cognition and does the active role in the 
selection of perceptions and the construction of information need to be emphasized, as the world 
construction models assume? From all these different cognition models three developmental 
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dimensions of thinking and different approaches to the origin of the fully developed – adult – 
human mind emerge. Theories centered on phylogeny place emphasis on the evolution of innate 
structures, whether they are anatomical or psychological-organizational. Theories centered on 
individual development focus on ontogenetic development, which, although it is based on 
genetic foundations, is heavily influenced by the actual environment and individual experiences. 
The third dimension of development in humans is historical: we increasingly actively alter  the 
surroundings that affect us, thus creating a cultural world that is passed on to future generations 
as a habitat. 
During the course of human evolution, from the last common ancestor of primates and humans 
to modern Homo sapiens sapiens, the physical foundations of cognitive faculties have evolved. 
The brain has increased in relative size and absolute in relation to body weight, possibly at the 
expense of the gastro-intestinal system and furthered by a high-energy diet. Besides size, 
primate brains also exhibit other specific qualitative and quantitative characteristics, such as 
differentiation of the cortex, neuronal density, neuropsychological mapping of specific 
capabilities, and varying amounts of different neurotransmitters – all in great individual 
varieties within the different species. The comparison of mass parameters, such as brain 
volume, brain weight, or encephalization quotient, are thus not comparisons of otherwise equal 
units. Moreover, they display no clear correlations, let alone causal relations, to behavioral 
characteristics and cognitive potential (cf. Holloway 1972: 188–89). 
During the course of human evolution, brain growth largely shifted to an extended post-natal 
period. Certain parts of the brain have relatively increased more than others: The cerebellum is 
slightly enlarged in comparison to other primate species and the percentage of the cerebral 
cortex has increased significantly. The prefrontal cortex and the Broca and Wernicke areas are 
more pronounced, although it can only be said that an increase in size and a shift in proportions 
occurred. The immediate cognitive consequences and the evolutionary causes of this change can 
only be speculated upon. The same applies for the evaluation of modifications to individual 
genes, such as the language-relevant FOXP2 gene, the selection conditions and significance of 
phenotypical characteristics of which have to remain largely speculative; the same applies to the 
observed general increase of gene activity in the human brain. 
The difficulty of establishing relations to the phylogenetic development of the organization and 
functionality of the human mind does not only stem from our rather cursory knowledge of 
physical development processes, their causes, and their effects on cognitive behavior. Apart 
from the connectionistic models on a cellular level, we are also largely missing models for 
modern humans that could provide a correlation between contemporary anatomical, 
physiological, and genetic characteristics and the organization of the mind and mental 
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processes, which go beyond the localization of specific cognitive processes in the brain. The 
answers to the question whether the organization of human thinking is modular or rather 
generalized with a possible pivotal point – whether that be language or expanded consciousness 
– seem to float in strangely empty space, mere developmental-psychological constructs with 
few links to other areas. 
Observations on the localization of brain functions, the failure of specific functions, indicators 
of the genetic fixation of individual cognitive domains like language, and talents based on 
cognition but independent from each other suggest a modular structure of the human mind. 
However, studies on the regeneration of damaged brains and clearly delimited modern 
functions, such as the ability to speak, write, and do maths, indicate that cognitive areas were 
not genetically selected as defined modules with specific functions. Possible explanations for 
this combination of phenomena include, for example, exaptation, which denotes the use of a 
functional unit for a different purpose than the one that initially let to its selection (Gould and 
Vrba 1982), and the adaptation of the brain to specific environmental tasks through practice, 
where the plasticity of the human brain may possibly be furthered by general factors like 
increased gene activity. 
While the different models of the organization of human thinking and its phylogenetic evolution 
remain largely divergent and hypothetical, language emerges as the common element of typical 
human thinking. Whether human language capacity has to be viewed as the cause or the result 
of the evolutionary process, whether the abilities necessary for the complete mastery of 
language, such as symbolic coding, grammatical structuring, and the perception of others as 
intentional actors, evolved concurrently, consecutively, or independently up to the ultimately 
sufficient variation, and what consequences the evolution of these capabilities had on other 
cognitive areas has to remain open for the time being. However, the fact that language is a key 
factor in human ontogenesis and the development of culture is undeniable. Language is a 
cognitive product that, being part of the created lived-in world, acts as an environment. As a 
means of communication, it also serves as a tool in our supra-individual dealings with our 
physical and mental surroundings. 
Models that focus on the ontogenetic dimension of the development of human cognition 
emphasize the practical side of interaction with the environment, with members of the same 
species, or with objects when it comes to the stimulation or development of cognitive 
operations. Language enables detailed supra-individual communication, so that the experiences 
of others without own participation and with spatial and temporal distance can be incorporated 
into thinking and learning processes. At the same time, language is treated as an object and part 
of the surroundings in itself. Depending on the actual environment, an individual undergoing 
10 Humans – Thinking – Objects 96
ontogenesis can and has to confront various elements, with the result that environments created 
or changed by humans entail vastly divergent experiences. 
The formation of the environment lies at the core of the third, historical dimension of cognitive 
evolution. This dimension is facilitated by phylogenetic changes, although for the time being it 
is unclear which. Possible initial factors include the perception of others as intentional actors, 
language, language-related offline-thinking without direct external action context, the 
progression of executive brain functions, and a fundamental structural change in the neuronal 
network. Additionally, other, general factors that take effect gradually and with increasing 
interaction with the environment, such as increased gene activity in the brain, increasing 
neoteny, or extended brain growth after birth, are conceivable as fundamental driving forces. 
The historical dimension of cognitive evolution nowadays can be mainly observed in humans. 
However, rudiments are also found among chimpanzees and orangutans that display group 
characteristics which can be explained culturally, even if the active transmission of cultural 
elements is still missing, as is an active, supra-individual confrontation with experiences or 
problems perceived in the environment. 
Products of cultural behavior are artificial material and mental objects. They aid in partial body 
elimination and artificial body expansion. Their design, manufacture, and use are associated 
with a dissociation from the environment that can be of a direct physical (e.g., Bolk 1962; 
Sloterdijk 2001) or reflexive nature (e.g., Bickerton 1995; Donald 2001). The thinking process 
and its subsequent actions are partially suspended from the immediate external problem context. 
This indirect approach may make individual elements of mental operations and physical actions 
seem pointless when viewed separately, but it will still achieve its objective, the solution of 
problems, when those elements are combined. The perception of intermediate steps as elements 
that lead to a successful conclusion enables the temporal delay of observed problems, thus 
leaving new scope for thinking and action and ultimately leading to the solution of so far 
unsolvable problems (cf. Köhler 1963). The increasing breakup of a direct link between a 
specific action and the achievement of a goal is also expressed in the transfer of existing 
complex solution strategies to the solution of new problems (cf. Sloterdijk 2001). The physical 
and reflexive dissociation from the environment and the transfer strategy are not exclusive but 
certainly prominent human characteristics that are displayed widely in artifacts and their use. 
A common characteristic of products of cultural behavior and artifacts is that they constitute 
external representations of cognitive processes and as such can again become the objective of 
thinking processes. Thus, the manufacture of and the interaction with cultural objects expands 
the basis of meta-reflections, that is, the contemplation of thinking processes, which then – like 
actions – not only can be carried out impulsively but also controlled actively. Within the context 
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of increasingly past-oriented reflection on already executed operations the future-oriented 
contemplation of possible actions – mind games and planning – also becomes possible. The 
perception of others as individuals with their own intentions furthermore enables the conception 
of actions within an action triangle composed of the subject, another person, and an object. 
Imitation and teaching are rooted in such triadic constellations, where divided attention is 
directed towards a material or mental object or event (Tomasello 2002). These forms of cultural 
learning are shortcuts in individual learning, since no longer every individual has to experience 
certain situations and devise their own, individual solutions. Rather, the culturally transmitted 
supra-individual approaches form the basis for further development. 
Besides the improved transmission of knowledge within one generation, from older to younger 
generations and vice versa, as well as the preservation of supra-individual group knowledge 
over several generations, human cognition is characterized by the ratchet effect. This 
mechanism not only enables the collection and preservation of behavioral and object 
innovations but also allows for their expansion and modification. Thus, the solution of a 
problem can be refined through generations by the accumulation of individual achievements; 
the development of knowledge turns into a historical process. The individual creation of small 
openings in the animal environment by means of the purposeful use of individual elements leads 
to the progressive widening of possible ranges of action and thought by historical accumulation 
– the creation of a world in Sloterdijk's terms (2001). 
Owing to the possibility of three-dimensional development – phylogeny, ontogenesis, and 
cultural-historic dimension – human cognitive space can expand exponentially (fig. 12). Within 
this process, cultural-historic development generates a special, self-reinforcing dynamic owed to 
the ratchet effect. When did this historical development actually take place? Tomasello (2002) 
assumes it beginnings sometime between six million and 200,000 years before present without 
elaborating on the structure of this cultural-historic development and its disposable time frame. 
Slotherdijk (2001) envisions a rather early beginning, which he equates with the first purposeful 
seizing of an object. Bickerton's theory on the evolution of language (1995), on the other hand, 
suggests a late start coinciding with the appearance of Homo sapiens sapiens. In contrast to the 
authors mentioned above, Donald (2001) proposes an evolution of cognition, as evidenced by 
cultural remains, in three stages; he dates its beginnings to around two million years before 
present and links it to the appearance of the species Homo and its assumed imitative 
capabilities. The first, mimetic stage is replaced around 500,000–400,00 years before present by 
the mythic stage, which is characterized by the development of language capacity. Around 
40,000 years before present, the third, symbolic stage commences, which is defined by the 
symbolic externalization of thoughts. But what is the actual evidence for these chronological 
postulates? 
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Fig. 12 The three dimensions of human cognitive evolution and the cognitive space they form. 
The cultural-historic dimension of human cognitive evolution is accompanied by language and 
other mental and material artifacts. Numerous correlations between these two groups of cultural 
products have been observed, but whether there exist causal relations and, if so, how far they 
go, is still a matter of controversy. Thus, it makes little sense to comb the material remains of 
early human forms for traces of linguistic expressiveness and cogitation. However, the artifacts 
themselves can be studied as the autonomous products of cultural-historic cognitive processes 
without unduly expanding their significance into other domains. 
The fact that object behavior plays a pivotal role in the evolution of human cognition is 
corroborated by various indicators. Conceptual disorders in the sequential organization of 
movements in the purposeful interaction with objects (ideatoric apraxia) can be localized as 
specific function areas in the temporo-parietal region of the language-dominant brain 
hemisphere. Thus, object behavior is a clearly defined cognitive area that is evidently connected 
with the language-related organization of the brain. During the ontogenesis of modern humans, 
the practical interaction with objects is regarded as crucial for the gain of knowledge about and 
the understanding of one's self and the environment. Last, but not least, it is artifacts – 
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manufactured mental and material objects – that constitute the culturally created world of 
humans. 
Thus, object behavior not only is part of the organization of the mind but also participates in the 
building of cognitive functions during individual life and active world-making. Owing to this 
connection with the three spheres of cognition theory and the conclusive link to at least the 
ontogenetic and historic dimensions of of cognitive evolution, object behavior is ideally suited 
as the empirical basis of a study on the development of human thinking. How object behavior as 
a cognitive parameter developed during the course of hominization is best demonstrated by 
means of the archaeological study of prehistoric remains. The following section introduces 
approaches to the establishment of an analytical framework that can interpret prehistoric finds 
and findings in relation to cognition. 
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III The Search for Cognition in Archaeological 
Remains 
11 How to Extract Thinking from Artifacts 
Prehistoric archaeological research uses artifacts – objects and features created by humans – as 
its primary source. Their interpretation is based on the fundamental assumption that they were 
produced intentionally: conscious and unconscious mental decisions dictated their manufacture 
in this specific way and not another. On this basis, prehistoric research pursues typological 
approaches to the differentiation of groups and the establishment of relative chronologies, and 
technological approaches that illuminate the history of how the technical knowledge of early 
populations was applied to the manufacture of objects. Research focusing on functional aspects 
deals with the probable and actual use of artifacts, while spatial approaches try to discover 
spatial and stratigraphical structures and relations. Those four methodological approaches, 
which are closely connected to the material aspects of prehistoric remains, form the core of 
prehistoric archaeology. Social and cognitive aspects, on which the artifacts can also inform, 
can typically not be extrapolated from the immediate find context or the description of a 
complete object or its significant details, but have to be deduced through a more interpretative 
approach. Despite sometimes vivid discussions during the last decades, these rather peripheral 
areas of archaeology are only slowly gaining importance. 
The introduction to a discussion panel in the Cambridge Archaeological Journal (issue 3/2, 
1993: 247) subsumes the cognitive approach to archaeology as follows: “Cognitive 
archaeology…should be that part of archaeology which deals with concepts and perception. In 
an archaeological context this may be taken to cover the whole spectrum of human behaviour, 
with especial reference to religion and belief, symbolism and iconography, and the development 
and expression of human consciousness.” The main topics of cognitive archaeology have 
surfaced repeatedly ever since archaeology emerged as a field of scientific study, but were 
rarely the goal of deliberate research. The first systematic studies on the cognitive foundations 
of archaeological phenomena stem from the 1960s and 70s (e.g., Leroi-Gourhan 1967; Flannery 
and Marcus 1976; Wynn 1979). “Cognitive archaeology,” a term in use since the 1980s, first 
emerged as a line of research in the 1990s, mainly in the United Kingdom and the United States. 
However, its focal points of interest and its methodological approaches to the extraction of 
cognitive information from artifacts remain inconsistent, owing to its widely differing 
theoretical foundations. 
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Searching for Objective Universalities: Processual Archaeology 
The 1960s and 70s witnessed the emergence, primarily in the United States, of the theoretically 
based processual or New Archaeology, whose main, positivist goal is to unearth universally 
valid facts on human behavior. Its process-oriented and functionalist approach is closely 
modeled on the scientific method. The aim is to test hypotheses and arrive at objective results 
by use of neutral and theory-independent empirical data. Refined excavation methods and 
documentation, quantitative procedures and statistical analysis all help to objectify the data 
collection process as much as possible. Questions exceptionally suited to this intended 
generalization deal with the environment, settlements, and subsistence, and are approached 
through technological studies, use-wear analysis, studies on find distribution and composition, 
ethnoarchaeological comparisons, and archaeological experiments of the cultural material 
remains. 
New Archaeology considers humans as mammals in their natural environment, whose behavior 
is determined by their surroundings. The significance of human decisions and, consequently, 
fundamental cognitive processes has been pushed back to the point where human actions can 
only be interpreted in a  behavioristic manner as automatic reactions to certain external stimuli. 
Sometimes, human evolution is interpreted as a progressive sequence of socioeconomic phases 
of organization that – analogous to natural evolution – are necessarily based on each other 
(Whitley 1998a: 3–6). If cognitive processes as aspects of the development of material remains 
are accepted at all, as some more moderate proponents of New Archaeology concede, they are 
either considered as conditions peripheral to the main influential economic or environmental 
pressures, or as objectively not subsumable. Processual archaeology explicitly incorporates the 
natural environment and the physical evolution of humans into its interpretations, since they 
provide the context of human material expressions. Social and cognitive aspects of human 
object behavior, however, are largely excluded as scientifically not identifiable (Flannery and 
Marcus 1993). 
Cognitive Influences: Structural Approaches and Postprocessual 
Archaeology 
The fundamental objection to the study of the cognitive foundations of human actions as 
expressed in processual archaeology and the mainly typology-centered European archaeological 
approaches led to a counter-movement that set out to search for just these connections. As early 
as the 1960s, André Leroi-Gourhan (1967) applied anthropological structural ideas to the study 
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of Palaeolithic art. Structuralism considers the human mind and its organizational principles as 
the basis of all artifacts – social organization and myths as well as three-dimensional objects – 
deeming no artifact category more important than another and positing that all categories can be 
the subject of research. Mark P. Leone (1982: 742) explains the basic principles of structuralist 
archaeology as follows: “…first, that all objects in a particular culture are equal with respect to 
the overall organization and coherence of the total structure of that culture. And second, while 
the details and particulars of a past culture may be lost, the principles of that organization, or 
structure, may be suggested through what remains.” During the early 1980s, structuralism was 
taken up by Ian Hodder, among others. At the same time, the first theoretical studies on the 
newly awakened interest in cognitive aspects of the human past were published (e.g., Leone 
1982; 1986). Structuralism and cognitive theory, ideology as expressed in materialist-Marxist 
approaches, and the conscious approach to history, which later expanded into Critical 
Archaeology, are all subsumed as topics in the research of the human mind. The direct 
confrontation of objects as the physical combination of mind and matter was relegated to the 
background; phylogenetic approaches were not part of the main sphere of interest. 
From these approaches, Postprocessual or Interpretative Archaeology emerged during the 1980s 
and 90s (Shanks and Hodder 1995; Whitley 1998a: 8–13). It defines itself as the critique of 
processual New Archaeology and vehemently rejects positivism as well as behaviorism. In 
contrast to Processual Archaeology, which focuses on environmental influences, the 
postprocessual approach is oriented mainly towards culture and society. Instead of looking for 
universally valid answers, the individual and its characteristics are centered upon – as a research 
subject as well as researchers and interpreters of the past. Since already the sampling of data 
negates their theory-independent existence, postprocessual archaeology does not recognize the 
scientific method as an objective procedure. And since interpretation in archaeology constitutes 
a process in itself, there is no such thing as a definitive past. Based on this relativistic point of 
view, postprocessual archaeology aims for multivocality, as expressed by the varied 
sociocultural backgrounds of researchers and the different approaches employed – including 
cognitive interpretation. On the philosophical side, the postprocessual approach is heavily 
influenced by hermeneutics, the study of interpretation and comprehension theory. As such, one 
of its central concepts is the significance of cultural expressions, which can only be revealed 
through the understanding of an artifact's cultural and historical context. Thus, the processual 
search for general scientific causality is supplanted by the individuality of a cultural 
phenomenon within its historical context. In contrast to the prevalence of economic, settlement, 
and environmental questions in Processual Archaeology, Postprocessual emphases are on power 
relations and symbolic systems in art, religion, and the styling and ornamentation of material 
goods. The assumed historical individuality of cultural phenomena leads to a general rejection 
of diachronic comparisons – such as the one that, for example, Leroi-Gourhan (1964; 1967) was 
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trying to find. Although the mental aspects of object behavior are accepted as important cultural 
elements, the cognitive evolution of humans is not deemed accessible within postprocessual 
archaeology. 
A Melting Pot of Cognitive Approaches: Anglo-American Cognitive 
Archaeology 
“Cognitive Archaeology” itself also formed as a response to New Archaeology, but its rejection 
of processual approaches is less extreme than within postprocessual archaeology. Like the latter, 
cognitive archaeology is mainly culture-oriented. It focuses on the cognitive processes that lie 
behind the material remains and searches the human mind for explanations of behavioral 
strategies and their material expression in artifacts (Whitley 1998a). This line of research is not 
based on a unified theory and its development was undefined and unsystematic (Flannery and 
Marcus 1993: 260). Five contributions to “Viewpoint: What is cognitive archaeology?” 
published in the Cambridge Archaeological Journal (issue 3/2, 1993: 247–70) mirror this 
diverse understanding of Cognitive Archaeology. Colin Renfrew (1993) defines it as a 
cognitive-processual approach that runs parallel to postprocessualism. He rejects the validity of 
a number of postprocessual characteristics, such as relativism, the refusal to generalize, the lack 
of explicit methodology, and the interpretative approach for cognitive archaeology. In his 
opinion, the main question in cognitive-processual archaeology is not what earlier populations 
were thinking, since the ancient significance of objects and symbols is difficult to establish, but 
how – how were cultural expressions used in their specific individual context? Additionally, 
Renfrew detects two key aspects of Cognitive Archaeology. One is concerned with the 
connection between cognition and tool production as well as language evolution during the 
course of human evolution, the other is focused on the study of cultural changes among modern 
humans, such as sedentarization, the formation of cities and states, the emergence of agriculture, 
writing, metallurgy, and organized religion and ideologies. In contrast to postprocessual 
archaeology, aspects of economic and settlement history are not rejected but incorporated and 
elaborated upon through the study of their cognitive foundations. 
In his definition of Cognitive Archaeology, Christopher Peebles (1993) stresses the importance 
of mental capacities and the knowledge that was applied to mastering the respective natural and 
social environments of prehistoric societies. The study of these aspects is based on the cultural 
remains that mirror the use of this knowledge. Peebles rejects the narrative and relativistic 
approach of postprocessual archaeology. By contrast, Cognitive Archaeology should try to link 
the three worlds inhabited by humans as defined by Karl Popper – 1. all living and non-living 
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things; 2. emotions and self-perception; 3. the respective group-specific knowledge – since they 
do not exist independently from each other. 
Following Ian Hodder (1993), Cognitive Archaeology works  with the symbolic and structural 
content of material remains, incorporates their social and historical context, proceeds 
hermeneutically in the search for the significance of artifacts within this context, and interprets. 
However, he rejects cognitive-processual approaches despite strong content-related similarities. 
His criticism of these approaches focuses on their positivist method, which calls for the testing 
of hypotheses against objective data, and the lack of attention to hermeneutic problems in the 
translation between different significance levels. Hodder suggests studying cognition only in 
connection with the respective society and the social significance of its artifacts. He deems the 
mere analysis of structures and value systems as insufficient, since it can only expose existing 
variability without contributing to the understanding of its underlying causes. But the 
knowledge that an individual can access is always also characterized by a social framework: the 
rules, limits, and proclivities of a society. Hodder detects three forms of socially influenced 
cognition in archaeology: 1. linguistic cognition, which applies to all sign systems that are 
organized by rules and thus further communication, like language, writing, and material 
symbols; 2. practical cognition, which subsumes movements, technological knowledge, and 
emotions; and 3. the thinking of archaeologists themselves. 
Barbara Bender (1993) does not recognize Cognitive Archaeology as an independent line of 
research but sees it merely as a form of cultural materialism. While she concedes the necessity 
of increased attention by archaeologists to their own role and the perception of their own 
subjectivity, as postprocessual cognitive archaeology demands, she views the resulting liberal 
multivocality as subject to possible arbitrariness, where the individual autonomy it expresses 
only reflects the political system of the western world. Thus, Bender focuses mainly on the 
question of power – in prehistoric societies as well as in modern academia. Cognitive 
Archaeology helps to identify power structures in prehistoric societies; physical structures like 
hillforts, enclosures, and ditch systems can express power by the way they include or exclude, 
signify permission or prohibition, limit, or exert pressure. 
As extreme representatives of a processual cognitive approach, Kent Flannery and Joyce 
Marcus (1993) view Cognitive Archaeology as a complement to basic subsistence and 
settlement archaeology. Its key points of research are, in their opinion, all those aspects that 
stem from the human mind, such as cosmology, religion, ideology – expressed in concepts, 
philosophy, ethics, and values –, iconography, and all other forms of intellectual and symbolic 
behavior. Flannery and Marcus stress that these topics are not peripheral phenomena, but often 
form the basis of an understanding of subsistence and settlement behavior and changes therein. 
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They reject the notion of “Cognitive Archaeology” as a separate line of research and argue for a 
generally more holistic approach, since studying the cognitive foundations of material 
phenomena, where applicable, is part of every archaeologist's task. Topics like cosmology, 
religion, and ideology, however, can only be studied under methodologically rigorous 
conditions and in cases where sufficient background information, such as historical documents 
from within or outside the studied group, is available. 
Taken together, the five positions expressed in “Viewpoint: What is cognitive archaeology?” 
published in the Cambridge Archaeological Journal (issue 3/2, 1993: 247–70) do not offer a 
clear definition of the theoretical and methodological lines along which Cognitive Archaeology 
is structured – quite contrary to the situation in Processual and Postprocessual Archaeology. 
Rather, it resembles a patchwork of different directions taken in the assessment of its key topic: 
the mental foundations of archaeological remains. On the one hand, Cognitive Archaeology is 
considered an extension of Processual Archaeology, when dealing with the causative 
explanation of behavior in economy and settlement organization, although environmental and 
behavioral explanations are rejected. On the other hand, there is a distinct overlap of cognitive 
and postprocessual interests and lines of research on such topics as cosmology, religion, 
ideology, value systems, iconography, and symbolic behavior. Consequently, postprocessual 
archaeologists often assume that Cognitive Archaeology can be equated with Postprocessual 
Archaeology if its processual elements are rejected. A third line of research is concerned with 
the cognitive evolution of humans; it expands on the primarily scientific research in hominid 
evolution and generally follows processual procedures. 
From Theory to Practice in Cognitive Archaeology 
When considering recent publications with cognitive archaeological content (e.g., Gibson and 
Ingold 1993; Lock et al. 1994; Renfrew and Zubrow 1994; Mellars and Gibson 1996; Mithen 
1996; Renfrew and Scarre 1998), rather than the associated theoretical discussion, it becomes 
increasingly clear that Cognitive Archaeology incorporates processual as well as postprocessual 
elements and does not view itself as an extension of an archaeology primarily concerned with 
settlement and subsistence questions. Rather, it constitutes its own line of research, the key 
interest of which lies in studying the development of human thinking – an original approach not 
covered by other lines of research. In the chapter “What did they think? Cognitive archaeology, 
art, and religion” of their popular textbook, Archaeology: Theories, Methods and Practice, 
Colin Renfrew and Paul Bahn (2000: 385) call for the development of explicit procedures in the 
study of concepts and ways of thinking within early societies. When dealing with the evolution 
III The Search for Cognition in Archaeological Remains 107
of human thinking, models derived from developmental psychology are often used as a basis, 
and archaeological remains are sifted for their equivalents. Examples of this practice include 
Jean Piaget's theories on logical and spatial intelligence (see Piaget 1985), used in the works of 
Thomas Wynn (1979; 1981; 1985); Howard Gardner's model of multiple intelligences (1991) in 
the studies of Kate Robson Brown on early Palaeolithic artifacts (1993); and the studies by John 
Tooby and Leda Cosmides (1989; 1992) and Annette Karniloff-Smith (1992) on the transition 
from specific intelligences for certain areas of knowledge to a generalized intelligence, which 
influenced the writings of Steven Mithen (1994; 1996). 
In an epistemological assessment of studies on Palaeolithic cognition, Isabelle Saillot et al. 
(2002) detect three core themes: 
1. The search for indicators of modern cognitive capacities, where the evaluation of the same 
indicators varies according to the initial view taken ( “capability x is recent”; “capability x is 
old”). 
2. The reconstruction of the development of cognitive capacities, which is either approached as 
a theoretical question, as a matter of tool development, or is summarily rejected. 
3. The development of models of cognitive capacities during the Palaeolithic. While some 
researchers deem this development basically impossible, others insist on new, specific 
approaches, since they consider models developed for modern humans as non-transferable to 
animals or pre-modern humans. A third group considers the deduction of Palaeolithic cognition 
models from modern ones as feasible. 
After Saillot, it is not possible to compare the different studies on Palaeolithic cognition 
directly, since the terminology they employ is derived in part from different fundamental 
concepts that are often not clearly defined. For example, the term “planning,” as used in the 
context of tool manufacture, describes a mental concept of sequential actions and thus differs 
from “planning” in terms of subsistence, or the spatial planning of settlements or temple 
compounds. The approaches also differ in their fundamental theoretical views of the 
development of the human mind – genetic, cognitivistic, looking for increasing complexity, 
focused on primatology or zoology in general – and their assumption of what constitutes typical 
human behavior (e.g., language, symbolism, complex behavior, or no special characteristics). 
The choice of the method of research and the archaeological material considered as relevant is 
completely dependent on the choice of approach (ibid., 9). 
The main chronological focus of publications dealing with the development of human thinking 
and often covering the cognitive-archaeological angle only by implication is centered upon the 
transition from the Middle to the Late Palaeolithic; thematically, the focus is on the first 
appearance of modern cognitive capabilities. All those publications suffer from a lack of 
11 How to Extract Thinking from Artifacts 108
explicit methodology, as criticized by the processualists, combined with a lack of attempts to 
arrive at more profound interpretations, as the postprocessualists criticize. Instead, although 
approaching the topic from different angles, these studies all enumerate more or less the same 
indicators for or against a cognitive or symbolic and/or linguistic revolution around 50,000–
40,000 years before present (Chase and Dibble 1987; Trinkaus 1989; Binford 1989; Whallon 
1989; Mellars and Stringer 1989; Hayden 1993; Klein 1995; Noble and Davidson 1996; Mellars 
1991; 1996; Otte 2001; Coolidge ans Wynn 2001; Klein and Edgar 2002; Mellars 2005). With a 
few exceptions, such as Mithen (1994; 1996) or Coolidge and Wynn (2001), no cognitive 
explanation of the postulated symbolic revolution is provided, apart from the merely conjectural 
argument of a sudden and not further specified genetic mutation, which for example Klein and 
Edgar (2002) put forward. Alternate approaches to the development and early use of material 
symbolic systems in Palaeolithic times are missing. Colin Renfrew's fundamental critique 
(1996), namely, that the presented indicators of changes accompanied by a cognitive revolution 
are sparse and often include circular arguments, still applies. His ensuing demand for the 
development of more effective methods for the study of cognitive processes should be taken as 
an incentive to further methodological and theoretical developments within Cognitive 
Archaeology. 
The French Way: The Technological Concept of chaînes opératoires
and the schéma conceptuel 
Parallel to the Anglo-American discussions of Cognitive Archaeology between processualism 
and postprocessualism, another cognitive-archaeological line of research, this one based on 
ethnological approaches (Lemonnier 1983; Karlin et al. 1991), emerged in France during the 
1980s (Pelegrin 1985; 1990; 1991; Pelegrin et al. 1988; Nelson 1991; Sellet 1993). Based on 
technological processes that are interpreted as action chains – chaînes opératoires – it attempts 
to approach the thinking processes these chains are based upon – the schéma conceptuel; its 
main employ is in the study of Palaeolithic groups (e.g., Geneste 1985; Ploux 1989; Boëda et al. 
1990; Saillot 2002; Boëda 2005). Ideally, all technical and decision processes that occur during 
the “lifetime” of an artifact – from the selection of the raw material through the manufacture of 
its basic form, its modification by shaping or remodeling, to its final discarding – can be 
recorded as a chaînes opératoires, i.e.,  organized chains of individual actions (fig. 13). Within 
archaeology, stone tools constitute an ideal data set, since they occur frequently and are mostly 
resistant to erosion, so that even the debitage from their manufacturing process can be recorded, 
and reconstitution allows an almost unbroken reconstruction of subsequent actions. 
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Chaîne opératoire of blade production in 
Magdalenian sites of the Paris Basin  
(after Adouze et al. 1988 in Eriksen 2000) 
1. Procurement 
2. Testing of raw 
material 
3. Initial dressing 
4. Shaping of core 
regarding volume 
and axis of flaking 
5. Preparation of 
striking platform 
6. Removal of a 
primary cortical flake 
R  Touching-up of the core 
shape 
L       Removal of flakes 
7. Touching-up of the 
striking platform  
8. Modification of the 
striking platform / 
redirection of flaking 
9. Raw material 
exhausted 
10. Damage / accident 
11. Further exploitation 
uneconomical 
12. Discarding 
Process, Action: 
Indirectly present in the  
inventory available for  
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At this point the knapper  
has to make a decision  
between different possible  
actions 
Direction of process or  
transformation 
1
4
6
L
nL
12
5
6
L
nL
7
P
R
Ä
P
A
R
A
T
IO
N
A
B
S
C
H
L
A
G
S
E
R
IE
2
3
R
R
8 54
10 119
A
B
S
C
H
L
A
G
S
E
R
IE
W
IE
D
E
R
H
O
L
U
N
G
 B
IS
 V
E
R
W
E
R
F
U
N
G
Fig. 13 Example of a chaîne opératoire (after Adouze et al. 1988, in Eriksen 2000: fig. 6). 
Karlin and Julien (1994), van der Leuw (1994), and Schlanger (1994) all incorporate the 
theoretical background of the chaînes opératoires concept with their derived conclusions and 
thus place the detailed recording of technological and associated concepts within the realm of 
Cognitive Archaeology. Thus, after Lemonnier (1990), the processes and techniques within a 
given group constitute social products: they are the materialization of socially acquired 
concepts. Accordingly, Boëda (1990) views the Levallois flaking technique not merely as a 
certain method to produce flakes but as the expression of a distinct concept (schéma conceptuel) 
of cores possessing a striking platform for the desired flakes. It follows that the Late 
Palaeolithic is not characterized by the final blade product, but by a different core concept that 
allows for three-dimensional instead of two-dimensional reduction. 
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Pelegrin (1990; 1991) distinguishes between connaissances, the conceptual knowledge or 
mental representation of ideal forms and materials within a group, and savoir-faire, the 
technical knowledge about the mental and physical execution of a process. Connaissances and 
savoir-faire – concepts and methods – together form a techno-psychological axis, while a 
techno-sociological axis including cultural, spatial, and economical interdependencies 
influences the application of this knowledge. Besides conceptual and technological knowledge, 
Sylvie Ploux (1989; Pelegrin 1990) additionally acknowledges the intention to act and the 
mastering of the execution as further independent factors in tool production. In her analysis of 
the Magdalenian site at Pincevent, she recognizes not only different levels of competence – 
beginners, ordinary knappers, and specialists – but also two different percussion techniques: 
tools intended for future, i.e., delayed, use were standardized and only produced by specialists, 
while tools intended for immediate use were also manufactured by less experienced individuals. 
A similar teaching/learning situation is found in the silex inventory of the Magdalenian station 
Etiolles, according to M. Olive (1988) and Nicole Pigeot (1990). 
This rather technologically oriented French line of research has so far gained little access into 
Anglo-American dominated Cognitive Archaeology, even though it constitutes one of the 
stipulated methods in the research of prehistoric concepts. Similarly, the theoretical approach to 
Cognitive Archaeology has met with only minimal notice in France and Central Europe. One 
result of this non-ideological approach to specifically human behavior and the method of 
process description is that the concept of  chaînes opératoires could be transferred to animal 
tool production (Beyris and Joulian 1990; Joulian 1996); thus, human cognition derived from 
artifacts can be considered on a directly comparable level. 
The different theoretical foundations and methodological approaches to the extraction of 
cognitive components in archaeological inventories show a very heterogeneous picture. Their 
lowest common denominator is the certainty that artifacts constitute the realization of ideas in 
objects. The answers to whether these cognitive elements are, in fact, accessible and how this 
access can be realized, are as diverse as those to the questions about the physical and psychical 
basis of human cognition and its nature in the approaches of the cognitive sciences, philosophy, 
psychology, neuroanatomy, and genetics. 
The following chapter presents archaeological models of the development of human cognition. 
These are often quite closely related to models from other fields of research and attempt to 
reconstruct their inner concepts within the archaeological source material. The discussion of the 
methods used to extract cognitive aspects is particularly interesting. 
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12 Models for the Evolution of Human Thinking Supported 
by Archaeology 
Prehistoric research has in various ways commented on the interplay of mind and matter that 
finds its ultimate expression in artifacts. The examples presented in the following do – as a rule 
– not build upon each other and thus present mainly independent lines of research. They 
approach the question of the evolution of human thinking and its expression within 
archaeological contexts from widely varying angles. In general, the prehistoric approaches 
mirror the varied approaches by other disciplines concerned with cognition. Thus, there are 
cognitivistic as well as connectionistic models; they are all more or less phylogenetically 
oriented, with mostly minor ontogenetic influences.
Surprisingly, archaeological discussion for the most part excludes the active participation of 
prehistoric groups in the evolution of cognition – postulated as an essential part by 
constructionist or world creation models within the cognitive sciences (see Varela 1990: 90) – 
from its considerations. The third, cultural-historical, dimension of development (after 
phylogenetic and ontogenetic history) almost exclusively comes into play only after ca. 40,000 
before present, with Homo sapiens sapiens as the carrier of culture whose modern human 
thinking expresses itself mainly in his expansion to previously uninhabited territories and the 
use of figurative art. A cultural-historical development during the preceding periods is generally 
rejected, owing mainly to the slow pace of regional diversification and technological progress 
during that time. The dominant anthropological-scientific approach employed in the study of 
early prehistory has resulted in the search for primarily phylogenetic explanations and the 
exclusion of possible answers found within this field of study itself, which actually contains a 
wealth of cultural-historical context relevant to the evolution of human cognition. 
The Palaeontology of Human Thinking 
In his fundamental work on the evolution of human cognition, La geste et la parole (1964/65), 
famous French prehistorian André Leroi-Gourhan (1984) reaches back to his palaeontological 
roots to explain the evolution of technology, language, art, and consciousness as the physical 
liberation of the spirit. In his opinion, it is the upright walk that constitutes the initial 
characteristic change that precedes and triggers all other physical and mental developments 
leading to modern humans (fig. 14). 
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Fig. 14 Leroi-Gourhan's model of cognitive evolution (1984): Steps in physical evolution leading 
to anatomically modern humans. Human cognitive evolution causally follows these physical 
changes. 
Thus, the translocation of the foramen magnum underneath the skull freed the occipital area and 
facilitated the enlargement of the brain, just as the upright walk freed the hands for 
technological purposes. The reduction of the jaw and the masticatory muscles, which resulted 
from technological solutions, led in the course of time to a different skull architecture and, 
consequently, to the “unlocking of the forehead” (Leroi-Gourhan 1984: 170), which in turn 
resulted in the characteristic prefrontal cortex that is typical for modern humans. 
According to Leroi-Gourhan, the freeing of the hands caused by upright locomotion was the 
initial cause for the development of technology and object manufacture, as opposed to the 
merely ad hoc use of objects among animals. While he certainly views the developing 
technological intelligence as a zoological phenomenon (ibid.: 130), he also stresses that humans 
are not just slowly improving apes, but have to be regarded as completely different beings once 
tool use can be ascertained. The free and not completely determined element that is expressed in 
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the tools, and which probably encompassed actions as well as vocal expressions, characterizes a 
new organization of thinking that should be viewed not as biological evolution, but rather as a 
step away from zoological bounds (ibid.: 152). Among the primary characteristics of humans, 
Leroi-Gourhan counts the upright walk, the short face, the hands freed from locomotive 
purposes, and the use of movable tools; he classifies the increase in brain volume as secondary 
(ibid.: 36). However, humans in the strict sense of the word are characterized by symbolic 
thinking (ibid.: 237) and the “domestication of time and space” (ibid.: 387). 
The discovery, in the late 1950s and the early 1960s, of a simple stone tool culture and remains 
of Zinjanthropus (today: Australopithecus boisei) within the same sediment layers of Olduvai 
Gorge, northern Tanzania, by Mary and Louis Leakey led Leroi-Gourhan to search for the pre-
human–human transition already among the australopithecines. Since with upright locomotion 
the use of teeth and mouth as tools shifted to the now free hands and the manual use of external 
tools, the mouth was now mostly free for language (ibid.: 55). Leroi-Gorhan also detects the 
interconnection of “hand and word” in the cortex areas for verbal and gestural association, 
which he sees as already clearly pronounced in the australopithecines (ibid.: 118). Parallel to 
technological differentiation and increasing complexity he assumes the development of 
language capabilities – from single and partially deliberate vocalizations among Zinjanthropus,
through more complex variations among the manufacturers of bifaces, to the possible 
transmission of symbolic content starting with the last Neanderthals (ibid.: 151). While the 
technological intelligence of human ancestors up to Homo erectus only developed slowly, the  
growth and diversification of the middle frontal and parietal areas of the brain that Leroi-
Gourhan observed led to a highly developed, if still mainly technological, intelligence in the 
Neanderthals. But it was only the development of the prefrontal cortex, which controls 
emotions, prevision, consciousness, reasoning, and thus the reflection of behavior, that cleared 
the way for increasingly conscious, non-functional actions, symbolizing actions, and creative 
consciousness. 
It is this developing potential of the prefrontal cortex that shattered the bonds of biological 
evolution, according to Leroi-Gourhan. While our biological species up to the Neanderthals 
functioned in their role of transmitters of memory mainly through inherited instincts and the 
development of action chains  dependent on single individuals, these deliberate innovations 
increasingly made use of the ethnic group as social memory carrier; language acted as the 
transmitter of memories and experiences, and the development of action chains became a supra-
individual process. Leroi-Gourhan finds testimonies of cognition that exceed material-
technological thinking already at the end of the Mousterian period and during the 
Chatelperronian, as expressed in burials, collections of aesthetically pleasing objects such as 
color pigments and fossils (ibid.: 144–45), and the expression of thoughts and ideas in graphic 
12 Models for the Evolution of Human Thinking Supported by Archaeology 114
symbols or rhythmic notches (ibid.: 237). The disassociation of thinking processes from 
immediate necessity then led to an explosion of artifact variety and symbols during the Late 
Palaeolithic. Since the choice between alternative action chains is only possible if consciousness 
and language are involved, the freedom of alternative behavior only exists on a symbolic level, 
but not on the level of direct actions. In contrast to animals, humans are capable of projecting 
their actions by freeing them from material dependencies and changing them to chains of 
symbols. 
Leroi-Gourhan's model of cognitive evolution is based on physical changes that allowed a 
progressive “emancipation” of the anatomy and its functions from locomotive and subsistence-
related tasks. This disassociation is paralleled by an increasing externalization of acting 
capacities – from an originally direct use of hands, mouth, or teeth as as tools; through the direct 
motor use of the hands when using objects as tools; the indirect motor use when manual 
machines are employed, such as the atlatl beginning with the end of the Late Palaeolithic; to 
finally the use of the hands as mere activators of motor processes, such as for example water-
driven mills in historical times. The very recent employ of programmed processes in automated 
machines constitutes the externalization of wide areas of action and influence: the tools, their 
manipulation, the gears, the process memory, and the individual treatment of the blanks 
according to their mechanical characteristics (ibid.: 302). Besides the external relocation of 
acting capacities, modern humans also exhibit external relocation of memory into writing, time 
into artificial rhythms, and social symbols into artistic expressions, such as jewelry. 
Leroi-Gourhan's focus is on physical evolution as the basis of mental development that is 
reflected in artifacts. He sees artifacts merely as secondary sources that can be classified 
according to functional and symbolic content or use. In the development of functional tools he 
sees an increasing technological complexity over time, which he does not differentiate further. It 
is only with the end of the Middle and the beginning of the Late Palaeolithic that he detects 
deliberate actions and the development of symbolizing capabilities, which are displayed by, for 
example, aesthetical expressions that go beyond merely technological intelligence. Several finds 
of an earlier date, which Leroi-Gourhan may have interpreted as evidence of rhythmic fixation, 
such as the incisions from Bilzingsleben or the sophisticated tool behavior among chimpanzees 
and orangutans, where still unknown when he formulated this model. 
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Piaget's Stage Model of the Evolution of Intelligence in the 
Archaeological Context 
While André Leroi-Gourhan's approach to the reconstruction of the development of human 
thinking is centered around physical evolution, Thomas Wynn (1979; 1981; 1985) attempts to 
transfer Jean Piaget's stage model of the ontogenetic development of intelligence (see Chapter 
8) to phylogeny and to apply it to Palaeolithic artifacts. In this process, he defines intelligence 
as the capability to organize one's own actions in a complex manner. Its foundations are 
genetically determined structures that evolve into increasingly complex forms of organization 
during the individual process of maturation. Wynn roughly summarizes Piaget's stage model 
into three stages. The first, infant stage of sensorimotor intelligence includes the simple action 
intelligence without internal representation of the action. In this phase an action cannot be 
anticipated mentally. The second stage of preoperational intelligence is characterized by the 
appearance of internal mental images of actions; the capability to visualize actions is the 
precondition for the projection of future actions and the reflection on past ones. During this 
stage, however, thinking is restricted to a sequence of individual actions that have to be 
processed consecutively. Thus, the results of actions can be anticipated, but the contemplation 
of changes has to focus on one variable at a time; the results of a combination of different 
variable factors cannot be anticipated. Consequently, the planning of actions during this stage 
has to focus on one variable and will employ the trial and error method (Wynn 1981: 531). 
It is only the third stage of concrete operational intelligence that allows for the processing and 
coordination of different variables at the same time. The mental simulation of action sequences 
leading up to a result or, inversely, the extrapolation of necessary steps to be taken from a 
desired imagined result allows for more complex planning (Wynn 1985: 34). The mental 
reversibility of actions and the possibility to return to the starting point when a mentally chosen 
approach turns out to be unprofitable makes it possible to correct mistakes before they are 
physically carried out (Wynn 1979: 373–74). In contrast to Piaget, who combines the 
preoperational and concrete operational phases into one stage that extends up to the 11th–13th 
year of a child's life, and who only then assumes a third stage of formal operational intelligence 
(Piaget 1970), Wynn ends his second stage with preoperational intelligence; this is followed by 
the concrete operational and formal operational subphases, which combine to form the stage of 
operational intelligence. While, initially, concrete sequences of action can be organized only in 
physical units, such as objects or other persons, a second step allows for the mental simulation 
of purely imagined operations, i.e., the contemplation and organization of theoretical 
assumptions and hypothetical units. 
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Since the sequence of stages in Piaget's ontogenetic model is necessarily logically determined, 
because each stage is a further development of the preceding one, the same sequence applies to 
Wynn's phylogenetic model (Wynn 1981: 532), and for the same reasons. In his studies of the 
phylogenetic evolution of human cognition, Thomas Wynn transfers essential deductions from 
Piaget's stage model and ensuing concepts of spatial thinking (Piaget and Inhelder 1967 in 
Wynn 1979) to the archaeological record. Modern primates exhibit mental concepts of desired 
results, as well as the computations of means to achieve them. In this manner, natural objects 
such as twigs or vines are deliberately modified to act as termite fishing devices; however, 
primates can only use the trial and error method, which is characteristic of preoperational 
intelligence (Wynn 1981). Even in early Old Palaeolithic times, with its Oldowan technology, 
Wynn does not see any indicators pointing towards more than preoperational thinking. The 
problem to be solved existed as a vague visualization; the intention allowed a projection of 
actions into the future. However, only one variable at a time could be contemplated, so that a 
stone tool had to be flaked in single, incoherent steps until it finally served its purpose – the 
solution of the problem. The emergence of different classes of artifacts, where specific forms 
served as standard tool solutions for specific purposes, cannot be detected during the Oldowan. 
While Oldowan and Developed Oldowan artifacts can be manufactured without operational 
intelligence, according to Wynn, this kind of intelligence is a prerequisite for the manufacture of 
Acheulean handaxes. Wynn detects four modes of operational spatial thinking in the production 
of these stone tools (Wynn 1979). He regards bifacial tools with only minimal reworking, but 
which nevertheless exhibit the characteristic shape of the handaxe, as evidence for the 
perception of an object as a whole and the retouching flakes as parts thereof. In order to 
minimize necessary modifications, the reversibility of the mental sequence of actions is 
prerequisite. The intentionally straight retouching, especially of later handaxes, can only be 
achieved if each percussion is considered in relation to others, according to Wynn. And with the 
help of mental reversibility, these spatial relationships of individual elements are not only 
perceivable when they already exist, but can also be caused deliberately. 
In the symmetry exhibited by the handaxes, Wynn sees the manifestation of two characteristics 
of spatial-operational thinking. On the one hand, relationships between individual elements are 
perceived as potentially transferrable to other spatial or temporal contexts. The symmetrical 
cross-sections of handaxes cannot be achieved by flaking sequences based on the trial and error 
method; rather, invisible view points have to be constructed based on available visible views. 
However, Marie-Louise Inizan et al. (1992: 42) point out that the symmetrical cross-sections do 
not necessarily constitute a deliberate choice but may have been the inevitable result of the 
bifacial technology in handaxe production. On the other hand, Wynn (1979) perceives in the 
frontal view of the bilateral symmetry of the edges, in both its parallel (congruent) and mirrored 
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(inverted) variants, the repetition or reversal of an equivalent relationship of elements, where all 
dimensions of this relationship have to be identical. Thus, in order to create symmetry in the 
frontal view, measurements taken with the help of some kind of reference are necessary. 
Especially for the early handaxes, however, Wynn leaves open the question of whether the 
symmetry of the handaxes was indeed an intended result or merely exists in the eyes of modern 
beholders. 
Due to his classification of the development of intelligence, which differs from the stages 
assumed by Piaget, Wynn (ibid.) sees all spatial-cognitive criteria of modern, adult, operational 
thinking met by 300,000 before present at the latest. While Piaget views the time between 12 
and 16 years of age as a major marker in the development of intelligence – the progression from 
the concrete operational to the formal operational stage – Wynn defines the formal operational 
stage as a simple extension of the concrete operational stage, which cannot be evidenced in the 
archaeological record and is negligible from a technological perspective. He sees the first 
indicators of operational intelligence, as expressed by the reversibility of mental action 
sequences, already in the Upper Bed II of Olduvai, about 1.1 million years before present. 
Judging from the technology, he detects no increased intelligence during the Late Palaeolithic, 
since the spatial concepts behind blade technology are no more complex than those behind the 
bifacial or Levallois technologies. Thus, Wynn merely acknowledges a cultural development 
after the Acheulean but rejects the assumption of a further increase of genetically determined 
cognitive potential. 
Wynn sees further evidence for his results, which were obtained by transferring Piaget's stage 
model to the archaeological context, in divided standards exhibited by the handaxes. In contrast 
to the Oldowan artifacts, which do not show specific shapes, bifacial tools rely on certain 
conventions. Social knowledge influences the shape of artifacts starting with the Acheulean, and 
their uniformity is based on the perception of an adequate shape by other members of the group. 
The manufacture of handaxes can thus not be learned through the simple repetition of other 
group members' actions, but requires the perception of others' purposes as purpose (Wynn 
1993). Such conventions or standards are not tied to immediate problems but exist 
independently from them: tool types are standard solutions, the concept of which does not have 
to be re-invented each time. Thus, Wynn implicitly identifies Tomasello's key innovations of 
modern human behavior – the “perception of others as intentional actors” and the ensuing 
“cultural ratchet effect” – already in Acheulean tools (see Chapter 9; Tomasello 2002). 
The problem of deducing generally increased intelligence from certain characteristics of stone 
tools is elucidated by the studies conducted by Christophe and Hedwige Boesch (1984) on the 
stone hammer transport among chimpanzees in Taï National Park, Ivory Coast. This long-term 
study showed that chimpanzees not only possess a measure to judge distances between different 
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stone hammers and certain nut-bearing trees, but that they also keep this measure independently 
of their own position and without direct sensory input. They are also able to compare an average 
of five different spatially positioned distances with a mental map and to choose from them the 
shortest distance to a targeted tree; the weight of the stones is also taken into account, if on a 
somewhat secondary level. Additionally, this mental map of stone hammers and nut-bearing 
trees can be adapted according to hammers already transported to other locations, and the 
reference point (a different tree) can be changed as well. Boesch and Boesch (1984: 168–69) 
thus prove the existence of Euclidian space with measurements and distances among 
chimpanzees, the same space that is assumed to exist among human children of the concrete 
operational stage, after about nine years of age, according to Piaget. Wynn's studies (1979; 
1981) of Old Palaeolithic chopping tools and handaxes consequently only apply to the 
manifestations of Piaget's stages of intelligence in stone tools and cannot be expanded to apply 
to the general thinking of early human forms. Wynn himself cautions that intelligence displayed 
in material execution and the archaeological context has to be regarded as minimal competence: 
“The prehistoric actor may have used more sophisticated abilities in realms of behavior that are 
archaeologically invisible” (Wynn 1985: 33). 
Depth of Planning, Projection, and Organized Action
In contrast to Wynn, who attempts to unravel the development of cognitive potential from the 
conceptual characteristics of prominent artifact types and their manufacture, Lewis Binford's 
approach (1989) ties human cognitive evolution to our capability to plan ahead, which he sets 
out to detect in both the macro- and microstructures of archaeological remains. Motivated by 
passages from A. L. Kroeber's textbook (1923), Binford revisits Kroeber's idea of modern 
humans that differ from Neandertals by “patience and projection.” After Binford, modern 
human populations are characterized by several traits pertaining to these attributes: 
• He uses the term Depth of Planning to describe the period of time between the anticipation of 
actions and their actual, thus facilitated execution, the amount of work expended in the 
anticipation, and the amount of thus facilitated actions. The higher the depth of planning, the 
more steps in tool production can be observed, and the higher is the number of tools that are 
used in the manufacture of other tools. These often simple or coarse production tools must not 
be confounded with the tools of earlier periods, since they are based on a different depth of 
planning. 
• The Tactical Depth is defined as the capability to find different possible solutions to a problem 
based on stored knowledge about mechanical principles, environmental characteristics, and 
other opportunities. 
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• Curation, finally, is used by Binford to describe the degree of maintenance evident in a tool 
assemblage. Curation can be assessed through the intensity of use of different raw materials, 
their transport over long distances, and the ease of replacement of individual elements in 
composite tools, among others. 
According to Binford, modern hunter-gatherers display in their behavior a great variety of depth 
of planning, tactical depth, and curation that is primarily dependent upon the availability of 
resources and thus the ecology of the populations in question (Binford 1989: 19–22). 
For the Early Palaeolithic, Binford only detects a few indicators of minimal planning. The sites 
are not structured into different areas, which indicates that the spatial use of those sites was not 
planned. While both during the Oldowan and the Acheulean raw materials were transported to 
the sites, Binford views this transport as episodic and not in need of consistent planning. The 
few observed maintenance procedures evident from tools transported to other sites were, 
according to his observations, carried out in all sites with the same probability; a differentiation 
of activities between base and hunting camps, as his model for Late Palaeolithic hunter-gatherer 
groups suggests, did not take place. Although during the Acheulean the extent of the territory 
populated by Homo outside of Africa increased considerably, Binford detects no specialized 
tool inventories adapted to different ecosystems at this time. From this, he deduces minimal 
variation in social organization, the lack of cultural inheritance mechanisms, and thus the lack 
of cultural systems. He concludes that whereas adaptive processes during the Early Palaeolithic 
were facilitated technologically, their base mechanism was biological, similar to that of 
chimpanzees. He rejects the occurrence of hunting activities, which would indicate planned 
behavior, even for Late Acheulean times (ibid.: 25–31). 
While Binford detects increasing spatial-temporal inventory units during the Middle 
Palaeolithic, he does not see them to originate within populations conscious of their own 
culture. Although there is a clear difference between the transport and use of raw materials of 
varying qualities (curation), the depth of planning has to be considered low, according to 
Binford, since the tools are not manufactured or maintained centrally, but still in the place 
where they are needed. The turnover of artifacts is generally high, but their maintenance is low. 
Binford does not detect a spatial structuring in Middle Palaeolithic sites; they are merely the 
product of episodic presence. Tools used in tool manufacture would point to successive 
planning steps in technology, but Binford doubts their existence during the Middle Palaeolithic. 
Overall, he views Middle Palaeolithic humans as not adapted to differentiated environmental 
conditions, neither in group size nor in technology, with limited mobility and flexibility. Parallel 
to the Early Palaeolithic, he does not see any indicators for hunting, just for the scavenging of 
carrion (ibid.: 31–35). 
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It is only with the Late Palaeolithic, that Binford detects the true technological and thus cultural 
adaptation to the environment, which is based on new means of organization through language. 
The increase in variation is seen in the size, the permanence, and the spatial differentiation 
within and between the sites, new structural and find categories, such as burials, art, and 
personal ornaments, as well as new raw materials like bone, antler, and soft stone. Planned 
hunting and the use of tools to manufacture other tools also only occur with the late 
Palaeolithic, according to Binford. For him, the  rapid change towards a flexible adaptation to 
extremely varying environmental conditions is the main difference to all previous, slow changes 
and can only be explained by the cultural evolution taking place about 40,000 years before 
present (ibid.: 36–37). 
The fundamental differences between the Middle and Late Palaeolithic regarding planning and 
technological organization, postulated earlier by Binford, are critically discussed by Roebroeks, 
Kolen, and Rensink (1988), especially where they pertain to the use of stone tools and their raw 
materials. During the Middle Palaeolithic in Central Europe, raw materials in different stages of 
reduction up to the finished products were transported to and from various sites (e.g., 
Maastricht-Belvédère C and G, Rheindahlen Westwand B1, Lehringen, Sclayn, Schweinskopf); 
their distance to the original source of raw material can amount up to 100 km. The spectrum of 
transported, used, modified, and sometimes further transported goods included prepared cores, 
flakes from different specialized flaking sites, and hand axes. According to Roebroek et al., the 
transport, planned maintenance of the assemblage, and extension of duration of use through 
reshaping before discarding indicate a pronounced depth of planning, as well as curation. 
Several inventories from sites in the Rhineland, Belgium, and France indicate the replacement 
of individual elements, such as points in compound tools. Overall, the research of Roebroeks et 
al. demonstrates a positive correlation between transport distance and the use intensity of an 
artifact. The authors do not detect big differences between the Middle and Late Palaeolithic 
regarding the planning of actions and technological organization. 
Apart from the detailed criticism of Binford's assessment of behavioral changes in the use of 
artifacts at the beginning of the Late Palaeolithic as put forward by Roebroek et al., there exist 
more general limitations to Binford's approach. Although Binford claims to study the transition 
to modern human behavior not selectively but from a general evolutionary perspective, he 
remains caught in the dichotomy of non-modern vs. modern or non-cultural vs. cultural 
behavior. Such an either/or classification always excludes gradual changes, since transient 
stages are not allowed for. Thus, while he describes planning behavior in the Early and Middle 
Palaeolithic, he has to reject its validity as implicitly not completely modern. His study of the 
evolution of planning behavior is rendered even more subjective by vague definitions of what 
exactly constitutes the existence or lack of depth of planning, tactical depth, and curation in 
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object behavior. While he relates social behavior, such as (communal) hunting or the spatial 
structure of camp sites, to planning in general, its connection to object behavior, and thus its 
significance for the three characteristics of object behavior to be studied, remains unclear. He 
even generally rejects indicators of hunting earlier than the Late Palaeolithic and interprets them 
as mere signs of carrion scavenging. To support his argument Binford claims that. Clearly 
structured sites, such as they increasingly occur during the Middle and Late Palaeolithic, are 
missing in the Lower Palaeolithic; however, more unfavorable conditions of preservation are to 
be expected with increasing depth of time. 
It is Binford's accomplishment to have introduced characteristics derived from tool and object 
behavior gleaned from archaeological remains into the discussion of human cognitive evolution; 
this is not the mere adaptation of models and theories from other disciplines to the material 
implementation of thinking. Overall, however, the evidence put forward in support of his model 
is not exhaustive and remains selective, contrary to his original intent. The criticism by 
Roebroeks et al. clearly challenges Binford's interpretation of marked differences between 
Middle and Late Palaeolithic planning behavior;  however, they also do not put forward an own 
evolutionary prospect. 
From Specialized Domains of Intelligence to the Permeability of the 
Mind 
Kate Robson Brown (1993) and Steven Mithen (1994; 1996) choose a very different approach 
to the evolution of human thinking as expressed in object behavior and archaeological remains – 
an adaptation of the intelligence domain model developed in psychology. These models of the 
organization of the human mind, which consider it as a composite of different, independently 
evolved domains of intelligence, have become increasingly popular since the early 1980s (cf. 
Chapter 7). Noam Chomsky (1980) views the syntactic capabilities for language processing as 
tied to a module that operates independently from other intelligence capacities. In his “Theory 
of multiple Intelligences,” Howard Gardner (1991) defines seven types of intelligence, which he 
locates in different areas of the brain and which he assumes to develop and work independently 
from one another. John Tooby and Leda Cosmides (1989; 1992) explain the evolution of 
different specialized domains with the high adaptation capacities of specific intelligences within 
Pleistocene hunter-gatherers, as opposed to the overall inertia of general intelligence. As part of 
the Pleistocene heritage, children seem to possess at least four domains of intuitive knowledge: 
language, psychology, physics, and biology (cf. Mithen 1996:51). However, according to 
Patricia Greenfield (1991), children under the age of two years only display general 
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intelligence; it is only later that the different modules develop. Annette Karloff-Smith (1992) 
perceives many modules as culture specific; the innate intuitive knowledge forms the core from 
which micro-domains, such as mathematics, develop. In her opinion, it is only with the typically 
human cooperation of modules that knowledge becomes available outside of its specific field of 
application and creativity can develop. 
While Kate Robson Brown (1993) demonstrates different aspects of a single domain – spatial 
intelligence – through the study of Early Palaeolithic artifacts, Steven Mithen (1996), in his 
outline of the evolution of human thinking, The Prehistory of the Mind, transfers the model of a 
fundamentally modular development with later permeability of the domains from ontogeny to 
human phylogeny. During the course of phylogeny, our modern intelligence developed in three 
phases. A phase of general intelligence is followed by a phase of the increasing development of 
specialized domains, which terminates in a phase of connection between the domains, so that 
now knowledge and ideas can be freely transmitted between the permeable domains. The 
domains evolving in Phase 2 are interpreted by Mithen, parallel to the intuitive knowledge 
postulated for modern children, as social, natural historical, technical, and linguistic intelligence 
(ibid.: 64–72). 
Mithen classifies modern chimpanzees in between Phases 1 and 2, since they possess a first 
specialized domain – social intelligence (ibid.: 93). He also awards a kind of social intelligence, 
which allowed the perception of other individuals' intentions and a concept of other social 
worlds, to the common ancestor of humans and chimpanzees around 6 million years before 
present (fig. 15). Mithen assumes that by around 2 million years before present the domain of 
social intelligence was fully developed, while until 1.8 million years before present the technical 
and natural historical domains emerged, which facilitated the spread of the species Homo
through large parts of the Old World. Parallel to the relative brain growth, for which he assumes 
two main phases at 2–1.5 million and 500,000–200,000 years before present, the rapid 
development of technical and natural historical comprehension was followed by a long static 
period between 1,8 million and ca. 500,000 years before present, where no major changes 
occurred. Mithen places the development of linguistic intelligence between 500,000 and 
100,000 years before present, but views language largely as a social interaction and thus tied to 
social intelligence (ibid.: 203–7). He assumes that during this time it was not yet possible to talk 
about technical concerns or the environment, since the pertaining knowledge was still locked 
within the respective domains (ibid.: 140–46). It is between 60,000 and 30,000 years before 
present that Mithen detects an explosion of culture caused by the opening of the specialized 
intelligences to the knowledge that until then had been restricted to other domains. This 
permeability and the flow of knowledge between the domains that characterize Phase 3 are 
recognizable in bone artifacts and flake industries, burial goods, the colonization of Australia, as 
well as personal ornaments and art (ibid.: 151–53). 
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Fig. 15 The evolution of cognition after Mithen (1996). From left to right: Development of a first 
domain of social intelligence until ca. 2 million years before present; Emergence of different 
intelligence domains in Homo erectus; Emergence of the linguistic intelligence domain in Homo 
heidelbergensis and Homo neanderthalensis, from ca. 500,000 years before present. It is only 
with Homo sapiens that the isolated intelligence domains become permeable and able to 
combine perceptions. 
According to Mithen, these artifact categories are missing from the preceding phase of multiple 
intelligences because they require the collaboration of different intelligence domains. Thus, 
during Phase 2, bones are considered as parts of animals by the natural historical domain, while 
the technological domain does not recognize them as a raw material with specific characteristics 
fit for artifacts. In the dressing of bone hand axes during the Middle Palaeolithic, the bone 
material is treated and flaked like stone, but is not understood as a material with its own, 
alternative possibilities. Special and sometimes complex hunting weapons that are attuned to the 
behavior of specific animals only become possible through the collaboration of the natural 
historical and technological domains, according to Mithen's model (ibid.: 130–31). Burial goods 
constitute a combination of social intelligence with other domains: natural historical in case of 
food provisions for the afterlife, and technological in case of artifacts (ibid.: 180). 
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Likewise, art and personal ornaments emerge in Phase 3 as the combinational result of the 
technological and social modules (ibid.: 139). The production of earlier non-functional artifacts, 
such as the carved nummulites from Tata, Hungary, or the carvings on elephant bones from 
Bilzingsleben, was facilitated by technological intelligence alone, according to Mithen, since 
these artifacts still lack any symbolic content (ibid.: 160). He views the new cognitive flow 
between the domains in Phase 3 not  simply as an increase in the processing capacity of 
knowledge but as an actual creation of new conduits between existing domains, so that 
completely new possibilities of thinking could emerge. As achievements of this now modern 
thinking he lists science, the belief in the supernatural, and agriculture, among others (ibid.: 
209). 
Mithen transposes a combination of various modular intelligence models established within 
developmental psychology from ontogeny to the phylogenetic evolution of human thinking. 
However, the evidence he provides for his model in the form of archaeological remains cannot 
conclusively prove the reflection of separate intelligence domains, nor their permeability, in 
object behavior and its material manifestations. While, on the one hand, he notes that the 
bifacial and Levallois technologies do not differ significantly on a cognitive level, he accepts, 
on the other hand, the Late Palaeolithic blade technology as an indicator for a new, supra-
modular way of thinking. He duly acknowledges indications of early non-functional artifacts, 
such as carvings and the use use of pigments, while at the same time categorically denying any 
social or symbolic significance they may have held. Even if his discussion of bone artifacts as 
the result of the combination of technological with environmental intelligence were 
comprehensible, the question would still remain why the manufacture of wooden tools, such as 
the spears or lances from Schöningen, Clacton, and Lehringen, which required the use of 
whittling, a technique specifically tailored to the working of wood, was not considered as a 
transgression of domain borders. In a later article, Mithen himself contradicts his assumption of 
a lack of social function in artifacts before the Late Palaeolithic, when he proposes that Early 
Palaeolithic hand axes served mainly as a means in the process of mate selection (Kohn and 
Mithen 1999). Wynn (1993: 311; 1995), on the other hand, detects the combination of social 
and technological knowledge as early as in the standardization of hand axes during the 
Acheulean. 
Owing to the synoptic view of his study, Mithen does not discuss in detail the possible bases of 
intelligence within the various groups of artifacts. Consequently, he does not detect any 
substantial changes in the cognitive organization and potential of humans between 1.8 million 
years before present and the beginning of the Late Palaeolithic – with exception of the 
postulated evolution of the linguistic domain at around 500,000 years before present, which 
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cannot be detected through archaeological remains, because no link with technological 
intelligence existed. 
Milestones: Language and Symbol Behavior 
Based on a different psychological model but the same archaeological evidence, the 
psychologist William Noble and the archaeologist Iain Davidson arrive at conclusions very 
similar to Steven Mithen (Noble and Davidson 1993; 1996). Their social approach is based on 
the cognitive effects of language and symbolic communication that manifest themselves in 
behavior and artifacts. In Noble and Davidson's view (1996), intelligent behavior is always 
interactive and routed in a community. Mental products are exchanged between individuals 
through the symbolic use of signs within purposeful communication. The basis of modern 
human cognition is the attribution of meaning, which isolates things and events from the 
constant flow of perceptions. While chimpanzees seem to have internalized images of 
prominent objects classified as desirable or menacing, so that they can execute actions related to 
these objects even if they are not visible, this improved perception of the environment remains 
individual and not communicable. It is only in humans that the conscious attention to an object  
or an event, as well as the knowledge of its significance, is divided. Objects, events, and other 
non-linguistic units do not possess significance by themselves, it has to be construed socially 
and remains subject to continuing dispute within the community. The communal knowledge of 
the significance of any given unit is dependent on language (ibid.: 128–38). 
Communication can only emerge through divided attention. As the point of origin of purposeful 
interpretation, Noble and Davidson (ibid.: 218) suggest the purposeful throwing of objects at 
prey, enemies, or rivals (fig.16), which may have led, on the one hand, to a natural selection of 
the neuronal organization of fine motor skills of the upper extremities and hand-eye 
coordination. On the other hand,  the process of aiming itself, without the ensuing throw, may 
have been recognized as an important component. Thus, the aiming process may have led to the 
emergence of an iconic, illustrative gesture. In their repetition, these gestures may have left 
accidental traces, for example in mud, which were recognized as representations of these 
gestures and imitated. This would have led to the emergence of a new unit of visual attention – 
the symbol (ibid.: 221–24). Once the principle of representative symbols in form of sounds or 
gestures was recognized, language capability was born: “As with the notion of something 
having, or not having, 'meaning,' symbols are either present or absent, they cannot be halfway 
there.” The discovery of symbolic signs precludes the slow development of a proto-language. 
the communal attribution of meaning leads to language, and language allows the description of 
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perceptions, reflection, self-awareness as part of the perceived world and as percipient, memory, 
and planning for the future. It is only with the help of significance units and concepts that build 
on them that planning in the sense of designing a sequence of conscious actions to achieve a 
predetermined goal becomes possible (ibid.: 215–16). 
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Fig. 16 Cognition model after Noble and Davidson (1996): The development of symbol behavior 
and language as the precondition of human cognition. 
To corroborate their model and as indicators of language and the attribution of meaning, Noble 
and Davidson present evidence from archaeological inventories that indicates symbolic 
behavior and planning as defined above. According to their interpretation, the manufacture of 
lithic tools from the Oldowan, through the Acheulean, to the Mousterian does not display a 
cognitive but only a technological evolution. While they debate whether Oldowan core tools, 
such as choppers or chopping tools, were an intended product, the remnants of the flaking 
process, or the products of no conscious intention (ibid.: 167–68), they view the Acheulean 
hand axes as leftover cores derived through advanced flaking techniques that were not subject to 
conscious shaping. Neither do Noble and Davidson detect any purposeful production of stone 
tools during the Middle Palaeolithic: they reject the idea of conscious manufacture of specific 
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flake forms within Levallois technology (ibid.: 200) and view the modifications of flakes as 
mere use retouch (ibid.: 193). Only with the transition to the Late Palaeolithic do they identify 
conceptual variations in the stone tool inventories (ibid.: 205). The specific manufacture of 
other artifacts seems equally dubious to them until some time in the Middle Palaeolithic. In the 
manufacture of wooden spears they acknowledge the use of tools to produce other tools as a 
technological improvement, but do not detect any cognitive steps towards the conceptualization 
of form, which they only grant to the bone and antler tools of the Late Palaeolithic (ibid.: 203–
4). 
While one often-mentioned indicator of planning behavior, the transport of raw materials, 
displays an increase in transporting distance from the sources during the course of human 
evolution, the authors attribute this fact to the expanding roaming range of Homo groups until 
the Middle Palaeolithic; it is only with the emergence of modern behavior that they 
acknowledge a change from the collecting of raw materials as part of other simultaneous 
activities to the organized, planned procurement of or purposeful bartering for raw materials 
(ibid.: 202–3). Noble and Davidson also view the provisioning of meat as a result of planning 
not before the early Late Palaeolithic, when big game animals were clearly hunted with traps or 
composite weapons that required conceptual planning (ibid.: 190). The conscious kindling of 
fire is, in their opinion, as much an achievement of modern planning behavior as the 
construction of shelters, for which they acknowledge no evidence earlier than the Late 
Palaeolithic. The postulated burials of Neanderthals they ascribe to specific sedimentation 
processes in caves; evidence of real, consciously carried out burials in combination with 
concepts of an afterlife they only find during the Late Palaeolithic and later, as evidenced 
through rich inventories of burial goods. Artifacts earlier than the Late Palaeolithic, such as 
hand axes with fossils, that have been cited as evidence for the early use of symbols are viewed 
with skepticism by the authors, especially since there are no obvious conventions for these signs 
and repetitive occurrence as evidence for communal use is missing. The use of ocher as a 
pigment and possible symbol becomes more frequent with the end of the Middle Palaeolithic 
(ibid.: 206–11). 
For Noble and Davidson, the most prominent indicator of modern cognition is the colonization 
of Australia. In contrast to earlier expansions of habitat by various Homo forms, which were 
only an automatic spreading, modern man's colonization of the Sahul region, which 
encompasses Australia, New Guinea, and Tasmania, could only be accomplished by boat. The 
construction of boats and their use to traverse large distances indubitably required conceptual 
planning and language, according to the authors. Archaeological finds in Australia that have 
been dated up to 60,000 years before present form a milestone, in their opinion, after which 
modern cognition clearly has to be assumed. While Noble and Davidson do not view the 
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emergence of language as a gradual development but as the fundamental discovery of the 
possibilities of symbolic significances, they do not assume that all modern behavioral traits that 
are rooted in language emerged at the same time but became dominant through natural selection 
(ibid.: 173–74). Even if behavior rooted in language is only evidenced from ca. 60,000 years 
before present onwards, the authors assume that it first started to emerge between 100,000 and 
70,000 years before present (ibid.: 217). 
The Frontal Lobe – Home of Modernity 
While Noble and Davidson trace back reflection, memory, conceptual thinking, and planning to 
language and the latter to divided attention and the attribution of meaning, and thus regard the 
mind not as individual but socially constructed, Coolidge and Wynn (2001) pick up the model 
of the phylogenetically evolved frontal lobe of the brain as the seat of reflective and planning 
thoughts. The development of the cortical frontal lobe was already viewed by Leroi-Gourhan 
(1984; see above) as a factor in the evolution of modern human cognition. From the observation 
of behavioral problems in people with damage to the frontal area of the brain, either caused by 
accidents or congenital, several executive functions of this part of the brain could be deduced: 
decision-making, formulation of objectives, planning and organization as well as the 
development of strategies to achieve a goal, and the exertion of control in case of the disruption 
of planned actions, their obstruction, and their mental integration through space and time or 
sequential memory. Welch and Pennington (cited in Coolidge and Wynn 2001: 265) subsume 
the executive functions of the frontal lobe as the capability to retain a matching set of a problem 
and its solution in order to achieve future goals. In their search for the key factor of modern 
human behavior, which they locate around the beginning of the Late Palaeolithic, Frederick 
Coolidge and Thomas Wynn (2001) revisit the hereditary executive functions of the frontal lobe 
as the crucial characteristic. In their opinion, the transition to modern cognitive capacities is not 
linked to an anatomical change visible in the skeleton – such as Leroi-Gourhan's “unlocking of 
the forehead” (1984: 170) – but can be viewed as neuronal re-connections caused by simple 
changes on the  genetical level. 
To corroborate their hypothesis, Coolidge and Wynn (2001) search for indicators of some of 
these executive functions within the archaeological material. The function of sequential memory 
is the basis of complex action sequences, which they easily detect within the Neolithic. 
However, even complex flaking sequences, such as those of the Levallois technology, could be 
explained – after Schlanger (1996) – without resorting to tightly linked action sequences. It is 
only for between 100,00–50,000 years before present that they accept evidence of a truly multi-
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stage technology, such as, for example, in the bone harpoons from the sites at Katanda in the 
Semliki Valley, Zaire, the dating of which to the Middle Stone Age remains controversial, 
however (Klein 1999: 439). A second executive function, the suspension of an immediate 
reward for an action or the action itself, can be detected in the archaeological context at the 
earliest during the Late Palaeolithic, finding its expression in storage, the cultivation of plants, 
animal husbandry, or indirect means of capture such as traps. Organization/planning as a third 
executive function of the frontal lobe coordinates different actions; the transport of raw 
materials over several kilometers does not meet these conditions, according to the authors, and 
has to be omitted from the evidence for the thus defined form of planning. Like Noble and 
Davidson (1996), they cite the colonization of the Sahul region (Australia, New Guinea, and 
Tasmania) around 60,000–50,000 years before present as the earliest unambiguous product of 
the planning function of the frontal lobe: “... and it seems unlikely that such a colonization was 
unplanned” (Coolidge and Wynn 2001: 257). 
In their study, Coolidge and Wynn do not follow the evolution of cognition as visible in 
archaeological artifacts but search for the possible cause of a jump in evolution that would 
explain the changes in artifact inventories at the transition from the Middle to the Late 
Palaeolithic. Older aspects of the human mind, such as spatial cognition (see Wynn 1979; 1981; 
1985), are assumed; thus, the evolution of human thinking took place in several independent 
steps, the latest of which – the expansion of the executive function of the frontal lobe – led to 
modern human behavior. While Wynn and Coolidge postulate that, in order to serve as the 
foundation of a truly evolutionary model, the necessary step towards modern cognition must 
have been a relatively simple change on the genetic level, they themselves view the change in 
executive functions of the frontal lobe as “not attributable to a single dominant gene or 
recessive genes but to many alleles at different loci which add up to a strong effect on variation 
in executive functioning” (Coolidge and Wynn 2001: 257). 
The “Dawn of Human Culture” as Genetic Lightning Strike 
A similar genetic scenario, which identifies different brain functions as the foundations of 
human thinking and behavior but also tries to explain the changes in the artifact spectrum at the 
beginning of the Late Palaeolithic, is laid out in the works of Richard Klein (Klein 1995; 2000; 
Klein and Edgar 2002). After a number of mutations with selective advantages that form the 
basis of early cognitive evolution, the last and decisive biological step towards truly modern 
human thinking and behavior took place around 50,000–40,000 years before present with a 
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neural restructuring that also created language and symbol capacities, according to Klein (2000: 
26–27). 
Klein and Edgar (2002: 22) view the evolution of the human mind not as a continuous process 
but as a punctuated equilibrium: long phases of stability are followed by spurts of abrupt 
change, which in turn are followed by another long phase of stability. Evolutionary innovations 
occur suddenly and rarely. During the course of human evolution, the authors detect between 
three and four such spurts (fig. 17), which are supposed to have occurred in East Africa and 
disseminated with their carriers into other regions of the world. 
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Fig. 17 Development of human cultural capacity after Klein and Edgar (2002). Long periods of 
cognitive conformity are followed by short phases of genetically triggered changes. 
The first step in Klein and Edgar's model – 2.5 million years ago – is characterized by first stone 
artifacts and a significantly larger brain compared to modern primates. The behavior that can be 
deduced from the Oldowan sites shows in their opinion no further specific human 
characteristics; thus, they classify the early Homo representatives as “technological apes” (ibid.: 
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92). Around 1.7 millions years before present, Klein and Edgar detect a second step, which is 
revealed in the modern human physiological proportions of Homo ergaster and progressive 
bifacial stone tools, such as hand axes that have been consciously shaped. The habitat of the 
species Homo is extended to include more arid and seasonal environments, facilitating the first 
colonization of regions outside Africa. 
After a stationary phase in human evolution that lasted at least a million years, Klein and Edgar 
assume a third step took place around 0.6 million years ago, which is, however, difficult to 
detect in the archaeological record. Emerging in Africa during this time, Homo heidelbergensis
is thought to display a distinct increase in brain volume that was accompanied by a qualitative 
improvement in stone tool industry. While they assume a dissemination of cognitive abilities 
with Homo heidelbergensis towards Europe, Asia remains, in the opinion of Klein and Edgar, a 
cognitive backwater colonized by the successors of Homo ergaster, the different Homo erectus
forms. Their archaeological argument for East and Southeast Asia's backwardness is based on 
the lack of hand axes in these regions, first postulated by Hallam L. Movius (1949) and since 
disproved by the discovery of Early Palaeolithic hand axes in the Bose Basin of southern China 
(Hou et al. 2000); these regions now can merely be regarded as yielding few hand axes. 
Concerning the absence of effective hunting strategies, however, Klein and Edgar (2002: 131) 
detect no major differences between the different Homo species. They do not detect other 
changes in behavior and its cognitive foundations until the end of the Middle Palaolithic. In a 
preceding article, Klein (2000) does not mention this third stage around 600,000 years before 
present; instead, he recognizes changes during the Middle Palaeolithic/Middle Stone Age from 
ca. 0.25 million years before present, such as an increasing variety of flaking techniques, the 
control of fire, the collecting of pigments, the occasional simple burial of the dead, the habitual 
hunting of relatively harmless large mammals, and increasingly regionally and chronologically 
circumscribed stone artifact types. 
The last and decisive step in human cognitive evolution according to Klein (1995; 2000) and 
Klein and Edgar (2002) took place among anatomically modern humans around 50,000 years 
before present, with the completely modern capabilities of innovation and the manipulation of 
culture. These are manifest in “solidly built houses, tailored clothing, more efficient fireplaces, 
and new hunting technology” (ibid.: 235) and the emergence of art, jewelry, a greater diversity 
of stone tool types, and formal artifacts made from bone, antler, and ivory (ibid.: 261). The 
cause of this “dawn of human culture” is biological in the authors' opinion; such a fundamental 
and sudden change could only be explained by a genetic mutation that resulted in a completely 
modern human brain (ibid.: 268–70). The capacity for innovative behavior they relate to 
language capacity and the evolution of the FOXP2 gene (Lai et al. 2001; Enard et al. 2002; see 
Chapter 6). 
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The Perception of Universal Divine Origin 
Hermann Müller-Karpe (2001a; 2001b; 2001c; forthcoming) vehemently objects to the notion 
that the evolution of human thinking can be explained by biological and, thus, scientifically 
explicable processes, such as genetic mutation and selection, but he nonetheless arrives at a very 
similar result to that of Klein and Edgar (2002), concerning the course of its development. 
Müller-Karpe deems the scientific-factual, explanatory approach that views humans generally as 
part of the animal kingdom and their capabilities rooted in biological evolution as insufficient. 
He contrasts this approach with his own, hermeneutically interpreting, understanding approach, 
in which humans with their culture and deisms are considered fundamentally different from 
animals (Table 5). At the same time, he combines both approaches in his evolutionary model, 
where he assumes a first phase of hominization until the end of the Early Palaeolithic that is 
characterized by genetically determined evolution processes and thus open to scientific 
explanations, while the subsequent phase of true humans is characterized by integrated 
cognition in conjunction with a principle of the divine and can only be approached in a 
hermeneutic-understanding way (Table 6). 
Scientific-factual explanatory approach Hermeneutically interpreting, understanding 
approach 
anthropological humanistic 
materialistic intellectually historical 
genetical historical 
nature culture/principle of the divine 
focus on: corporeality, functional artifacts focus on: mental capacities, functional / religious 
artifacts 
gradual evolution one-time introduction of a new principle, cultural 
development 
humans are principally like animals Humans are fundamentally different from animals 
Table 5 Comparison of  different approaches to human cognitive evolution after H. Müller-Karpe 
(Haidle in Müller-Karpe et al. 2005). 
Thus, in his philosophical-theological interpretation of archaeological remains Müller-Karpe 
(2001a; 2001b; 2001c; Müller-Karpe et al. 2005) stresses the view that human evolution during 
the Early Palaeolithic and larger parts of the Middle Palaeolithic should be considered a 
principally zoological phenomenon that has to be clearly distinguished from the subsequent 
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cultural evolution starting around 40,000 before present at the latest; a view that can also be 
found – at least partially – in the works of Binford (1989), Mithen (1996), Noble and Davidson 
(1996), Coolidge and Wynn (2001), and Klein and Edgar (2002). Müller-Karpe sees humans in 
the true sense of the word as characterized by a mental dimension that precedes and determines 
any empirical reasoning – the perception of the unified origin of the world. This origin of all 
things and beings was not considered as an abstract principle but personified as a deity (Müller-
Karpe et al. 2005); thus, everything perceivable could be read as divine creation. Through the 
idea of a common origin, humans construed at the same time a religious basis and a historicity 
that could give rise to cultural development. After Müller-Karpe, the development of human 
cognitive capacities, which are rooted in this new dimension of perception, cannot be derived 
from the gradual progression of animal capabilities; it constitutes a completely new principle of 
thinking. 
Human evolution since the 
Neanderthals, Middle 
Palaeolithic 
cultural 
development, 
historical 
humanistically-intellectual historically 
perceivable mental capacities, 
functional/religious artifacts 
One-time introduction of the mental principle of the divine 
Pre-human evolution until 
Homo erectus, Early 
Palaeolithic 
gradual natural 
evolution, genetical 
anthropological-materialistically explicable 
corporeality, only functional artifacts 
Table 6 Two-phase evolution of human cognition after H. Müller-Karpe (Haidle in Müller-Karpe 
et al. 2005). 
In evidence of his approach of the perception of universal divine origin, Müller-Karpe cites the 
absolute functionality of Early Palaeolithic stone tools without the emergence of types, the 
cognitive potential of which he does not see surpassing that of animal tool behavior, and which 
is supplemented with cultural elements only during the course of the Middle Palaeolithic. In 
some archaeological remains of the Neanderthals, such as burials and an inferred belief in 
eternity, he detects early indicators of the religious capacities of the human mind. While he 
holds true that the stone tool industry in its practicability continued the hominid tradition, he 
also states with the Middle Palaeolithic the focus shifted from exclusively functional tools to 
artifact types that were increasingly influenced by cultural or group aspects. According to 
Müller-Karpe, the thinking consciousness and the perception of the divine then unfolded in Late 
Palaeolithic art, which should be viewed not as a practical tool in the sense of magical 
shamanistic practices, but as an expression of the worship of creation. He interprets images of 
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animals and humans as expressions of thankfulness for successful hunts, the survival of danger, 
the encounter of two people, and pregnancy; hand imprints are an expression of adoration 
gestures. From the perception of divine universality, Müller-Karpe deduces a new significance 
of everyday experiences and the consciously accepted dependency from the environment during 
the Late Palaeolithic. However, in his view the mental capacities of humans also contain the 
freedom of existential autonomy, which finds its expression towards the end of the Palaeolithic 
in a changed understanding of the environment, human egoism, and hubris, leading to 
aggression and wars from the Neolithic onwards. Concomitantly to the differentiated 
development of the human mind, the harmony of existence was lost. 
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13 Problems in the Approaches of Archaeological Models of 
Cognitive Evolution 
Despite differing starting hypotheses, the archaeological models of cognitive evolution 
presented in the preceding chapter all share distinctly similar results (fig. 18). Modern human 
cognition is linked to a few aspects of behavior, some of which the authors view as closely 
related: Language (Noble and Davidson 1996; Klein and Edgar 2002), symbolic (Leroi-
Gourhan 1984; Noble and Davidson 1996; Klein and Edgar 2002) or specifically religious 
behavior (Müller-Karpe in Müller-Karpe et al. 2005), planning or reflective behavior (Leroi-
Gourhan 1984; Wynn 1979; 1981; 1985; Binford 1989; Noble and Davidson 1996; Coolidge 
and Wynn 2001), and the free combinability of all knowledge domains and abilities (Mithen 
1996). Not all of these aspects are equally considered typically modern; thus, Leroi-Gourhan 
(1984) assumes first roots of language already parallel to earliest tool production. Mithen (1996) 
surmises the evolution of linguistic intelligence between 500,000 and 100,000 years before 
present, where it was initially limited to the social domain and then increasingly associated with 
non-social contents, thus leading to the modern cognitive structure of permeable domains 
instead of the former delimited mental areas. Symbol use, a common characteristic of 
modernity, is often – as a means of communication (Noble and Davidson 1996; Klein 1995; 
Klein and Edgar 2002) – but not always (Leroi-Gourhan 1984; Mithen 1996; Müller-Karpe in 
Müller-Karpe et al. 2005) linked to language capacity. The emergence of symbols and “non-
functional” artifacts, such as art and jewelry, is additionally explained as resulting from the 
interconnection of different intelligence domains (Mithen 1996), as the expression of a 
perceived universal divine origin (Müller-Karpe 2001c; Müller-Karpe in Müller-Karpe et al. 
2005), or as the consequence of expanded executive functions of the brain, such as emotion 
control, consciousness, and reflection (Leroi-Gourhan 1984). 
The cognitive elements whose origin and characteristics are linked most closely to modernity 
and which are studied from the most varied angles are planning, projection and reflective 
thinking. Leroi-Gourhan (1984) and Coolidge and Wynn (2001) detect anatomical foundations 
in the development of the prefrontal cortex in Homo sapiens sapiens, while Binford (1989) as 
well as Noble and Davidson (1996) view the capabilities of planning and reflection as directly 
linked to language capacity. Whereas for Wynn (1979; 1981; 1985) planning manifests in the 
application of spatial parameters to artifact manufacture, Binford (1989) finds its expressions in 
the organization and structure of settlement and subsistence behavior, and Noble and Davidson 
(1996) as well as Coolidge and Wynn (2001) detect it as the basis of a planned communal 
effort, such as the crossing of the open sea in boats that led to the colonization of Australia. 
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Leroi-Gourhan 1964 (1984) 
Wynn 1979; 1981 
Binford 1989 
Mithen 1996 
Noble & Davidson 1996 
Coolidge & Wynn 2001 
Klein & Edgar 2002 
Müller-Karpe 2001c; Müller-Karpe et al. 2005 
Fig. 18 Comparison of the progression of human cognitive evolution according to different 
archaeological models. 
- - - technological progress, cognitively similar to modern great apes 
––– slow cognitive progression, not specifically defined 
––– modern human cognition 
   |   break in cognitive evolution, evolutionary jump 
The origin of modern cognition is often linked to physical changes. In these cognitivistic 
models, the way of thinking is mainly dependent on specific anatomical structures or genetic 
traits. Thus, Leroi-Gourhan (1984) views anatomical innovations like upright locomotion and 
the development of the cerebrum as the precursors of modern thinking. Klein and Edgar (2002) 
take pains to identify a genetic mutation as the trigger of a neuronal restructuring that facilitated 
language and symbol behavior, while Coolidge and Wynn (2001) assume several genetic 
changes behind a neuronal reorganization of the frontal lobe. By contrast, those hypotheses that 
explain the development of new ways of thinking with the restructuring of extant physical 
elements without fundamental changes have to be viewed as connectionistic in the widest sense 
of the word. For example, Noble and Davidson (1996) consider the basis of purposeful 
communication by means of conscious signals to be rooted in a changed throwing behavior, on 
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the one hand, and increased possibilities for divided attention, such as those generated by 
carrying infants in front of the body instead of on the back, on the other. While according to 
their model the development of fine motor skills as well as the hairlessness of the mothers, 
which changed the carrying behavior, are contingent upon genetic changes, the perception of the 
symbolic significance of an utterance for the whole community is considered as an exclusively 
mental epiphany. Müller-Karpe (2001c; Müller-Karpe in Müller-Karpe et al. 2005) posits a 
similar sudden realization of new cognitive dimensions that cannot be ascribed to genetic 
mutations with his theory of the abrupt perception of a universal divine origin. By contrast, 
Mithen (1996) stresses in his model the slow development of linguistic utterances based on 
behavior, from exclusively social domains to others like technology and the environment, and 
the subsequent interpenetration of cognitive domains. As different as the presented models are, 
they all are unified in their lack of constructivist components: cultural mechanisms only really 
function after the emergence of modern cognitive capacities and only then do they influence the 
implementation of mental capabilities. The historical dimension does not come into play in 
these explanatory approaches to the early phases of the evolution of human thinking. 
The fact that the different models all reach very similar conclusions regarding the course of 
human cognitive evolution (see fig. 18), with a few exceptions (Wynn 1979; 1981), is not 
necessarily due to the fact that humans indeed only evolved into reflecting and foresighted 
beings during the last 100,000 years. The image of primarily technological progress until the 
middle or the end of the Middle Palaeolithic, which was accompanied by only minor and not 
further definable cognitive developments, benefits from two methodological problems. 
The Ontogenetic Adult Perspective 
One possible factor in the prominence of the evolutionary period between 60,000 and 30,000 
years before present may be a problem of perspective. During the course of ontogeny, body and 
mind develop into an adult phenotype under the influence of the natural, social, and cultural 
environment and according to genetic predisposition. The course of development from the 
ovum to sexual maturity is largely predetermined, as well as the physical and mental basic set-
up of an adult human in comparison to other species. A problem arises, however, when the 
principle of ontogeny with its fixed tracking is applied to phylogeny. As justification for this 
transfer, the biogenetic law established by Ernst Haeckel in 1866 is often cited, which states that 
ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny (Wuketits 1988: 139). However, Haeckels original 
formulation talks about ontogeny being a shortened and condensed recapitulation of phylogeny; 
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while most citations stress the repetitive aspect, the limiting factors implied in the condensed 
state are often overlooked. 
Phylogeny consists of a string of many individual developments – ontogenies. The ontogeny of 
any organism, in turn, is the result of a chain of ontogenies of its ancestors, with channeled 
evolutionary processes and the transmission from genotype to phenotype under the influence of 
the natural, social, and cultural environment. However, the script of ontogeny is not merely a 
summary of phylogeny and follows the latter only in an abbreviated manner; there are 
qualitative and quantitative divergences during its course. Some processes in ontogeny  are 
speeded up (acceleration), others are slowed down (retardation), and sometimes different 
developments only apply to individual organs (heterochrony; ibid.: 146). In phylogeny, on the 
other hand, species or group specific characteristics can occur that do not form part of the 
ontogenies of different or later lineages. This means that ontogeny does not replicate 
phylogenetic periods of evolution in a chronologically proportional manner and thus does not 
simply mirror phylogeny. Since human phylogeny is moreover not a simple succession of 
different species, but displays various side branches, evolutionary dead ends, and ambiguous 
alternatives of descent, the exact interrelations of which are as disputed as the main lineage, 
neither can its complete course be parallelized to ontogeny, nor can individual aspects like the 
emergence of cognitive capabilities in early humans be extrapolated. To postulate, for example, 
“the brain of a one-year-old who was not even able to talk” (Walker 1996: 81) to be applicable 
to Homo erectus hardly makes sense. The same holds true for the emergence of the executive 
functions of the frontal lobe of the brain during the course on ontogeny in modern humans (see 
Coolidge and Wynn 2001), which, owing to the phylogenetically different evolution of the 
various areas of this brain region (Karnath and Sturm 2002), cannot simply be transferred as a 
unit into phylogeny. 
Furthermore, ontogeny and behavior in particular are strongly influenced by cultural factors in 
humans.  This makes the application of the biogenetic law to the evolution of human behavior, 
from which the cognitive potential is then deduced, even more dubious. Early hominid forms 
are not crude and incomplete modern humans, ergo defective, but consist of autonomous adult 
individual according to their species. In the same way that the object behavior among gorillas 
and bonobos cannot be deemed an aspect of chimpanzee-like tools behavior, but has to be 
regarded as different behavior (see Byrne 1996), so too can australopithecine, Homo erectus, or 
Neanderthal behavior not be considered as a mere fraction of modern human behavior. The 
focussing on indicators of behavior defined as modern human within the archaeological context 
skews the perspective in favor of results that display fully developed, adult characteristics, as 
opposed to crude or defective characteristics in infantile, earlier periods. Overall, ontogeny 
cannot provide an exact image of phylogeny, so that extrapolations of the synchronous 
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emergence of different cognitive aspects like language, planning, and symbol use from 
ontogeny to phylogeny have to be approached cautiously. 
Approaches to Artifact Categories vs. Attribute Analysis 
A second methodological problem, besides the “adult perspective” derived from ontogeny, is 
present in dealing with the archaeological record, the questions asked, and the interpretation of 
findings. In general, a limited number of archaeologically documented artifact categories 
summarily serve as attributes of modern cognition: blade technology, bone artifacts, burials or 
burial goods, jewelry, and art (Binford 1989; Mithen 1996; Otte 2001; Tattersall 2001; Klein 
and Edgar 2002; Coolidge and Wynn 2002; Müller-Karpe in Müller-Karpe et al. 2005). The 
colonization of Australia complements the catalogue of modern elements mainly derived from 
characteristics of the Late Palaeolithic (esp. Noble and Davidson 1996). Thus, it is not 
surprising that the starting point of most archaeological models of cognitive evolution is defined 
by an assumed cognitive break linked to the emergence of anatomically modern humans around 
100,000 years before present at the earliest, but mostly dated between 60,000 and 30,000 years 
before present. Varying in the specific approach from model to model, an attempt is made to 
explain the different attributes that are considered modern human as a unified complex via a 
common causative factor. The actual relations between the attributes and the cognitive bases 
they indicate remain largely speculative. 
In the process of verifying the models advocating a sudden jump in cognitive evolution at or 
around the beginning of the Late Palaeolithic the same attributes that formerly served in the 
formulation of the model are considered again. Relatively broadly defined artifact categories are 
created, the massive occurrence of which then marks the cognitive break. Precursors to the 
clustered indicators are rejected as not exactly matching the characteristic in question, later 
developments are subsumed under a period “from the Late Palaeolithic onwards,” owing to their 
relative chronological proximity as opposed to the vast period of evolution that preceded. Thus, 
early non-functional artifacts, such as the carvings from Bilzingsleben or the reshaping of a 
chunk of tuff with natural female shape from Berekhat Ram, can be excluded from closer 
scrutiny as not adequate to the artistic representations from the Aurignacian, such as for 
example the small sculptures from the Swabian Jura; concerning the argument of the sudden 
flourishing and varied bone industry the opposite holds true, and early Late Palaeolithic simple 
bone points are often lumped together with late Late Palaeolithic bone needles, harpoons, and 
atlatls. 
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If, however, the archaeological remains from the Early and Middle Palaeolithic, that is, before 
the assumed break of 100,000–30,000 years before present, are considered more closely, that 
scrutiny always takes place in predefined chronological periods that are summarily perused for 
the occurrence of specific artifact categories. Early isolated indicators of new modes of behavior 
are discarded as not reflecting the general common behavior of the period in focus, and 
expansions of potential are only recognized as such when their implementation has become 
universal. The classification of indicators relevant to the changes in mental capacities is often 
arbitrary or cannot be reconstructed from the articles. For example, Klein and Edgar (2002) do 
not explain why the more carefully fashioned hand axes from 0.6 million years before present 
onwards mark a step in cognitive evolution compared to the generally less carefully fashioned 
ones from the Middle Palaeolithic, while early Middle Palaeolithic evidences of hafting of stone 
artifacts and thus of composite tools do not, nor why the increased use of bone, antler, and ivory 
should constitute a distinct extension of cultural capacities. Concerning the archaeological 
material from the Early and Middle Palaeolithic, most models indeed reconstruct no actual 
cognitive evolution during the course of human phylogeny. Their main aim is to differentiate 
modern from non-modern behavior, the latter of which  summarily subsumes all behavior 
exhibited within the species Homo before the Late Palaeolithic. These models only serve to 
manifest the exceptional position of Homo sapiens sapiens; they are not models for the 
phylogenetic evolution of human thinking. 
If certain artifact categories are considered as autonomous study units, the reconstruction of 
developments remains naturally difficult. These artificial types serve as static index fossils that 
can only be rated qualitatively as present or absent. A quantitative study is usually not carried 
out. Additionally, if the selection of types is restricted to those that can be related to modern 
humans and their cognitive modernity, cognitive potential that expresses or manifests itself 
otherwise cannot be detected in the archaeological record. Instead of specifying indicators for 
cognitive characteristics, the mode of relationship of which is unknown and does not even have 
to be causative, an open attribute analysis independent from or permeating artifact categories 
should be conducted. Its conception should also permit the inclusion of existing, type-related 
periodizations only after the analysis of attribute development, when the results are integrated 
within their cultural-historical framework. This would introduce an openness towards results 
that cannot be found in any of the existing archaeological models of human cognitive evolution. 
The following section of this study attempts precisely such an attribute analysis. Instead of 
documenting the presence or absence of specific artifact categories as attributes of cognitive 
modernity, I will study a characteristic the fundamental significance of which for the cognitive 
area of object behavior and its manifestations in the archaeological record has already been 
established in the first section of this study: the spatial, temporal, and individual dissociation of 
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solutions from problems that cannot be solved in a current situation – thinking outside the box. 
Comparing animal object behavior with archaeological artifacts from the beginnings of stone 
tool manufacture to the Neolithic, I will pursue the question if and how far the cognitive option 
of dissociation, and thus expansion, of problem solutions has changed during the course of 
human evolution. The interpretation of the results of this attribute analysis will consider the 
potential otherness of earlier hominid species as well as influences of a cultural-historical 
dimension of development. 
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IV The Increasing Distance Between Problem and 
Solution 
The notion of planning, studied by Binford (1989) as the curation of artifacts, the increased 
circuitous action noted by Köhler (1963: 72–73) in the use of tools, the thinking about the future 
that Lethmate (1994: 35–36) considers specifically human, the increasing elimination of the 
body in combination with artifact use as discussed by Alsberg (1922) and Sloterdijk (2002: 
179–87), the anticipatory cognition detected by Osvath and Gärdenfors (2005) in the transport 
of raw materials during the Oldowan, and the increasing depth of planning displayed in the use 
and manufacture of tools (Haidle 1999; 2000; 2004a; 2004b) are all linked to one and the same 
phenomenon: the increasing distance between problem and solution. The progressive 
dissociation of immediate need and its direct fulfillment is one of the main preconditions for the 
use of objects as media and can be detected in animal tool behavior as well as the archaeological 
record. It is not a binary characteristic that can only be classified as present or absent but 
appears as a gradual, increasable feature. Thus, it is well suited as a characteristic on which to 
study and describe the evolution of an important part of human cognition. 
The elimination of the immediacy of problem and solution and the related expansion of extant 
physical and mental capabilities, where the acting individual exploits the characteristics of 
suitable objects, is able to increase the action range of tool-using animals enormously. The 
extension of the problem–solution distance, its progression during the course of human 
evolution, and its effects are the questions looked at more closely in the following chapters. The 
basis of this study is a database, found in the appendix, detailing tool use observed in animals 
and encountered in archaeological remains. First, however, it seems necessary to clarify the 
definition of the term “tool.” 
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14 Tools – A Matter of Definition 
In ethnographical, ergonomical, archaeological, and zoological literature, the fact that a subject 
– human or animal – uses an object in order to achieve a goal is recorded differently. What 
constitutes an object and how it has to be manipulated to be considered a means or medium 
varies with the respective approach. Even seemingly unambiguous terms like “tool” can denote 
different things depending on their definition. 
Meyers Großes Taschenlexikon from 1900 (Vol. 24: 91) defines tool – Werkzeug – as 
“generally every implement that is used to more easily handle, manufacture, or manipulate an 
object… According to modern ethnological and (palaeo)anthropological terminology, 
distinctions are made between tools in the form of simple pieces of material that are used 
unaltered for a specific purpose only once and implements as pieces of material that are 
selected, shaped or specifically manufactured, and used repeatedly.” 
Walter Hirschberg and Alfred Janata (1986) define the terms “tool” and “implement” in their 
handbook of material culture in ethnology from an ethnological point of view. Their criterion is 
exclusively the modern human use of the different resources that have to be classified. The term 
“tool” is rather restrictively used and should denote, according to Hirschberg and Janata, only 
changes in shape, the irreversible modification of the volume of an object. This definition 
applies to knives, scrapers, axes, hatchets, adzes, chisels, wedges, hammers, drawing dies, 
molds, and clamping and grasping tools (anvil and tongs), amongst others. The category of 
implements is much broader and includes all simple, non-composite auxiliary means, also 
including water, air, and fire besides objects such as pokers and containers (ibid.: 42–43). 
From an ergonomical point of view, Christopher Baber defines tools as objects and artifacts that 
are used to induce changes to other objects in the environment. They facilitate the extension of 
the user's physical and mental capabilities beyond his restricted individual repertoire (Baber 
2003: 1–8). Separate from the tools are other manipulable objects that do not allow flexible use 
in order to control or refine the effects of changes (ibid.: 146); keys, door handles, and gear 
shifts, for example, do only permit predetermined use, while hammers and screwdrivers, 
amongst others, can be used in a more differenciated manner depending on the force or angle 
applied, etc., according to necessity. 
From an archaeological viewpoint, these distinctions are irrelevant, since the types of tools that 
require specified manipulation in order to achieve a predetermined result of use are very late 
developments and derivatives of object behavior with an open outcome. Joachim Hahn (1993) 
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thus defines tools and implements with special respect to early human archaeological remains. 
He stresses the importance of distinguishing between natural objects and those relating to 
humans, as well as the determination of their use. As an umbrella term, he uses “artifacts” to 
denote the category of all material objects altered by humans: this includes stones moved by 
humans from one place to another as well as pits, fireplaces, or stone structures, which are 
clearly fashioned by humans. “Proper artifacts are objects of stone, bone, wood, or other 
materials that exhibit at least traces of use but typically have been modified in several steps” 
(ibid.: 10). The artificial modification of the artifact's base shape produces a tool, regardless 
whether the modifications are intentional, such as in retouched stone tools, or unintentional, 
such as in traces of use. However, within the archaeological record, the identification of tools 
whose base shapes or natural objects, while having been used, do not display any consequential 
modifications, is problematic (ibid.: 164–66). 
Compared to its archaeological use, the definition of tool use in zoology and behavioral 
sciences has been progressively refined, since the observation of animal tool use allows the 
documentation of behavior and objects that cannot be detected in the archaeological context and 
thus neither included in nor excluded from the definition. A basic definition of tool use was 
established by Jane van Lawick-Goodall (1970: 195), who describes it as the use of external 
objects as a functional extension of the mouth, beak, hands, or claws to achieve an immediate 
purpose. By contrast, Alcock's (1972: 464) restricted definition excludes, for example, the 
intimidation techniques employed by macaques to impress third parties by shaking smaller 
monkeys and throwing their own feces around. For him, tool use is the manipulation of an 
inanimate object that was not produced internally, in order to effect improved efficiency in the 
change of the form or position of another object. Finally, Benjamin Beck (1980: 4–12) cautions 
that the employ of both preceding definitions could lead to the inclusion of, for example, 
scratching one's back on a tree as tool use, because tools are not explicitly defined as isolated 
from the environment. Consequently, he further refines the definition with regard to the object 
used, the purpose of its manipulation, and the mode of use. In his definition, tool use is the 
external use of a freely movable object from the environment, in order to more efficiently 
change the form, position or condition of another object, another organism, or the user himself. 
In the process, the user holds the tool during or immediately before its use and is responsible for 
the correct and efficient orientation of the tool. 
Based on Beck's conditions, the active throwing of feces can be defined as tool behavior, as well 
as the the intimidating flourishing of young animals towards aggressive members of the same 
species. Likewise, the behavior of Egyptian vultures that throw stones at ostrich eggs to smash 
them open (van Lawick-Goodall and van Lawick-Goodall 1966) can be identified as tool 
behavior. However, the cracking open of snails by song thrushes, by means of smashing them 
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against a hard surface (anvil) in a so-called “Drosselschmiede” or the throwing of shells by 
seagulls (Beck 1980:203) and similar actions do not constitute tool behavior, since the molluscs 
are the targeted objects to be manipulated and not a medium of change. Parker and Gibson 
(1977) coined for this distinction the term “true tool use” as opposed to “proto tool use.” To be 
counted under true tool use in the sense of Parker and Gibson's definition, the tool or medium 
has to be freely movable and needs to be used actively. However, if a medium is stationary 
within the environment and only the object to be manipulated is moved, such as in the case of 
cracking open hard shelled foodstuff on an anvil among fishes, birds, primates and other 
mammals (Beck 1980: 126–28; see chapters 17 and 18), or the lancing of an internal abscess by 
putting the trunk over a dead branch as observed in an Asian Elephant in the zoo (Steinbacher 
1965 in Beck 1980: 128), the behavior constitutes proto tool use. 
Peter-René Becker (1993: 14) disagrees with these limitations when it comes to the use of 
anvils, since he considers this behavior to be as complex as the manipulation of freely movable 
hammers. Likewise, Sylvie Beyries and Frédéric Joulian (1990) detect no marked difference in 
the complexity of action chains in their comparison of eleven different true and proto tool 
behaviors in seven animal species. In order to test whether the differentiation of true and proto 
tool behavior is merely an arbitrary problem of definition or whether it implies existing 
fundamental differences of a cognitive nature, Lefebvre et al. (2002) compared the frequency of 
true and proto tool behavior, innovative feeding habits, and different parameters of brain size in 
birds. Their starting point was the idea put forward by Kathleen Gibson (1986 in Lefebvre et al. 
2002) that the relative size of brain structures with key functions in object behavior could allow 
for a distinction of the two behavioral patterns if they would turn out to exact different cognitive 
demands. It appeared that bird species that exhibit true tool behavior do indeed show an 
increase in average brain size; additionally, there is an observable correlation between  the 
number of different tool behaviors per taxon (species, genus, or higher classifying category) and 
the overall brain size, as well as the size of the neostriatum, a region of the cerebrum in birds 
that, together with others, is considered to be an equivalent of the neocortex in mammals. The 
occurrence of proto tool behavior or “borderline tool use” in different taxa, on the other hand, 
can be deduced mainly from the amount of innovations in feeding habits within these groups, 
according to the statistical analyses by Lefebvre et al. (2002: 960–63). As a result of their 
studies among birds it has to be stated that, indeed, “...three lines of evidence show that true 
tool users differ from borderline tool users in size of key neural structures...” (Lefebvre et al. 
2002: 960). 
Whether these results can be transferred to mammals and primates still has to be verified. 
Additionally, the results of Lefebvre's group cannot be considered completely unquestionable, 
since their categorization of different behaviors (Lefebvre et al. 2002: 948–54), and thus the 
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base data of their study, are contested to a certain degree. For example, while they view the 
baiting of fish with bread and other objects, which Beck (1980) classifies as true tool use, as 
borderline tool use, they consider the seizing of fishing lines cast by humans in the crow species 
of Corvus corax and Corvus corone (Holmberg in Boswall 1977 and Scott 1974; both in 
Lefebvre et al. 2002: 953) as true tool behavior, together with Thorpe (1963 in Beck 1980) and 
Millikan and Bowman (1967 in Beck 1980), but contended by Beck (1980: 132) and Boswell 
(1977). Consequently, the differentiated cognitive assessment of proto and true tool behavior 
still has to be regarded as an justified assumption, but not as a solid fact backed by independent 
evidence. Whether the borderline cases collected by Beck (1980: 124–33) in fact do represent 
true tool behavior in certain instances, will probably depend on the respective interpretative 
approach. Examples of these borderline cases include sticky “capture blobs” of silk to catch 
prey in Bolas spiders (Mastophora), anvils, scratch poles used for grooming in ungulates, the 
ritualistic presentation of food or other objects in courtship, nesting, and hatching behavior, or 
swallowed objects as digestive aids or stabilizers. The identification of tool behavior is 
controversial in the use of the body's own raw materials (saliva, feces, vomit), such as in the 
case of baiting seagulls by orcas (Mason 2005) or the “self annointing” of Western European 
hedgehogs (Erinaceus europaeus), who lick strongly fragrant objects or substances like rotting 
meat or urine, mix it with large amounts of their own saliva, and then spread the mixture on 
their spines. Further examples, largely not included in tool use in the strict sense, are the 
washing and soaking of food, as in the famous case of the Japanese macaques of Koshima Islet, 
orangutans using planks, tree trunks, or boats as floats, and the bridging of gaps by members of 
the same species in howler monkeys, ants, and orangutans. 
Animal constructions such as nests, burrows, bowers, hives, nets, traps, dams and lodges 
(Collias and Collias 1976; von Frisch 1974), as well as stores of provisions are all excluded 
from the definition of tool use mentioned above. While they represent animal artifacts, even the 
most complex and decorated among them, such as the courtship ritual constructions of 
bowerbirds and some birds of paradise (Borgia 1985; Borgia et al. 1985; Diamond 1982; 1987; 
Pruett-Jones and Pruett-Jones 1988; Veselovsky 1978) are no actual media to change the form, 
position or condition of other objects. The individual elements of construction, decoration, and 
bolstering are used and incorporated as building materials and thus do not serve as tools or 
media. 
In order to establish a database of animal, early human, and modern human behavior (see 
Appendix) and to enable the following comparative studies, I have generally followed Beck's 
definition of tool behavior. Thus, tools as media are defined as freely movable objects that are 
used in a controlled manner with hands, feet, beaks, mouths, trunks, and tails as an extension of 
these in order to change the form, position or condition of another object, organism, or the user 
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himself. This definition can be applied relatively readily to animal tool use and its employed 
artifacts, since generally the use of these objects has been observed directly. Thus, even 
inconspicuous objects that show no obvious traces of use can be classified as tools. In the 
archaeological context, artifacts classified as not used according to this definition, such as 
production debris, post holes, layers of flagstones, fireplaces, and burials, amongst others, have 
to be separated from implements. I will do this as far as possible, but I will also – where 
appropriate – consider the additional information bearing on production technology or usage 
context of tools employed inherent in these artifacts in order to complement the picture of 
human tool behavior in prehistory. 
Tool or Toy? 
The following comparative studies of object behavior incorporates, besides tool behavior in the 
strict sense, interactions with objects or media in a playful or artistic-symbolic context, which 
usually are not  considered as tool use because of their not apparent functional context. The 
basics of the discussion whether tools and toys can be equated or have to be separated are found 
in Jean Kitahara-Frisch (1977) and Benjamin Beck. There, play is characterized as an action or 
actions without economically useful results, “...often seen not to be practiced as a means to an 
end but to constitute rather an end in itself. The center of interest is process rather than a goal 
(Miller 1973).” (Kitahara-Frisch 1977: 61). 
The term tool, by contrast, is predominantly centered around subsistence behavior. This 
limitation is caused by the general connotation of tool with work and effective and efficient 
behavior. For example, Nishida (1974 in Kitahara-Frisch 1977: 62) considers object behavior to 
be tool behavior only if it can be considered imperative for survival. Tool behavior improves the 
odds of survival and thus of reproductive success, while play is not dominated by selection 
pressure. In the search for the difference  of humans and their evolution (e.g., Oakley 1963; 
Lancaster 1968), tool use within the context of subsistence and intra- and extra-species 
competition can be used as a simple but easily conceivable as directly adaptive characteristic, all 
the more so, since both behavioral complexes can be construed from the archaeological record. 
The discussion of the emergence and assertiveness of new genera and species during the process 
of hominization, as well as the extinction of human ancestors and side branches is still generally 
characterized by the focus on immediate subsistence concerns. 
In a comparison of the reproductive success of chimpanzees and baboons in Gombe, Benjamin 
Beck (1975 in Kitahara-Frisch 1977: 59) realized that even fully developed animal tool use in a 
IV The Increasing Distance Between Problem and Solution 149
subsistence context does not necessarily lead to a significant advantage in competition. Thus, 
Kitahara-Frisch poses the question whether tool use in chimpanzees does indeed fulfill the same 
functions as those he assumes unquestioningly for early hominids, namely “exploiting and 
adapting the environment as an answer to the biological needs of the tool-makers” or whether, 
by contrast, it has rather to be seen generally as a form of pastime, also employed in the 
foraging for food. However, he assumes that play and subsistence contexts cannot be separated 
and views the real significance of object behavior less as connected to the actually mastered 
tasks, but as an expression of an underlying cognitive development:  “How can play be told 
apart from subsistence strategy, a toy apart from a tool?” (Kitahara-Frisch 1977: 63). 
Many of the antagonistic (overawing or intimidating behavior, defense) or subsistence-related 
behaviors  including tools are already anticipated and practiced in the social or solitary play of 
young animals and are resumed by adolescents and adults as a non-functional pastime (see 
examples in Beck 1980: 40, 47, 56, 67, 75–76, 78–81, 83–85, 90–92, 94–95, 100–102, 104–5, 
109, 111–12, 114, 154–55). Köhler (1963: 50–71) views object behavior of his chimpanzees 
outside experiment situations as play, rather than the accomplishing of tasks, although an 
objective differentiation between subsistence and play contexts is not always possible. To 
elucidate this point, Kitahara-Frisch (1977: 61) chooses the example of dipping bread into a cup 
of water in order to then suck the sponged water out of it, after most of the thirst has already 
been quenched by taking large gulps: “...the behavior seems to be an end in itself and not only 
or always an answer to a need.” Matsusaka et al. (2005) also report tool use unessential for the 
quenching of thirst by scooping or sponging water among wild chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes 
schweinfurthii). Young animals, up to an age of ten years, of the M-group in Mahale used tools 
at bodies of running water, scooped water from tree holes even during the wet season, and 
occasionally incorporate other elements of play into this behavior. It has to be noted here that 
this mode of interaction with objects is not limited to animals; numerous object activities among 
modern humans arise from the joy of handling objects and are only subsequently reinterpreted 
as economically useful or subsistence-problem-solving activities. 
Besides the practicing of tool use in a playful context among young animals and the transfer of 
tool use from a primarily subsistence-related context to other areas of behavior among 
adolescents and adults, some animal species – especially primates – demonstrate intensive 
occupation with objects from their environment that cannot be related to subsistence or 
antagonistic behavior. Huffman (1984) and Huffman and Quiatt (1986) describe eight different 
subspecific forms of stone-handling, a form of solitary play, among Japanese macaques 
(Macaca fuscata), which otherwise display explicitly functional tool behavior on a negligible 
scale. Bonobos (Pan paniscus) also feature intensive and sometimes, in social play, very 
differentiated tool use, where for example while playing tag the object of play can attain tool 
14 Tools - A Matter of Definition 150
status through its use as a communication signal. In these situations, the animal to be tagged 
carries a stick; if it drops the stick, the play is interrupted, if it takes it up again, the play is 
resumed; if the animal is caught, the stick changes ownership, although possession of the stick 
does not seem to be the overall goal. When the group moves on and the play is suspended, the 
object of play is discarded. Ingmanson (1996: 201) notices that in these situations “...the stick 
enhances the play, signalling to other players information and focusing attention on the activity 
itself.” 
Whether complex, flexible tool use is possible without preceding playful interaction with 
objects during individual ontogeny, is a problematic question, owing to the lengthy conceptual 
and sensorimotor learning processes involved even in basic object interaction (cf. Connolly and 
Dalgleish 1989; Beck 1980: 174–76). However, I consider the exclusively functional 
interpretation of play as merely the practice version of alleged subsistence behavior as too 
narrow. As the examples above demonstrate, play can assume a major role in the perception, 
experience and affirmation of one's self and one's social community, where objects can 
definitely be used as media and, thus, tools. Since from this perspective playful context and tool 
behavior cannot be separated, I have included the playful interaction with objects into the 
comparative analysis of animal and human object behavior. This choice is deliberate also 
regarding the fact that the archaeological interpretation of artifact inventories precludes the 
context of play, since its attestation is by far more difficult than that of important functions in 
the strife for everyday survival, such as subsistence and, less frequently, defense or overawing 
behavior. The cases considered in the following consideration of the evolution of object 
behavior are compiled into a database, the tabulated version of which can be found in the 
appendix. 
IV The Increasing Distance Between Problem and Solution 151
15 Comparative Studies of Human and Animal Object 
Behavior 
Detailed studies of tool use and manufacture among animals as opposed to humans are few and 
far between. Even rarer are attempts to not only contrast the tool behavior of humans and 
animals, but to compare these instances from a technological and conceptual point of view. In 
the search for the reasons behind this lack, Thomas Wynn (1990) primarily cites different 
science traditions, which already differ in the collection of data, but even more so in their 
analysis and interpretation. The biological-ethological approach (“natural historic” in Wynn) 
frequently describes spontaneous animal tool behavior, often not evoked during experiments, in 
an anecdotal manner, without interpretation or generalization of the primary sources or the 
fitting of these sources into a theoretical background. Usually, thus far unknown phenomena are 
reported, while the initial phase of the observed behavior remains as unobserved or neglected as 
its technological components. Especially the material basis of the behavior, that is, the tool as 
such, its base material, and its manufacture, is often just grazed. Systematic analyses of 
individual known behaviors are rare (e.g., Boesch and Boesch 1983: 1984a; 1984b; McGrew 
1974; Uehara 1982) and, logically, confined to a few frequently observed behaviors among 
intensively studied species. Interpretations focus on ecological, adaptive, social, motivational, 
or cognitive contexts of the respective behavior. It is only recently that material-technological 
questions increasingly become a focus of attention (e.g., Fox et al. 1999; Hicks et al. 2005; Hunt 
2000a; Hunt and Gray 2004; Sanz et al. 2004). 
Due to the relatively short chronological range even of long-term studies, one can only 
speculate about the evolutionary history of animal tool behavior (e.g., Nishida and Hiraiwa 
1982). The first archaeological excavations of the material remains of animal object behavior 
(Joulian 1996; Mercader 2002) had to start with the study of a site known through the direct 
observation of this behavior. The detection of animal tools outside a narrow chronological 
context of action will remain difficult, since modifications to animal tools are relatively 
unobtrusive, their mostly organic raw materials are highly perishable, and the identification and 
attribution of animal origination pose a double problem. Thus, it will probably remain 
impossible to write a prehistory of chimpanzees. While there exist occasional discussions of 
innovative behavior in primates (e.g, Kummer and Goodall 1985; Huffman and Quiatt 1986) 
and its dissemination beyond individual learning processes (e.g, Boesch and Tomasello 1998; 
van Schaik et al. 2003; Whiten 2005), approaches to study technological change are lacking. 
Syntheses of tool behavior on a group (e.g, Whiten et al. 1999; van Schaik et al. 2003) or 
species level (e.g., Beck 1974; Huffman and Quiatt 1986; McGrew 1991; 1992; Byrne 1996; 
Hohmann and Fruth 2003) often display astonishing differences regarding the situational 
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context. However, species-specific technological comparisons do not exist, as already Wynn 
(1990) bemoans. Even the otherwise extensive study of tool behavior among chimpanzees by 
William McGrew remains rather uninformative regarding the material and technological 
aspects. 
By contrast, archaeological studies of (early) human tool behavior are definitely dominated by 
the consideration of material remains. Ethological aspects, such as the mechanisms and actors in 
the transmission of traditions, remain peripheral, since they cannot be observed directly and are 
difficult to extrapolate: “L'analyse des seuls outils transformés renvoie trop souvent à un aspect 
cognitif individuel et non social.” (Joulian 1998: 72). Primary sources generally introduce new 
sites, although occasionally individual artifact types are presented that so far were not 
documented in a region or period, and which are very rarely completely new. Archaeological 
primary publications mainly deal with artifact classes and their degree of standardization, and 
often only summarily with their functions, the raw materials used and their provenance, 
production processes, and artifact assemblages. The group-specific context of behavior is 
stressed versus an individual, ecological-adaptive perspective. This “supra-organic tradition” 
considers technology as a quasi autonomous cultural system and attaches great importance to 
the idea of technological progress with increasing complexity and efficiency (Wynn 1990: 103–
4). While this tradition incorporates a general concept of development, as opposed to the natural 
historical approach, theories about the course and the mechanisms of this process are still only 
rarely substantiated. And while primate tools are dealt with without the discussion of 
technological change, early human tools are only considered from a human-technological 
perspective, without the inclusion of animal data from the natural historical approach for 
comparison or integration. Thus, according to Wynn (1990), none of these schools of thought 
can provide an approximation to the differences of human and animal tools. 
That the line does not necessarily have to be drawn between the biological-ethological (natural 
historical) and the archaeological-technological (supra-organic) approach, and thus between 
non-human primates and early human tool cultures, is demonstrated by Michael Tomasello 
(2002), who transforms the theoretical-methodological dichotomy criticized by Wynn into a 
phylogenetic difference. As a starting point of actual human behavior, he looks for “the 
comprehension of intentionality and causality” (ibid.: 29–37) as a new cognitive capability, 
which possibly occurred for the first time as late as 250,000–200,000 years before present, and 
only which facilitated various technologies as cultural systems and the increase of complexity 
and efficiency by cumulative cultural evolution. If one follows Tomasello's argument, the supra-
organic, technological approach cannot be applied prior to the evolution of this comprehension 
of intentionality and causality, because before that no major technological systems nor their 
change existed. 
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Yet, there exist attempts to combine both approaches, whereby usually archaeological-
technological questions are applied to primatological data, while the transfer of ethological 
approaches to tool behavior onto archaeological data has thus far attracted only limited interest, 
owing to insufficient data. A pioneer of this interdisciplinary direction is Wright (1972), who in 
his study of the five-year-old orangutan Abang reached the conclusion that australopithecines 
were generally cognitively capable of learning how to manufacture stone tools through the 
observation of Homo individuals. In practice situations, he first showed the ape how a tied-up 
box containing food could be opened with the help of flakes. In a second phase, he 
demonstrated how to produce a flake from a fixed core; Abang proved capable of learning from 
a different species (Homo sapiens) in both situations. While Wright's study deals with 
fundamental cognitive capacities, Kathy Schick and Nicholas Toth (1993; Toth et al. 1993; 
Schick et al. 1999) employ long-term stone flaking experiments with the bonobo Kanzi to 
monitor the development of his manual and conceptual capacities, as well as the comparability 
of the thus acquired artifacts to Oldowan inventories. 
Besides experimentally generated capabilities, tools created by chimpanzees in contexts without 
human influence were also studied with regard to their inherent potential. Thomas Wynn and 
William McGrew (1989) also employ Wynn's approach of the transfer of Piaget's theories to 
archaeological artifacts (Wynn 1979; 1981) in their study of chimpanzee tools. From a 
comparison of the cognitive complexity manifest in these tools, in the sense of Piaget, they 
reach the conclusion that the cognitive capabilities of Oldowan individuals did not surpass that 
of modern chimpanzees, except in the transport of raw materials. However, they state that their 
existing cognitive potential is not used by modern chimpanzees to the extent apparent in the 
preserved Oldowan tools. A similar result is presented by Frédéric Joulian (1996), who derived
chaînes opératoires from various tool actions, such as nut-cracking with a hammer among 
chimpanzees or the manufacture of an Oldowan chopper. In a comparison of chimpanzee and 
early hominid behavior that considers archaeological-technological as well as primatological-
ethological questions, Adriaan Kortland (1986) notices that no indicators of a functional 
equivalence, similar motion sequences, or analog motivations could be found in the use of stone 
tools of both groups. 
In a study of eleven different tool use behaviors, which were observed among seven different 
animal species, from an assassin bug to chimpanzees, Sylvie Beyries and Joulian (1990) reach 
the conclusion that the complexity of chaînes opératoires cannot be correlated with the 
zoological classification of the species. However, the number of individual actions and action 
phases hardly equals the complexity of the underlying schéma conceptuel (Beyries and Joulian 
1990: 24). In order to approach the evolution of this conceptual potential, I will attempt to 
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sketch the development of the expansion of the problem-solution-distance in a comparison of 
animal and (early) human tool behavior in the following chapter. 
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16 The Study of Problem-Solution-Distance: Basics 
This present study of the expansion of the problem-solution-distance during the course of 
human evolution has to be placed in the theoretical sphere of Cognitive Archaeology. It has 
risen from deliberations on object planning behavior (Haidle 1999; 2000; 2004) and is based on 
a compilation of human and animal tool behavior. Its point of departure is the tool, that is, the 
medium that is employed in the solution of a problem. In order to illustrate the distance between 
problem/need and solution/satisfaction, I use a further development of the chaînes opératoires
method. Since the extended course from the perception of a need, through different phases of 
problem solving, to its final satisfaction can only be partially and indirectly ascertained in the 
artifacts, the approach to the reconstruction of these processes can only be hermeneutic-
understanding. 
In choosing tool behavior, I have singled out a definitive type of behavior, which occurs in 
many species of the animal kingdom, though often only isolated. The amount of animal tool 
behavior is still documented rather clearly and widely, so that an overview (see Appendix) can 
be attempted and then contrasted to a selection of the vast multitude and variation of (early) 
human tool behavior. The compilation of archaeological tool types – from the earliest stone 
tools to the elements of the Neolithic – and their underlying problem solution strategies took 
place according to important types that in our modern perception define whole periods, as well 
as significant innovations and interesting exceptions. However, the whole process can be 
transferred to any other given animal or archaeological tools, so that the theories of the course 
of the expansion of the problem-solution-distance advanced here can be tested and possibly 
disproved at any time. 
The study's intention is to outline the evolutionary course of a remarkable and typical aspect of 
human thinking, while at the same time no causal explanation is intended. The archaeological 
attestations are not subsumed into broad chronological periods, but are compared diachronically 
according to their more or less exact dating. Since chronological periods do not constitute 
natural phases and do not coincide with the contemporary units they describe, but are mere 
auxiliary constructions that are meant to facilitate an organized overview, it would be 
counterproductive to use them as the foundation of a study that attempts to sketch the course of 
developments. A subsumption of the results according to chronological periods is only useful 
subsequently, as a means of facilitating comprehension. 
Additionally, no strictly quantitative comparison of the frequency of certain phases of problem-
solution-distance is attempted. For one, this would by far go beyond the scope of this study, 
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which consequently would have to be limited in its chronological or geographical range. 
Secondly, while every expansion of the problem-solution-distance and its underlying object 
planning capacity leads to an expansion of potential tool behavior – i.e., new and innovative 
behaviors can occur, but do not necessarily have to – the actual use of behaviors among 
humans, and probably also chimpanzees and orangutans, is group-specific, dependent on culture 
and environment, and finally also individual. The inference of behavioral potential, and possibly 
a classification into more primitive or progressive, or more or less intelligent populations, 
according to the different manifest repertoires of tool behavior within individual groups is not 
possible. 
Extreme caution has to be exercised in statements about the cognitive capabilities of a group 
regarding archaeological sources. In these situations, results obtained have passed through a 
double filter: a) generally, only thought processes that have materialized into artifacts are open 
to scrutiny; b) many material implementations are not or only badly preserved, or 
geographically very diverse, and, especially in the early phase of the Early Palaeolithic, barely 
documented. In spite of this double filter of materialization and preservation/ location/ 
documentation and its ensuing problems, statements regarding the cognitive development 
derived from tool behavior are possible, since already minor variants of the cognitive 
foundations or their application can find their expression in the artifact spectrum. Thus, it is 
possible to outline at least the broad course of the expansion of the problem-solution-distance 
and the development of object planning behavior by mapping the first materialized and 
documented appearance of a behavioral variation. 
I assume that the cognitive potential of a species follows the same normal distribution as other 
capabilities. It follows that the occurrence of a tool behavior at one site implies that other 
individuals or groups within the same species are or were generally cognitively capable of the 
same behavior. Overall, however, it is only possible to ascertain a secure point in time post 
quem an expansion of potential can be assumed, though that point not necessarily indicates the 
first appearance of the capacity. David Whitley (1998b) stresses the fact that the intellectual 
potential of the modern brain was realized only long after its assumed first manifestations, and 
even possibly has not been realized fully until this day. He describes the human mind as clearly 
structured but with a lot of space for variability within this order, so that neuroanatomic 
determinism an be ruled out. The question why existing potential is not or only partially 
realized, or why one group realizes it when another does not, has to be traced back to 
ecological, social, cultural, and individual factors (see, for orangutans, Fox et al. 1999: 112–
113). The approach chosen for this present study thus describes an evolution, but is not 
evolutionistic in the sense that the increasing differentiation of cognitive possibilities in tool 
behavior and the associated planning capability necessarily have to lead to an expansion of the 
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actual behavioral repertoire. 
The question which fossil Homo species in particular is responsible for which form of tool use 
will not be considered here, owing to a number of problematic attributions. Consequently, and 
also due to the difficulties arising from the summarizing of long periods of time mentioned 
above, a cognitive characterization of Homo erectus or the Neanderthals is not undertaken. The
typical representative of a fossil human species that spans hundreds of thousands years does not 
exist; he can only be construed in retrospect, with all strengths and weaknesses inherent to such 
a model. 
The Database 
The compilation of animal tool use found in the Appendix attempts to furnish a more or less 
complete overview of the currently known forms of behavior involving true tools (true tool use 
in the definition of Parker and Gibson 1977). Owing to the vast amount of information, entries 
in the database incorporate, amongst others, already existing compendia (inter alia Beck 1980; 
Becker 1993; Chevalier-Skolnikoff and Liska 1993; Jordan 1982; Lefebvre et al. 2002; McGrew 
1992; van Schaik et al. 2003; Whiten et al. 1999; 2002) without always verifying individual 
entries against their primary sources. However, to allow verification for those interested, the 
sources cited in the compendia are appended. It is only possible to examine individual cases 
from this vast database during the following chapters; quite a number of cases have not been 
processed further. Nevertheless, the complete database is appended, since it provides an 
overview, serves as a tool for further study, and provides inspiration for future research. 
The database is organized according to species groups (gastropods and mollusks, insects and 
crustaceans, fishes, birds, mammals, primates, hominidae). Amongst amphibians and reptiles, 
no tool use has been observed so far. Within those groups, the different tool uses amongst a 
species are listed in alphabetical order according to the Latin name of the species. A data set 
further incorporates information on the observation circumstances (wild and uninfluenced to 
trained in experiments), an artifact category, such as for example lever, probe, or sponge, and a 
description of the tool behavior and the artifact, as well as possible modifications thereof, 
wherever possible. The classification of modifications follows that of Beck (1980), which 
includes the following categories: detach (e.g., a branch from a tree), subtract (e.g, defoliate, 
debark), add-combine (e.g., stacking of several boxes), and reshape (e.g., sharpening, 
unraveling). The data set is completed by the functional context of the tool use (personal 
hygiene, subsistence, play, parental care, defense, overawing, stimulation). The occurrence of 
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certain forms of behavior in different contexts amongst a species is reflected in the respective 
existence of multiple data sets. Additional elements of the database are a list of up to three 
variants of raw materials for the same tool, as well as the solution unit. This last entry describes 
whether the tool was not modified, modified directly by the subject by means of hands, teeth, 
fingers, or claws, or modified indirectly with the help of another tool (cf. Haidle 1999; 2000; 
2004). A final entry field lists the pertaining literature. 
An extension of the database to incorporate archaeological artifacts was – contrary to my initial 
plan – not undertaken; without chronological or geographical limitations, the amount of data 
would be endless. While possibly still feasible for the early and middle Early Palaeolithic, the 
stream of data from the Middle Palaeolithic onwards would not be manageable without dams 
and barriers. Finally, to incorporate only a select collection of archaeologically documented tool 
behavior into the database seemed hardly logical, since the selection process has to remain 
arbitrary if the main goal is merely to increase the number examples cited in the text, the latter 
of which are, however, selected for specific reasons and thoroughly explained. 
The Method: Cognigrams 
In a descriptive study, Frédéric Joulian (1996) compares the complexity of tool behavior 
involved in the cracking of Panda oleosa nuts among chimpanzees with the manufacture of 
Oldowan choppers using the concept of chaînes opératoires (cf. Chapter 11). He dissects both 
tool actions into individual steps of action – the smallest units of action – and combines a 
number of them into larger segments; the exact delimitation of these phases remains unclear. 
From this comparison, Joulian – such as others before him (e.g., Wynn and McGrew 1989) – 
reaches the conclusion that the action chains of these two forms of behavior differ only 
minimally, with the cracking of nuts probably even being the somewhat more complex action 
(fig. 19). This result contradicts the often voiced opinion that the manufacture of even a very 
simplistic tool by means of another, secondary tool and its later use constitutes a fundamentally 
different cognitive process than an action involving a tool produced only by individual physical 
means, however complex that action may be (e.g., Kitahara-Frisch 1993; Haidle 1999; 2004b). 
In the search for possible reasons behind the lack of complexity in Joulian's description of the 
chopper manufacture action chain, it has to be noted that, while nut cracking constitutes the 
satisfaction of a need (food) experienced by the subject directly, the description of the action 
chain in the chopper example ends with the use of the tool itself and thus before the actual direct 
satisfaction of the subject's need. This circumstance could be explained by the fact that this 
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continuation of the action chain to the final solution of a direct physical or psychological 
problem experienced by the subject was simply overlooked. It could, however, also mean that 
the manufacture and use of a tool are indeed viewed as a concluded chain of action. 
Cracking of Panda oleosa-Nuts  
(after Joulian 1996) 
Knapping of an Oldowan chopper  
(after Joulian 1996)
PHASE I: Gathering nuts 
1. Selection of tree / anvil 
2. Search for hammer stone 
3. Transport to anvil 
4. Gathering nuts 
5. Transport to anvil  
PHASE II: Opening nuts 
6. Positioning individual 
7. Positioning nut on anvil 
8. Taking hammer 
9. Hammering (several 
times) 
10. Putting hammer aside 
(if nut is open: Phase III 
Eating) 
11. Repositioning nut 
12. Hammering 
13. Putting hammer aside 
PHASE III: Eating nuts 
14. Direct consumption 
15. Indirect consumption
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PHASE I: Gathering 
rawmaterial 
1. Search for rawmaterial 
2. Search for hammer stone 
3. Transport to atelier 
PHASE II: Knapping tool 
4. Positioning of the 
individual 
5. Positioning of rawmaterial 
and hammer 
6. Knapping (debitage) 
7. Turning the core 
8. Knapping (retouch) 
9. Knapping (flake)  
PHASE III: Use of the tool 
10. Use chopper 
11. Use flake 
Fig. 19 Chaîne opératoire of the cracking of Panda oleosa nuts among chimpanzees (Pan 
troglodytes) in comparison with the action chain of the manufacture of Oldowan choppers:  
Graphs produced according to Joulian's description of action chains (1996) following the usual 
graphic criteria (cf. Chapter 11). 
However, each of our conscious and unconscious actions (excluding reflexes) originates from a 
subjective point that demands positive or negative feedback. Choppers and flakes are not 
manufactured by reflex, but are produced as tools originating from an intention that is based on 
the subject's perception of an actual need; and this basic problem demands a solution. In order 
to better demonstrate the different levels of requirement, the problem perception underlying the 
actions has been incorporated into the cognigrams (figs. 20–21; cf. fig. 22). 
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Cracking of Panda oleosa nuts
0.           Perception of basic need: 
hunger 
0a.         Perception subproblem 1: 
need of a nut 
0b.         Perception subproblem 2: 
need of a tree / anvil  
0c.         Perception subproblem 3: 
need of a tool 
PHASE I: Selection of tree 
1. Selection of tree / location 
of anvil 
PHASE II: Search for tool 
2. Search for hammer 
PHASE III: Transport of tool  
3. Transport to anvil 
PHASE IV: Gathering nuts 
4. Gathering nuts 
5. Transport to anvil 
PHASE V: Use of tool / Opening 
nuts  
6. Positioning of individual 
7. Positioning of nut on anvil 
8. Taking hammer 
9. Hammering (several 
times) 
10. Putting hammer aside 
(if nut is open: Phase VI 
Satisfaction) 
11. Repositioning nut 
12. Hammering 
13. Putting hammer aside 
PHASE VI: Satisfaction of need 
14. Direct consumption 
15. Indirect consumption 
A-Focus 1
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P-Focus 2
Object
nut 
A-Focus 4
Tool
hammer
P-Focus 3
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Fig. 20 Cognigram of the cracking of Panda oleosa nuts among chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes): 
Graph resulting from the description of the action chain after Joulian (1996), with the subdivision 
of the comprehensive Phase I into four individual phases and complemented by the conscious 
perception of needs and problems (0–0c) preceding the actions. In addition to the criteria 
usually illustrated, the four subphases also integrate the subject's changing foci of attention 
during the action. 
The definition of phases in Joulian (1996) is inconsistent. In order to achieve uniform results, it 
is suggested to define phases or process sections as the combination of closely related individual 
actions that lead to an intermediate result. A phase cannot be interrupted and then resumed at 
the same place some time later, but has to be started over from the beginning of the sequence. 
The following always constitute different phases: 
• the search for raw material or a tool and an object to be acted upon, even if they are in the 
immediate vicinity of the subsequent action in which they are employed; 
IV The Increasing Distance Between Problem and Solution 161
• the manufacture of a tool; 
• the transport of raw material, a tool or an object to be acted upon, if they are not in the 
immediate vicinity of the subsequent action in which they are employed; 
• the use of a tool; 
• the satisfaction of a need. 
Use of an Oldowan tool to cut meat by Homo sp.
0.           Perception of basic need: food 
0a.         Perception sub-problem 1: 
need of meat 
0b.         Perception sub-problem 2: 
need of cutting tool 
0c.         Perception sub-problem 3: 
need of tool for production 
PHASE I: Gathering raw material for 
tool 1 
1. Search for raw material / 
Gathering 
PHASE II: Transport of raw material 
for tool 1 
2. If necessary, transport to 
atelier 
PHASE III: Search for tool 2 
3. Search for hammer stone 
PHASE IV: Transport of tool 2
4. Transport of hammer stone to 
raw material / atelier 
PHASE V: Use of tool 2 / production 
of tool 1 
5. Positioning of individual 
6. Positioning of raw material 
and hammer stone 
7. Knapping (debitage) 
8. Rotating core 
9. Knapping (retouch) 
10. Knapping (flake)  
PHASE VI: Use of tool 1 
11. Use of chopper, or 
12. Use of flake 
PHASE VII: Satisfaction of need  
12. Direct consumption 
13. Indirect consumption (e.g. 
sharing, feeding) 
A-Focus 1
Subject
P-Focus 2
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Fig. 21 Cognigram of the manufacture and use of Oldowan choppers: Graph resulting from the 
description of the action chain after Joulian (1996), with the subdivision of the comprehensive 
Phase I into four individual phases and complemented by the conscious perception of needs 
and problems (0–0c) preceding the actions. In addition to the criteria usually illustrated, the four 
subphases also integrate the subject's changing foci of attention during the action. 
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Thus, the description of the nut-cracking process results in the subdivision of Joulian's 
comprehensive Phase I (cf. fig. 19) into four individual phases (fig. 20). The transport of the 
nuts to the anvil does not have to be attributed its own individual phase, since they are in 
immediate vicinity to each other. In the manufacture of a chopper (fig. 21), Joulian's 
comprehensive Phase I can be split into two to four phases, depending on the organization of 
the action. In this simple example, the production site is assumed as a given location, 
predestined, for example, by the presence of a cadaver to be butchered. If the raw material and 
the hammer are transported there separately, the action requires four phases; if the raw material 
is transported together with the hammer, the action only requires three phases. If the raw 
material as well as the hammer were to be found in the immediate vicinity, only two phases 
would be sufficient to complete the action. 
At the same time, the different actions were split according to their level of problem and color-
coded to represent different foci of attention, so that the cognigram – as opposed to the chaîne 
opératoire – allows a direct reading of which problem level or focus of attention is active during 
any given action phase. This mode of illustration demonstrates that nut-cracking, as described 
by Joulian, requires four different foci of attention: the subject, the nut as object, the anvil as 
specific location (that can incidentally be used or changed as an object), and the hammer tool. 
The flaking of a chopper also requires four foci: the subject, the object to be manipulated by the 
tool (such as, e.g., a cadaver), the tool (chopper and/or debitage), and another tool, the hammer, 
to produce the chopper and the debitage. Thus, the number of foci by itself does not indicate any 
difference between these two action chains. 
The difference between primary and secondary tool use lies in the number of active and passive 
foci of attention (A and/or P focus) and in the relationships of the foci that build on each other 
(see fig. 22). During nut-cracking, only two foci are active, i.e., have to be controlled by the 
subject with respect to their modifying effect: the subject itself and the hammer as a tool. While 
anvil and nut are allocated their own foci of attention, they remain passive; none of these action 
elements effect any change (nut) or the change cannot be controlled by the subject (anvil). 
While the hammer affects the nut in a controlled manner, the anvil remains unaffected. By 
contrast, the production and use of a chopper requires three active foci of attention: the subject, 
the chopper as tool 1, and the percussion stone to manufacture the chopper as tool 2. This 
simple example already demonstrates the difference between a completely unmodified, used-as-
found tool, such as the hammer or percussion stone, and a modified, manufactured tool, such as 
a chopper, a flake, or a twig probe. While the probe is affected and modified by the subject, who 
has to break off the twig, defoliate and debark it, the hammer tool does not require any further 
action or additional focus in its conception. 
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In contrast to the probe, choppers or flakes are produced with the help of a second tool, a 
percussion stone. While in the case of the hammer only one focus has a controlled modifying 
effect on another (hammer on nut; fig. 20), in the case of the probe there are already two foci 
that effect modifying changes, one after the other (subject on probe, probe on insect nest). In the 
manufacture of flaked stone implements, there are also two different foci of attention within the 
chain of effects: percussion stone on stone, stone tool on object, such as food, for example. The 
difference with regard to the probe is that here three active foci of attention have to be 
controlled within a phase – the percussion stone, the stone to be modified, and the subject. 
Generally, the breakdown and illustration of a thought and action chain in a cognigram 
depicting multiple foci of attention can be subsumed as follows (fig. 22): The mental starting 
point is a basic need of the subject, which should be satisfied at the end of the action chain. A 
basic need that cannot be satisfied by the subject's action on itself leads to the perception of one 
or more subproblems (illustrated as the basic need as diamonds), which each opens a focus of 
attention, such as, e.g., an object needed for the solution, like species-specific food, a tool, or a 
subordinate need of the subject. The action taken following the basic need and the perceived 
subproblem is subdivided into minute units, so-called action steps. The first step in an action 
chain (illustrated as a square containing the number of the step) proceeds from the perception of 
a problem and takes place within the focus of attention opened by this perception. Further steps 
in the action chain are assigned to their main focus: the manufacture of a tool to the tool focus, 
the modification of an object with this tool to the object focus, and so on. 
The sequence of the thought and action process, as well as potential feedback, are marked by 
solid arrows, the resumed use of a tool already manifest in an earlier part of the action chain 
(illustrated as a rhomboid) is represented by a dashed arrow. The sequence of further problem 
perceptions outside the main action chain is illustrated as a dotted arrow: On returning to an 
already open focus of attention, the respective problem perception is reactivated and 
subsequently initiates the further action steps within this focus. 
The foci of attention underly the thought and action chain as solid-colored bars. Which foci of 
attention are open at any given time in the action chain can be derived from the delimitation of 
the action phases. These phases have to be understood as the combination of closely related 
action steps leading to an intermediate result that cannot be disrupted and then resumed at the 
same point the disruption occurred at a later time: Resumption has to take place at the start of 
the phase. They are represented by dashed rectangles that only comprise the open foci for that 
respective phase. Subject and tool foci, that is, A-foci with effects that have to be controlled 
actively, can overlap other foci by specifically influencing them physically or psychologically. 
This phenomenon is illustrated by filling in the gap between the foci – with the color of the 
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active focus in case of physical interference or with the hatched color of the active focus in case 
of psychological influence. 
H
Perception of a need or problem:  
Here the subject opens a new / additional 
focus of attention. 
Operational step / activity: 
Indirectly evident in the inventory and 
partially identifiable by refittings or 
characteristic debitage / waste products 
Tool (here, e.g., H for hammerstone)
Direction of course of the process 
Direction of course of additional problem 
perception beside primary chain of activities
Direction of survival of a tool until its reuse 
P-Focus 2
object
nut
A-Focus 3
tool
Focus: 
Center of attention of a subject, a) 
A-Focus: Focus to be actively 
controlled by the subject. A-Foci 
can encompass a physical or 
mental need of the subject itself, or 
a tool, respectively different 
characters of a tool. 
b) P-Focus: a passive focus such 
as a location or an object which is 
not actively controlled in an activity 
Effect of a focus (here: A-Focus 
3 –  tool) on another focus: 
Active foci (the subject as well as 
tools) are able to have an effect 
other foci (active or passive) and 
influence or change their qualities.  
Phase of activities: 
Integration of single activities 
which are tightly connected and 
possess a common intermediate 
aim. A phase cannot be interrupted 
and revived at another time at the 
same spot, but must be resumed 
from the beginning of the phase. 
Fig. 22 Key to the cognigrams. 
Since in the following I will break down different examples of tool use in animals, and later in 
humans, using the cognigrams introduced above, I would like to start with a closer examination 
of the emergence of the cognitive foundations for tool use and the development of the problem-
solution-distance. 
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17 Animal Tool Behavior 
From snails to humans – very different species of animals use tools. Amongst the vertebrates, 
only reptiles and amphibians have so far not been observed to exhibit tool behavior. Tool 
behavior among animals can serve different purposes, such as the acquisition of food, brood or 
offspring care, it can occur within threatening or intimidating behavior, as well as in defense or 
protection mechanisms. With the help of tools, animals can disguise themselves, take care of 
personal hygiene in the widest sense of the word, increase their personal well-being, and 
stimulate themselves. Objects are used to stabilize and straighten up their bodies, or to increase 
the personal range of action. Whether objects are actually used as decorative tools, such as in 
the antler “decorations” among several deer species or the drapings among the great apes, still 
remains unclear. Tool behavior occurs during solitary as well as social play and also includes 
the use of living “objects,” just as in tool use as social stimulus (to buffer aggressive behavior, 
to initiate contact, or to attract attention). The following simplified characterizations of different 
animal groups mainly document behaviors observed in animals living in the wild; a complete, 
tabulated list of the data they are based upon can be found in the appendix. 
Invertebrates 
Observations of tool use among molluscs are few and far between. Only two species of marine 
top snails, Tegula brunnea and Tegula funebralis, the carrier snails Xenophora conchyliophora 
and Xenophora pallidu, as well as two octopus species, Octopus vulgaris and Octopus disgusti,
exhibit any indicators. The behavior of the carrier snails falls into the grey area between nest-
building and tool use: they cement stones and shells to their shells with the help of secretions 
from a gland in their foot, in order to disguise themselves and to gain additional stability (Beck 
1980; Becker 1993: 17–18). Top snails, by contrast, use stones they pick up and position with 
their soles as counterweights to straighten themselves up (Weldon and Hoffmann 1975). Here, 
tool behavior is directly related to the subject itself, as is also the case among Octopus disgusti,
who uses shells as artificial opercula (lids) for snail shells it inhabits (Berry in Thorpe 1963 in 
Beck 1980). Only the Common Octopus possibly uses a tool in the acquisition of food: already 
Pliny mentions that the animal uses a stone as a wedge to keep the valves of larger shells open 
while it eats. Confirmation of this behavior comes from only one incidental observation by 
Jeanette Powers in 1857 (Becker 1993: 18). 
There are more reports on tool use among crustaceans, although many of the behaviors would 
rather have to be characterized as tool application, similar to the carrier snails and in 
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anticipation of later executions. Hermit crabs of the genus Pagurus and Dardanus choose 
different snail shells matching their own size during their lifetime and carry them around with 
them (Beck 1980; Becker 1993). Crabs of the genera Dromia, Stenorhynchus, and Dardanus
cement shells and sea anemones to their own shells in order to disguise or protect themselves 
from natural enemies. Melia tessellata not only uses the poisonous sea anemones passively, but 
also waves them around in defense and to attract prey (Beck 1980: 18). This example may serve 
as the first indicator that not only inanimate objects, but also living organisms and even 
members of the same species can be used as tools for various purposes. 
Several groups of insects – hymenoptera, assassin bugs, and ants – regularly display tool use, 
whereby generally the form of behavior and its respective context is limited to one stage of their 
lives. The larvae of the antlions Myrmeleon formicularis and Euroleon nostras and of the snipe 
flies Lampromyia and Vermileo throw sand at their prey (Becker 1993: 24–27), the larvae of the 
green lacewing Chrysopa slossonae feed on certain species of aphids and use the wax deposits 
from their carapace to disguise and protect themselves from the ants tending the aphids (Beck 
1980: 14–15). Disguises are also employed by the assassin bug Salyavata variegata, which use 
material from termite nests as camouflage and attracts further termites with the carapace of its 
first victim (Becker 1993: 23–24). The digger wasps Ammophila and Sphex secure the entrances 
to their subterranean nests by compacting the sediment in place with stones, clumps of earth, 
pieces of wood or bark, and seeds; some individuals seem to go so far as to check the thus 
achieved level of density with probes (Beck 1980; Becker 1993: 28–29). Among ants various 
forms of tool behavior were observed. Weaver ants of the genera Oecophylla and Campanotus
use their own larvae and the sticky secretions they produce to glue leaves together as the cover 
of their nests. Several species of the myrmicine ants Aphaenogaster and Pogonomyrmex use 
pieces of leaves, wood, mud and sand as sponges, making the transport of liquids of up to ten 
times more effective (Beck 1980: 16). 
Fishes 
Owing to their natural environment, the tool spectrum among fishes is limited. Only 
archerfishes (Toxotes), gouramis (Colisa, trichogaster), and triggerfishes (Balistes fuscus) has 
thus far been observed using tools. Archerfishes and gouramis shoot down flying insects with a 
stream or droplets of water and then collect their prey from the surface. While adult Toxotes can 
target insects up to a distance of 1.5 m, the range of the gouramis is limited to several 
centimeters (Beck 1980: 20–21; Becker 1993: 33–36). The Rippled Triggerfish squirts water 
from its mouth underwater to flip over sea urchins and expose and open their less spiny 
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undersides (Fricke 1972 in Becker 1993: 37). In addition to spitting water droplets while 
hunting, the honey gourami (Colisa chuna) exhibits a similar behavior in parental care in order 
to find loose eggs and reattach them to the foam nest (Becker 1993: 36). While both Beck 
(1980) and Becker (1993) have no problems to classify the use of water by fishes as tool 
behavior, I have my doubts as to whether this can be considered true tool use behavior. Water to 
fishes is as air to land-dwelling animals – their natural surrounding element; a comparable 
behavior would be a child blowing off a fly. In this case, water is not a detached or detachable 
object, but only appears as such once the stream of droplets clears the surface. Thus, it is not the 
manipulation of a tool that achieves the effect, but a variation of a common bodily function. 
Correspondingly, the behavior among African and Asian elephants to clean themselves or the 
floor of their cage with pressurized air from their trunks, which is cited as tool behavior by 
Chevalier-Skolnikoff and Liska (1993: 213), remains debatable in my opinion. 
Birds 
Birds, on the other hand, exhibit truly varied tool behavior (cf. Boswall 1977; Beck 1980: 21–
31; Becker 1993: 38–66; Lefebvre et al. 2002: 952–54), within their natural environment as well 
as in captivity and under various circumstances. Different species use bait to catch fish (see 
Chapter 18; Lefebvre et al. 2002: 948; Becker 1993: 59–62; Beck 1980: 28–29), or throw 
objects at food to open it or at other animals to chase them away and thus be able to loot their 
clutch of eggs (van Lawick-Goodall and van Lawick-Goodall 1966; Beck 1980: 23–25; Becker 
1993: 40–44, 62–63). Birds use stones as hammers (Beck 1980: 24; Becker 1993: 39–40) and 
probe for insects with different tools, such as the widely known woodpecker cinches
(Camarhyncus pallidus or Cactospiza pallida) of the Galapagos Islands and related species 
(Beck 1980: 25–26; Becker 1993: 52–55; Lefebvre et al. 2002: 953). The New Caledonian 
Crow (Corvus moneduloides) is known to employ two types of probes that differ markedly in 
their raw material as well as their manufacture, and which each can occur in several sub-
varieties (Hunt 1996; 2000a; 2000b; Hunt and Gray 2003; 2004). 
Apart from subsistence purposes, tools are also used in parental care; the Brewer's blackbird 
(Euphagus cyanocephalus) dips his prey in water in order to provide his young with a drink 
(Koenig 1985 in Lefebvre et al. 2002: 953), the white stork (Ciconia ciconia) does the same 
with moss (Rekasi 1980 in Lefebvre et al. 2002: 952). Used in personal hygiene and/or 
stimulation is a behavior widely spread among starlings and sparrows known as anting, where 
the birds usually rub ants on their feathers, although they will also use beetles, onions, cigarette 
butts, mothballs, and beer (Beck 1980: 30–31, 136–38); however, Becker does not consider this 
17 Animal Tool Behavior 168
behavior as distinct tool use (Becker 1993: 14). While the construction of the elaborate and 
often highly decorated bowers by bowerbirds by definition does not count as tool behavior, 
tools are sometimes used during their construction. Different species of bowerbirds paint or 
plaster the insides of their bowers with a mixture of saliva and pigment or berries, blossoms, 
bark, or dried grass used as cement. During this process, a bundle of fibers or dried grass keeps 
the bird's beak slightly open, keeps the mixture from issuing at the tip of the beak, and at the 
same time soaks up excessive mixture (Beck 1980: 22; Becker 1993: 57–59). 
Mammals (other than Primates) 
Between the different groups of mammals, frequency and form of tool behavior differ 
enormously. The spectrum of tool functions increases: besides subsistence and hygiene, intra- 
and inter-species social aspects gain importance in defense, overawing, and play. Locomotion is 
another field of functions that gains importance. While among the animal groups surveyed so 
far – except for a few birds – each species usually exhibits tool behavior only in one area of 
activity, several mammal species not only use different tools, such as in subsistence, but also 
use different tools in different contexts. Sea otters (Enhydra lutris), for example, use stones 
within a subsistence context, but also kelp to keep them afloat. 
Other than throwing polar bears, other bear species using different tools, egg-opening mungos, a 
great panda cleaning itself, and a dog practicing dental care (Beck 1980: 38–41; Becker 1993: 
74–76), sea otters are the only predators/carnivores that have been observed using tools (Hall 
and Schaller 1964; Beck 1980: 41–44; Becker 1993: 70–74). Californian  groups regularly open 
shells while swimming on their back by balancing them on their chest and cracking them open 
with a stone, but they also use stone hammers to dislodge abalone shells from the bottom of the 
sea and keep themselves afloat for short naps in the water by anchoring themselves to strands of 
kelp. Amongst rodents (Beck 1980: 31–32; Becker 1993: 66–68) and ungulates (Beck 1980: 
36–38; Becker 1993: 77–78) tool use is rare. Tool use among whales has only recently been 
observed in animals living in the wild (Taylor and Saayman 1973 in Beck 1980: 166; Krützen et 
al. 2005; Mason 2005; see Chapter 18). Rough-toothed dolphins (Steno bredanensis) seem to 
transpose a behavior also known in orcas (Orcinus orca; Heise et al. 2003), the throwing around 
of prey until it are dead and easier to eat, into a play context as well, where the living “toy” 
actually often survives. 
Next to primates, elephants exhibit the widest range of tool behavior – to threaten, in personal 
hygiene, or to expand their range of action (Chevalier-Skolnikoff and Liska 1993). Whether the 
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covering of dead members of the same species, other animals, and humans can be classified as 
tool use, as Beck asserts (1980: 34), or has to be viewed in the context of nest-building or other 
constructions, has to remain an open question in the light of the behavior's uncertain function. If 
the objects used in the covering are truly tools, who or what do they physically or 
psychologically affect? The acting subject, the object to be covered, or something completely 
different? 
New World Monkeys 
Primates exhibit the most extensive tool behavior of all orders within the animal kingdom, but 
only some primate species use tools, and not all use them to the same extent. Among the New 
World monkeys, the isolated use of tools has been observed in different genera. Tool use among 
howler monkeys (Alouatta), woolly monkeys (Lagothrix), squirrel monkeys (Saimiri), spider 
monkeys (Ateles) and sakis (Pithecia) is limited to the dropping and, occasionally, throwing of 
branches at intruders. Capuchin monkeys of the genus Cebus, by contrast, exhibit a more 
differentiated use of tools in various contexts, in the wild as well as in experiments in captivity 
(inter alia Beck 1980: 46–51; Becker 1993: 80–84; Chevalier-Skolnikoff 1990; Parker and 
Gibson 1977; Westergaard 1995; Westergaard and Suomi 1995). Most of the time, the 
observations of these tree-dwelling animals are not systematic with regard to their tool use; 
thus, it has to remain open, whether it is only accidental that the method of tool manufacture is 
limited to mere detachment without further modification. Only in one, not further identified 
Cebus species has the manufacture of an insect probe been recorded as not only the simple 
detachment of the twig, but also its modification by debarking (Jay 1968 in Becker 1993); 
however, the method of tool production among many capuchin monkey species has not been 
documented adequately. 
The opening of hard-shelled food with different hammers is common among several species of 
capuchin monkeys, and it is striking that tool and object are often the same: Cebus albifrons
opens cumare fruit by smashing them together, Cebus apella uses palm nuts to open palm nuts 
and oysters to open oysters. In these situations, a clear differentiation between the object and 
tool or proto-tool status of the objects involved is not possible (Becker 1993: 81; cf. Chapter 
18). While it is not unusual for animals in captivity to use stones or pieces of wood to open 
foodstuffs, it seems to be an unusual and maybe even non-existent trait amongst animals in the 
wild. While Dampier's frequently cited eye-witnessing of capuchins opening oysters with stones 
in 1697 does not hold up to close scrutiny of the original source (Becker 1993: 83), observations 
by the local population and the frequent association of stones and empty nutshells led to the 
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assumption of the use of stones as hammers among Cebus apella. Ottoni and Mannu (2002) 
were eventually able to prove this behavior in a group of semi-wild animals. It is interesting to 
note the posture of the animals, which involves using their powerful tail as a stabilizing aid to 
their two-legged stance while swinging the hammer stone (fig. 23). 
Fig. 23 Capuchin monkeys cracking open nuts with a stone hammer (from Ottoni and Mannu 
2001). 
Old World Monkeys 
Isolated tool use in the natural environment among Old World monkeys living in Africa and 
Asia has been observed in colobus monkeys (Colobus or Procolobus), surilis (Presbytis), long-
nosed monkeys (Nasalis larvatus), mangabeys (Cercocebus), guenons (Cercopithecus), and 
patas monkeys (Erythrocebus patas; Beck 1980: 51–53; Becker 1993: 87). In most cases, the 
context is overawing or intimidating behavior, where stones, sand, and branches are thrown or 
dropped, just as among New World monkeys. Additionally, there are reports of western red 
colobus monkeys (Colobus or Procolobus badius) and unspecified mangabeys widening the 
entrances to subterranean insect nests with sticks (Jobaert in Koortlandt and Kooij 1963 in Beck 
1980: 52). 
In captivity, different species of macaques (Macaca), which together with baboons belong to the 
family of Cercopithecinae, demonstrate different forms of tool behavior in subsistence and play 
contexts, both spontaneous and within experiments, while the same animals living in the wild 
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mainly exhibit the purposeful throwing, rolling, or dropping of objects as part of overawing or 
threatening behavior (Beck 1980: 53–56; Becker 1993: 87–88). Crab-eating macaques (Macaca 
fascicularis), which transport stones over a distance of up to 75 m in order to crack open 
oysters, and barbary macaques (Macaca sylvana) seem to be exceptions to this rule; the latter 
even demonstrate three different types of tool behavior: the crushing of scorpions with stones 
(Beck 1980: 55), the throwing of roof tiles at pursuing humans (ibid.: 53), and the use of young 
animals as social buffer when approaching an aggressive male in an antagonistic situation (ibid.: 
56). Besides the washing of food (potatoes, cereals), which is not defined as tool behavior, 
Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata) develop striking play behavior. Eaton (1972) reports 
borderline tool behavior, where big snowballs were rolled and then used as elevated seats, 
among a group of captive but mostly uninfluenced living animals in an outdoor enclosure in 
Oregon. Huffman and Quiatt (1986) cite no less than eight different types of stone-handling 
observed among wild groups that were, however, provided with additional food. 
The family of Papionini, which includes baboons (Papio), geladas (Theropithecus), mandrills 
and drills, uses the most varied selection of tools among primates, only to be surpassed by 
humans (Beck 1980: 57–67; Becker 1993: 85–87). While tool behavior amongst mandrills 
(Mandrillus sphinx) and drills (Mandrillus leucophaeus) has thus far only been observed in 
captivity, the different species of baboons and geladas exhibit this behavior also in their natural 
environment. In the wild, chacma (or cape) baboons (Papio ursinus), which when caged and 
limited in their range use objects as probes, rods, lines, levers, ladders, and digging sticks, 
mainly employ stones to break open the fruit of the Baobab tree or to throw or roll them at 
intruders. A unique observation reports a male specimen that took a palm frond and placed it 
over a tree stump on which it than sat and enjoyed the sun (Beck 1980: 67; Becker 1993: 85–
86). Yellow baboons (Papio cynocephalus) are only known to probe subterranean termite nests 
in the wild, while sacred baboons (Papio hamadryas) use tools for defensive as well as 
offensive purposes: they are reported to purposefully throw sand or dirt into the eyes of their 
non-human enemies, and they also roll down stones from elevated points, as for example in 
altercations with competing groups of geladas (Beck 1980: 57–59). Additionally, tool behavior 
among baboons is often observed in a social context. Lower-ranking Sacred baboons, as well as 
olive baboons (Papio anubis) and Guinea baboons (Papio papio), use young animals as 
pacifying buffers in situations where they are scared by stronger, aggressive male animals. An 
olive baboon was also observed to probe with a stick in the mud for small stones, which he then 
cleaned and sorted for further use as a digestive aid (Oyen 1978 in Beck 1980: 66). Throwing 
and dropping stones among this species is not only employed against intruders, but also 
possibly serves in the hunt for goats, if reports by the local human population are correct 
(Pickford 1975 in Becker 1993: 87). Olive baboons are also the only species of Papionini that 
practice tool use in personal hygiene, as evidenced by the stones and nibbled-off corn cobs they 
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use to clean their faces of sticky substances (van Lawick-Goodall et al. 1973). As it is, they are 
– next to the great apes – the most versatile tool users amongst the primates. However, except 
for the breaking off of a twig to use as a probe by one Yellow baboon and the digging up of 
stones to roll at intruders by Chacma baboons, no tool manufacture amongst Papioninis in the 
wild could be documented thus far. 
Apes 
White-handed gibbons (Hylobates lar) are the only species of small apes that have thus far been 
reported to use tools. In the wild, they only exhibit the breaking-off and throwing or dropping of 
branches at intruders or human observers, a behavior they also employ in intra-species conflicts 
(Beck 1980: 67–68; Becker 1993: 88–89). 
Although tool behavior amongst the great apes have already been discussed elsewhere (cf. 
Chapters 3 and 14), I would like to summarize the most important points again in order to 
facilitate comparison with other species. While studies of zoo animals (Boysen et al. 1999; 
Jordan 1982; Parker et al. 1999) verified versatile tool use not only amongst chimpanzees (Pan 
troglodytes) and orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), but also for gorillas (Gorilla gorilla and
Gorilla beringei) and bonobos (Pan paniscus), long-term observations only recently succeeded 
in documenting tool behavior amongst other species than chimpanzees in the wild (Breuer et al. 
2005; Fox et al. 1999; Fox and bin'Muhammad 2002; Hohmann and Fruth 2003; Ingmanson 
1996; Parnell and Buchanan-Smith 2001; van Schaik et al 1996; van Schaik and Knott 2001; 
van Schaik et al. 2003). 
Orangutans have the distinction of using a wide variety of tools to facilitate movement, and 
some of these behaviors are clearly group-specific (van Schaik et al. 2003). The groups of 
Agusan and Ketambe on Sumatra use leaf padding on the soles of their feet and hands to climb 
prickly durian trees and to handle their equally prickly fruit. Hooked branches are used to reach 
otherwise inaccessible branches (Fox and bin'Muhammad 2002). Semi-wild animals at a 
reintroduction station were observed to use tree trunks and boats to float across rivers. A male 
individual held on to the boat even during other activities, such as the search for food, to be able 
to use it again at a later time. The animals constructed bridges from smaller tree trunks to cross 
creeks and also used the trunks as ladders by balancing them or leaning them against something 
(Galdikas 1982). 
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Compared to other apes, orangutans also seem to employ tools as psychological aids or to let off 
steam (Beck 1980: 70–71, 75). When approaching members of the same species, in the presence 
of humans, or during play, the animals often drape plants or plant parts around their heads and 
shoulders. The covering of the head, neck, and/or back has also been observed repeatedly as a 
mean of physical comfort: to shield against sun or rain, against insects, and –in captivity – as a 
cover during the night (Beck 1980: 75–76). In intimidating behavior, branches are usually 
thrown or dropped from trees (Beck 1980: 69–70; Becker 1993: 91–92), and every now and 
then leaves are used to wipe the mouth or to clean feces from a youngster's fur (Beck 1980: 75; 
Becker 1993: 91). Orangutans use branches and twigs to explore unknown or scary objects 
(Becker 1993: 93), scratch themselves in hard-to-reach places (Beck 1980: 72; Becker 1993: 
92–93), and chase away flying insects (Becker 1980: 71; Becker 1993: 92). As stimulation, 
objects are rubbed against the genitalia (Beck 1980: 75). Tool use and tool manufacture in the 
subsistence context is varied and often directly affects the food, such as in the use of different 
probes to acquire ants, termites, stingerless bees and their honey, or the seeds of the Neesia fruit 
(Fox et al. 1999; see Chapter 18). Sometimes, however, tools are used indirectly, such as the 
leaf paddings cited above. 
For the longest time, reports on tool use amongst gorillas usually did not differentiate between 
the different varieties of gorilla (cf. Beck 1980: 76–79; Becker 1993: 93–95), since it was 
assumed that a division existed only on a subspecies level. Recently, however, mtDNA analyses 
(Jensen-Seaman et al. 2004) have allowed to distinguish between eastern gorillas, which include 
mountain gorillas (Gorilla beringei beringei) and eastern lowland gorillas (Gorilla beringei 
graueri), and western gorillas, which include western lowland gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla), 
and recent reports now clearly identify these species (Breuer et al. 2005; Nakamichi 1998; 1999; 
Parnell and Buchanan-Smith 2001). In the following, I will refer to exact specification if 
applicable and otherwise just talk about gorillas in general. As opposed to the often voiced 
assumption that these two species of central African great apes do hardly exhibit tool behavior, 
indications of tool use amongst wild animals could be found even in older literature. However, 
tool use in the context of food acquisition, which is especially complex amongst mountain 
gorillas, is thus far lacking (Byrne 1996; 1999). 
As all the other great apes, gorillas use objects that they purposefully or randomly throw or drop 
to increase the effect of their intimidating or overawing behavior towards humans or members 
of the same species. Within the same context, they brandish branches or beat them with bamboo 
shoots (Beck 1980: 76–77; Becker 1993: 94–95). Western lowland gorillas demonstrate a 
particular behavior in open, marshy glades, which employs water as a proto-tool in ten different 
variants (fig. 24). Mainly silverbacks, but always male individuals, beat the water into fountains 
with intimidating intent, also more rarely in play. This behavior is usually directed at other male 
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animals or other species, though rarely also at female gorillas (Parnell and Buchanan-Smith 
2001). Another use of water, this time as a true tool, was observed by Beck (1980: 78) among 
male individuals in the zoo, who held water in their fists in order to increase the volume of their 
chest beating. 
Fig. 24 Male western lowland gorilla (Gorilla gorilla gorilla) during overawing behavior supported 
by splashing fountains of water (from Parnell and Buchanan-Smith 2001). 
Whether gorillas indeed use sticks to reach otherwise inaccessible fruit has to remain open, 
since Phillips later doubted her own observations on the subject (Beck 1980: 77). A unique 
occurrence is the picking of a flower by an old male gorilla, who used it to tickle a young 
animal (Becker 1993: 94). Adult western lowland gorillas using different tools to clean not 
themselves but young animals is a peculiar behavior so far only observed among zoo animals 
(Fontaine et al. 1995; cf. Chapters 18 and 19). Both wild animals and those held in captivity pile 
up plant matter on wet or humid ground to create a dry sitting place – a borderline case of tool 
behavior. 
Real tool behavior is documented for the use of sticks by two female western lowland gorillas. 
One animal used a stick to gauge the depth of water and as support while crossing a swamp (fig. 
25). The other animal used the stick she had broken off first to keep herself from slipping into 
the water while fishing for water plants in a swamp, and – after she had satisfied her hunger – to 
cross the same swamp on dry foot (see Chapter 18, figs. 31–32; Breuer et al. 2005). 
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Fig. 25 Female western lowland gorilla (Gorilla gorilla gorilla) crossing a swamp with the help of 
a stick to gauge the depth of the water and as support (from Breuer et al. 2005). 
While Beck (1980) and Becker (1993) already regarded bonobos as a separate species, but did 
not consider their tool behavior separate from chimpanzees owing to a relative sparseness of 
indicators, and Frans de Waal (1998) in his overview of dwarf chimpanzees also did not 
mention tool behavior, our knowledge in this field has increased enormously during the last 
years. Jordan's study (1982) provides a good overview of tool use in captivity, and Ingmanson 
(1996) as well as Hohmann and Fruth (2003) give an insight into the varied use of tools in the 
wild. It is remarkable that tool use in a subsistence context among bonobos is markedly reduced 
in comparison to chimpanzees. Thus far, only the use of moss as sponges has been documented 
(Hohmann and Fruth 2003); possible digging sticks, which were found with dirt clinging to both 
ends, are assumed to have been used in the search for termites or mushrooms (Kano 1979 in 
Becker 1993: 110). 
Bonobos often use objects as visual or acoustic signals in various social contexts. Besides the 
purposeful throwing of objects, branches are dragged through the underbrush while running to 
reinforce threatening or overawing behavior. This noisy branch-drag is also frequently used in 
decampment situations when a group moves on to a different place. The acoustic stimulus 
created through stripping branches of leaves by hand is employed to overawe as well as in play. 
Similar behavior – although rather with a visual effect – is reported from female individuals that 
pick leaves apart by hand in an attempt to appear attractive to specific male animals. Juveniles 
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of both sexes and adult females pick small leaves and hold them with their mouth while 
contemplating other members of the group (Hohmann and Fruth 2003). Jordan (1982) reports 
the repeated generation of acoustic stimuli with the help of tools among zoo animals. 
Tools in the conventional sense are used by bonobos to increase their personal comfort and 
well-being. They scratch themselves with twigs, use leaves to clean fur of fecal matter, employ 
twigs as toothpicks, use leafy branches to chase away insects (Ingmanson 1996; Hohmann and 
Fruth 2003) or to protect themselves from rain (Kano 1982; Ingmanson 1996; Hohmann and 
Fruth 2003). While in their sleeping nests, bonobos occasionally cover their belly with leafs and 
twigs, and they bend down branches without snapping them to use as seats (Hohmann and Fruth 
2003); this behavior has to be considered borderline tool use. 
Play behavior is extremely pronounced among bonobos. Besides the acoustic signals mentioned 
above (leaf-strip and leaf-clip), there are solitary as well as social games that integrate inanimate 
objects and other animals. Besides solitary play that resembles the stone-handling amongst 
Japanese Macaques (see above), Ingmanson (1996) describes games of tag using a stick as a 
signal among bonobos (see Chapter 18). The stick indicates which animal is supposed to be 
tagged and also serves as a more general signal: if it is dropped, the game is interrupted. 
Additionally, bonobos have been observed covering a bushbuck with twigs (Becker 1993: 110) 
and using guenons and colobus monkeys as living toys (Hohmann and Fruth 2003), without 
harming the respective animals. 
Besides humans, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) are the most versatile tool users. Even in wild 
populations, they regularly use tools manufactured in different ways (Beck 1980: 79–105; 
Goodall 1986; McGrew 1992; Becker 1993: 95–109; Whiten et al. 1999; 2001), notably to 
supplement their normal food spectrum with various insects, honey and other liquids, marrow 
from long bones, algae and hard-shelled nuts, and to collect tasty remains from fruit shells and 
peelings or the skulls of animals preyed upon. They use tools to dig, lever, crack open, probe, 
explore, soak up, extract, enlarge, bash, dab, clean, impress and threat, fetch, protect, stimulate, 
pad, fan, play, and fish. While the subsistence aspect certainly takes precedence, tool behavior 
in a play context is also frequent and particularly repeats and anticipates behaviors known from 
other contexts. 
While different forms of tool behavior relating to personal hygiene and even the inspection and 
cleaning of wounds (inter alia Nishida and Hiraiwa 1982; Whiten et al. 2001) have also been 
observed among animals living in the wild, altruistic care for other members of the group by 
means of tool use is restricted to captive animals. In the Delta Regional Primate Research 
Center, McGrew and Tutin (1972; 1973 in Beck 1980: 91) were able to repeatedly observe a 
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female individual cleaning the teeth of a male juvenile in second dentition with twigs and 
removing a loose deciduous molar. For locomotive purposes, chimpanzees in the wild have only 
been observed to reach for high-hanging branches with the help of other branches and to use 
short, smooth branches wedged between their toes to pad themselves when climbing thorny 
kapok trees (Alp 1997; Whiten at al. 1999; 2001). 
Other than its group-specific occurrence, tool behavior among chimpanzees is characterized by 
its great flexibility. While the same tool types may be used under varying circumstances, similar 
circumstances may lead to the employ of different forms of tools or tools manufactured from 
different raw materials. In experiments, Whiten et al. (2005) were able to show that 
chimpanzees are able to recognize different solutions to a problem when observed in members 
of the same species, but that they typically prefer the solution they first learned themselves. 
Additionally, chimpanzees are the only species, besides humans, among which the sequential 
use of different tools in the accomplishment of a single purpose has been recorded. While 
mountain gorillas display complex action sequences in dealing with various vegetable 
foodstuffs (Byrne 1999), and there are indicators – not yet bolstered by hard data – for 
sequential tool behavior among orangutans (Fox et al. 1999), this mode of behavior has been 
repeatedly observed in Pan troglodytes. Sanz et al. (2004) describe the use of two different sets 
of tools in the hunt for termites living underground or in mounds. Brewer and McGrew (1990) 
even report the sequential use of four different tools to open a bees' nest and extract the honey 
(see Chapter 18). However, in the latter case it has to remain open whether the animal 
anticipated the need for the full set of tools before the action, or whether the need for each tool 
was perceived individually ad hoc when the one previously employed did not lead to the 
required result. 
Another extraordinary observation was made by Frans Plooij (1978) in Gombe. While hunting 
for bushpigs, a male chimpanzee threw a stone into the herd, causing them to scatter, so that the 
previously protected young animal in their midst could be captured. While the aimed throwing 
of objects at animals from other species has occasionally been mentioned (Beck 1980: 82; 
Becker 1993: 97), chimpanzees do not use this behavior regularly or even in a planned manner 
in hunting; this behavior occurred spontaneously within a given situation and did not serve to 
kill the prey. However, the decided killing with projectiles only constitutes a variation of this 
behavior, mainly by shifting the goal of the action – an exaptation of behavior (cf. Vrba and 
Gould 1980). 
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Requisite Conditions 
Now, which are the factors that enable or promote tool use within an animal species? To this 
end, van Schaik, Deaner and Merrill (1999) developed a model for primates that looks at the 
subsistence context. It contains several nested conditions that each limit the range of animal 
species that comply with these conditions: extracting food acquisition, expert manipulation of 
objects, intelligence, tolerant and gregarious social life, and teaching or exchange of knowledge 
(fig. 26). Besides fundamental capabilities, the model is also supposed to explain the frequency 
of tool use among a species. 
extracting food
aquisition
expert manipulation
intelligence
(insight, imitation)
tolerant 
gregariousness
teaching +
exchange?
Evolution of material culture
(after van Schaik et al. 1999)
many primate species
cebus (capuchin 
monkey), apes, 
cercopithecines
great apes
some chimpanzees, 
some orangutans
humans
extraction
tool use
(in captivity)
tool manufacture + 
individual use (in the
wild)
population-wide tool
use in the wild 
(material culture)
cumulative culture
Fig. 26 The nested conditions that promote tool use within the subsistence context – from the 
preconditions of ecological opportunities and manipulative capabilities to cognitive and social 
factors that support the invention and circulation of capabilities for tool use. On the left, primate 
groups that comply with increasingly higher requirements; on the right, phenomena associated 
with the meeting of the conditions (after van Schaik et al. 1999). 
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Extracting food acquisition is often, but not always, accompanied by tool use: while all primate 
tool users within the subsistence context are expert extractors, not all extractors are expert tool 
users and most expert extractors do not operate in the wild (ibid.: 736). The physical capability 
to expertly handle tools is a prerequisite condition for their use, but van Schaik et al. (1999) 
note that only intelligence or insight and imitation enable the manufacture and individual use of 
tools among animals living in the wild. Additionally, regular, population-wide tool use – 
material culture – depends on a social life that tolerates new tool use and is gregarious. The 
model's final condition, which only humans meet, is teaching and the exchange of knowledge, 
which enable the cumulation of cultural achievements. 
The model established by van Schaik et al. (1999) for the subsistence context among primates 
contains many important factors that also apply to tool use among other animals and within 
other areas of activity that are not necessarily of lower importance in the development of 
material culture; however, some restrictions have to be applied. In order to transfer the model 
onto other contexts, the term of extracting food acquisition needs to be enlarged to incorporate 
the more general aspect of ecological factors (fig. 27). Ecological variables can enable 
opportunities of tool use as well as the necessity to use implements in their exploitation. As a 
rule, animals face different ecological factors than they would encounter in their natural habitat. 
Electric fences and metal tubing protecting trees are among the variables that motivate bonobos 
and chimpanzees to use stout sticks and branches as ladders, in order to climb those trees 
despite their protections (Beck 1980: 95–97; Gold 2002). Observations of tool use in captivity 
can yield important indicators of the influence of different factors on the behavior of a certain 
species, especially when compared to studies of animals in the wild. Spontaneous tool use in 
captivity – that is, not under specific experimental conditions or even trained – is not necessarily 
a simpler form of tool behavior. 
It is obvious that the physical capabilities of handling implements determine and limit tool use 
within a species. Sea otters with versatile paws and elephants with trunks that can grasp objects 
have a definitive advantage over ungulates and whale species. But even these animals use tools, 
such as bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops sp.) that pull sponges over their noses to protect them 
while stirring up the sea floor in the search of food (Krützen et al. 2005) or use tile to scrape 
algae from their tank walls (Taylor and Saayman 1973 in Beck 1980: 166). In order to scratch 
otherwise unreachable spots on their backs, water buffalo (Bubalus bubalis) and the common 
eland (Taurotragus oryx) can tear down bits of fencing or posts and balance them between their 
horns. Horses (Equus caballus) and goats (Capra hircus) have been observed to use sticks or 
straws held with their mouths for the same purpose (Beck 1980: 36; Becker 1993: 78). An 
orangutan's short thumbs limits their expert manipulation of tools by hand, which is why they 
often use their mouths in the execution of actions requiring fine motor skills (Fox et al. 1999). 
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Thus, it becomes clear that obvious physical capabilities are a limiting, but by no means 
excluding factor, since proficiencies of secondary importance for tool use at first sight may still 
turn out to enable the latter in the end. 
ecological factors
physical capabilities
intelligence
(insight into problem
solution)
tolerant 
gregariousness
teaching +
exchange?
Foundations of multifaceted tool use
depth of problem
perception
flexibility
Which opportunities or necessities arise?
Which proficiencies or handicaps are
present?
What is a problem, what is not?
(How) can I solve the problem?
How can I solve the problem by other means?
Who can learn from my example?
Who can I impart my knowledge to?
Fig. 27 Factors that promote tool use: from general ecological, through individual cognitive, to 
social aspects. 
While the lack of physical capabilities for tool use may limit tool behavior within a species, 
physical characteristics, on the other hand, may render tool use redundant. Sea otters in the 
Aleutian Islands exhibit tool use, other than their relatives of the Californian coast, only during 
the juvenile and old-age stages of their lives, when their teeth are still too weak or already to 
abraded to open their food. Other than the Aleutian clams, which are relatively small and 
possess weaker shells, the clams that constitute the main food source of Californian sea otters 
can usually only be opened with the help of tools, even by adult animals in their prime (Hall and 
Schaller 1964; Jones 1951 in Beck 1980). Physical handicaps in relation to the solution of a 
problem promote tool use, whether in the habitual opening of hard-shelled food or the singular 
use of a feather by a double-crested cormorant (Phalacrocorax auritus). The mobility of the 
neck of this latter animal was probably limited by an injury, making it only possible to reach its 
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preen gland and preening its plumage with the help of a tool (Beck 1980: 27–28; Becker 1993: 
63). Consequently, the factor of expert manipulation should be extended beyond mere physical 
capabilities. 
One factor that the model by Schaik et al. (1999) does not consider is the breadth of problem 
recognition – which situations are actually recognized as problems. There is no such thing as an 
objective problem that can be avoided. It is always subjective and dependent on the point of 
view of the subject; however, it is not necessarily chosen consciously. The satisfaction of a need 
– with or without a tool – and the satisfaction process do not have to have economic advantages, 
but serve to further (and increase) subjective well-being. This remains true for all functional 
areas of tool behavior, the emphasis on economical or psychological satisfaction varies from 
case to case. 
Intelligence and problem comprehension vary significantly in animal tool use. Ant lions 
reflexively throw sand towards an external stimulus, sand knocked loose by prey crawling along 
the edge of the pit (comp. Chapter 18), other animals are able to learn and gain better 
comprehension of a problem-solution relationship. Comprehension of a problem solution in tool 
behavior also includes the recognition or isolation of an object from its environment and the 
coordination of actions and different foci of attention.  
Fig. 28 The use of a spontaneously fashioned wire hook by a female New Caledonian crow 
(Corvus moneduloides) and some of the tools (from Weir et al. 2002).  
  
Flexibility and the ability to be innovative, beside broad problem recognition and problem 
comprehension, are further basic cognitive abilities for versatile tool use. This aspect becomes 
most important during unusual situations that include a problem similar to previously solved 

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problems; the problem is recognized and not discarded because it does not seem solvable. An 
excellent example of this is the spontaneous production of wire hooks by a New Caledonian 
crow (Corvus moneduloides) in an experiment in which prepared wire hooks were tested. While 
a male animal exclusively used the prepared wire hooks to fish food out of a pipe, a female 
animal bent a straight piece of wire into a hook so that she could also reach the reward (Fig. 28). 
In later experiments, the animal repeated this behavior multiple times; it was not previously 
trained to do so (Weir et al. 2002). 
A number of variables in this problem are already known and recognized: Extracting food using 
a hook end, the circumstance that probes need to be produced and the knowledge of what a 
functioning probe made out of the new raw material looks like. The more elements are known, 
the easier innovation becomes. That is why alterations of common problem solutions can be 
observed more frequently than entirely new behavior, which requires the recognition of an 
unknown problem as well as new problem-solution relationships, new raw materials, new 
actions and new rewards. 
  
The assessment whether an action is innovative and, in consequence, the determination of 
flexibility and innovative ability, should not be too strict or limited to new behavior. Fox et al. 
(1999), Kummer and Goodall (1985) and numerous archaeologists (comp. Chapter 12) believe 
that the innovative ability of orangutans, chimpanzees and humans remains very limited 
throughout large parts of their development. It is important to differentiate between individual 
and momentary flexibility, which is probably rarely documented by ethnographic or 
archaeological observations, and the establishment of innovation in a group over a longer period 
of time. The majority of innovations are created in short-termed and unusual situations; as soon 
as the situation normalizes, the subject generally returns to trusted activities and solutions. 
Innovations rarely lead to new problems and freedom of action. 
In order for an innovation to become included in the behavioral repertoire of a group, other 
members of the group must recognize the problem at the same time. In addition, the solution 
must be reproducible with the given materials and other members of the group must be able to 
recognize the problem-solution relationship for themselves. Group tolerance for new tool 
behavior as a catalyst for the distribution of innovation can only arise if these conditions are met 
by making it possible for others of a group to observe and follow an action example. Teaching 
and exchanging knowledge can also lead to an active recognition of the problem, the problem-
solution relationship and can explain and illustrate the action example.  
  
Although all the mentioned aspects interlock, they do not represent a simple evolutionary 
sequence against the backdrop of animal tool behavior. Different groups and species of animals 
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possess different, simple to complex variations of individual economic, physical, cognitive and 
social factors on which a species-specific picture of tool use is based. A species’ intelligence 
and flexibility can be pronounced, while problem recognition remains limited as in Corvus 
moneduloides, where the observed tool behavior is limited to a tight problem-circle – probing to 
extract food – in a subsistence context. Their bodily abilities do not differ from other species of 
birds that do not use tools, their ecological niche, like that of the finch, focuses their attention on 
the extraction of food from places that are not accessible without tools. One or two forms of tool 
behavior may occur in a species based purely on instinctive behavior as in the ant and worm 
lions. At the same time, intelligent animals with problem comprehension, high flexibility, broad 
problem recognition and social tolerance, such as dolphins, even with their physical limitations, 
can still use and establish tool use in their groups while others, such as the gorillas, do not show 
regular tool behavior despite their distinct manual manipulative abilities. The different factors 
are in part necessary or limiting factors for the development of tool behavior, their presence 
automatically generates specific forms of tool use.  
  
In the next chapter I will discuss the cognitive factors breadth of problem recognition, problem 
comprehension and flexibility by illustrating individual examples of tool use among animals 
through Cognigrams. 
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18  Problem-Solution Distances in Animal Tool Behavior 
Animal tool behavior is generally defined as a behavior form with unmodified objects, rarely 
with prepared objects, that usually occurs in a subsistence context and is instinctive or can be, at 
least partially, learned. The cognitive processes involved in this behavior are rarely 
differentiated. This chapter looks at what differentiates proto-tool use from true-tool use; it 
examines how identical goals can be reached through different methods and how similar actions 
with different goals require distinctive thought-processes. The goal is to arrive at a distinctive 
picture of the cognitive capabilities in animal tool behavior, which will then serve as the 
foundation for a comparison with the development of human tool usage and behavior.  
Proto-Tool Use: e.g. The Drosselschmiede 
If and how proto-tool use can be distinguished from true-tool use and whether it is constructive 
to treat them separately has been the subject of numerous discussions (e.g. Parker& Gibson 
1977; Beck 1980; Becker 1993; see Chapter 14). Lefebvre et al. (2002) found differences in the 
development of areas of the brain of birds working with true-tools versus those using proto-
tools. Proto–tool behavior is only treated briefly in this paper; it is important to take look to see 
if and how it can be distinguished from true-tool behavior with respect to problem perception 
and foci of attention.  
Different species of birds demonstrate proto-tool use in a subsistence context by holding on to 
their prey through spearing or pinning it down, by dropping prey with hard shells onto hard 
surfaces to open them and by hammering prey onto an anvil as in the example of the 
“Drosselschmiede” (Lefebvre et al. 2002, 948-952; Becker 1993, 46-52). Similar use of an anvil 
was also observed in multiple species of wrasse (Coris angulata, Cheilinus lunulatus and 
Cheilinus trilobatus); the fish beat sea urchins onto large rocks to break them open (Fricke 
1971, 1973 in Becker 1993, 37). The most prominent anvil behavior among mammals was 
observed among the tufted capuchin (Cebus apella) (Becker 1993, 81-83). Due to its frequency, 
the anvil use in subsistence contexts will be used as an example for proto-tool use behaviors.  
The external catalyst for the use of a “Drosselschmiede” (Fig. 29) is a snail shell that needs to 
be opened. The thought and action chain only involves three phases: the search for a suitable 
anvil, opening and then consuming the snail. Three foci of attention are activated in the action 
process involved in this behavior: The active focus of the perceiving and acting subject, the 
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passive object focus on the snail and the second, also passive, object or location focus on the 
anvil. The animal carrying out the action must include the passive effect or changing effects of 
beating the objects (anvil or snail) in its considerations, but it only has to control its own action 
as the active factor in the action process. It is not necessary to coordinate the subject's own 
actions with the active effects of another medium. The subject feels a basic need; the subject 
acts using passive objects; the subject satisfies its needs: There is no transfer of the active 
moment.  
Proto-Tool Use: “Drosselschmiede“
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Fig. 29 Cognigram of a “Drosselschmiede” e.g. for sing thrushes (Turdus philomelos) and 
redwings (Turdus iliacus) (comp. Becker 1993, 46-47).  
The next example of true-tool use, hammering an egg with a stone to open it (Fig. 30), is similar 
in process and result, yet different. The external catalyst of behavior is the discovery of an egg, 
the thought and action chain is also limited to three phases. Although there are also three foci 
active in the course of the action process, the egg is the only passive object being acted upon or 
being changed. The third focus, the tool, is active like the subject focus. The animal carrying out 
the action must consider the passive variability of the object (egg) when cracking the egg with a 
stone. It must control the active forces, its own actions as well as the effect of the tool. It is 
necessary to coordinate the animal’s own actions with the active effects of the medium. The 
subject feels a basic need, the subject acts indirectly through a tool on a passive object; the 
subject satisfies its need: A transfer of the active moment from the subject to the medium takes 
place in the act of opening the egg. In this example, the cognitive problem-solution distance is 
expanded with two foci of attention compared to the example of the “Drosselschmiede”, which 
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involved only one active focus. The difference is illustrated in the cognigrams: For the 
"Drosselschmiede" (Fig. 29), the subject focus influences one object focus, when hammering an 
egg (Fig. 30), both the subject and the tool foci influence the object focus.  
  
Tool use: Hammering an egg with a stone to open it by Neophron 
percnopterus (after van Lawick-Goodall & van Lawick-Goodall 1966)
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PHASE IV: Satisfaction of need 
6. Consumption 
A-Focus 1
Subject
P-Focus 2
Object
egg
4
6
5
IV
P
H
A
S
E
 I
II
0a0
A-Focus 3
Tool
stone
0b
1
3
II
  
  
  
  
 I
H
Fig. 30  Cognigram for an Egyptian vulture (Neophron percnopterus) hammering an egg with a 
stone. 
White fronted and tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus albifrons and Cebus apella) demonstrate a 
seemingly intermediate form of cracking open nuts, oysters and fruits with objects of the same 
kind. Since the acting subject does not differentiate between the object and the tool, as it did in 
the previous examples, the analysis of behavior in the cognigram must look different (Fig. 31). 
Only two foci of attention are activated, the subject’s focus and the focus of the identical 
objects. Due to the selection of e.g. two nuts, the object focus is split into two sub-foci with 
identical significance. There is no sequence to handling the objects, nor is there a differentiation 
between the active object and the object being acted upon. At the end of the action, one or the 
other nut, oyster or fruit, or both is opened and eaten. The subject is not in control of the result. 
The only active moment that is controlled in this thought and action chain is the subject’s own 
actions, it is not necessary to coordinate the actions and the active effect of the medium. A 
transfer of the active moment to a tool does not take place. In this case, we assume that the 
animals searched for the food. However, if the animals happened upon the objects, fruits, nuts 
or oysters, by chance, then the number of phases is reduced to two. 
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Proto-hammering by Cebus albifrons und Cebus apella 
0.          Perception basic need: food 
0a.        Perception subroblem 1:  
 need of nut / oyster 
PHASE I: Collection of nuts / 
oysters 
1. Searching and finding of nuts 
/ oysters 
PHASE II: Cracking open nuts / 
oysters 
2. Holding nut  / oyster 1 in one 
hand 
3. Holding nut / oyster 2 in the 
other hand 
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Fig. 31  Cognigram for different species of capuchin monkeys (Cebus) cracking open nuts, 
oysters or cumare fruits with an identical object (after Becker 1993). 
Although, at first glance, the behavior of the species of Cebus looks like borderline tool use 
because both elements are handled and cracked against each other, a second glance shows that 
the behavior can be rated as a simple form of proto-tool use with only two foci of attention. 
Tool Use and Intention: e.g. the Ant Lion 
The definition of tool behavior is dependent on the acting subject’s intention and what it aims to 
achieve with its actions; this is demonstrated using the example of the ant lion (Myrmeleon 
formicarius and Euroleon nostras), whose hunting behavior is defined as explicit tool behavior 
(Beck 1980, 16; Becker 1993, 26). The doodlebugs (larvae of the ant lion) build funnel shaped 
traps in the sandy earth (fig. 32) in which they trap their prey. They dig themselves into the 
earth at the base of the funnel and wait for an ant to fall into the trap and slide down to them. If 
the prey tries to save itself by clinging to the lip of the funnel, thereby loosening grains of sand 
that fall down into the funnel and onto the ant lion, it reflexively throws sediments into the 
direction from which the grains of sand came. The thrown sand causes the walls of the funnel to 
become instable and the prey slides down into the center (Beck 1980, 14; Becker 1993, 25-27; 
personal observation).  
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Fig. 32 An ant lion's funnel trap (Photo: Haidle) 
If we define the ant lion’s behavior as capturing prey using tools (fig. 3), then it becomes clear 
that capturing prey for food is multi-phased behavior that encompasses multiple foci of 
attention. However, the action sequence is cognitively less complex than it seems.  
Capturing of prey by Myrmeleon formicarius 
(after Becker 1993) 
0.              Perception basic need 1:  
                 food 
0‘. Perception basic need 2: 
 building a funnel 
PHASE I: Building a funnel trap in sandy 
earth 
1.   Digging of a funnel in sandy earth 
PHASE II: Satisfaction of need 2 
2.   Burrowing himself 
3.   Waiting still 
(x. Prey gets into funnel and struggles 
to get out. Sand trickles down) 
Perception stimulus → reflex:  
 Sand trickles down → Throwing of 
sand 
PHASE III: Throwing of sand 
4.    Throwing of sand in direction of 
sand trickling down the rim of the 
funnel 
(xx. Prey slides down into the center of 
the funnel) 
Perception stimulus → reflex:  
 Prey in reach → Capturing prey 
PHASE IV: Capturing prey 
5.   Capturing prey 
PHASE V: Satisfaction of need 1 
6.   Consumption 
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Fig. 33 Cognigram of the behavior of the ant lion, interpreted as capturing prey using tools.  
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Capturing of prey by Myrmeleon formicarius 
(after Becker 1993)
0.          Perception basic need 1:  
             building a funnel 
PHASE I: Building of a funnel trap in 
sandy earth 
1. Digging of a funnel in sandy 
earth 
PHASE II: Satisfaction of need 2 
2. Burrowing himself 
3. Waiting still 
(x. Prey gets into funnel and 
struggles to get out. Sand 
trickles down) 
Perception stimulus → reflex:  
 Sand trickles down →
Throwing of sand 
PHASE Ia: Throwing of sand 
4. Throwing of sand in direction 
of sand trickling down the rim 
of the funnel 
(xx. Prey slides into the center of 
the funnel) 
0‘.          Perception basic need 2: food 
Perception stimulus → reflex:  
 Prey in reach → Capturing 
prey 
PHASE I‘: Capturing prey 
1‘. Capturing prey 
PHASE II‘: Satisfaction of need 2 
2‘. Consumption
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Fig. 34 Cognigram of the behavior of ant lions interpreted as two separate thought and action 
processes, funnel building and hunting. 
The different foci are not activated through the identification of subproblems, but through 
instinctive basic needs and the perception of external impulses. Building the funnel is not an 
anticipatory or intentional reaction to the basic need for sustenance – the funnel is not build in 
order to capture prey in the future - it is an independent basic need that must be satisfied. If sand 
trickles into the funnel, the ant lion reflexively throws sand in the direction of the trickle, again, 
probably not to intentionally hit the prey. If an ant finally lands at the bottom of the funnel, the 
first basic need is satisfied without the ant lion anticipating it or having become intentionally 
active. The tool and object focus of the prey are not activated from the beginning; only 
independent external impulses, which are not based on the subject’s intentional actions, activate 
these foci for a short period of time.  
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In contrast, according to the definition by Alcock and Beck, orcas (Orcinus orca; Mason 2005) 
that vomit food to bait birds may not be considered as tool behavior since the bait is an internal 
product of the subject and does not come from the surroundings (comp. Chapter 14). The 
subproblem “bait” is identified, but a new focus of attention is not activated to use resources 
from the subject’s surroundings, the problem is solved through its own actions (vomiting) (fig. 
35). However, here the subject does not directly act on the target object “seagull”; it is not spit 
from the sky; the vomit converts into the medium through the temporal separation of the act of 
vomiting and its resulting effect. The active moment is transferred to the bodily product as the 
medium. 
The interpretation of the hunting strategies, carried out by ant and worm lions, as successive and 
intentional thought and action chains involved in tool behavior (fig. 33), as argued by Beck 
(1980) und Becker (1993), is therefore not correct. In fact, they represent two separate, 
intentionally independent processes with individual basic needs that are neither accidentally, nor 
intentionally, interlocked. The thrown sand is a tool only because it was thrown, not because it 
is a tool in and of itself. It is used outside of the thought and action chain, which it initiates. To 
interpret both processes as a causal thought and action chain with the goal to acquire food, 
corresponds to the human way of thinking.  
The Controlled Use of Tools: e.g. Baiting … 
As opposed to the ant lion throwing sand, which is generally characterized as tool behavior, the 
tool character of an object being used in baiting is still the subject of much discussion. Lefebvre 
et al. (2002, 948) place the baiting behavior by birds into the category of proto-tool use, Becker 
(1993, 59-62) and Beck (1980, 28-29) accept it as true tool use.  
Different species of heron, also a black kite and an Australian rainbow bee eater, were observed 
as they first searched for and caught bread crumbs, feathers, worms or insects, and then placed 
these onto the water surface in order to bait fish. Prytherch (1980 in Becker 1993, 61) observed 
the squacco heron (Ardeola ralloides), used here to demonstrate this behavior, which caught 16 
insects in a period of 20 minutes and then used them to catch fish. In this case, only one basic 
need can be identified, the need for food (fig. 35). Based on this need, two subproblems are 
recognized and the corresponding foci of attention activated. The insects are caught and placed 
on display with the intention to bait prey. The insect is an external, independently moving 
object that is used for a specific process. However, in the process of baiting, when the insect 
medium tempts (psychologically) the target object, the fish, it is not handled by the subject, only 
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observed. A transfer of the active, effective moment from the subject to the medium takes place, 
yet the subject has no direct influence on the effectiveness of the tool; it only controls it through 
selection and placement. Therefore, baiting with insects and bread is interpreted as borderline 
tool behavior, tool implementation as opposed to tool use. 
Proto - tool use: Vomiting food to bait birds by Orcinus orca  
(after Mason 2005)
0.           Perception basic need: 
food 
0a.         Perception subproblem 1: 
need of bird 
0b.         Perception subproblem 2: 
bait necessary 
PHASE I: Provisioning of a bait 
1. Vomiting food 
PHASE II: Baiting a bird 
2. Waiting still and observing 
3. Baiting the bird 
PHASE III: Satisfaction of need 
4. Consumption 
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Tool use: Baiting with insects by Ardeola ralloides  
(after Beck 1980; Becker 1993; Lefebvre et al. 2002)
0.            Perception basic need: 
food 
0a.          Perception subproblem 1: 
need of fish 
0b.          Perception subproblem 2: 
bait necessary 
PHASE I: Provisioning of a bait 
1. Catching of insect 
PHASE II: Baiting a fish 
2. Positioning of insect on the 
water surface 
3. Waiting still and observing 
4. Baiting the fish 
PHASE III: Satisfaction of need 
5. Direct consumption 
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Fig. 35 Cognigrams of baiting by orcas (Orcinus orca) and squacco herons (Ardeola ralloides). 
It makes sense, that the use of the subject’s own bodily products is not considered as tool use 
because the subject does not take external measures into consideration to solve the problem: 
The distance between problem and solution is shorter. Since, in this case, the bodily product is 
not used directly because its effect is delayed; it is possible to assume a belated interpretation as 
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an object or tool. No matter which point of view one supports in this case, it has become 
increasingly obvious that it is not easy to make a clear differentiation between tool behavior and 
other borderline behavior.  
The impulse in both types of baiting is not a predefined target object that activates the thought 
and action chain, as in the case of the “Drosselschmiede” or the use of a hammer to open an 
egg, but an undefined external or internal stimulus, the anticipation of a reward. This behavior 
represents an investment whose continuing effect on an object cannot be continuously observed 
and whose conclusion is uncertain.  
... And Antler Adornments in Deer 
Antler adornment by different species of deer (Beck 1980, 37-38, Fig. 1-1; Becker 1993, 78) is 
an example of how the classification of such borderline cases of behavior, and the intention 
behind it, is dependent on the human observer. It is possible to observe this phenomenon among 
the Peré David’s stags (Elaphurus davidianus); primarily from July until September, the stag’s 
antlers can be seen covered with plants or mud (Beck 1980, 38). The trigger for this behavior is 
just as unknown as the intention behind it. The phenomenon is often interpreted as intentional 
behavior in a rutting context; however, it remains unclear whether the intention is to impress a 
competitor or to attract female animals, in short, what is the target object. Beck (ibid.) interprets 
the accumulation of hay or plants with the antlers as an accidental by-product during feeding. At 
the same time, he considers the affixation of mud to the antlers to be an intentional action, even 
though the time of year when this predominantly occurs does not completely correlate with the 
rutting season in June and July.  
Depending on whether one sees the behavior as target-oriented in a rutting context, as accidental 
in a feeding context or as target-oriented in some other context, the hangings can be interpreted 
as tools, by-products or intentional products without tool-character. If one assumes that the 
hangings were not intended to be used as adornments, then they could be accidental by-products 
of feeding or aggression reduction. For the latter, it is quite possible that stags visit a bush or 
pool of mud in order to take out their aggression on it: This behavior would activate a second 
focus of attention (fig. 36a). The satisfaction of the basic need occurs, when the subject acts on 
the object (bush, pool of mud), only the subject is active. Whether female deer are possibly 
attracted by these hangings is irrelevant for this behavior with which a basic need is satisfied: 
No other focus of attention is activated for the female deer, the doe, within this action chain. 
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Adorning (?) antlers with mud or plants by Elaphurus davidianus  
(after Beck 1980) 
a)                                                           a) 
0.          Perception basic need:  
             rejection, restlessness during rutting, 
             itching of the 
             antlers 
0a.        Perception subproblem 1:  
             need of something to reduce 
             aggression 
PHASE I: Search for suitable object 
1. Search for mud, plants, etc. 
PHASE II: Satisfaction of need 
2. Running antlers through mud, rubbing 
antlers against plants, etc. 
(3. ‚Adorned‘ antlers attract doe) 
P
H
A
S
E
  
  
  
II
  
  
  
  
I
A-Focus 1
Subject
P-Focus 2 
Object 1 Object 2
doe0 0a
1
AA
3
2
?
b)                                                          b) 
0.          Perception basic need:  
             mating 
0a.        Perception subproblem 1:  
             need of a doe 
0b.        Perception subproblem 2:  
             increasing perceptiveness  
PHASE I: Search for raw material 
1. Search for mud, plants, etc. 
PHASE II: Production of adornment 
2. Running antlers through mud, rubbing 
antlers against plants, etc. 
PHASE III: Awaking attention 
3. Prancing with adorned antlers 
4. ‚Adorned‘ antlers attract doe   
PHASE IV: Satisfaction of need 
5. Mating 
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Fig. 36 Cognigram of adorning antlers with mud or plants among Peré David’s stags: a) as an 
unintentional by-product of feeding, b) as target-oriented tool use.  
Depending on whether one sees the behavior as target-oriented in a rutting context, as accidental 
in a feeding context or as target-oriented in some other context, the hangings can be interpreted 
as tools, by-products or intentional products without tool-character. If one assumes that the 
hangings were not intended to be used as adornments, then they could be accidental by-products 
of feeding or aggression reduction. For the latter, it is quite possible that stags visit a bush or 
pool of mud in order to take out their aggression on it: This behavior would activate a second 
focus of attention (fig. 36a). The satisfaction of the basic need occurs, when the subject acts on 
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the object (bush, pool of mud), only the subject is active. Whether female deer are possibly 
attracted by these hangings is irrelevant for this behavior with which a basic need is satisfied: 
No other focus of attention is activated for the female deer, the doe, within this action chain. 
If we assume that the hangings are intentional and meant as adornment, then the actions must be 
interpreted as true tool behavior with a tool, which the subject controls. The active, effective 
moment is transferred from the subject to the ornament medium, or at least it is expanded by the 
addition. Depending on the impulse, the thought and action chain must be extended by one or 
two phases. If the trigger is one or more specific doe, then the total process may encompass four 
phases (fig. 36b); if an internal stimulus activates the actions, then the number of phases, 
including the search for a doe, increases to five. The breakdown of behavior in the cognigram is 
very dependent on the point of view of the observer and the phrasing of the behavior 
description: Adornment – effective or hanging – neutral?  
From Toy to Tool: Two Uses for a Feed Basket 
It is only possible for specific behavior in new context to develop from one form of behavior by 
displacing the target goal and extending the foci of attention. The Grevy Zebra in the Brookfield 
zoo is an example of this (Beck 1980, 154-155, fig. 4-1) (fig. 37). A similar displacement of 
goals - from antler hangings to rutting ornamentation – could also be taken into consideration in 
the case of the stags.  
The young male zebra (Equus grevyi) came to the Brookfield zoo, already exhibiting 
pronounced playful behavior by throwing feed baskets. If you break down this behavior in a 
cognigram, then the basic need could be play or entertainment, which is satisfied with the 
basket (fig. 37a). Beside the subject focus, the attention is on the tool, the basket. The subject’s 
own actions must be coordinated with the effects on the basket. The active moment is 
transferred from the subject to the basket as the medium. It is not only the subject’s own 
unusual movement or behavior which fascinates the zebra, but its extension through the tool and 
its “actions”. It is difficult to accept the basket as a tool; however, if we alter the basic need to 
that of clearing out a stuffed nose and replace the basket with a probe, which must be 
manipulated, (fig. 42) then the result is an identical action chain. The difference is that the probe 
functions physically, the basket psychologically. 
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Toy of Equus grevyi  (after Beck 1980)
a) 
0.           Perception basic need:  
 distraction / playing 
0a. Percepton subproblem 1:  
 need of toy 
PHASE I: Search of toy 
1. Search and Finding of feed basket 
PHASE II: Playing  
2. Brandishing / throwing around of 
basket 
PHASE III: Satisfaction of need 
3. Distraction 
3. Brandishing frightens unfriendly 
mares 
b) 
0‘.          Perception basic need:  
              playing / impressing mares 
0‘a.        Perception subproblem 2:  
 frightening mares 
0‘b. Perception subproblem 1:  
 need of tool 
PHASE I: Search for tool 
1‘.          Search and finding of food basket 
PHASE II: Frightening mares  
2‘.          Brandishing / throwing around of 
basket 
3‘.          Brandishing frightens unfriendly 
mares 
PHASE III: Satisfaction of need 
4‘.          Impressing
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Fig. 37  Cognigram of the utilization of a feed basket by a Grevy zebra: a) as a toy,  b) 
exaptation of the same behavior used to impress.  
In its new home in the Brookfield zoo, the playful zebra encountered two older female animals, 
which seemed to dominate it. Throwing the basket scared the older zebras and caused them to 
run away. The young male animal seemed to recognize the reaction and how it came to be 
because it began to stalk the older mares with the basket (Leja in Beck 1980, 154). The 
phenomenological identical behavior was carried out with a new goal: The basic need changed 
from the need to entertain, to the need to impress (fig. 37b). The target object of the action 
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changed from the subject itself to the mares. Three foci of attention are activated in the 
operation chain; the tool is controlled in order to achieve the desired affect from the mares. The 
subject is satisfied when the mares run away and the subject is dominant. As in the case of the 
antler ornaments (s.a.), the number of phases depends on the trigger of the behavior: If the 
mares are the external impulse, then the action is restricted to three phases; if an inner stimulus 
triggers the action and the mares must be located first, then a fourth phase is activated.  
In the zebra example, behavior developed in a specific context is found to be effective in 
another context and is thereafter used in the new context. This is not an adaptation – the 
behavior (throwing baskets) is developed to master a certain situation (impressing the mares) – 
but an exaptation of behavior (comp. Gould & Vrba 1982). From the cognitive point of view, 
this case is interesting because, initially, the behaviors seem identical; however, the problem-
solution distance is extended due to the recognition of sub-problems and the activation of a new 
focus of attention. The inclusion of a different target object in place of the subject and the 
resulting activation of three foci of attention have only been observed among ungulates in the 
case of the zebra and - if the behavior is interpreted as use of ornamentation – in the use of 
antler adornments among some species of deer. 
Production of Tools: e.g. Leaves as Scoop and Sponge 
The production of tools, which requires an additional increase of the problem-solution distance, 
was only treated as a possible side-aspect in the case of antler hangings among stags. While the 
stone, once it was found and transported to the egg, was used immediately as a hammer to open 
the egg, many tools have to be produced first by altering their raw form. Beck (1980, 105) 
distinguishes four different production types in animal tool behavior. The simplest form of 
manipulation is to detach the intended tool from its substrate: Plucking a leaf from a tree, 
breaking off a branch from a bush or digging up a stone. Once the object is free and 
manageable, tool production can continue. Reductive actions are actions in which excessive 
parts are removed, e.g. defoliating, decorticating, and cutting a probe. Additive action or the 
combination of elements has so far only been observed by animals in captivity (comp. Chapter 
19). Reforming a raw form into a functional tool, e.g. has been observed in different groups of 
chimpanzees who use leaves as sponges and folded leaves (fig. 38) as scoops.  
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Production and use of a folded leaf 
to scoop water by Pan troglodytes
(after Tonooka 2001)
0a. Perception stimulus:  
 knothole filled with water 
0.          Perception basic need: drinking  
0b.        Perception subproblem 2: tool to 
scoop water necessary 
PHASE I: Search for raw material 
1. Search for adequate leaf 
PHASE II: Production of tool
2. Breaking off the leaf / leaves 
3. Putting in the mouth 
4. Multiple folding 
5. Removing from mouth 
PHASE III: Use of tool 
6. Dipping the folded leaf into the water 
PHASE IV: Satisfaction of need
7. Consumption 
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Fig. 38 Cognigram of the production and application of a folded leaf used to scoop water 
among chimpanzees.  
Infrequently, unaltered leaves may be used as simple spoons; leaves are carefully chewed and 
crumpled into leaf sponges or folded in the mouth to increase their scooping potential. The 
thought and action chain (fig. 38) is thereby extended by an additional phase of production. The 
result focuses on the target object, the thought and action steps involved in the chain, however, 
are only focused on the tool and its raw material form. To solve the problem, the impulse to 
directly go for the target object, is further delayed. A subject must principally be able to 
recognize an object’s potential from looking at its raw shape and that it is possible to remove 
the potential tool from its substrate in order to include it in a production phase. 
Tools for a Secondary Goal: e.g. Nose Protection 
So far, we have only addressed tool behavior in which the tool was used as medium to directly 
impact the satisfaction of the basic need. In this example, I will show how the tool is used to 
resolve a secondary problem. Off the West-Australian coast, dolphins use their nose to stir up 
the ocean floor in search of food. In order to protect the skin of their nose from sharp particles 
in the sediment, some animals developed a habit of tearing off living sponges and putting them 
over their nose while searching for food (fig. 39).  
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Fig. 39  Dolphin (Tursiops sp.) off the West-Australian coast with a sponge, searching for food 
(from Krützen et al. 2005) 
So far, this behavior has only been observed among a group of closely related female animals in 
Shark Bay. However, it is highly probable that ecological as well as genetic factors cannot be 
held accountable for the distribution of this behavior (Krützen et al. 2005).  
Use of a sponge as nose protection by Tursiops sp.   
(after Krützen et al. 2005)
0.           Perception of basic need: 
food 
0a.  Perception subproblem 1: 
access to food 
0b.         Perception subproblem 2: 
sediment of sea floor hurts 
nose 
0c.         Perception subproblem 3: 
protection necessary 
PHASE I: Search for tool 
1. Search for appropriate 
sponge 
PHASE II: Production of tool
2. Detaching of sponge  
3. Putting it over the nose / 
protection 
PHASE III: Scaring up prey / use 
of tool 
3. Putting it over the nose / 
protection 
4. Scaring up prey from 
ocean floor  
5. Catching the food 
PHASE IV: Satisfaction of need 
6. Consumption  
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Fig. 40 Cognigram of sponge use while searching for food, in wild Australian dolphins. 
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In the course of the problem perception to satisfy the basic need “food", a sub-focus is activated 
alongside the object focus “food”, the desire to avoid damaging the nose and to avoid pain (fig. 
40). A tool is not necessary to satisfy the basic need for the object “food” – ten other behavioral 
forms are known aside from the use of sponges (Krützen et al. 2005, 8939) – however, the 
additional need to protect the skin during the search for food is satisfied using a medium, for 
which a fourth focus of attention must be activated. The impulse for this behavior – the specific 
external irritation or the anticipation of a hurt nose and, thereby an internal stimulus – remains 
unclear. The behavior only occurs in a subsistence context although it is not directly coupled 
with the solution to the subsistence problem. The cognitive distance between the basic problem 
and the solution is clearly extended: While satisfying the basic problem, another comparatively 
insignificant secondary problem is recognized and a solution is found, thereby delaying the 
satisfaction of the primary need.  
Tools for a Higher Goal: e.g. The Cleaning Probe for Children 
While the dolphin’s nose guard is a secondary need that is identified, pursued and satisfied, 
another type of tool use was documented among gorillas and chimpanzees where the subject's 
basic need is the well-being of another individual.  
Tool use: Probe for cleaning the nose by Pan troglodytes  
(after Whiten et al. 1999; 2001)
0.          Perception basic need:  
             breathing freely 
0a.        Perception subproblem 1:  
tool necessary 
PHASE I: Search for raw material 
1. Search for a small twig 
PHASE II: Production of tool 
2. Breaking off the twig 
3. Possible modification  
of the twig 
PHASE III: Cleaning of the airways 
4. Inserting probe into the  
nostril 
5. Moving probe inside the 
 nostril 
PHASE IV: Satisfaction of need 
6. Sneezing / Cleaning of the 
airway
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Fig. 41. Cognigram of the use of a probe for cleaning the nose among chimpanzees. 
18 Problem-Solution Distances in Animal Tool Behavior 200
Usually, tools used in a hygiene context are used by and on the subject itself (fig. 41). The 
subject recognizes a basic need and the necessity of a tool. Its own actions and the effect of the 
tool are controlled simultaneously. Only two foci of attention are activated. Fontaine et al. 
(1995) describe an extension of this behavior of a female western lowland gorilla (Gorilla 
gorilla gorilla) at the Centre International de Recherches Medicales de Franceville in Gabon. 
The animal recognizes a need to use a tool for cleansing on its sleeping child and not for 
personal hygiene, for which an additional focus of attention is activated (fig. 42).  
The problem-solution distance remains the same although different intentions may be 
responsible for the action. Either the subject wants to play and uses the young animal as a tool 
or toy that is manipulated using a second tool. Or the subject has recognized the other 
individual’s basic need, a need that the young animal does not recognize itself, and handles the 
child as a tool to satisfy its own basic needs (comp. Chapter 19). 
Probe to clean the ears and bellybutton of a young by Gorilla gorilla 
gorilla (after Fontaine et al. 1995)
0.          Perception basic need:  
             satisfying the basic need of the 
young (?) 
 or distraction (?) 
0a. Perception subproblem 1: 
 basic need young → cleanliness 
(?) 
 or toy necessary (?) 
0b.        Perception subproblem 2:  
 tool necessary 
PHASE I: Search for raw material of 
tool 2 
1. Search for a small twig 
PHASE II: Production of tool 2 
2. Breaking of the twig 
3. Modification of the twig 
PHASE III: Manipulation of tool 1 
              Cleaning of the ears and the 
bellybutton 
4. Inserting probe into ears / 
bellybutton of the young 
5. Moving the probe 
6. Removing dirt 
PHASE IV: Satisfaction of need 
7. Young is clean
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Fig. 42. Cognigram of the use of a probe to clean the ears and bellybutton of a younger animal 
by a western lowland gorilla. 
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The example of partner dental hygiene in chimpanzees cannot be interpreted as a game (Beck 
1980, 91; comp. Chapter 17). It shows that the individual basic need in great apes, which 
initiates the thought and action chain, can be geared to satisfy the needs of another individual. 
The impulse for this behavior is definitely a specific external stimulus, the sleeping young 
animal, recognized either as object or subject, as well as the group member suffering from a 
toothache.  
Multifunctional Tools: e.g. the Stick 
It is not self-evident that one category of objects can function as tools in different action chains, 
possibly even in different contexts: Such behavior is rare in animals and can be predominantly 
observed among the great apes. Especially if the behavior does not take place within established 
social parameters and develops slowly into learned behavioral routines, but when it occurs 
individually and spontaneously based on the situation, then it requires a high degree of abstract 
thinking about the object and the situation as well as flexibility. One example of the same tool 
being used in two different thought and action chains and contexts was observed among the 
western lowland gorillas (Breuer et al. 2005). 
Fig. 43  A female western lowland gorilla using a stick for support at the edge of a swamp while 
harvesting water plants (from Brewer et al. 2005) 
While searching for food near the edge of a swamp, a female animal searched for a strong, dead 
branch, broke it off and rammed it into the soft ground using both hands. Afterwards, she 
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supported herself on the branch to avoid loosing her footing on the slippery shore while 
harvesting and eating the water plants (Fig. 43). After satisfying her hunger, she pulled out the 
branch and placed it onto the swamp. She then balanced on the stick to cross the swamp and 
avoid sinking into the soft ground.  
Using a stick for support and as a bridge by Gorilla gorilla gorilla  
(after Breuer et al. 2005)
0.       Perception basic need: 
food 
0a.  Perception subproblem 1: 
need of  water plants 
0b.     Perception subproblem 2: 
shore of the  swamp is 
splippery, staying dry 
0c.    Perception subproblem 3: 
support is necessary 
PHASE I: Search for raw 
material 
1. Search for suitable branch 
PHASE II: Production of 
support
2. Breaking of the branch 
3. Ramming it in the soft 
ground using both hands 
PHASE III: Use of tool  
4. Supporting herself on the 
branch 
5. Harvesting the water plants 
with the hand 
PHASE IV: Satisfaction of need 
6. Consumption 
0‘.      Perception basic need: 
crossing the swamp 
0‘a.    Perception subproblem 1: 
staying dry 
0‘b.    Perception subproblem 2: 
bridge necessary 
PHASE V: Production of the 
bridge 
1‘.      Picking up the same branch
2‘.      Pulling the branch out of 
the swamp 
3‘.      Positioning the branch on 
the swamp 
PHASE VI: Crossing the swamp
4‘.     Balancing on the branch  
PHASE VII: Satisfaction of need
5‘.  Swamp is crossed 
A-Focus
1
Subject
feeding
A-Focus 4
Tool
A-Focus
3
Subject
staying
dry
P-Focus
2
Object
water
plant
1
3
I
P
H
A
S
E
 V
IV
  
  
  
  
II
I 
  
  
  
  
  
 P
H
A
S
E
 I
I
S
0a0 0c
2
45
6
0‘
V
II
  
  
 V
I
0b
A-Focus 5
Subject
crossing
swamp
0‘a 0‘b
1‘
3‘
B
2‘
4‘
5‘
Fig. 44 Cognigram of a western lowland gorilla using a stick for support and then as a bridge. 
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The impulse for both uses of the tool is the same specific external stimulus, the swamp. In both 
instances, the solution for the problem is found in the immediate vicinity. In the first thought 
and action chain, the tool serves a secondary goal (s.a.): The basic need for food is accompanied 
by the second need to stay clean. This is satisfied through use of the tool (fig. 44). After the 
action chain in the subsistence context was completed, the basic need to cross the swamp 
activates a new, intentionally independent thought and action process that, through use of the 
same stick in another function, is connected to the previous action sequence. The action 
sequence in the subsistence context is not interpreted as a completed and connected complex. 
Instead, individual elements are transferred to another context where they are partially altered.  
This behavior represents an extension of the problem-solution distance in which an action chain 
is not static or thought of as a self-contained whole. The solution of a problem is found by 
reflecting on remembered elements from other action contexts. Therefore, a tool can occur in 
correlation with a number of different foci of attention. In the case of the zebra, the entire action 
chain was transferred to another context (s.a.); in this case, only one element is transferred and 
included in another thought and action chain. The flexibility of the tool behavior is increased. 
A Neesia Fruit is not an Insect Nest: e.g. Types of Probes 
The use of one object in different action contexts requires a certain degree of abstraction of the 
situation and the tool properties. The same is true when different tools are used in nearly 
identical contexts. The use of different extraction probes by orangutans in a subsistence context 
has been well documented from this perspective (Fox et al. 1999).  
While the tools - newly torn off, defoliated, shortened and partially decorticated branches - and 
the thought and action process - production of a tool, food extraction, consuming food - seem 
identical, the difference between fishing for the seeds of the Neesia fruit and different insects 
can be found in the details. An inner stimulus starts the search for a nest, a prerequisite to the 
extraction of insects from the nest. Unless the impulse for the behavior is the accidental 
discovery of a nest, then the impulse is a specific external stimulus. Only once a nest is found, 
the orangutan searches nearby for a suitable branch or bush, which it can then use to make the 
required tool. The behavior involved in the extraction of seeds from a neesia fruit can also be 
stimulated through either a specific external or an internal stimulus. The probe is produced first. 
Then the orangutan climbs the fruit tree or chooses the fruit, from which it will extract the seeds 
by first removing the spiny hairs that surround the seeds (fig. 45).  
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Probes for extraction of a) insects / honey b) neesia fruits by Pongo 
pygmaeus  (after Fox et al. 1999)
a) 
0.       Perception basic 
need: eating 
insects / honey 
0a. Perception 
subproblem 1: 
need of a nest 
PHASE I: Search for 
an insect nest 
1. Searching and 
finding a nest 
0b.      Perception 
subproblem 2: 
tool for 
extraction 
          necessary 
PHASE II: Search for 
raw material 
2. Search for 
adequate fresh 
branch in the 
vicinity (ca.1 m) 
PHASE III: 
Production of 
a probe for 
extraction  
3. Breaking of the 
branch 
4. Defoliating 
5. Shortening 
6. Decorticating 
PHASE IV: Extraction 
of insects / 
honey  
7. Pounding, 
pocking, 
probing 
8. Extracting 
PHASE V: 
Satisfaction of 
need  
9. Consumption 
b) 
0.       Perception basic 
need: eating 
cernels of the 
neesia fruit 
0a. Perception 
subproblem 1: 
need of a neesia 
fruit 
0b.     Perception 
subproblem 2: 
tool for extraction 
necessary 
PHASE I: Search for 
raw material 
1. Search for 
adequate fresh 
branch 
PHASE II: Production 
of a probe for 
extraction
2. Breaking of the 
branch  
3. Defoliating 
4. Shortening 
5. Decorticating 
PHASE III: Search for a 
neesia tree 
6. Searching and 
finding a tree and 
a fruit / transport 
probe 
PHASE IV: Extracting 
kernels of the 
neesia fruit  
7. Removing spiny 
hairs from the 
cracks of the fruit 
8. Pushing the 
kernels towards 
the open top of 
the fruit 
PHASE V: Satisfaction 
of need  
9. Consumption 
A-Focus 1
Subject
P-Focus 2
Object
V
  
  
  
IV
  
  
  
  
P
H
A
S
E
 I
II
  
  
  
  
  
  
II
  
  
  
I
a) A-Focus 3
Tool
3
P
0a0
2
7
9
5
4
6
1 0b
8
A-Focus 1
Subject
P-Focus 2
Object
b) A-Focus 3
Tool
1
3
P
0b0
2
9
5
4
6
0a
8
7
V
  
  
  
 I
V
  
  
  
  
II
I 
  
  
  
P
H
A
S
E
 I
I 
  
  
  
 I
Fig. 45 Cognigram of the use of different probes by Orangutans. 
In the case of the insect probe, the tool focus is only activated once the target object is found. 
This does not reflect a lack of anticipatory thinking, but is ecological and at the same time 
economically smart. Even when an animal actively searches for an insect nest and doesn’t 
simply find one per accident, it is more efficient to activate the tool focus afterwards since the 
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tool type depends on the type of insects to be extracted or insect nest that needs to be opened. 
Among the orangutans on Sumatra, Fox et al. (1999, 104) observed significant difference in the 
type of probe made out of new twigs dependent on the target object. The probe for ant nests are 
thin and usually decorticated, for spineless bees they are of medium thickness are less 
frequently decorticated, while the tools for termites are thick and rarely decorticated. The tool 
form is clear for the extraction of seeds from the neesia fruit. The tool form can be anticipated 
and the tool produced early – possibly using better raw material resources than those found on 
site in the neesia tree. If we only recognized the search for insects by orangutans and ignored 
the ecological and economical conditions of the action chain, then we would get a false 
impression of this animal’s maximum possible problem-solution distance. It is only possible to 
recognize a minimum of the actual possible cognitive fitness. 
Fig. 46 A New Caledonian crow (Corvus moneduloides) with a hooked probe (courtesy of 
Gavin Hunt). 
While probes used by orangutans (Fox et al. 1999) and chimpanzees (Hicks et al. 2005) or the 
perforation of different types of bee nests, also by chimpanzees (Stanford et al. 2000) look very 
similar and the transitions are smooth so that the differentiation between the tool groups can 
only take place using statistical methods, the New Caledonian crow (Corvus moneduloides) 
uses two phenomenological different types of tools as probes (Hunt 1996, 2000; Hunt & Gray 
2003, 2004; Hunt et al. 2001). The mode of production for these two tool types, probably used 
to search for insects in dead and living wood, is very different. The production of hooked probes 
made out of branches (fig. 46), which are used throughout a large area in the southeast of the 
New Caledonian island Grand Terre, begins with the selection of a suitable forked branch. A 
branch is broken off above the fork, then the remaining branches beneath the fork are removed 
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and the probe is defoliated and decorticated. Finally, the hook is formed by removing small 
pieces of wood. In the observed cases, the production of the probe takes on average 68 ± 12 s 
(Hunt & Gray 2004).  
Hook-Probe (a) and stepped Pandanus-Probe (b) 
by Corvus moneduloides   
(after Hunt & Gray 2004 (a) and Hunt & Gray 2003 (b))
a) 
0.           Perception basic need: food 
0a. Perception subproblem 1: need of insects
0b.         Perception subproblem 2: extraction tool 
necessary 
PHASE I: Search for raw  material 
1. Search for suitable fresh forked branch 
PHASE II: Production of Hook-Probe  
2. Breaking off a branch above the fork 
3. Breaking off branch directly under the 
fork 
4. Shortening the branch 
5. Trimming off side-branches 
6. Finishing of the hook end 
PHASE III: Search for insect holes 
7. Search for insect holes in wood / 
transport probe 
PHASE IV: Probing  
8. Probing / extracting the insects 
PHASE V: Satisfaction of need  
9. Consumption 
b)
0.           Perception basic need: food 
0a. Perception subproblem 1: need of insects
0b.         Perception subproblem 2: extraction tool 
necessary 
PHASE I: Search for raw material 
1. Search for a suitable fresh Pandanus leaf 
PHASE II: Production of Pandanus  Probe 
2. Ripping across 
3. Ripping longitudinal 
4. Tearing off 
PHASE III: Search for insect holes 
5. Search for insect holes in wood / 
transport probe 
PHASE IV: Probing  
6. Probing / extracting the insects 
PHASE V: Satisfaction of need  
7. Consumption 
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Fig. 47 Cognigram for New Caledonian crows using different types of probes.  
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Tiered probes made out of segments of Pandanus leaves, which have natural barbs, are 
produced using different techniques (Hunt & Gray 2004; Hunt et al. 2001). The crows tear a 
leaf with their beak and pull the segment away from the stem. They tear the leaf perpendicular 
to the original and then tear the segment off along the direction of the plant fibers to separate a 
suitably long probe. The object is generally not modified further after it has been torn off (Hunt 
2000). Both types of tools are used numerous times at different locations for up to 30 minutes at 
a time to probe for food; they only put down the probes on the branches on which they sit for 
short periods of time (Hunt 1996) The impulse for both types of tool use – specific the external 
stimulus or general external trigger or internal stimuli – remains unclear. 
Although the production methods of both tool types are very different, their cognigrams are 
very similar (fig. 47). Starting with the basic need for “food”, the same secondary problems are 
recognized and two further foci of attention for the insects and their nests and the extraction tool 
are activated, next to the subject focus. The search for a suitable tool and the manipulation of 
that tool take place within the tool focus and are followed by an extraction and a consumption 
phase. Deviation in the thought and action chain can only be found in the production of the tool: 
In the case of the hooked probe, this phase includes various different steps, while the production 
of a leaf probe repeats the same steps, tearing and tearing off. The problem solution distance of 
both thought and action chains is identical. 
Hunt und Gray (2004, Fig. 2) separate their chaîne opératoire for the production of the hooked 
probe into four different phases - selection of the forked branch, separation of the extra branches 
above the fork, separation of the tool below the fork, fine tuning of the hook. According to the 
definition of a phase as the combination of closely related individual actions that lead to an 
intermediate result, which cannot be interrupted and then resumed at the same place some time 
later, but has to be started over from the beginning of the sequence, the New Caledonian crow’s 
behavior represents a process consisting of one phase. It would only be possible to interpret a 
second phase after the separation of the tool, if a bird were to fly away with an incomplete 
hooked branch (ibid. p. 89); however, a resumption of tool production has not yet been 
observed.  
We can observe different local variants within the group of pandanus leaf probes: steppes, long 
and thin and short and wide probes, their distribution partially overlaps (Hunt & Gray 2003) 
(Abb. 48). The basic production technique of tearing into the leaf and then tearing it off 
lengthwise is the same in all three variants. The variants can be attributed to slight differences 
and preferences in the production techniques. At this time, it is not clear what is being extracted 
with which tool type. Therefore it remains unclear whether the crows, like the orangutans, 
produce tools suited to a specific problem, whether individual animals create and use different 
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variants (hooked branch and Pandanus probes, different Pandanus leaf probe versions) or 
whether an animal leans and implements only one variant of the probing behavior throughout its 
life. Examinations of naïve juvenile crows, brought up in captivity, show that the probing 
behavior is innate; the behavior variant that is actually implemented is learned (Kenward et al. 
2005). It is possible that the tool behavior of Corvus moneduloides (comp. Chapter 17) in a 
subsistence context is not as flexible and abstract as it first appears. 
Grande Terre
Maré
Fig. 48 Distribution of different versions of Pandanus leaf probes manufactured by New Caledonian 
crows (after Hunt & Gray 2003, fig. 2) 
One Tool for Multiple Subjects: e.g. Playing Catch 
A context of tool use that is practically not traceable in an archaeological context is the social 
context involving games and play. Therefore it is all the more interesting to be able to interpret 
an observation of this behavior in great apes with respect to the action chain and problem-
solution distance. Ellen Ingmanson (1996) reports solitary play with different objects as well as 
social play among bonobos. Play with objects begins at the age of ca. three months; it is 
primarily solitary until the age of two years and occurs only in a social context after the age of 
three years. In this case, a thing is not the object of the game (comp. Chapter 17) but also an 
object that acts as a medium to initiate play and function as an indicator of play.  
When playing catch, a stick indicates which animal is “it” to be caught. The purpose is not to 
get the stick because if the individual being chased drops the stick, the individual chasing it 
stops and waits until the medium is picked up again before the chase can continue. If an 
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individual throws the stick away, e.g. when the group moves on, the game ends. The game with 
the stick as medium, a common focus, seems to take longer and occur more frequently than the 
game without a tool: „...the stick enhances to play, signaling to other players information and 
focusing attention on the activity itself. “ (Ingmanson, 1996, 201) 
The interpretation of the tool behavior in a Cognigram is based on a number of assumptions for 
which the description remains unclear. The indicators for the start of the game remain vague: 
Do the players gather together, does an individual initiates the game after finding a suitable 
stick, or is the suitable stick a specific external trigger that starts the game? Figure 49 shows the 
cognigram in which the players gather first and the tool is brought into the process at a later 
point in time, the reverse is also possible. As a consequence, phases I and II would be reversed 
when the subject acts on an inner stimulus and searches for the stick first. If a conspicuous stick 
is needed to initiate the idea of the game, then the number of phases in the action chain would 
be reduced by one. The further order of events and the problem-solution distance would not 
change; the communication of the wish to play could possibly be simplified. To improve the 
legibility of the following cognigram, I only included one additional player.  
In contrast to the previous examples, alongside the original subject focus, a new subject focus is 
activated for each additional player. In tool behavior with a higher purpose, other individuals 
are understood to be subjects with their own needs but are treated as, at best, responsive objects. 
In the example of bonobos playing catch, other players function as independent acting subjects. 
The cognigram, which follows the existing principles, greatly simplifies the event: The 
cognigram should consist of two individual and interlocking sub-action sequences for a 
minimum of two individuals, where each player is treated as a tool together with the object to 
satisfy the need and as the acting subject. In this case, the tool i.e. the stick only functions 
psychologically. The long action sequence of the regulated game requires a high degree of 
flexibility of the subjects since the individual players can influence the satisfaction of their own 
need, but are not completely in control of it. The stick helps to restrict the required flexibility by 
focusing the actions on a common goal, satisfaction of a need through play with rules. This tool 
characteristic is exemplified at the point in the game where the subject drops the game indicator 
(fig. 49, step 7). The stick on the ground stops the players from continuing according to their 
original impulse, to catch the subject. The other players stop chasing the subject until it has 
picked up the stick and continues to run.  
The extension of the problem-solution distance in this case, is due to the inclusion of (at least) 
one other active and independently acting focus of attention, the other player, which the subject 
attempts to influence with the help of the tool. While action sequences with passive objects as 
well as active tool foci, still dependent on the subject, can be anticipated and planned, the course 
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of the game itself is influenced by the decisions of two or more subjects. The tool becomes 
effective during critical points in the action sequence. In the cognigram, these are marked with 
red arrows. When it is dropped, two different actions are initiated simultaneously: The subject 
searches for the stick and picks it up again while the other players pause and only recommences 
the chase when the subject begins to run again. Another critical point is activated when the 
subject is caught. All players now pursue a different goal: The animal being chased now 
becomes a chaser; the chaser is now the one being chased.  
Playing catch by Pan paniscus (after Ingmanson 1996)
0.           Perception basic need A:  
              social play → catching 
0a.         Perception subproblem 1: willing 
              conspecifics necessary 
PHASE I: Finding a group of players 
1. Finding of other players 
0b.         Perception subproblem 2: indicator 
of play necessary 
PHASE II: Finding tool 
2. Subject 1 searches stick 
PHASE III: Playing 1 
3. Subject 1 picks up stick 
4. Subject 1 runs away 
5. Playmate chases subject 1 
PHASE IV: Interruption 
6. Subject 1 drops stick 
7. Playmate pauses and waits 
PHASE V: Catching the player holding the 
stick 
8. Subject 2 catches subject 1 
PHASE VI: Satisfaction of need 
9. Amusement in social play 
PHASE III‘: Playing 2 
3‘. Subject 2 picks up stick 
4‘. Subject 2 runs away 
5‘. Subject 1 chases subject 2 
PHASE VI‘: Satisfaction of need 
9‘. Amusement in social play 
0‘.          Perception basic need B  
              
PHASE VII: Ending game 
10. Stick is thrown away 
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Fig. 49  Cognigram of bonobos using a stick as an indicator in a game of catch. 
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A Complete Toolbox: e.g. Extraction Sets 
Several species of mammals, such as sea otters, orangutans and chimpanzees, have access to a 
type of toolbox with different tools for different tasks and contexts. These are not used 
spontaneously but regularly by the group and therefore belong to an established tool inventory. 
The use of different tools for different tasks in an action chain has so far only been observed 
among chimpanzees. Sanz, Morgan and Gulick (2004) documented two tool sets used for the 
extraction of termites from subterranean nests or from aboveground hills used by the Moto 
group (Pan troglodytes troglodytes) in the Goualougo Triangle of the Nouabalé-Ndoki National 
Park in the Republic of the Congo (fig. 50).  
Fig. 50  The use of different tool sets for the extraction of termites from a) underground nests 
and b) aboveground hills by chimpanzees of the Moto group (drawings by Regine Stolarczyk 
after Sanz et al. 2004) 
To access the underground nests without visible entrances, the apes use heavy sticks to perforate 
the nests as well as probes to fish the termites out of the opened chambers. The prepared 
extraction probe – shortened, defoliated, one end chewed with the teeth to form a brush – is 
commonly kept and carried while the stick for perforating the nests is only kept in one third of 
the cases. Sticks left over from previous events were frequently used again. The perforation tool 
is pressed into the earth with both hands, and sometimes also a foot, using the animals own 
bodyweight. Once the desired depth is reached, the animal pulls the instrument out and inspects 
it. If the termite chamber is open, the second tool, the probe is activated. Otherwise the 
perforation process is repeated. In contrast to the underground nests, the aboveground nests 
have visible entrances, which the termites seal shut when they are not in use. To open these 
A B 
1 2 
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relatively soft seals, the animals use thin twigs as perforation tools. The tool is held with the 
precision grasp between thumb and second finger. After the entrance is opened and cleaned, the 
previously produced and used brush probe is used to fish for the termites. It is possible that 
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes troglodytes) in the Ngotto Forest in the Central African Republic 
use similar perforation and extraction sets for dipping ants and harvesting honey (Hicks et al. 
2005). 
Use of a tool set to extract termites by Pan troglodytes   
(after Sanz et al. 2004)
0.       Perception of basic need: 
food 
0a.  Perception subproblem 
1:   
 open termite nest / 
extract termites 
0b.     Perception subproblem 2: 
tool necessary to open 
nest 
0c.     Perception subproblem 3: 
tool necessary for 
probing 
PHASE I: Manufacture of 
probe I 
1. Search for appropriate 
twig 
PHASE II: Manufacture of 
probe II  
2. Detaching the twig 
3. Shortening / removal of 
leaves / fraying of 
brushtip 
PHASE III: Transport of probe 
4. Transport of probe to 
termite nest 
PHASE IV: Search for chisel  
5. Selection of chisel on site
PHASE V: Opening the 
termite nest 
6. Pushing with chisel 
(several times) 
7. Inspection of chisel 
PHASE VI: Probing for 
termites 
8.  Extraction of termites 
with probe 
PHASE VII: Satisfaction of 
need 
9. Consumption 
A-Focus 1
subject
P-Focus 2
object
termite
nest
I
V
II
  
  
  
 V
I 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 V
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 I
V
  
  
  
  
  
II
I 
  
  
  
P
H
A
S
E
 I
I
0a0
6
9
4
8
A-Focus 4
tool 2
probe
1
P
2
A-Focus 3
tool 1
chisel
5
CH
0b 0c
3
7
Fig. 51 Cognigram for chimpanzees using different tools to extract termites from their nests. 
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The thought and action chains for both extraction sets observed by Sanz et al. (2004) are 
identical except for some details (Fig. 51). The trigger – specific external stimulus or general 
external or internal stimuli – is not clear. In both cases, two tool foci are activated in parallel at 
the beginning of the process, together with the subject and object foci. Bringing both tools to the 
termite hill is proof that the animal had the foresight to recognize the need for both action 
components, perforation and extraction. We already identified four parallel active foci of 
attention in the example of nose protection by dolphins and the support branch used when 
harvesting water plants by the western lowlands gorilla, however, two of these were sub-foci of 
the same individual, the active subject. In this case, for the first time, an individual uses three 
external objects in parallel in a single action phase. This fact and the anticipation of different 
action elements represent a significant expansion of the problem-solution distance. 
Aside from using different tools to perforate and extract food from ant and termite nests, 
Sugiyama (1997) also reports that the animals also used leaf sponges and sticks to pull the 
sponge, soaked with water, out of the knot-hole of a branch (comp. Chapter 19). Although this 
example clearly shows the conscious use of two different objects by one subject in a thought 
and action chain, the other examples presented by Sugiyama do not show true tool-sets. In the 
example of the palm crowns, the subject used a stick as a tool to beat the palm crowns to a pulp, 
afterwards the fibers, soaked full with palm juice, are sucked dry. This does not represent tool 
use since the fibers are not used or controlled intentionally. Cracking nuts with a hammer and 
anvil is also not considered to be the use of a tool set since the anvil is only a proto-tool. The 
same goes for the use of wedges to stabilize an anvil (comp. Chapter 19). Probing into a nut that 
has already been opened in order to extract the stuck nut requires the use of a tool set – that is, 
only if the extraction of the nut is attempted by the same animal that cracked the nut.  
Fox et al. (1999) also observed orangutans on Sumatra using multiple tools during one 
extraction episode. They doubt whether the use of „four tools in succession to obtain honey 
from a single tree” (ibid, 105) really represent different tools adapted to the different steps of 
the extraction process as is the case for the extraction sets used by the chimpanzees of the Moto 
group; the observation data for orangutans is too scarce for such a statement. 
With regard to the problem solution distance, it is important to differentiate whether the 
additional tool is recognized parallel to a necessary tool already in use or whether its necessity 
is only recognized after the original tool was used. Besides the subject focus, are only two foci 
of attention required or three? Earlier examples showed that orangutans and chimpanzees are 
able to recognize different tools for different tasks and that they are principally able to 
differentiate a sequence of different tools adapted to the various steps in the process. But are 
they able to recognize the necessity of different tools at the beginning of an action chain or do 
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they only recognize the need for a new medium when the tool they are currently using doesn't 
help them anymore?  
Stella Brewer and William McGrew (1990) recount the case of a female chimpanzee (Pan 
troglodytes verus): After an unsuccessful attempt to extract honey using a simple probe, she 
used four different types of tools to open the nest and then probe for the honey. In terms of Fox 
et al. (1999), different tools are used, each adapted to further advance the action chain: First, a 
strong chisel, then a second thinner and shorter chisel, followed by a thin awl to open the nest 
and, finally, multiple similar probes with which honey is extracted for circa 10 minutes. It 
remains unclear from the observations whether the animal really foresaw the need for four 
different tools and thereby activated a total of five foci of attention in parallel for each tool type 
and the nest. 
A simpler cognigram with the same result is also possible (fig. 52). After the first effort failed 
and ended without satisfaction of the basic need, the same basic need “eat honey” as well as the 
same sub-problem “open nest” are recognized anew and a new variant of the second sub-
problem “need tool” is activated: a different tool. Twice more the application of the new tools 
ends without the nest being opened; the activated action chain is broken off (Step 7’ and 7’’). A 
new action begins with the repeated perception of the first sub-problem and the sub-problem 
variants 2'' and 2'''. The animal is finally able to open the nest using the awl, there is no 
frustration, instead the need for an additional tool, the probe, is recognized (sub-problem 2’’’’). 
The use of this tool finally leads to the satisfaction of the basic need.  
In place of elements in a complete and anticipated action chain with five parallel and active 
external foci of attention, the production and use of different tools represents multiple, 
successive action chains with an identical goal. Each phase I-I’’’, II-II’’’ and III-III’’’ is 
activated through a renewed observation of the object “insect nest” and a new focus of the 
following action sequence. At most, it is possible that the need for a probe is anticipated as in 
the extraction set of the Moto group (s.a. Sanz et al. 2004). Each of the short action sequences 
between the chisel and the awl could have had different consequences. The current result could 
have required the use of an additional tool or the action could have ended with success instead 
of frustration, leading to the direct activation of the probe. Although the animals have different 
tools adapted to different requirements available to them in the form of mental templates, the 
necessity for using each of these individual tools is not foreseen (parallel perception), but 
dependent on the result of the previous action chain (consecutive perception).  
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Use of different tools to extract honey by Pan troglodytes  
(after Brewer & McGrew 1990)
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Fig. 52 Cognigram of the use of different tools by chimpanzees to extract honey.  
18 Problem-Solution Distances in Animal Tool Behavior 216
Even though the behavior observed by Brewer and McGrew (1990) does not consist of a 
complete and anticipated long action chain but of a sequence of shorter chains, it is still 
remarkable from the point of view of the problem-solution distance due to the link of multiple 
chains of operation to reach a specific goal. The actual distance from the subject cannot be 
determined, however, it is not discouraged of its goal neither through the first failed attempt nor 
through the small advances using the chisel, although also without success. Frustration at the 
end of an action chain does not cause the chimpanzees to give up on their problem; instead they 
continue to purse the solution to a problem that seems solvable even though there were 
setbacks. 
Variations and Limits 
The examples in this chapter were selected to give an overview of the different types of 
problem-solution distances in animal tool behavior and to clarify their limits. This compilation 
is not representative because it does not show the frequency of the behavioral forms, nor is it 
differentiated according to animal species or animal groups. This type of notation shows how 
variable animal tool behavior can be from a cognitive perspective and in how many different 
contexts and forms it can occur. The itemization of behavior into Cognigrams clarifies the 
differences between proto and true tool behavior with respect to the active effect of media and 
the control over them. The interpretations of the cognitive foundation of behavior seem to be 
strongly dependent on the subject’s insinuated intentions. The categorization as tool behavior of 
certain actions is doubtful or cannot be confirmed.  
Aside from common tool use – the use of an active and controlled external medium on an object 
or the acting subject, where a minimum of two foci of attention, the subject and the tool, and 
possibly another passive attention focus for an object on which the subject or tool will act, are 
active - animals also demonstrate more complex tool behavior. With the help of partially 
manufactured tools, basic needs are satisfied and subordinate problems are solved in a 
secondary action. At the same time, other subjects and the other subject's problems are 
recognized and the tools are used to reach a solution. Whether this represents the recognition of 
the other animal’s basic need, if the behavior is based on a mental theory - the assumption of an 
equally active mind in the other individual - or whether the acting subject assimilates the other 
animal’s body and needs and thereby satisfies its own wishes, e.g., bodily hygiene, remains 
unclear. In animal tool behavior, two additional active foci of attention can be active parallel to 
the subject focus: While during the game of catch among bonobos the subject only controls one 
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additional active focus, the chimpanzees using their extraction sets draw on two different tools 
when planning the solution to their problem, although only one tool is used at a time.  
The coding of animal tool behavior into cognigrams shows that the problem-solution distance is 
not a one-dimensional measurement but encompassed different axes: 
a) The number of steps involved in an action: This element is also documented by chaînes 
opératoires in their common format and illustrates the length of a solution process.  
b) The number of phases in the action process: This element is critical for the problem-
solution distance because the phases comprise stages of the process with sub-goals and 
intermediate results. The phases are parts of a thought and action chain that, with 
sufficient abilities to abstract, become subroutines that can be implemented in other 
actions. Thinking in phases represents a hierarchization of the problem-solution path. A 
simple thought and action chain for tool behavior in which it is not necessary to search 
for an object because it is not required in order to satisfy the basic need or is already 
available as a specific external stimulus, consists of three action phases: the search and 
use of the tool and finally the satisfaction of the need. If an additional object needs to be 
found or produced to satisfy the need, e.g. a fruit, then the problem-solution distance is 
expanded by additional phases. Tool behavior consisting of five or more phases is 
limited to chimpanzees, bonobos and humans, according to current observations. 
Among the different species of gorilla and orangutan, it is not the cognitive framework 
that is missing; it is probably a lack of observation of these behaviors. Due to their 
ability to flexibly integrate known subroutines into other action chains, it is possible to 
postulate conscious hierarchical thinking in phases for the great apes. The sequence of 
phases in a thought and action chain is also only briefly interrupted for these animals.  
c) The total number of active and passive foci of attention: Passive elements are variables 
in the action to which the active factors need to be adapted to reach the desired results. 
The content of the passive foci of attention can be selected at the start of an action; 
afterwards, they are fixed and can only be influenced through the changing and 
controlled effects of the content of the active foci. During the non- or proto-tool 
behavior, generally only one active attention focus is opened at one time; with in true 
tool behavior, the effects of at least two agent or factors – subject and tool – have to be 
controlled. In animal tool behavior, a maximum of four foci of attention, three active 
foci, were observed in an action chain. Even when three agents are involved such as in 
the game of catch among the bonobos or the chimpanzee’s extraction sets, only two are 
controlled at a time.  
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d) The number of active and passive foci of attention whose contents are processed in a 
phase: While the total number of attention foci includes all passive variables and active 
factors anticipated in an action, the number of activated foci in a phase shows which 
variables and factors the subject focuses on in the current action phase. Hiding the foci 
that are not active in the current phase is an advantage when there are a number of foci, 
by simplifying the cognitive complexity of individual action phases This effect is not 
pronounced among animals due to the small number of foci; the differentiation between 
the total number of foci and the number of steps active in a phase is relatively 
insignificant. 
e) The number of foci of attention affecting each other: The contents of active foci of 
attention can affect passive variables as well as active factors. When one active element 
influences another active element, a functional chain is created. Each action chain, even 
those with simple tool production, includes a functional chain: The subject changes the 
tool which in turn affects the object or the subject. In a functional chain, the following 
effects are dependent on each other. In animal tool behavior, the number of foci of 
attention affecting each other is limited to three, according to current observations. In 
behavioral forms with multiple tools such as the chimpanzees' extraction set the tools 
don’t affect each other; therefore these also include a functional chain with three 
elements.  
In this chapter, I focused on the spectrum of problem-solution distances among animal tool 
behaviors; these results will be compared to examples of human tool behavior from different 
episodes of development.  
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19  Problem-Solution Distances in Human Tool Behavior 
Similarly to the analyses of the problem-solution distances in animal tool use, these can also 
only be exemplified for human tool behavior. The examples were selected from 2.5 million 
years of archaeological tool traditions based on their informational value for the expansion of 
the problem-solution distance. Tools that represent pivot points in cognitive development such 
as the first flaked tools of the Oldowan, handaxes or Upper Paleolithic blades are analyzed for 
their expansion potential. These are compared to other, from the point of view of cognitive 
development less relevant, tools such as the bone tools from Swartkrans, the spears from 
Schöningen and more complex devices. This selection of nearly chronological examples does 
not imply that no further expansion of the problem-solution distance took place between the 
first occurrence of the individual examples and the appearance of synthetic raw materials. The 
selected examples cannot represent a complete picture of the development of this aspect of 
human cognition due in part to the fragmented nature of archeological traditions. They serve to 
present an overview in order to understand and discuss the nature of the development process.  
Multiple Tool Elements Together: From Stacking Boxes to 
Assembling a Fishing Rod 
In the previous chapter, I introduced the use of two different tools within one action sequence. 
This behavior counts as some of the most complex tool behavior observed among non-human 
primates. The anticipation of different tools to find a solution to the problem became apparent 
for the termite extraction sets among the chimpanzees of the Moto group (Sanz et al. 2004). 
This foresight has been assumed but not proven for similar behavior among other groups of 
chimpanzees (Brewer & McGrew 1990; Hicks et al.2005) and orangutans (Fox et al. 1999). 
However, it is important to differentiate between the succession of different tools in different 
phases of an action sequence and the use of two tools within a single phase. Experiments with 
primates have shown that chimpanzees, orangutans and western lowland gorillas can principally 
combine multiple elements into one tool in order to achieve an objective. 
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Fig. 53 A chimpanzee trying to reach a reward with the help of stacked boxes (from Köhler 
1963). 
Chimpanzees can stack up to four boxes and use them as a ladder to try and reach objects that 
are otherwise out of their reach (Fig. 53). In different tests, the animals even emptied and 
carried the boxes, whereby up to three individuals were observed cooperating together (Köhler 
1963; Yerkes & Learned 1925; Bingham 1929, Schiller 1957, Yerkes 1943, Wazuro in Döhl 
1966, Lorenz in McGrew et al. 1975, von ButtelReepen in Bierens de Haan 1931 in Beck 1980, 
97-98). Gorillas (Yerkes 1927a, 1927b, 1928-29 in Beck 1980, 78) and orangutans (Lethmate 
1976 c, 1976d, 1977a, 1977b, Yerkes 1916 in Beck 1980, 74) are also able to stack up to four 
boxes on top of each other to reach a reward. Orangutans also place chairs on top of tables 
simply to climb and play on them (Rensenbrink 1960 in Beck 1980, 74). This behavior clearly 
represents a complex problem solution using objects; whether the boxes can be accepted as 
tools is subject to interpretation. On the one hand, the boxes are freely movable and are 
arranged spatially to achieve an objective, however, during the phase in which they are climbed, 
they are not manipulated freely: Beck (1980, 10) defines this behavior as tool behavior. 
According to the definition by Baber (2003, comp. Chapter 14), the boxes are not considered as 
tools.  
From the point of view of the problem-solution distance, do the boxes used for stacking 
represent one or more active or passive foci of attention? When the animal climbs up the boxes, 
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these are not anchored to the floor. The subject must control the effect of the boxes, therefore 
they must be considered as active foci. However, the subject does not have to manage multiple 
tools that act upon each other in separate foci, in order to reach its reward, it controls all boxes 
together as one tool in one attention focus (Fig. 54). 
Creation of a ladder using stacked boxes and its use by Pan 
troglodytes (after Beck 1980)
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Fig. 54 Cognigram of the creation of a ladder using stacked boxes.  
The addition of elements to produce a tool is only a different method of assembly similar to 
subductive manipulation - removing pieces through defoliation, decortication or trimming side 
branches etc. This technique provides new possibilities to finding solutions, but it does not 
represent an additional expansion of the problem-solution distance compared to the subductive 
and transforming alteration of a raw form presented in Chapter 18 (comp. Fig 39). A similar 
combination of tool elements, combining up to three staffs, was observed in another experiment 
involving chimpanzees (Köhler 1963; Kats 1972b, Schiller 1957 in Beck 1980, 114) (Fig. 55). 
In similar experiments, orangutans have combined up to five sticks (Ellis 1975, Lethmate 
1976b, 1976c, 1976d, 1977a, 1977b, 1977c, 1977d, 1977e, 1978 in Beck 1980, 72 and 110). 
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Different elements are added together to produce a tool that is handled as one unit with only one 
focus of attention for the solution of the problem.
Fig. 55 A chimpanzee fitting staffs together to produce a tool with which he can reach a reward 
that is located out of his reach (from Köhler 1963). 
Another combination of tools is involved in the experimental task of using one tool to reach a 
second tool that was placed out of reach in order to be able to retrieve a reward that could not be 
reached using the first tool. Different experiments have shown that chimpanzees can use up to 
four sticks to finally reach the desired object (Köhler 1963; Hobhouse 1926, Jennison 1927, 
Jackson 1942, Jacobson et al. 1935, Kats 1972b in Beck 1980, 93). At least two different active 
tool foci and the subject focus are included in the thought and action chain; however, only one 
is actively controlled in any one phase of the process. The behavior represents a sequence of 
tool uses, whereby both tools are not targeted on the final reward as in the example of the Moto 
group’s extraction sets (Sanz et al. 2004). The subject uses the first tool with the goal to reach 
the second tool with which it will then attempt to retrieve the reward. Combining tools in this 
form represents an expansion of the problem-solution distance, similar to the simple production 
of tools, with an additional phase in the action chain that is psychologically focused on the 
target object but whose actions are not aimed directly at it.  
A third variation of the combination of tools in one phase was documented by Reuvens (in 
Yerkes & Yerkes 1929 in Beck 1980, 72): An orangutan threw a sack over an orange located 
outside of his reach, using a second overlapping sack, he pulled the first sack together with the 
underlying orange to him. In this case, both tools are used in sequence; only one object is 
controlled in each individual phase. The first sack alters the target object so that it can be 
retrieved using the second object. The problem-solution distance is expanded compared to the 
termite extraction set because the first sack is not cast aside after it was actively used, instead, it 
is treated as a unit together with the fruit. Whether the orangutan recognized the connections 
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and planned to use both tools in a sequence to reach its rewards does not become clear from the 
description of the behavior.  
The use of multiple similar tool elements together to achieve an objective has so far only been 
documented among primates in captivity. It represents a preliminary stage to the simultaneous 
use of different elements with different functions in one phase. This in turn is the basis for the 
production of tools using tools, which has, so far, only been observed in hominids or has been 
reconstructed from archaeological remains. 
A New Tool Function: Tools to Produce Tools 
The production of tools using tools, so-called secondary tool use (Kitahara-Frisch et al. 1987; 
Kitahara-Frisch 1993; Haidle 1999, 2000, 2004a, 2004b) demonstrates a new tool function that 
prerequisites the combination of multiple devices in one phase. As stated in the discussion of 
the differences between cracking nuts by chimpanzees and the production of stone tools (Fig. 
19-21) in Chapter 16, the use of a secondary tool represents an expansion of the problem-
solution distance, in contrast to the direct production of tools by the subject using hands, mouth, 
teeth or claws etc. (comp. Chapter 18, Fig. 29) as well as the previously mentioned combination 
of multiple tools in a phase. For the first time, a medium is not only used to manipulate a target 
object but to manufacture another medium, which will be used to satisfy a basic need. Thinking-
around-the-corner is expanded to include the production of tools. 
Three active foci of attention are active in a thought and action chain involving secondary tool 
use: The subject focus, the focus of a tool used to manipulate an object and the focus of the 
second tool used to produce the first tool. The active sequence is expanded by the subject’s use 
of a tool to fashion a medium that will finally solve the problem. In contrast, the production and 
application of a termite hook only has two active foci: The subject manipulates and uses the 
twig probe to extract termites. In addition, in the production of stone tools all three active foci 
must be controlled simultaneously and independently of each other within a phase. This differs 
from previously introduced tool combinations. The core, from which a flake will be separated 
using the hammer stone, is not just held down in front of the subject, the hammer stone and the 
core must both be controlled individually to achieve the desired result. 
The use of secondary tools such as stone artifacts can be traced back ca. 2.5 million years 
(comp. Appendix II). Cut marks on animal bones from early Ethiopian find sites such as Bouri 
(deHeinzelin et al. 1999), Ounda Gona OSG-6 as well as Kada Gona EG-13 and WG-9 
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(Domínguez-Rodrigo et al. 2005) document that stone tools have been used as cutting tools to 
disarticulate animal cadavers. Analyses by Mercader et al (2002) prove that stone tools of the 
Oldowan industry do not represent accidental by-products of other activities that were identified 
as fitting for a certain task and then used in a new situation. A comparison between splintered 
stone fragments that gathered over time at a preferred nut-cracking site beneath a Panda oleosa
tree in Taï National park with very simple Oldowan inventories from Omo123, Omo FtJj1 and 
Koobi Fora FxJj1 showed that both complexes included a large variation of fragment sizes and 
morphological similarities. However, they significantly vary in the selection of the raw 
materials. While local granites and laterites were used as hammer stones for cracking nuts, the 
material from the Oldowan find sites was selected for the improved control of its breaking 
characteristics. Local raw material was selected at the different find sites in Gona, up to 2.6 
million years old (Stout et al. 2005); in the over 2.15 million year old find site Kanjera South, 
Kenya (Plummer et al. 1999), suitable raw materials were transported into the site. A raw 
material selection for hammer stones was demonstrated for the 1.8 to 1.5 million year old find 
sites from Bed I and II of the Olduvai Gorge (Tanzania), eponymous site for the Oldowan 
industry (Mora & de la Torre 2005).  
In addition, other stone tool inventories, which Mercader et al. (2002) did not include in the 
comparison, also show characteristics that suggest that they were manufactured intentionally. 
Besides large quantities of artifacts in Kada Gona EG-10 and EG-12 (Semaw et al. 1997) and 
the high density of artifact in Ounda Gona OGS-7 (Semaw et al. 2003), it is the reduction 
techniques, reconstructed based on knapping marks and refits between fragments, that 
distinguish early stone tools from accidental fragmentation. In Lokalalei 2C, a 2.24 to 2.34 
million year old find site, it was possible to refit 60 artifact sets, each composed of up to 51 
flakes from one core (Fig. 56). The reduction sequences followed both uni- and multidirectional 
reduction from one flaking surface; both natural and prepared striking platforms were used 
(Roche et al. 1999). The production process in Lokalalei 2C concentrated on the reduction of 
flakes, not the production and forming of core tools: By adhering to certain technical rules, it 
was possible to achieve a high frequency of flakes per core. The impact scars on the cores and 
hammer stones give evidence for a very controlled striking technique (Delagnes & Roche 
2005). Retouched flakes, flakes that were worked into stone tools, already show up in the early 
phases between 2.5 and 2 million years ago (Semaw et al. 2003; Roche et al. 1999; Delagnes & 
Roche 2005).  
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Fig. 56 Recombination of a core from Lokalalei 2C, Kenya (drawing by Achim Frey). 
The preparation of the core prior to the reduction itself and the retouch of a flake after its 
separation both represent an expansion of the thought and action chain through additional 
phases, each with individual results (Fig. 57). They differ from the modifications in simple 
production sequences such as the preparation of a hooked probe by New Caledonian crows 
(Corvus moneduloides) (comp. Chapter 18) in their variety – it is not necessary to prepare a 
striking platform or retouch a flake to produce a sharp edge - and in the different phase goals. 
The focus shifts to the use of the tool, and thereby to the object, in the last phases of production. 
In the phases leading up to this point, the focus lies on facilitating and improving the tool 
production. Phases that do not lead to the fastest solution of the problem but that improve the 
effectiveness of the tool and its production are included.  
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Production / use of a flake tool
0.   Perception basic need 
0a. Perception subproblem 1 
0b. Perception subproblem 2 
0c. Perception subproblem 3 
PHASE I: Gathering of raw 
material tool 1 
1. Search for raw material / 
gathering 
PHASE II: Transport of raw 
material tool 1 
2. If necessary transport to 
atelier 
PHASE III: Search for tool 2 
3. Search for hammer 
PHASE IV: Transport of  
tool 2
4. Transport to atelier 
PHASE V: Use of tool 2 / 
Production of tool 1 A 
5. Positioning of individual 
6. Positioning raw material 
and hammer 
7. Knapping (core 
preparation) 
PHASE VI: Use of tool 2 / 
Production of tool 1 B 
8. Turning core 
9. Knapping (flake)  
PHASE VII: Use of tool 2 / 
Production of tool 1 C 
10. Selection of a flake  
11. Knapping (retouch)  
PHASE VIII: Use of tool 1 
12. Use of flake 
PHASE IX: Satisfaction of 
need  
13. Direct consumption 
A-Focus 1
Subject
P-Focus 2
Object
e.g. food
A-Focus 3
Tool 1
A-Focus 4
Tool 2
0c
1
3
4
8
9
5
6
7
12
F
13
IX
  
  
  
  
 V
II
I 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
V
II
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 V
I 
  
  
  
  
  
P
H
A
S
E
 V
  
  
  
 I
V
  
  
  
  
 I
II
  
  
  
  
  
II
  
  
  
 I
 
H
0b0a0
2
10
11
Fig. 57 Cognigram of the production and use of a flake tool. Phase V (Core preparation) and 
Phase VII (Retouch) are optional. If these steps are not carried out, Steps 5 and 6 in Phase V 
and Step 10 in Phase VIII take place. 
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Secondary Tools: Exclusively Human? 
The production of tools using tools is generally accepted as a typically human characteristic; 
however, there are a few cases of animal tool behavior that could limit this exclusiveness. Write 
(1972) used the production of stone tools, a behavioral pattern not common to non-human 
primates in their natural environment, in his experiments on the ability of non-human primates 
to learn from humans, from another species. In various phases of training, he first showed the 
young orangutan Abang how to use stone tools to cut open a tied-up box containing a reward. 
Then Wright trained the animal to produce its own cutting tools by removing a flake from a 
fixed core. Abang showed that he was able to reproduce what he had learned and formed a tool 
with the help of another tool. The controlled handling of two movable objects did not occur 
because the manual abilities of the orangutan suggested that this could be too difficult for him. 
  
In similar experiments involving freely manageable cores, Kathy Schick and Nicholas Toth 
(Toth et al. 1993; Schick et al. 1999) documented the developments of a bonobo’s (Pan 
paniscus) manual and conceptional abilities while knapping stones, over a period of years. 
Kanzi learned, by observing human examples, to produce flakes from a core held in its hands 
using a hammer stone and then use them as cutting tools. The animal preferred a technique that 
he developed himself - throwing a pebble onto a hard surface or another stone - that required a 
great deal of strength to separate a flake from the core.  
The products of the Kanzi experiments primarily differ from the Oldowan industries in the 
different production techniques. The striking platforms were not used consequently, leading to 
an obvious accumulation of some and a lack of other flake categories. The large variation of the 
striking angle between 50 and 125° is also a result of a lack of planning and control of the 
throwing technique: The average angle 89.7°, which Kanzi produced, is significantly higher 
than the average angle of 80° produced by direct hard-hammer percussion (Schick et al. 1999). 
The bonobo is principally able to produce a tool using another tool and can also control the core 
and hammer tool at the same time, however, when possible he prefers a simpler throwing 
technique where he does not need a tool to produce the cutting edge. The experiments with 
Kanzi confirm that the production of the early Oldowan industries was created by means of 
controlled and planned processes. 
Although the production of stone tools has only been observed among animals in experimental 
situation, other tools have been described as the products of secondary tool use among wild 
primates as well. Yukimaru Sugyiama (1985) documented so-called brush sticks among 
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) in the Campo Animal Reserve, Cameroon. He interpreted the 
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stick as having a double function as a digging stick on the blunt end and an effective termite 
fishing rod on the brush end. For a long time, it was not possible to observe either the 
production or the use of these tools. Experimental attempts by the researcher to chew on a fresh 
stick and form a bushy end failed; therefore, the theory that the brush end was fashioned using a 
stone to beat the stick and form the fibrous end was adopted. Meanwhile, Sanz et al. (2004) 
where able to observe that the brushed end on a termite fishing rod was produced using teeth 
among the Moto group in the Congo Republic. The brushed end on digging sticks or perforators 
were created when branches of a certain type of wood were broken off (Takemoto et al. 2005); 
in this case, the fibers are the result of raw material selection. 
Another prominent form of object behavior, described among wild chimpanzees as “meta-tool” 
use (Matsuzawa 1996, 201), is the use of a stone wedge to stabilize and straighten an anvil used 
for cracking nuts (Fig. 58). Matsuzawa (1996, 203-204) analyzed the use of a wedge in tree 
diagrams (Fig. 59) in which he linked the freely movable objects within an action in hierarchical 
steps. He concludes that the use of the wedge is not directly related to the nut and that it 
represents a superior tool that makes the actual tool, the anvil, more serviceable. 
Fig. 58 Wedge, anvil and hammer: A set of three objects from the nut cracking behavior of the 
Bossou group, Guinea (from Matsuzawa 1996, Fig. 15.4). 
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  Level 0             Level 1                  Level 2                             Level 3 
Eating a termite 
without tool 
  Use of a twig for 
  fishing a termite 
  Use of a hammer to crack 
  open a nut on an anvil 
 Use of a hammer to crack open a 
 nut on an anvil, which is stabilized 
 and straightned with a wedge 
termite twig           termite hammer           nut     anvil    hammer        nut        anvil     wedge 
Fig. 59. Tree diagram of different tool uses among chimpanzees according to Matsuzawa 
(1996, Fig. 15.6). 
Matsuzawa does not differentiate between passive and active action elements; hammer, anvil 
and wedge are all interpreted as equal tools. However, in the example of the “Drosselschmiede” 
(comp. Chapter 18, Fig. 29) we already established that an anvil does not represent an actively 
controlled tool such as a hammer does. Even if the anvil is freely movable, it remains a passive 
proto-tool since it is not handled when cracking open nuts (Fig. 60). 
  
Fig. 60 Hammer, anvil and wedge used in opening nuts: Only the hammer is handled and 
controlled (from Matsuzawa 1996, Fig. 15.5). 
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The wedge does represent an element that is controlled and used to create an even anvil surface. 
This behavior more closely represents the stacking of boxes to form a ladder (s.a.): The wedge 
is not an independent tool but an element of an anvil made up of multiple pieces. The use of two 
stones as proto-tool anvil is therefore an example of a simple additive production format; it is 
the label of the stabilizing stone as “wedge” that makes one think of an independent tool.  
The same can be summed up for the experiments by Santos et al. (2005) with cottontop 
tamarins (Saguinus oedipus). In an experiment to understand the means-means-end connections 
in tool use - the need for a device to get a device with which you reach the goal - the animals 
were offered two test scenarios. A reward was placed onto or into one object that could be 
retrieved using an existing connection with the help of a second object. The alternative 
arrangement of elements did not allow for the object with the reward to be pulled in. This 
experiment is meant to prove tool-oriented tool behavior as a secondary goal on the way to the 
problem solution, that goes beyond the simple stringing together of independent but goal 
oriented action phases as is the case in the termite and honey extraction sets of chimpanzees and 
orangutans. The test arrangement does not test tool behavior - none of the elements can be 
controlled to manipulate another independent object or to create a new connection - it only tests 
whether existing object connections are recognized and acted upon. The animals were presented 
with the choice between a functioning set that works as a unit and a non-functional 
arrangement. They were successful after some training. It is not possible to draw conclusions 
about secondary tool use, the use of a meta-tool or a means-means-end-tool from the 
experiments with the tamarin monkeys. 
Among the spontaneously occurring behavioral forms involving tools in animals, the use of a 
wet sponge to clean a younger animal, observed by Fontaine et al. (1995) comes closest to 
resembling secondary tool use. A female western lowland gorilla modified the dry coconut 
fibers, which she had gathered, to clean her child by wetting them with water (Fig. 61). Whether 
the animal intended to wet the fibers with water in order to improve the cleaning abilities 
remains unclear, just like the question whether the animal may have observed and copied 
similar behavior from the animal keepers. 
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Sponge for cleaning a young by Gorilla gorilla  
(after Fontaine et al. 1995)
A-Focus 3
Tool 1
coconut fibres
A-Focus 1
Subject
P-Focus 2
Object
young
5
P
H
A
S
E
  
V
  
  
  
  
 I
V
  
  
  
  
  
  
II
I 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 I
I 
  
  
  
  
 I
4
0
1
0b0a
A-Focus 4
Tool 2
water
0c
3
SP
2
0.     Perception basic need: 
satisfying the basic need 
of the young (?) 
0a. Perception subproblem 
1:  basic need young 
→ cleanliness (?) 
0b.   Perception subproblem 
2:  tool necessary 
PHASE I: Search for tool 
1. Collecting coconut fibres 
0c. Perception  subproblem 
3: 
 water necessary for 
production of tool 1 
PHASE II: Search for water 
2. Search for water 
PHASE III: Modification of 
tool with water 
3. Dipping the fibres into 
water 
PHASE IV: Cleaning of the 
young 
Wiping the back and bottom 
of the young 
PHASE V: Satisfaction of need 
5. Young is clean 
Fig. 61 Cognigram of the production and use of a wet sponge made out of coconut fibers used 
to clean a younger animal by a female western lowland gorilla in captivity. 
In conclusion, we must answer the question whether the use of secondary tools is a uniquely 
human behavior form with yes, insofar as researchers have not yet observed secondary tool use 
in wild animals. Although especially non-human primates are able to use multiple tools 
consecutively in different phases and can combine multiple elements into one tool that is used 
in one phase, the production of a tool with the help of another tool seems to be restricted 
entirely to humans. The earliest examples of this behavior - up to 2.6 million year old flakes 
used as cutting tools – are also the earliest examples for tool production, although this may be 
entirely due to preservation. Due to the lack of parallels in tool use among today’s animals, 
these tools can be attributed to hominids.  
However, it remains unclear whether the genus Homo is the exclusive producer of these stone 
tools. The oldest Homo sp. fossil KNM-BC-1, a fragment of an Os temporale from the 
Chemeron formation in Kenya, can be dated to a maximum age of 2.4 million years (Hill et al. 
1992). It is also possible that late gracile australopithecines such as Australopithecus garhi, 
living in the region at the same period in time, could be responsible for cut marks on bones 
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and/or stone tools (comp. Appendix II) from Ethiopian find sites (comp. Semaw et al. 2003). 
Analyses of the wrist bones of robust australopithecines show that they would have been 
anatomically capable of controlling and powerfully handling cores and hammer stones in order 
to produce flakes (Susman 1991, 1994, 1998). Finally, a parallel development of stone tool 
production cannot be ruled out, especially if we consider the performance and potential of 
today’s non-human primates. Therefore, the question whether the use of secondary tools is an 
exclusively human behavioral form must be answered with maybe, depending on how we define 
humans.  
Not Just Stone Tools: e.g. Digging Sticks for Termite Hills 
Even though stone artifacts dominate the spectrum of archaeological finds due to their improved 
preservation, they are not the only evidence for early tool use. Bob Brain and Pat Shipman 
(1993) identified bone tools in the inventory of the South African find site Swartkrans as 
digging tools, based on use wear patterns and experimental comparisons (Fig. 62).  
Fig. 62 A selection of bone tools from Swartkrans with significantly altered ends, traces of tool 
use (from Backwell and d’Errico 2001, supplemental data). 
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Use of bone tools from Swartkrans
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Fig. 63 Cognigram of the use of the bone tools from Swartkrans. Among the 23,000 bone 
fragments found in the layers Member 1-3, dated to 1.8 to 1.0 million years ago, a total of 85 
artifacts with traces of use-wear were found (Backwell & D’Errico 2001, 1358). While Brain and 
Shipman (1993) believed that the tools were used to dig up tubers and roots, Backwell and 
d’Errico (2001) were able to prove through experimentation that they were used as chisels to 
open termite hills.  
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Production and use of the bone tools from  Swartkrans 
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Fig. 64  Cognigram of the production and use of the bone tools from Swartkrans. 
Yet if we assume that the bone was broken with the intent to fashion a digging stick from it, 
then a hammer stone, and with it an additional active focus of attention and an additional phase 
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for the procurement of the hammer stone and the production of the long bone fragment, must be 
added to the cognigram as well as (Fig. 64). In this case, the bone artifacts would be products 
of secondary tool production that are then combined with a probe to form a set. 
It is clear that the bone fragments were used in an activity similar to the one described by Sanz 
et al. (2004), where wooden perforators were used by chimpanzees as part of a termite 
extraction set. With this information, it is possible to develop a cognigram (Fig. 64) for the bone 
tools from Swartkrans that greatly resembles the diagram of the Moto group’s tool set (Fig. 51). 
For Figure 64, we assume that the bone fragments are by-products of subsistence strategies that 
are used at a later point in time and independently of the consumption of bone marrow. 
Once the tool has been employed and the need, which it served to satisfy, is satisfied the tool in 
animal tool behavior is generally left behind at or near the location where it was last employed. 
Tools rarely get lost between two locations and are then replaced by new ones. At the very least, 
chimpanzees have a memory of the location of individual hammer stones used to crack open 
nuts that were left behind in a certain area and that are available for re-use at that location 
(Boesch & Boesch 1984b). The re-use of tools is not limited to hammer stones but has also been 
observed for perforators, thick, robust branches, that were left behind after the entrance to the 
termite nests were opened (Sanz et al. 2004). The repeated use of the bone tools from 
Swartkrans is also probable because bone fragments in experiments only began to show use-
wear patterns similar to those on archaeological finds after 15 to 30 minutes of use. Blackwell 
and d’Errico (2001, 1359) specify that this corresponds to the amount of time it takes to dig up a 
medium sized termite hill. The average time it takes to achieve a systematic perforation of a 
termite nest through chimpanzees was not mentioned by Sanz et al. (2004), however, the 
description leaves the impression that it is a significantly shorter period of time, so that it would 
take multiple uses to develop corresponding use-wear patterns.  
The bone tools from Swartkrans were recovered together with a few stone tools and faunal 
remains that suggest hominid and predatory activities. Whether the entire cave or only the area 
near the cave entrance was used by hominids is not clear (Brain 1993c, 259), it also remains 
unclear whether the tools were used on site. If termite nests or hills had existed in the immediate 
vicinity of the entrance to the cave, then the accumulation of tools toward the inside and back of 
the cave could be interpreted as relocation of tools from the place where they had been left 
behind. If there are no termite hills in the immediate vicinity of the cave entrance, then the bone 
tools must have at least been brought to the entrance area of the cave (Fig. 65). Such an 
additional transport only makes sense if the user expects to reuse the tool at a later point in time. 
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Fig. 65  Cognigram of the use of the bone tools from Swartkrans with their subsequent 
deposition for future use. 
PHASE a-z: Various other activities (not specified) 
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The anticipation of a similar need in the future and subsequent actions in preparation to satisfy 
that future need have not been observed in the tool behavior of animals. This would require 
semi-acute problem awareness (Fig. 65, problem awareness 00-00b) above and beyond current 
needs that require an immediate solution. The preparatory action is followed by an interruption 
of the action chain until the special need arises again, the subject continues with activities that 
are independent of the first action and follow different foci of attention (Fig. 65, phase a-z). 
Only when the original specific need is recognized anew does the subject remember its previous 
action and continue with the prepared tool to the solution.  
The example of the early South African bone tools is speculative. It only suggests the possibility 
of prognostic performance in the Oldowan, it does not prove it. This proof, however, can be 
found in the transport of raw materials for the production of stone tools and in the stone tools 
themselves.  
Interruption of a Chain of Action: e.g. Transport of Raw Materials 
Transport of tools also occurs in animal behavior, however, rarely across larger distances. 
Generally, tools and their raw materials are obtained in the immediate vicinity of the problem 
and within sight of the object to be worked with. Egyptian vultures (Neophron percnopterus), 
for example, use stones, which they find within 50m but also up to 4km away from the ostrich 
eggs they want to break open (van Lawick-Goodall & van Lawick-Goodall 1966; Becker 1993, 
42). In some cases, tools are reused for multiple identical actions in different locations if the 
basic need has not been satisfied. Sea otters (Enhydra lutris) retrieve their stone anvils, which 
they use to open shells, from the bottom of the sea and continue to use them throughout multiple 
dives (Hall & Schaller 1964; Beck 1980, 42; Becker 1993). New Caledonian crows (Corvus 
moneduloides) also carry their probes from tree to tree during their search for food (Hunt 1996).  
The longest well-documented transport distance of mammalian tools was identified among 
chimpanzees in the Taï National Park in the Ivory Coast. The chimpanzees searched for hammer 
stones made out of granite or laterite to open different types of nuts. The stones were primarily 
retrieved from within 20m of the nuts; transports of up to 200m are also frequent. They also 
dragged stones weighing over 9 kg over long distances. Individual hammer stones were shifted 
more than 500m (Boesch & Boesch 1984b). It is not clear whether this distance was bridged at 
once or if it represents a cumulative distance that accumulated during an action sequence with 
interruptions and implementation of the tool in different trees to satisfy the subject’s basic need, 
similar to the implementation of probes among New Caledonian crows. Numerous direct 
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transports to targets outside the direct line of sight have been documented. Boesch and Boesch 
(ibid.) also recognize that hammers are selected in relation to the previously selected nut trees 
and according to the criteria distance and weight. The animals have a tactic and use a mental 
map of the area in which they memorize the location of hammers and trees in correlation to each 
other and compare the different distances. 
The transport of raw materials and tools can be identified in archaeological materials in 
different ways. In large and systematically excavated inventories, the frequency of specific 
artifact categories, which are compared to values that were calculated using characteristics from 
other artifacts, can provide clues whether the element was brought into or removed from the 
find site. Potts (1991) and Kimura (1999; 2002), for example, were able to reconstruct that cores 
and flakes were removed from different Oldowan find sites based on the lack of cores of certain 
raw materials whose corresponding flakes were present at the site as well as the relationship of 
flake negatives to cores. Braun et al. (2005) see problems in this method and limit the value of 
such reconstructions. A survey and map of the closest raw material deposits of a find site allow 
an estimate of the transport distances. It remains unclear whether these distances represent 
direct transports or cumulative distances of multiple years and multiple individuals. Even with 
these uncertainties, it is possible to assume a significantly larger amount of material that is 
transported over greater distances for the early hominids. 
Information about the frequency of raw materials at a site and the distance to raw material 
sources varies depending on the excavator and the quality of the area survey (comp. Appendix 
II). Only vague information is available about the primarily local raw material from the 
inventories of the early Ethiopian find sites Kada Gona EG-10 and EG-12 (Semaw et al. 1997). 
Howell et al. (1987) postulate a partial raw material transport of up to 20km for the find sites 
Omo 123 and FtJj2 of the Shungura Formation. However, the artifacts may have been displaced; 
therefore their age of 2.3 to 2.4 million years is not certain. In the material of Excavation 1 from 
Kanjera South in Kenya, dated to over 2.15 million years, 15% of the identified raw material 
did not come from local sources (Plummer et al. 1999). The Olduvai Gorge West Trench 57, 
dated from 1.78 to 1.84 million years, contained 92% quartzite, a local raw material. Three 
pieces of lava, whose origin is assumed to have been located 15 to 20km away were also 
recovered (Blumenshine et al. 2003). Raw materials from 10 to 15km away, were probably also 
brought into the Koobi Fora find sites KBS, HAS and NMS, all dating to 1.8 million years or 
older. Plummer (2004), despite individual clues to greater distances, believes that the stone raw 
materials in the Oldowan generally came from sources within 2 to 3km of the sites.  
In the following example, I will assume a transport distance of multiple kilometers for raw 
materials and tools. It begins with the recognition of a need and ends with the satisfaction of the 
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need. In this case, the distance is not cumulative. It is not a combination of multiple use 
episodes where the same tool is applied to multiple situations nor connected to the satisfaction 
of multiple needs as in the later example of the handaxe. However, we cannot assume that the 
entire distance was completed at once.  
If we do not assume a cumulative distance where the specified object was used at each 
interruption, then it is very likely that the trigger for these actions was not the individual’s acute 
basic need that had to be satisfied quickly. The future basic need is recognized and its 
satisfaction can be delayed for a limited amount of time. At the same time, it seems logical that 
a long transport can be interrupted by external influences that require the subject’s attention and 
distract it from the objective of its actions, even if the individual attempts to continuously 
concentrate on the fulfillment of its goal. These reflections result in an interrupted cognigram 
such as the one in Figure 66. 
In this diagram, the interruption occurs after the transport, similar to the securing of the tool in 
the Swartkrans example (Fig. 65). The search for the raw material and the transport are not 
triggered by the satisfaction of a need and the foresight that the same tool may be required for a 
similar need. Rather, a basic need in the near future and the corresponding sub-problems are 
recognized and trigger the actions “search for raw material” and “transport” although they are 
not yet acute or necessary. The actual production and use of the tool only occurs once an acute 
basic need arises. If possible interruptions and resumptions of thought and action chains are 
possible for the satisfaction of semi-acute needs, then such interruptions can also occur at 
different points in time: During a search for raw materials that may take longer than expected or 
during transport and after the acute perception of the need. It is possible that the acute problem 
cannot be solved as a result of such a late interruption. The ability to think with interruptions, to 
follow an action sequence and resume a prior string makes it possible to consciously pick up 
where the interruption occurred when the basic need arises again at a later point in time.  
Recognizing that a tool has a continued use, as may be the case in the securing of bone tools 
from Swartkrans, is the basis of curation. This term was coined through the work of Louis 
Binford (e.g. 1979; 1989) and can be approximately translated with anticipatory, careful and 
long lasting behavior, it can be applied to raw materials, tools as well as tool sets. Curation
expands the service life and efficiency of tools; it is the opposite of ad hoc use of tools where 
the search for the raw material only begins after the acute basic need is identified. It is usually 
searched for in the immediate vicinity and the tool is left behind after the need is satisfied. 
Bamforth (1986, cited in Odell 1996, 54) subdivides the anticipatory and long lasting behavior 
into five different aspects: Preparation of tools in advance, design of tools for multiple uses, 
transport of tools from place to place, care for existing tools and recycling. Curation in all of its 
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variation has “the net effect of prolonging the amount of time an implement remains operable 
within a cultural system” (Odell 1996, 53).  
Production and use of an Oldowan tool with extended raw material 
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Fig. 66  Cognigram of the production and use of an Oldowan tool with an interruption of this 
thought and action chain through phases a-z. 
PHASE a-z: various other
       activities (not specified) 
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Although the anticipation of an action chain and the – minor – anticipatory production of the 
necessary tools has been documented for the extraction sets of chimpanzees of the Moto group 
(Sanz et al. 2004), the trigger for the action in animals remains the acute perception of a basic 
need. The possible securing of the bone tools from Swartkrans may represent an early variation 
of care and maintenance of existing tools: A similar need as the one that was just satisfied is 
recognized for the near future and the tool is deposited for safe-keeping, to be used again when 
the need arises. A third aspect of curation, the transport of raw materials and tools, can be 
proven for the beginnings of human tool production and also for semi-acute needs in the near 
future.  
Thinking and acting with tools already becomes independent of the perception of an immediate 
necessity in the Oldowan. The time frame is thereby significantly increased into the near future. 
Simple planning and organization of actions can be carried out above and beyond the necessary 
immediate steps. Archaeological remains cannot encompass the entire spectrum of this 
advanced thinking-around-the-corner. Yet individual clues shed light on the possibilities that 
arise.  
About the Maintenance of Tools: e.g. Use of Fire 
One of the earliest traces for the controlled use of fire are the burned bone fragments from layer 
Member 3 in the South African find site Swartkrans (Brain 1993b), dated to 1.5 to 1 million 
years before present based on fauna and cultural material remains. The preceding layers 
Member 1 and 2 as well as Member 1 hanging remnant contained almost no burned bones, the 
270 pieces identified in Member 3 were spread over numerous square meters and throughout the 
entire layer. Bob Brain (1993b, c) concludes that these findings are the result of the controlled 
use of fire in the area near the cave entrance. Individual burned bones could be the result of an 
accidental bush fire that also burned wood near the entrance of the cave; however, the large 
quantity and regular distribution of the burned pieces in Member 3 provide evidence for the 
recurring presence of fire. The Swartkrans excavator does not believe that the fire was started 
on site, but that grass fires, similar to today's fires, were used, which are the result of lightning 
bolt strikes during thunderstorms at the start of the summer rainy period in October and 
November (Brain 1993c, 262). 
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Maintenance of a fire as a source of warmth
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Fig. 67  Cognigram of the maintenance of a fire as a source of warmth and/or protection. 
The cognigram for the controlled use of fire in the entrance of Swartkrans is relatively simple 
(Fig. 67). Besides the subject focus “warmth” and “protection”, an additional attention focus, a 
burning branch as carrier of the fire, is opened and impacts another piece of wood, the object. 
The location also represents an additional passive focus since it is selected, not determined 
through one of the other foci. The need can be satisfied with very few action steps in five 
phases. If it is necessary to first produce a tool, to light a branch using an existing fire, then 
another phase of production is added. At first glance, the cognigram of the use of fire at 
Swartkrans resembles the use of fire to drive prey out of hiding (Fig. 68) by an Australian bird 
of prey, probably the black kite (Milvus migrans) (Lockwood in Boswall 1977 in Beck 1980, 
25; Becker 1993, 62). It is said that the animals grasp glimmering branches from areas where 
the bush fires have already burned down and drop them over unburned areas in order to catch 
small animals fleeing from the newly kindled fire. 
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Use of fire to drive prey out of hiding by Milvus migrans  
(after Beck 1980; Becker 1993)
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Fig. 68  Cognigram of the use of fire through Australian birds of prey (black kite?). 
However, the use of glimmering branches by black kites does not represent tool use because the 
branch is not handled actively or focused on the target object. It more closely resembles the use 
of bait (such as insects, feathers and bread) by different species of heron (comp. Chapter 18). In 
contrast, the probable use of fire through hominids does represent tool use since the glimmering 
branch is not simply used to start an unspecific conflagration, but to light up and monitor a 
small scale, limited amount of material. In the South African find site Swartkrans the possible 
fire users are the robust australopithecines, whose presence at the site is verified through fossil 
bones in the same layer, as well as Homo ergaster, who lived in the same region at the same 
time. Similar evidence for the controlled use of fire is known from the almost 790,000 year old 
Israeli site of Gesher Benot Ya'aqov in the form of burned flint flakes and pieces of wood 
(Goren-Inbar et al. 2004). The tool users in this case belong to the group of middle Pleistocene 
Homo, although the species cannot be clearly identified. Burned fragments of bone were also 
found in the oldest, ca. 500,000-year-old layer Level 10 from the Chinese Homo erectus cave 
Zhoukoudian. Due to the lack of ash and charcoal remains, Weiner et al. (1998) question the 
presence of the postulated fire pit and do not see direct evidence for the maintenance of an in 
situ fire.  
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Relocating a fire as source of warmth (direct)
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Fig. 69  Cognigram of the relocation of a fire, the source of warmth, when moving to a new 
campsite. 
The problem-solution distance shows that the short-termed controlled use of fire is not an 
exceptional form of tool use. However, the evidence for the use of this, from a modern point of 
view, very useful tool is rare and begins late in human evolution. This is only in part due to poor 
preservation and the difficulty to differentiate between traces of natural fire and fire controlled 
PHASE a-z: various other activities (not specified)  
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by humans. Aside from the elements required to make use of a fire, these elements had not been 
part of the typical activity spectrum, - a glimmering branch as tool, production and use of tool 
through lighting objects that are not yet burning - it is the continuous occupation with the fire to 
keep it alight and alive, that hindered its regular use. The required anticipatory perception of 
semi-acute basic needs and the pursuit of a thought and action chain with interruptions through 
other problems and solutions have been observed in other forms of tool use. The maintenance 
and relocation of a fire to another campsite may simply have taken place in the manner 
illustrated in Figure 69.  
In contrast to the previously described thought and action chains with interruption in which the 
tools were either put down at a specific location and not considered until they were required 
again (Fig. 65) or where the tool was carried but did not require further maintenance (Fig. 66), a 
glimmering branch requires continuous care and attention or curation. It cannot be carried all 
day and put down someplace on the way without further attention and then picked up again in 
the evening to light the next fire. To keep the glimmering branch intact as a tool, the active 
subject could light small fires throughout the day without a specific acute basic need to produce 
a follow-up tool. Actions without acute or semi acute basic needs are always in competition 
with other actions for which an immediate need is felt. A high degree of abstract thinking and 
strong self-discipline is necessary to weigh the competing problem solutions and keep the 
individual from giving in the acute need. Another possibility is the use of a transport container 
in which the glimmering branch can be carried and remains functional until it is needed again. 
The advantage is that the tool can be carried along without having to pay further attention to it. 
However this solution requires a significant expansion of the problem-solution distance (Fig. 
70).  
Aside from the active focus of attention of the function (A-Focus 4), an additional sub-focus of 
continuous functionality must be activated for the tool (A-Focus 4’), which was not necessary 
for the simple use of fire. This action must take the changing nature of the tool and the time 
factor of the action into consideration. It is not just necessary to anticipate the basic need and 
pieces of the thought and action chain, but also to anticipate the problems involving the 
characteristics of the tool that can occur over a longer period time and develop solutions for 
them. Even more, the effect of the tool container does not show an immediate or directly 
observable result so that finding a suitable solution turns into a very complex undertaking.  
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Fig. 70  Cognigram of the transport and use of a fire as a source of warmth taking continuous 
maintenance, e.g. through a container as transport tool, into consideration. 
PHASE a-z: various other 
     activities (not specified) 
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If we look at the use of fire as a tool together with the follow-up problems, it becomes clear why 
fire did not belong to the regular tool set for a long time: Even after the discovery of the use of a 
glimmering branch lit from a natural fire, the use of fire probably remained infrequent. 
Depending on the regional frequency, glimmering branches could be retrieved from natural 
fires, started by e.g. strikes of lightning, volcanic activities or pyrophoric peat. They were useful 
and burned for as long as the basic need was active. When the basic need was satisfied, the fire 
had little chance of surviving as long as the subject was not capable of larger abstract thought 
(s.a.). Evidence for the controlled use of fire is not an indicator for making fire as Goren-Inbar 
et al. (2004) postulated for Gesher Bent Ya’aqov. The problem-solution distance for making fire 
is even greater than the long-term care for an existing fire. 
The use of a container to maintain the characteristics of the tool “glimmering branch” has not 
been proven archaeologically. Due to the complexity of the thought and action chain and the 
large problem-solution distance, the use of such a container probably only occurred hundreds of 
thousand years after the simple use of fire was documented for Swartkrans, at a point in time 
when different tools with similar complex cognigrams arise.  
Feedback in the Thought and Action Chain: e.g. the Handaxe 
Beside the use of fire, handaxes are the subject of the heaviest debates concerning tool use in 
the early Paleolithic. Handaxes are oval to almond, heart, drop or lance-shaped tools, whose 
lengths range between 10 to 25cm  - rarely larger or smaller -, whose front and back are worked 
bifacially. They usually have a thickened, blunt heavy end and robust cutting edges on the side 
that run out into a thinner prepared point. Large flakes, pebbles or cores of different lithic raw 
materials were used as the raw form for these bifacial tools; large bones were also used (e.g. 
Tromnau 1983, Villa 1991). Classic handaxes (fig. 71) can be surprisingly symmetrical both 
along the long axis and in the cross-section. This symmetry triggered the debate about the 
intentionality of the form and possible intended symbolism for this artifact type (Holloway 
1969; Wynn 1985; Graves-Brown 1995; Kohn & Mithen 1999; Porr 2000).  
Proto-handaxes have been documented for the developed Oldowan, they are very similar to the 
first rough handaxe forms from the slightly younger Acheulian. Chronologically, handaxes have 
been documented from 1.6 million years ago, e.g. in Konso-Gardula, Ethiopia (Asfaw et al. 
1992), to the end of the middle Paleolithic circa 40,000 years before present. Their geographic 
distribution ranges from Africa, Central and Western Europe as well as Western and Southern 
Asia. It was believed until recently that the distribution of handaxes was limited to this region 
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south of the so-called Movius-line (Movius 1949), however, circa 800,000 year old finds from 
the Bose basin in southern China (Hou et al. 2000) and an undated find from the Philippine 
island Luzon (Pawley 2002a; 2002b) prove that there were at least individual occurrences of the 
artifact type beyond this line.  
Fig. 71 Carefully shaped bifacial classic handaxe (Find site St. Même, France. Collection of the 
Institute for Pre and Protohistory and Medieval Archaeology, Department for Early Prehistory 
and Quaternary Ecology, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen. Photo: Hilde Jensen)  
Handaxes are frequently considered to represent a type fossil for the middle and younger early 
Paleolithic, however, their form and degree of preparation varies greatly depending on the raw 
form and degree of reduction (Ashton & McNabb 1994; McPherron 2000). In early Acheulien 
find sites, roughly formed pieces with very little edge and cross-sectional symmetry 
predominate. In the middle Pleistocene, the frequency of finely crafted and significantly more 
symmetrical handaxe forms increases. A comparison of find sites from the same time period 
shows a great variation in the frequency of this classical handaxe form. Early handaxe-carrying 
Acheulian inventories were contrasted with non-handaxe techno-complexes, such as the 
Clactonian in England and other contemporary pebble industries in Europe and Africa. Current 
more detailed analyses suggest that the shift from one type of industry to another shows a 
flowing transition rather than, as has been previously postulated, clear technological divisions 
(White 2000). 
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 In their discussion of the function of handaxes, Davidson and Noble (1993, 365) point out the 
finished artefact fallacy: Since the reduction process is made up of different stages and some 
form details have technological advantages, we should not assume that the classic handaxes we 
find were intentionally fashioned as such. The authors go even further and postulate that 
handaxes are the by-product of bifacial blade reduction and should be interpreted primarily as 
cores, not as intentionally produced tools. However, the different reduction phases do not 
necessarily prove that flakes were the final product. The production of a carefully worked 
handaxe includes different stages: Roughing out, thinning and finishing. Different fully 
functional flakes are created at each stage of the production process. It does not make sense to 
interpret the finishing as preparation of a core, since this frequently occurs directly prior to the 
rejection of the core.  
The core hypothesis and other extreme interpretations for the function of handaxes –  projectiles 
for hunting (Jeffreys 1965; O’Brien 1981; 1985; Calvin 1993) or fixed horizontally in the 
ground to scrape hides (Kleindienst & Keller 1976) – are brought into perspective through 
trace-wear analyses of the tools (e.g. Keeley 1980; Albrecht et al. 1984; Veil et al. 1988; 
Binnemann & Beaumont 1992; Sala 1996). Specific edge-wear patterns and polishes show that 
handaxes were probably used as tools to work with meat, hides and bones, less frequently with 
wood and other plant materials. Experiments have shown that the handaxes are very good 
butchering knives, primarily for cutting open and skinning medium to large mammals (Jones 
1980). Ashton and McNabb (1994) focused on the variability of the tool and the robusticity of 
its edges, easy transportation and the possibility for long use of the tool through sharpening of 
the edges. These characteristics make handaxes the ideal tools for unforeseeable butchering 
tasks.  
Whether the carefully worked, classic handaxes also had symbolic value, remains a matter of 
speculation. Porr (2000) believes that handaxes also incorporate social information, allowing 
them to function as tools for integrating their owner into social systems. Kohn and Mithen 
(1999) interpret the symbolism of especially well-formed, even and symmetric handaxes as a 
product of sexual selection, similar to a peacock’s tail feathers, where those males are selected 
as sexual partners, whose excellent subsistence strategies allowed them sufficient time and 
leisure to produce the finest and most complex handaxes to be presented as dowry.  
In order to find an interpretation for the function of handaxes and to produce a Cognigram, it is 
important to come to terms with the temporal dimensions of the production, use and possible 
reworking of the tool. Hallos (2005) offers an enlightening summary. A short story of handaxes 
that do not show significant interruption of the action chains from the first stages of production 
from the local raw material to use and discard can be observed in the British find sites 
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Caddington and Boxgrove. Beside the butchered horse from the so-called horse butchery site of 
Boxgrove (Quarry 2 GTP 17), it was possible to reassemble numerous cores of local flint. All 
reduction stages from roughing out, thinning out with a soft blow and the finishing stage as well 
as the handaxes themselves were found, thereby illustrating the thought and action chain from 
the first acute recognition of the basic need, uninterrupted, to its final satisfaction.  
Beside these snapshots, other find sites encompass even longer handaxe life cycles. Indicators 
for these cycles are the evidence for the transport of raw materials and tools into or away from 
the find site such as in Kilombe, Kenya (Gowlett 1991; 1993), Olorgesailie / Kenya (Issac 1977; 
Potts et al. 1999) and Elandsfontein, South Africa (Klein 1978; Avery 1988). Multiple phases of 
rework and sharpening of the tools, such as those identified by McPherron (2003) at the Israeli 
find site Tabun are also evidence for these cycles. Hallos (2005) used recombination to 
investigate the material from four middle Pleistocene find sites in north-western Europe, Cagny 
l’Epinette Level H, Ferme de l’Epinette Level MS, Elveden Area III, Beeches Pit Area AH, all 
of which were located right next to raw material deposits. Evidence for the import and export of 
raw materials and for phases of reworking and the export of newly sharpened tools was found.  
Due to the different production methods that were identified based of archaeological findings 
and the different lengths of time the handaxes were used, I will present three different 
cognigrams for this tool type: 
• For the production and use of a simple handaxe that is prepared using only a simple 
hammer stone and has a short period of use (Fig. 72). The handaxes corresponding to 
this cognigram were found in early African find sites and among the less classic pieces 
of other regions. 
• For the production of a finished handaxe that is roughened out in one or more phases, 
thinned out and then finished, with a short life-span and limited to a specific episode of 
a recognized and satisfied need (Fig. 73). The handaxes from the horse butchery site of 
Boxgrove are used as the model for this cognigram. 
• For the production of a finished handaxe that is roughened out in one or more phases, 
thinned out and then finished, with a long life-span and used in a number of individual 
episodes of recognized and satisfied needs that also include an interruption of the 
thought and action chain, as well as phases for transport and reworking (Fig. 74). 
Evidence from the French find sites Cagny l’Epinette Level H und Ferme de l’Epinette 
Level MS (Hallos 2005) is used to illustrate this cognigram. 
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Fig. 72 Cognigram of the production and use of a rough handaxe with a short life span. 
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The cognigram of the rough handaxe with a short life-span (Fig. 72) varies the common 
production process of a tool using a second tool and additional phases such as the search for raw 
materials and tools, transport, production of the tool, its use and, finally, satisfaction of the 
need. A rough handaxe is a relatively complex tool to produce due to numerous important 
variables (comp. Wynn 1979), all of which are important for its function – attention foci 3 and 
3a. It requires „a mental construct, not necessarily an idealised shape, but a concept of the 
artefact as a functional form“ (Ashton & McNabb 1994, 190). In order to reach such a complex 
functional form, the producer must continue to compare the current stage of production with the 
mental concept of the desired object and constantly adapt and alter his method. Phase IV 
simplifies and summarizes the most important steps, which are repeated, as is indicated by the 
arrows pointing against the general process direction.  
Conceptual control and adjustments (Steps 7 and 8) were not necessary in the previously 
described thought and action chains since simple tool forms were based on a functional form 
concept that could be reached through independent steps.  
The problem-solution distance is significantly increased by the form concept, which requires 
constant control and adaptation. The individual steps are not linear but in a feedback loop. 
The problem-solution distance in the cognigram of the finished handaxe with a short life-span 
(Fig. 73) is increased – in addition to the feedback loop between the different production phases 
(8 and 9, 8’ and 9’, 8’’ and 9’’) - through the use of a second, additional tool for the fine 
finishing of the handaxe. We previously introduced the necessity of two different tools to reach 
the solution of a problem in the termite extraction sets of the chimpanzees of the Moto group 
(Sanz et al. 2004, comp. Fig. 52). However, two different secondary tools are required for the 
rough and fine working of a handaxe, the tool that is needed for the solution of a basic problem. 
Soft-hammer percussion, using hammer stones made out of soft stones and percussors out of 
organic materials such as bone, antler or hardwood, were used for the thinning out and finishing 
phases on archaeological materials. In Figure 73, a soft hammer stone will be used for better 
understanding. Modern day flint knappers prefer to use organic pressure flakers (Newcomer 
1971), which require additional phases and tools for their production. Such tertiary tool use will 
be discussed in the following chapter. Possible additional sharpening phases, which may be 
inserted between use phases and satisfaction of the basic need, will be discussed in the last 
example involving handaxes (Fig. 74).  
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Production and use of a finished handaxe (with hard-hammer and soft-hammer 
percussion, short life span) 
0.      Perception basic need: (acute) food 
0a.    Perception subproblem 1: dismember a carcass
0b1.  Perception subproblem 2: tool necessary, 
which at the same time is good for cutting.... 
0b2.   Perception subproblem 3: ...and heavy duty purposes 
0c.     Perception subproblem 4: tool 2 for roughing out of tool 1 
necessary (hammer stone) 
0d.     Perception subproblem 5: tool 3 for finishing of tool 1 necessary 
         (soft hammer stone)  
PHASE I. Search for tool 3 
1.  Search for soft hammer 
stone 
PHASE II: Transport of tool 3 / 
search for tool 2  
2. Search for hammer stone 
PHASE III: Transport of tool 2, 3 
/ search for raw material 
tool 1 
3. Search for adequate raw 
material in the vicinity 
PHASE IV: Transport of tool 2, 3 
and raw material tool 1 of 
object 
4.  Transport 
PHASE V: Production of tool 1 / use of tool 2 →
Roughing out 
5. Positioning of the subject 
6. Positioning of the raw material and hammer 
stone 
7. Roughing out 
8. Perception subproblem 2 + 3, control of results 
9. Perception subproblem 2 + 3, adaptation of 
results 
10. Turning of blank  
PHASE VI: Production tool 1 / use of tool 3 →
Thinning 
11. Positioning of the raw material and the soft 
hammer stone 
12. Thinning 
8‘. Perception subproblem 2 + 3, control of results
9’.       Perception subproblem 2 + 3, adaptation of 
results 
10‘. Turning of blank  
PHASE VII: Production tool 1 / 
use 
of tool 3 → Finishing 
13. Finishing 
8‘‘. Perception subproblem 2 + 
3, control of results 
9‘‘. Perception subproblem 2 + 
3, adaptation of actions 
10‘‘. Turning of blank  
PHASE VIII: Use of tool 1 
14. Use of hand axe 
PHASE IX: Satisfaction of need  
15. Consumption 
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Fig. 73 Cognigram of a finished handaxe with a short life span. 
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The production of a fine finished handaxe with clear and symmetrical edges and profile requires 
a persistent focus on the production of the tool. Modern flint knappers can produce comparable 
tools in a maximum of 15 to 45 minutes. Modern replicas reproduce the finished handaxe. 
Possible additional thinning out and finishing as part of possible retouch phases cannot be 
completely reconstructed; therefore it is incorporated into the production phases. Following a 
form and function concept with constant control of the results and adaptation of the steps 
requires an increased detachment of the actions from the initial recognized specific need, even 
in 15 minute production sequences. The expenditure of different production phases with 
different tools improve the handaxe tool. However, this expenditure is not necessary in order to 
satisfy the acute need for food. The problem-solution distance increases. 
When we take a look at the cognigram for the long-term use of a finely worked handaxe (Fig. 
74), the diagram seems to become more and more incomprehensible and confusing, similarly to 
the hypothetical Cognigram for the transport and use of a fire that required continuous care and 
maintenance and included a container for transport (Fig. 70). The individual elements of the 
long thought and action chain however, are only a combination of the known phases described 
in the above-mentioned production processes for a carefully manufactured handaxe, an 
interruption by additional tasks that do not belong to the foci of attention of this chain of 
operation and a renewed uptake of the handaxe chain at a later point in time. 
Phases X and XI, additional sharpening of the tool, were inserted into the example prior to the 
satisfaction of the need. This does not seem likely in cases where the basic need is food. 
However, if we include other basic needs such as the need for warmth / protection, therefore, 
the desire for the hide and fur of the animal previously hunted for food, then the inclusion of an 
additional tool-working phase prior to the satisfaction of the first basic need seems plausible. 
The handaxes with a long life-span, e.g. Cagny l’Epinette Level H and Ferme de l’Epinette 
Level MS (Hallos 2005), are especially interesting because they document the first evidence of 
the combination of the proactive production of a tool and its tactical application for the 
satisfaction of more than one need. New Caledonian crows transport their probes from branch to 
branch (Hunt 1996) within one thought and action chain that is completed with the subject’s 
satiation. Even the chimpanzees in the Taï National Park (Boesch & Boesch 1984b) stopped 
using hammers to open nuts when their hunger was satisfied. They remember where they 
deposited their hammer stone, but this memory only becomes relevant to the action when a new 
need and desire for the nuts is recognized. The bone tools from Swartkrans (Brain & Shipman 
1993; Blackwell and d’Errico 2001) may represent the anticipation of the renewed use of a tool 
when the need arises again: The transport of raw materials and tools in the Oldowan represent 
an anticipation of a need, however, tool use ends with the satisfaction of the need. Individually, 
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the proactive production of a tool and its tactical implementation in more than one thought and 
action chain are not unusual. In combination, they represent additional evidence for an increased 
abstraction of a tool from a specific need, which leads to an uncoupling of tools and specific 
needs.  
Production and use of a finished handaxe (with hard-hammer and 
soft-hammer percussion, long life span) 
00.   Perception basic need:  
 (semi-acute) food 
00a. Perception subproblem 1: 
dismembering a carcass 
00b1.Perception subproblem 2: tool 
necessary, which at the same time 
is good for cutting....  
00b2.Perception subproblem 3: 
  ...and heavy duty purposes 
0c.   Perception subproblem 4: tool 2 
necessary (hammer stone) 
0d. Perception subproblem 5: tool 3 
necessary (soft stone)   
PHASE I. Search for tool 3 
1.  Search for a soft hammer stone 
PHASE II: Transport of tool 3 / 
search for tool 2  
2. Search for hammer stone 
PHASE III: Transport of tool 2, 3 / 
search for raw material of tool 1 
3. Search for adequate raw material 
in the vicinity 
PHASE IV: Production of tool 1 / use 
of tool 2 → Roughing out 
4. Positioning of the subject 
5. Positioning of the raw material and 
the hammer stone 
6. Roughing out 
7. Perception subproblem 2 + 3, 
control of the results 
8. Perception subproblem 2 + 3, 
adaptation of actions 
9.     Turning of the blank
PHASE V: Production of tool 1 / use 
of tool 3 → Thinning 
10. Positioning of the raw material and 
the soft hammer stone 
11. Thinning 
7‘. Perception subproblem 2 + 3, 
control of results 
8‘. Perception subproblem 2 + 3, 
adaptation of actions 
9‘. Turning of blank  
PHASE VI: Production tool 1 / use of 
tool 3 → Finishing 
12. Finishing 
7‘‘. Perception subproblem 2 + 3, 
control of results 
8‘‘. Perception subproblem 2 + 3, 
adaptation of actions 
9‘‘. Turning of blank  
PHASE VII: Transport of tool 1, 2, 3  
to object 
13.  Transport 
0.      Perception basic need: (acute) 
food 
0a.    Perception subproblem 1: 
dismember carcass 
0b1.  Perception subproblem 2: tool 
necessary, which at the same time 
is good for cutting….. 
0b2.  Perception subproblem 3: 
...and heavy duty purposes 
PHASE VIII: Search tool 1 
14. Search of handaxe 
PHASE IX: Use tool 1 
15. Use handaxe 
0a‘.   Perception subproblem 1: 
dismembering a carcass 
0b1‘. Perception subproblem 2: 
tool necessary, which at the 
same time is good for 
cutting…. 
0b2‘. Perception subproblem 3: 
...and heavy duty purposes 
→ sharpening! 
0c‘.   Perception subproblem 4: 
tool 3 necessary 
PHASE X: Search tool 3 
1‘. Search for soft hammer stone
PHASE XI: Production tool 1 / 
use tool 3 → reworking 
12‘. Finishing 
7‘‘‘. Percepton subproblem 2 + 3, 
control of results 
8‘‘‘. Perception subproblem 2 + 3, 
adaptation of actions 
9‘‘‘. Turning of blank  
PHASE XII: Use tool 1 
15‘. Use handaxe 
PHASE XIII: Satisfaction of need
16. Consumption 
00‘.   Perception basic need:  
 (semi-acute) food 
00a‘. Perception subproblem 1: 
dismembering a carcass 
00b1‘.Perception subproblem 2: tool 
necessary, which at the same time 
is good for cutting….. 
00b2‘.Perception subproblem 3: 
 ...and heavy durty purposes 
00c.  Perception subproblem 4: tool 2 
necessary (hammer stone) 
00d. Perception subproblem 5: tool 3 
necessary (soft stone)   
PHASE XIV. Search  for tool 3 
1‘‘.  Search for soft hammer stone 
PHASE XV: Transport of tool 3 / 
search for tool 2  
2‘. Search for hammer stone 
PHASE XVI: Search for tool 1 
14‘. Search for handaxe 
PHASE XVII: Transport of tool 1, 
2, 3, search for object 
13‘.  Transport 
PHASE a-z: various other 
     activities (not specified) 
PHASE a-z: various other 
      activities (not specified) 
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Fig. 74 Cognigram of the production and use of a rough handaxe with a long life-span. 
Small Steps Away from the Acute Need: The Beginning of Human 
Problem-Solution Behavior 
Human behavior involved in finding solutions for problems using tools shows a significant 
expansion of the problem-solution distance starting with the earliest evidence for stone tools. 
This is a case of thinking in circles: If the tools we recognize as being of human origin were no 
different from previously existing tools made by animals, then we would not be able to identify 
their hominid origins. Yet it is remarkable that tools produced by hominids are not distinguished 
through their choice of raw materials, tool form or use context but primarily through the 
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extended problem-solution distance. Oldowan stone tools are made out of stone like some of the 
hammers chimpanzees used to open nuts. These can splinter during use and still be used in a 
subsistence context. The difference is the intentional splitting of stones using a second tool, a 
hammer stone, to create flakes with which the food can be cut or scraped. Tools are not only 
implemented for the direct solution to a problem. Hominids recognized the possibility to use a 
tool in order to produce another tool with characteristics that cannot be achieved by 
manipulating the raw form with hands, teeth, claws, etc. The knapper recognizes the possibility 
to better manipulate the target object using other tools and must also apply the same principle to 
the production of the tool. This requires an increased awareness of the problem: On the one 
hand, the necessity for different tool characteristics required to work the target object and, on 
the other hand, the recognition of the possibility to achieve these characteristics (cutting) using a 
second tool. The use of secondary tools expands the distance between the basic problem and its 
solution by inserting an additional active attention focus into the solution process. 
The problem-solution distance in human behavior is expanded early on due to a delay in the 
problem’s solution. Additional active foci of attention that do not directly influence the target 
object but the tools, which in turn influence the target object, build a multi-linked chain of 
influence. The basic need is not recognized as an acute need requiring an immediate 
satisfaction, but as semi-acute. Such a future need can be triggered through the satisfaction of a 
current need, during which similar problems and the renewed need for the same tool arise. From 
this, it is possible that the functional tool is secured for renewed use in the future, as has been 
discussed for the bone tools from Swartkrans. A future action is prepared; the tool is ignored 
throughout the following interruption of the thought and action chain until a new acute need is 
recognized.  
The problem may also be recognized as semi-acute for the future, thereby requiring a 
continuous thought and action chain. During the transport of raw materials and tools over a 
large distance of multiple kilometers, we can assume that the distance was not covered in one 
session and that other problems arose and required the subject’s attention on the way. This 
could lead to an interruption of the chain of operation that can only be taken up again after the 
intermediate problem or need is resolved. The semi-acute recognition of the original need is still 
kept active throughout the interruption, even if it is not kept in the foreground of the subject’s 
awareness. The continuation of a chain of thought and bridging an interruption with an 
independent attention focus increases the effectiveness of tool behavior by allowing problem 
solutions with elements that cannot be found, or can only be found with great difficulties, in the 
immediate vicinity. It includes the possibility to encompass poor environments and the ability of 
the acting subject to act upon and alter its environment. 
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The previously discussed thought and action chains were achieved by linking independent steps 
to each other. The production of handaxes, however, requires feedback loops to continuously 
control the results and adjustments in the action sequences, when necessary, in order to realize 
the envisioned product. Due to the variability of forms and the degree of finishing of handaxes, 
we cannot assume that an underlying ideal concept for the classic symmetrical handaxe form 
exists for all handaxes. However, the pattern of a functional form with multiple significant 
variables is mirrored in all the different varieties of handaxes. And this form cannot be achieved 
through accidental reduction of individual flakes. It must be controlled and adjusted using a 
bifacial reduction technique. 
Generally, at least two different secondary tools are required for the production of finely worked 
handaxes. The use of a handaxe to satisfy a need – together with the feedback processes – 
significantly increases the attention focused on the tool and its production and pushes the 
satisfaction of the original basic need into the background. Finally, long-term use of tools, as it 
occurs in the combination of proactive production and tactical reuse of handaxes in multiple 
episodes of the recognition and satisfaction of needs, is an additional indicator for the increasing 
separation of human tool behavior from semi-acute or acute and definitely from concrete 
problem recognition. 
The term curation can be summed up as the recognition of continuous usefulness of a tool. The 
development of curation can be traced back to rudimentary forms throughout the Lower 
Paleolithic to the beginning of the Middle Pleistocene, ca. 780,000 years ago. The recognition 
of a problem and the interaction with elements of the chain of operation prior to an acute need is 
evident in the securing of tools for future use, in the proactive transport of raw materials for 
Oldowan tools as well as in the production and transport of handaxes. Individual tools are kept 
in good repair by depositing them in specific locations instead of discarding them after a need 
has been satisfied and, as evidenced by some handaxes, through reworking and sharpening them 
in order to keep them functional. Additionally, some carefully prepared handaxes seem to have 
been produced in order to serve multiple independent purposes.  
The beginning of curation and the increasing separation of tool behavior from concrete needs 
are heralds of a revolutionary development in the problem-solution distance that did not only 
influence modern tool behavior but made it possible. The early signs and the influence of the 
separation of tool and need will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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20 Decoupling of Tool and Need 
In animal tool behavior, thought and action chains are triggered by the perception of a basic 
need and end with the satisfaction of that need. Tools are produced and used in order to satisfy a 
specific need; after the need is satisfied, the tools are discarded. Animals rarely remember the 
location where they deposited their tools, such as in the case of stone hammers among 
chimpanzees in the Taï National Park (Boesch & Boesch 1984b) or, possibly, the robust 
wooden perforators used to open earthen termite nests (Sanz et al. 2004), in order to reuse them 
at a later point in time. Even among the most intensively studied chimpanzee groups, it has so 
far not been possible to observe that the chimpanzees prepared or secured tools, which they just 
finished using, for future use.  
On the one hand, thought and action chains in human tool behavior can be activated by an acute 
basic need and end with the satisfaction of that need. On the other hand, semi-acute needs that 
are expected to arise in the near future also activate specific actions. Thirdly, modern humans 
can recognize needs in general: They prepare, procure, care for, repair and secure tools even 
without the recognition or anticipation of a specific acute or semi-acute problem. Our own 
economy depends upon it – as demonstrated in hardware stores, clothing stores, bookshops and 
our own homes etc. The consumer world of products can only be produced by people that do 
not only act to satisfy a specific need which they recognized for themselves or others, they 
recognize general problems and begin to act as a result. In the following chapter, I will discuss 
the decoupling process of tool and need and the resulting consequences for human tool 
behavior.  
Living Tools: e.g. the Spear 
Due to poor preservation, wooden artifacts are rare in archaeological materials: They only occur 
in a handful of Paleolithic sites such as in the Acheulian layers of Kalambo Falls on the border 
between Tanzania and Zambia (J.D. Clark 2001), Bilzingsleben in Thuringia (Mania & Mania 
1998) or the Middle Paleolithic Abric Romaní in Spain (Carbonell & Castro-Curel 1992).  
Usually, the finds are very fragmented or heavily weathered and the form, production steps or 
function can no longer be identified, as in the case of an object made out of willow wood from 
Gesher Benot Ya’akov, Israel, which is described as board-like with polish (Belitzky et al. 
1991; Goren-Inbar et al. 2002). Lucky finds, such as the point of a spear made out of yew wood 
(length 387mm, max circumference 36mm), found in 1911 at the English find site Clacton-on 
Sea (Oakley et al. 1977) and dated to the Middle Pleistocene Hoxnian-warm period, are very 
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rare. A similar find is the “lance”, made out of yew wood, which was broken into eleven 
fragments by the weight of a falling forest elephant, from Lehringen in Lower Saxony, 
Germany. The spear is ca. 120,000 years old and has its origins in the last warm period, the 
Eem. It is 239cm long and ca. 31mm in diameter at its widest point near the base (Thieme 
&Veil 1985; Veil 1991).  
The find sites in the coal-bearing region around Schöningen in Lower Saxony currently 
encompass the largest and best-preserved complex of wooden tools, dated 300 – 400,000 years 
ago. Besides Schöningen 12, dated to the Reinsdorf interglacial, probably oxygen isotope stage 
OIS 11, which produced four cleft hafts made out of pinewood, Schöningen 13, dated to the late 
Reinsdorf interglacial, offers a look at the possible frequency of wooden tools that would not be 
preserved under normal conditions. A tool made out of a small spruce wood stem whose side 
shoots and bark were removed was interpreted as a throwing stick, based on ethnographic 
parallels. The tool, 78cm long, a maximum diameter of 3cm and carefully worked pointed ends, 
was probably used to hunt birds. A 88cm long staff, previously broken, made out of spruce 
wood with a maximum diameter of circa 3.6cm was also decorticated and trimmed. The stumps 
of the side shoots are, all but one, carefully worked and smoothed out. The staff is tapered 
towards the ends, one end is charred. Due to the charred ends and its proximity to two fire pits, 
the staff is currently interpreted as a skewer or poker (Thieme 1999). 
Seven spears made out of spruce wood (Fig. 75) and an additional fragment of a spear point 
complete the inventory of wooden tools from Schöningen 13 (Thieme 1997; 1998). All spears 
where decorticated and smoothed, the branch stubs where removed and the points carefully 
prepared. The lengths vary between 1.82 and 2.5m, the largest diameter between 29 and circa 
50mm. The center of weight is located in the front third of the staff, similar to modern day 
tournament javelins (Thieme 1999). Throwing experiments with reconstructions of the spears 
from Schöningen demonstrate the good throwing characteristics for distances up to 15m (Rieder 
2003).  
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Fig. 75  One of the seven javelins made out of spruce wood from Schöningen, Lower Saxony. 
(picture by Nicholas Conard) 
We do not have data about the production techniques for spears from Schöningen, such as the 
data from experimental reconstructions gathered by McNabb (1989) for the reproduction of the 
Clacton spear or by Veil (1991) from the Lehringen lance. Based on three reconstruction 
attempts, Veil suggests a production time of 4.5 to 5.5 hours, which includes felling the tree, 
trimming the branches, smoothing the branch stubs, decortication, reworking the surface and 
whittling of the point. However, the preparation from the raw form to the finished spear only 
represents a fragment of the chain of operations from the production to the use of the spear. The 
procurement and production of the stone tools required to prepare the lance are not included.  
In order to fell a small tree and prepare a spear or a similar wooden tool, it is not sufficient to 
use an unmodified tool. You must first make a cutting or hacking tool, usually with the help of 
an additional tool. In this case, tool use is not secondary – using a tool to produce a second tool 
– put tertiary: A tool is used to produce another tool that is needed to produce a third tool, which 
is required to solve the original problem. An additional active focus of attention is not simply 
added to the thought and action process, it is added to a chain of actions that are built up 
hierarchically upon each other. Tertiary tool use is already probable for the production of 
20 Decoupling of Tool and Need 262
Middle and Upper Pleistocene handaxes (Haidle 1999; 2000; 2004b; comp. Chapter 19). Soft-
hammer percussion used for thinning out and finishing the handaxes from Boxgrove, was 
probably carried out using tools made out of organic materials, such as percussors made out of 
antlers, that – as opposed to hammer stones -  need to be produced first. The stone tools brought 
into Schöningen 13 II-4 were also sharpened on site, probably using soft-hammer percussion. 
Bone retouchers that may have been used to sharpen the stone tools were found at the site.  
The production of wooden spears requires the previous production of tools; experiments have 
shown - as in the production of carefully worked handaxes – that the use of different tools in the 
various phases simplifies the production process. We can assume that the need for the 
production and use of different tools was anticipated. The production of these tools 
encompasses the search for suitable raw materials, on the one hand and, on the other hand the 
search for or production of suitable additional tools. An example is illustrated in the following 
action chain (Fig. 76): 
  
SPEAR
handaxe
flake tool
hard hammerstone
soft hammerstone
antler baton
hard hammerstone
flake tool
hard
hammerstone
PREY
Fig. 76 Possible effective chain of the tools that are required for the production and use of a 
hunting spear. 
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The production of a spear is not limited to the production phases involving the wooden raw 
materials – such as in the experiment of the Lehringen lance – but also includes the search for 
the wooden raw materials and additional phases for the search for raw materials made out of 
stone and the search for or production of tools. Figure 77 shows the cognigram for the 
production and use of a spear. The individual phases and their succession were developed for 
the spears from Schöningen based on observations of Veil’s (1991) experiment. The diagram 
represents a possible, very probable, yet not binding, scenario. 
It includes the most important foci of attention and phases, yet it could be extended if, for 
example, we assume that an antler percussor or a bone retoucher were used instead of a soft 
hammer stone to finish the handaxe. In this case, we would have to include additional phases 
with an additional tool and an addition attention focus. For purposes of clarity, I have refrained 
from including descriptions and illustrations of the individual steps in each phase; what these 
steps look like in detail can be inferred from the previously described thought and action chains 
in Chapter 19. The cognigram for the use and production of a javelin in Figure 77 is 
significantly simplified and abstracted. However, it would be very uncomfortable to pursue such 
a chain of operation beginning with the recognition of the basic need, food (meat), to its 
satisfaction, as in the previously described examples and as it was still plausible in the case of 
the hand axe. 
A solution was suggested in Chapter 19 – the increased separation of a tool from an acute need. 
Solutions can be found for a semi-acute need in the future or for additional needs other than for 
the acute one. A hard hammer stone is required at three possible points in the effective chain 
illustrated in Figure 76. It is possible that the subject used the same hammer stone three times 
for the production of three different tools and secures the stone so that it can be used again when 
a situation arises in the future. Tools are increasingly decoupled from specific problems and 
begin to have their own significance. The production of a tool is no longer triggered by a real 
basic need such as food, scratching an itch, defense or entertainment that can be satisfied 
through the application of the tool. The production of tools can be activated through the 
recognition of a principle problem whereby the satisfaction – since there is no specific need – is 
not achieved through the application of the tool but in the satisfaction of having principally 
provided a solution.  
Complex thought and action chains such as the production and use of a spear are only practical 
when the tool and specific need are decoupled since the satisfaction of the original need (eat 
meat) would take a number or days. Decoupling tool and need means that the chain of 
operations is not a unit as illustrated in Figure 77, but a combination of different units that can 
be combined freely: The production of a handaxe, the preparation of a hard and soft hammer 
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stone, the preparation of an antler percussor, the production of a flaked tool, the production of a 
spear. The individual production phases are supplemented by the specific or general search for 
raw materials. The independent units handaxe, flaked tool, percussor, hard hammer stone, soft 
hammer stone, spear are combined in a common thought and action chain through their 
application in producing another unit as well as through common phases of transport and 
combined use. Since these elements are not used exclusively for the satisfaction of a basic need, 
but as independent units that are also applied in parallel chains of operation, these thought and 
action chains (Figure 77) can no longer be viewed as a static unit. They are constructs that are 
the result of a combination of existing elements and additional elements that need to be found or 
produced. 
Tools begin to have their own significance independently of specific basic needs. It is not clear, 
when this began: It was a slow process and the archaeological remains are fragmentary. The 
beginnings of the decoupling can be seen in the recognition of semi-acute problems as, for 
example, in the raw material and tool transport of the Oldowan, more than 2 million years ago. 
The advanced decoupling of specific problems and tools as a solution is illustrated in tertiary 
tool use, probably in the carefully worked handaxes, definitely in the production of wooden 
spears for hunting 300,000 to 400,000 years ago. 
    
Decoupling the problem and the solution has significant consequences for both ends of the 
thought and action chain of tool use: First, for the circle of recognized problems and situations 
that can possibly be solved using tools and secondly for the volume of possible solutions. 
Problem recognition that is no longer limited to specific basic needs makes it possible to 
recognize how we can further influence and manage our surroundings. It is only possible to 
search for a solution to change a situation if we recognize that the situation can be manipulated 
with the help of tools. Dividing thought and action chains into manageable subsets makes it 
possible to identify new solutions and possibilities. Various elements can be combined freely 
because they are independent, not restricted to a specific intended use, thereby making it 
possible to experiment freely with objects and tools. The completion and preparation of the tool 
is satisfaction in itself. In the following examples, I will discuss possibilities of tool production 
and use that arise due to the combination of independent elements based on the new perception 
of problems and new solution approaches. 
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Production and use of a spear by Homo heidelbergensis 
00.   Perception basic need (in principle, semi-
acute): food 
00a.  Perception subproblem 1 (in principle, 
semi-acute): hunt prey 
00b. Perception subproblem 2 (in principle, 
semi-acute): need of spear (tool 1) 
00c1.Perception subproblem 3A (semi-acute): 
need of handaxe to cut down tree (tool 2): 
quality A 
00c1.Perception subproblem 3B (semi-acute): 
need of handaxe to cut down tree (tool 2): 
quality B 
00d.  Perception subproblem 4 (semi-acute): 
need of flake tool (tool 3) to work wood 
0e.  Perception subproblem 5 (acute):  
 need of hard hammer stone (tool4)  to 
produce tool 3 and work on tool 2 
0f. Perception of subproblem 6 (semi-acute): 
 need of a soft hammer stone (tool 5) for 
retouch of tool 2  
PHASE I: Search for tool 5 (soft hammer stone) 
PHASE II: Transport of tool 5 / Search for tool 4 
(hard hammer stone) 
PHASE III: Transport of tools 4, 5 / Search for 
raw material for tools 2 and 3 
PHASE IV: Production of tool 2 / Use of tool 4 →
roughing out of handaxe  
PHASE V: Production of tool 2 / Use of tool 5 →   
thinning 
00-00a. Perception basic need, subproblem 1 (in 
principle, semi-acute) 
00b1. Perception subproblem 2A (semi-acute) : 
quality A  
00b2. Perception subproblem 2B (semi-acute) : 
quality B 
0d-e. Perception subproblem 4-5 (acute) 
PHASE XVI: Production of tool 3 / Use of tool 4 
PHASE XVII: Production of tool 1 / Use of tool 3 
→ removing bark, reworking form 
00-00a.Perception basic need, subproblem 1 (in 
principle, semi-acute) 
00b1. Perception subproblem 2A (semi-acute) : 
quality A  
00b2. Perception subproblem 2B (semi-acute) : 
quality B 
0d-e. Perception subproblem 4-5 (acute) 
PHASE XVIII: Production of tool 3 / Use of tool 4 
PHASE XIX: Production of tool 1 / Use of tool 3 
→ reworking form, carving tip 
0-0b.Perception basic need, 
        subproblems 1, 2 (semi-acute, acute)  
0c. Perception subproblem 3 (semi-acute): need
  of tool 2 (handaxe) to butcher prey 
PHASE VI: Production of tool 2 / Use of tool 
5 →  retouch 
00-00f. Perception of basic need, 
subproblems 1-6 (in principle) 
0g. Perception subproblem 7 (acute): 
 secure tools at site  
PHASE VII: Transport of tools 2, 4, 5 and raw 
material to site 
00-00b.Perception basic need, subproblems 
1-2 (in principle, semi-acute) 
0c.  Perception subproblem 3 (acute) 
PHASE VIII: Search for raw material for tool 
1 / Transport of tool 2   
00-00b.Perception of basic need, 
subproblems 1-2 (in principle) 
0c. Perception subproblem 3 (acute) 
0g. Perception subproblem 7 (acute): 
 secure tools at site  
PHASE IX: Transport of tool 2 to site 
00-00b.Perception basic need, subproblems  
1-2 (in principle, semi-acute) 
0c. Perception subproblem 3 (acute) 
00f‘.Perception subproblem 6 (semi-acute): 
need of tool 5 for retouch of tool 2 
PHASE XX: Search for prey / Transport of 
tools 1, 2, 5 
PHASE XXI: Satisfaction of need not 
successful → frustration 
00-00c + f. Perception basic need, 
subproblems 1, 2, 3 and 6 (semi-acute, 
in principle) 
0g. Perception subproblem 7 (acute): 
 secure tools at site  
PHASE XXII: Transport of tools 1,2, and 5 to 
site 
0-0b.Perception basic need, subproblems 1, 
2 (semi-acute, acute)  
0c. Perception subproblem 3 (semi-acute): 
need of tool 2 (handaxe) to butcher 
prey 
00f‘.Perception subproblem 6 (semi-acute): 
        need of tool 5 to resharpen tool 2  
PHASE XXIII: Search for prey / Transport of 
tools 1, 2, 5 
  PHASE XXIV: Hunt / Use of tool 1 / 
Transport of tools 2, 5 → kill animal 
PHASE X: Search for raw material for tool 1 / 
Transport of tool 2   
PHASE XI: Production of tool 1 / Use of tool 2 
→ cut down tree 
PHASE XII: Production of tool 1 / Use of tool 2 
→ roughing out of blank of spear  
00-00b. Perception basic need, subproblems 1-
2 (in principle, semi-acute) 
0c. Perception subproblem 3 (acute) 
0g. Perception subproblem 7 (acute): 
 secure tools at site  
PHASE XIII: Transport blank 1 and tool 2 to site 
00-00a.Perception basic need, subproblem 1 
(on principle, semi-acute)  
00b1.Perception subproblem 2A (semi- acute) : 
quality A  
00b2.Perception subproblem 2B (semi- acute) : 
quality B 
0d-e. Perception subproblem 4-5 (acute) 
PHASE XIV: Production of tool 3 / Use of tool 4 
PHASE XV: Production of tool 1 / Use of tool 3 
→ reworking bases of branches 
PHASE XXV: Butchering prey / Use of tool 2 A →
Removing skin 
0-0a.Perception basic need, subproblem 1 
(acute) 
0c1. Perception subproblem 3A (acute): need of 
tool 2 (handaxe) to break open carcass: 
quality A 
0c2. Perception subproblem 3B (acute): need of 
tool 2 (handaxe) to break open carcass: 
quality B 
0f. Perception subproblem 6 semi-acute): need 
of tool 5 (soft hammerstone) to sharpen tool 
2  
PHASE XXVI: Retouch of tool 2 / Use of tool 5 
PHASE XXVII: Butchering prey / Use of tool 2 AB 
→  breaking open and butchering carcass 
PHASE XXVIII: Satisfaction of need 
00. Perception basic need (semi-acute) 
00a-c, f.Perception subproblem 1-3 and 6 (semi-
acute, in principle)  
0g.  Perception subproblem 7 (acute): secure 
prey and tools 1, 2, 5 at site 
PHASE XXIX: Transport of parts of prey and 
tools 1, 2, 5 to site 
PHASE a-z: several other activities
        (not related, not specified) 
PHASE a‘-z‘: several other activities 
        (not related, not specified) 
PHASE a‘‘-z‘‘: several other activities
   (not related, not specified) 
PHASE a‘‘‘-z‘‘‘: several other activities 
   (not related, not specified) 
PHASE a-z: several other activities (not 
     related, not specified) 
PHASE a-z: several other activities (not
     related, not specified) 
PHASE a-z: several other activities
      (not related, not specified)  
PHASE a-z: several other activities (not 
   related, not specified) 
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Fig. 77  Cognigram of the production and use of a javelin (simplified).  
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New Needs: e.g. Aesthetic Behavior 
A new category of needs that results from the decoupling of tool behavior and specific need is 
the occupation with so-called non-functional artifacts. This fuzzy term is primarily used to label 
aesthetic objects such as art, jewelry, pigments etc. Although these artifacts can have a 
multitude of functions and take on the role of a tool (comp. Haidle 2003), they do not serve to 
secure subsistence and are therefore considered non-functional or, for animals, non-adaptive. 
This label is only valid, if the specified artifact is viewed through economic-colored glasses, 
where the tool provides a fitness advantage in the fight for survival. Sometimes, animals also 
use objects, whose function cannot be connected to bodily needs such as subsistence or hygiene 
or with advantages to reproduction in the broadest sense e.g. with defensive or impressive 
behavior or learning such behavior through games. The multifaceted game with stones among 
the Japanese macaques (Huffman 1984; Huffman & Quiatt 1986) or the act of draping plants 
over their head and shoulders among a number of different types of monkeys (Beck 1980, 75, 
78, 104) are examples of this object behavior. The tool character of the objects used in these 
scenarios is put into question because their functionality is unclear (comp. Chapter 14 and Beck 
1980, s.a.). The use of non-adaptive objects and tools among animals has so far only been 
documented in one short problem-solution distance without specific production phases. 
Aside from one solitary jasperite cobble from Makapansgat, South Africa, which resembles a 
face and which Bednarik (1999) believes can only have been carried into the dolerite cave by 
hominid action, no artifacts with a primarily symbolic character have been found in the 
Pliocene. The stone face with three openings, interpreted as eyes and mouth, from the South 
African australopithecine find site is – especially due to the lack of any additional tool finds – 
over-interpreted as evidence for early aesthetic behavior. The evidence for aesthetic objects 
such as minerals, fossils and pigments that were intentionally brought into find sites increases 
toward the end of the Middle Pleistocene and significantly more so in the Upper Pleistocene. 
Various pigment finds give evidence to great transport distance, such as the hematite pieces 
from Hunsgi, India (Paddayya 1977), which were transported more than 25km and were dated 
to the Acheulian based on the accompanying stone artifacts. A large quantity of different 
colored pigments was also brought into and partially worked at the Zambian find site Twin 
Rivers (270,000 – 170,000 years before present). If we extrapolate the 1.6 kg of pigments that 
were recovered from the excavated portions to the quantity for the entire cave fill, then it is 
possible to expect circa 57 kg of pigments in the cave (Barham 2002). In the find site 8-B-11 on 
Sai Island, Sudan, van Peer et al. (2003) identified a number of small flint pebbles with polish 
produced by use wear and traces of pigments on them together with pieces of red and yellow 
ochre with smoothed surfaces. The flint may have been used to grind the color pigments into a 
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powder. Sandstone slabs, which are interpreted as rubbing stones for grinding pigments, were 
found in the layer above the flint pebbles, which dates with absolute date to 223,000 ± 19.000 to 
182.000 ± 20.000 years ago and cannot be further differentiated. The slabs may have been 
flattened and molded using picks, which would represent an example of tertiary tool use. 
Another object that has been the subject of much discussion for early aesthetic behavior is the 
figure from Berekhat Ram, Israel, dated to 280,000 years ago (Marshack 1997; d’Errico & 
Nowell 2000). The raw form for this artifact is a 3.5cm long piece of tuff stone with a vague 
human-like form (Fig. 78). Interesting about this piece are the lines etched into the stone to 
resemble a neck and arms and the possible abrasive traces in the chest area. Although experts do 
not agree on the details of the etchings or the techniques involved, they do agree that the raw 
form was intentionally altered and that it resembles a female figure. 
Fig. 78 The tuff fragment from Berekhat Ram, Israel with its artificially created human-like form 
(scale 1cm, from d’Errico & Nowell 2000, Fig. 1) 
A similar piece was found in Acheulian layers, dated to 300,000 to 500,000 years, by Lutz 
Fiedler in Tan-Tan, Morocco (Bednarik 2003). The raw form is made out of 5.8cm long 
quartzite pebble that has an anthropomorphic form, similar to the figure from Berekhat Ram 
(Fig. 79). Lines of erosion separate the piece into regions that resemble body parts; artificial 
horizontal lines, probably made by picking at the stone, complement the natural lines. To secure 
the diagnostic, a second independent analysis of the piece needs to be carried out, as for the 
Berekhat Ram figure.  
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Fig. 79 The anthropomorphic quartzite pebble from Tan-Tan, Morocco, from the front and back, 
with possible artificial horizontal lines (from Bednarik 2003, Fig. 2 and 3) 
Beside partially used chunks of pigments and reworked stones with natural anthropomorphic 
forms, scratches and scored lines build a third category of early aesthetic expressions. 
Prominent examples of these are different bone fragments from large mammals from the Homo 
heidelbergensis find site of Bilzingsleben, Thuringia, dated up to 350,000 years ago. The bones 
showed groups of incised lines, either running radially, as a repetition of three overlapping cuts 
or as parallel double lines (Mania & Mania 1988; Steguweit 1999). A detailed analysis using a 
laser microscope found that traces on the four fragments showed that the different groups of 
lines were each carried out with the same tool and regular incisions. The incisions are not 
accidental by-products that occurred when the bone fragments were used as a cutting board, but 
are deliberate cuts whose functions remain unclear (Steguweit 1999; 2003, 124-126). 
All of the early artifacts introduced in this chapter have one thing in common: Based on their 
unclear intention – why and for what purpose where the pieces fashioned? – it is doubtful 
whether they were intentionally fashioned objects or tools. If we equate the manipulation of 
aesthetic objects with the use of symbolic tools, then pre-Upper Paleolithic aesthetic 
expressions are generally rejected because their use in intentional symbolic communication is 
believed to be improbable. The possible symbolic content of most early artifacts, their codes, 
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are too abstract and the cases of aesthetic objects in the Lower and Middle Paleolithic too rare, 
to accept them as intentional tools for communication. 
We have to differentiate three categories in the communication with symbols in the form of 
two-dimensional diagrams, three-dimensional forms or even sounds and gestures (Graves-
Brown 1995):  
a) an icon encodes information based on the recognizable similarity between the symbol 
and what it represents, e.g. the traffic sign “deer crossing” has a picture of a jumping 
deer on it. 
b) an index associates an object with an sign that identifies it, as a hoof track can be 
associated with the deer itself. 
c) finally, a symbol is an arbitrarily chosen character, such as the word “deer”.  
Intentional communication using icons, indices and symbols, e.g. in the form of art objects and 
jewelry, is deemed to be a marker for modern cognition. The natural animal depictions in the 
cave and mobile art of the Upper Paleolithic undoubtedly have some meaning and are at the 
very least seen as iconographic. Contemporaneous abstract characters that frequently show up in 
combination with these images are also accepted as representatives – although difficult to 
interpret – conveying information, similarly to the natural depictions. Abstract signs from 
earlier time periods are generally not attributed such symbolic functions. It was the discovery of 
an engraved piece of hematite and scores on a bone fragment from the 70,000 year-old middle 
stone age layers in the South African Blombos Cave (d’Errico et al. 2001; Henshilwood et al. 
2002) that made it possible to believe that symbolic behavior may have existed prior to the 
arrival of anatomically modern humans in Europe. At this find site, these symbols occur within 
the context of other artifacts, bone tools and pearls made out of shells, that are accepted as 
markers of modern behavior (Henshilwood et al. 2001; 2004). 
At earlier find sites without accompanying markers for modernity, it remains difficult to 
recognize the use of symbolic tools, which is why “non-functional” and aesthetic objects – or, 
as in the case of handaxes, aesthetic elements – are denied any intentional meaning. However, if 
we look at these artifacts from the point of view of decoupling specific problems from the 
corresponding solution, then new possibilities for interpretation arise. Symbolic communication 
between people requires a principle agreement on a code between the person sending the signal 
and the person receiving the signal. This is simplified if a group already uses symbols and signs 
upon which others can build. A group communication system with symbols cannot be 
developed or implemented from nothing. A basic set of signs and symbols have to exist, their 
meaning is slowly diverted from their original intent. These forerunners were created in 
individual processes and gained their own meaning before the group could use them or similar 
IV The Increasing Distance Between Problem and Solution 271
artifacts as signals. The introduced objects and objects similar to them can be interpreted as 
artifacts with individual meaning. 
In order to prepare an object such as the piece of tuft from Berekhat Ram so that its meaning 
can be subsequently recognized and accepted from a scientific point of view, it is necessary to 
handle tools in such a way that is not connected to a specific subsistence problem. An individual 
discovers the raw material, recognizes the human-like shape of the object and then uses one or 
more tools to make the form more precise. The tools are not used to produce another tool with a 
clear function but for a task without a clear basic need that could be satisfied through the use of 
the new artifact. Satisfaction is achieved by using the tools to produce an object like the 
Berekhat Ram figurine.  
This behavior can be compared to the handling, hugging and carrying around of rocks practiced 
by Japanese macaques (Huffman 1984; Huffman & Quiatt 1986), where the satisfaction seems 
to be achieved by the simple handling of objects. In my opinion, these objects can be labeled as 
tools because they are manipulated in such a way as to achieve psychological satisfaction. The 
difference between stone handling among Japanese macaques and the aesthetic objects lies in 
the problem-solution distance: In the animal example, the objects are immediately used to 
satisfy the psychological need that activated the thought and action chain. The aesthetic objects 
from the Lower Paleolithic seem to have been part of a developing need. Both the development 
of the need and the satisfaction of the need were long-term processes, which intensified with the 
continuous manipulation of the object or tool, and include an increase in the meaning and 
significance of the object. 
At the beginning, this type of tool use and preparation occurred on an individual basis. As long 
as it is limited to isolated cases whose purpose is not manifest in material solutions such as bite-
sized pieces of food or driving off competition, general communication symbols cannot 
develop. The distribution of not-clearly functional tool behavior with a slowly growing need 
and delayed satisfaction takes time. The semiotic meaning of modern tools is primarily that of 
an index, e.g. their meaning is derived from their function (Graves-Brown 1995). Tools that are 
regularly associated with something can function as an index, e.g. to represent the producer(s) 
or the community that uses them. Distinguishable tool styles, created by dominant production 
techniques or form preferences, could also function as an index to distinguish one group from 
another. Intentional production of a tool with a primary index function – e.g. the royal insignia 
crown, scepter and globus cruciger – cannot be proven for the Paleolithic.  
The production of icons that can be recognized by other individuals due to their similarity to the 
depicted subject is illustrated by the figure from Berekhat Ram and further demonstrated for the 
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figurative reconstructions of the Aurignacian. It remains difficult to determine, whether these 
figures were intentionally created to aid communication and convey clear informational content 
or whether they were private tools with a personal meaning, which other people also considered 
meaningful. An indicator for the latter meaning can be found in the repetitive content found on 
numerous objects as, for example, in the representation of the lion man figures from the 
Hohlestein-Stadel in the Lone Valley and the Hohlefels in the Ach Valley by Schelklingen as 
well as on the adorant-plaque from the Geißenklösterle (Conard 2003). However, even the 
frequent depictions of body parts such as the vulva scratching or the colored handprints from 
the Aurignacian do not provide sufficient evidence for a final interpretation as intended symbols 
for communication 
Symbols (see the definition above) are, more so than icons and indices, dependent on a group 
meaning that goes beyond the individual. Abstract signs can also serve as an individual or 
common index e.g. to represent the prior presence of a (specific) person. Yet communication of 
not specifically associated contents with arbitrarily chosen symbols first arose with the written 
language that developed e.g. in the high cultures of the early Metal Age of the Mediterranean 
rim and the Near East. However, that does not rule out the possibility that hard to identify 
forerunners may have existed. The abstract symbols of the Paleolithic could have developed 
into such forerunners: The transition from purely rhythmic scorings without specific meaning to 
abstract symbols with individual meaning and finally to arbitrary symbols used for common 
communication is fluid. 
The discussion surrounding early “non-functional” artifacts, which is also linked to questions 
concerning the symbolic revolution ca. 35,000 years ago and the beginnings of cultural 
modernity, concentrates on the symbolic content of the tools and their potential for a form of 
communication (e.g. Klein 1995; Klein & Edgar 2002; Mithen 1996; Mellars 1996; 2005; 
McBrearty & Brooks 2000; Wadley 2001; d’Errico et al. 2001; d’Errico 2003; d’Errico et al. 
2003). 
 As discussed above, aesthetic tools can also simply have an individual as well as a primary or 
secondary meaning. This form is to be expected for forerunners of common tools for 
communication. It is not necessary to develop new tools on a very abstract level, existing 
instruments can be exapted, i.e. used for new purposes, to serve another function (comp. Gould 
& Vrba 1982). The prerequisite for the creation of such tools is the decoupling of specific 
problems and the search for solutions, which makes it possible to recognize and develop novel 
needs. 
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Combining Tool Elements: e.g. Hafting 
A further consequence of decoupling specific needs and tools develops from the possibility to 
combine independent units of a chain of operations. Through the dissolution of a thought and 
action sequence that ranges from a specific problem to a fitting solution, tools can be produced 
and made available independently and are used together with other tools to satisfy different 
needs. It is now also possible to combine different sub-units into a combination tool that can 
solve new problems and can help improve the satisfaction of known needs. 
Such combination or composite tools are, for example, hafted cutting or scraping tools with 
handles and the combination of projectile points and spears (Stordeur 1987). Completely 
preserved composite tools are rare in archaeological materials, the earliest specimens were 
recorded for late glacial period wetland find sites such as in Stellmoor in Schleswig-Holstein 
(Rust 1943; Bratlund 1990) and also from Neolithic lake shore settlements and the Ötzi find 
(Egg 1992). Yet pieces of composite tools with evidence for the combination of elements are 
known from the end of the Middle Pleistocene. The oldest-known evidence comes from the 
brown coal find site Schöningen 12 in Lower Saxony, placed into the Reinsdorf interglacial, 
therefore probably into oxygen isotope level OIS 11, and dated to between 300,000 and 400,000 
years ago. Four tools made from pinewood were recovered, three of these - with lengths of 17, 
19.1 and 32.2cm and a maximum diameter of 3.6, 3.9 and 4.2cm – are broken at one end, and 
the other end shows an incision. Both ends of the fourth tool, only 11.3 cm long, are incised. 
The regularly shaped notches at the ends of the fragmented branches are interpreted as cleft 
hafts for sharp-edged stone tools. The excavator and preparator Hartmut Thieme suggests that 
especially hard and weathered branch fragments may have been specifically targeted as the raw 
material for these wooden artifacts (Thieme 1999). 
Two pieces of birch pitch (Fig. 80) from 80,000 year-old layers from the find site Königsaue in 
Saxony-Anhalt, show impressions from stone artifacts and their hafting (Mania & Toepfer 
1973). These are the first pieces of evidence for the use of a special connective material that 
combined and secured the elements “handle” and “stone tool” more effectively than regular 
cleft connections. The origin of the material clearly identified as birch pitch, is not clear 
(Grünberg et al. 1999). The production of birch pitch involves a smoldering process in an 
airtight environment during which the birch bark converts to pitch (Weiner 1991). Because this 
is a very difficult process, the intentional production of the raw materials from the Königsauer 
find site by Neandertals, as postulated by Koller et al (2001), is subject of much discussion. The 
alternative is a natural smoldering process, occurring under ideal circumstance such as e.g. 
during a forest fire. In a number of simple steps that better correspond to the thought-and action 
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chain elements of this time period, individuals could have recognized, searched for and used the 
glue-like qualities of the sticky clumps.  
Fig. 80 Piece of birch pitch with impressions of an artifact from Königsaue A (Photo Landesamt 
für Denkmalpflege und Archäologie Sachsen-Anhalt, Juraj Lipták).  
Another type of glue was used in the late Middle Paleolithic of the Near East. Traces of bitumen 
were found on two Levallois points that were used as scrapers, from the Middle Paleolithic of 
the site Umm el Tlel, Syria. Thermoluminescence and C14 accelerator (AMS) date the finds to a 
minimum age of 36,000 years ago (Boëda et al. 1996). The chemical analyses of naturally 
occurring bitumen in the region suggest that it must have been heated – possibly during the 
shafting process. Levallois points in Umm el Tlel were used for cutting different materials and 
as projectile points (Boëda et al. 1999). The middle fragment of a levallois point was found 
embedded in the cervical vertebra of a wild donkey found in the 50,000 year old layer IV 3b’1. 
The size of the reconstructed point suggests that the shaft had to have been between 1.5 to 2 cm 
thick, therefore, it was probably part of a javelin. 
Evidence for shafting comes from contemporary South African find sites such as the Sibudu 
Cave in KwaZulu-Natal or the Rose Cottage Cave. Marlize Lombard (2005) examined unifacial 
and bifacial points and fragments from the Middle Stone Age (MSA) from the 51,800 to 61,000 
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year old layer MOD-SS in the Sibudu Cave. The fracture pattern on the archeological tools, 
their use wear patterns and the distribution of the different residues imply, in comparison with 
experimental data, that these tools where shafted. Based on different experimental results, 
Lombard suggests a combination of the points with wooden shafts from spears or lances with an 
additional attachment using plant fibers, resin and ochre.  
The multiple traces of ochre on the MSA stone tools from the Rose Cottage Cave led Lyn 
Wadley (2005) to investigate the origins of these traces. The material from Rose Cottage Cave 
had been washed very thoroughly and was therefore no longer useful for residue analyses. 
Therefore, Wadley studied the distribution of ochre residue on tools from the contemporary 
Sibudu Cave. Only 3% of scrapers and 27% of the flakes showed traces of ochre on the working 
edge while 47% of the flakes, 80% of scrapers and 68% of points showed traces of ochre on the 
proximal or medial surfaces of the tool. This pattern of distribution suggests that the traces of 
ochre did not primarily come from working on ochre with the tools, but can possibly be 
attributed to the use of ochre in the shafting process. Wadley carried out shafting experiments to 
support her hypothesis that ochre was used as temper for glue and glue mixtures of resin or 
waxes. Shafts using only resin were brittle and breakable when they dried, while mixtures of 
resin and ochre or resin, wax and ochre were significantly more robust. She achieved the best 
and most permanent result when she allowed the glued shaft and tool to dry by low heat near the 
fire over a period of three to four hours.  
Fig. 81 Middle Paleolithic foliated points from the Kleine Ofnet Cave (Collection of the Institute 
for Pre- and Protohistory and Medieval Archaeology, Department of Early Prehistory and 
Quaternary Ecology, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen. Photo Hilde Jensen). 
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The late Middle Paleolithic foliated points  (Fig. 81), used by different regional groups 
distributed throughout southeastern Central Europe and Eastern Europe, had multifunctional 
applications as a cutting tool and a projectile point (Bolus & Rück 2000) similar to the Levallois 
points from Umm el Tlel, Syria. The carefully worked, bifacially retouched and thinned pieces 
are examples for the production of elements that were produced independent of a specific 
problem, that do not simply exist as elements in an active chain consisting of different thought 
and action processes, but that can also be combined with other elements to make a new tool 
(Fig. 82). 
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Fig. 82 Possible effective chain for the tools that are required for the production and use of a 
hunting spear with projectile point. The combination of different elements is marked with a +. 
In Chapter 19, I described in detail the great apes’ ability to combine similar objects such as 
boxes, poles or stones into higher stacks, longer fishing rods or more stable anvils and then use 
them as real or proto-tools. At this point, I introduced the previously rarely used form of 
additive tool production with an increased potential for problem solving. While the independent 
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elements, which were brought together and then used as one unit were conceived as having the 
same function – when one box was not enough to reach the hanging fruit another box was added 
to increase the original effectiveness – it is now possible to combine the different functions of 
an element to exploit new characteristics and functions. The production of e.g. a spear with 
projectile point combines the characteristics of a projectile – the ability to kill a larger animal 
from a distance – with the cutting quality of a stone point or the perforating ability and the 
robusticity of a bone, antler or ivory awl and the solidity of glue and bindings such as plant 
fibers or sinews. The function of the individual elements when used on their own in the same 
(wooden spear without add-ons) or other contexts (point, glue and bindings) is well known.  
The important expansion of the problem-solution distance as it is displayed in e.g. shafting, is 
that the different functions are not simply activated one after another as in the application of e.g. 
first a perforator and then later a probe for extracting termites or the use of a hammer stone on a 
stone core to produce a flake for cutting. In composite tools, the different functions of multiple 
elements work together in one tool with resulting new characteristics. The prerequisite for the 
combination of composite tools is the existence of elements and tools that are independent of 
specific needs. A tool is not exclusively used to solve a specific problem, but can also be 
implemented at a later point in time in more complex contexts with altered problems in 
connection with the function of additional tools. 
An examination of some bone and ivory finds that were interpreted as points by Paola Villa and 
Francesco d’Errico (2001) showed, that no projectile points made out of organic materials exist 
for the Lower Paleolithic in Europe at this time. Middle Paleolithic organic points such as the 
specimens from the Vogelherd (Lonetal), the Grosse Grotte (Achtal), Baden-Wuerttemberg or 
Salzgitter-Lebenstedt, Lower Saxony (Gaudzinski 1999), are very rare and are primarily dated 
to the end of this period. Whether these tools functioned as projectile points in composite tools 
or as awls without a shaft similar to the numerous organic tools from the Châtelperronian layers 
from Grotte du Renne in Arcy-sur-Cure (d’Errico 2003) needs to be clarified on an individual 
basis. What Holdoway (1996) still doubted is widely accepted today: Even without clear 
evidence for organic projectile points, there is no doubt that composite tools and a projectile 
point technology (Shea 1997) existed prior to the arrival of modern humans in Europe.  
In the previous chapters, in addition to the different occurrences of present day animal tool 
behavior, I described how the problem-solution distance expanded throughout the course of 
human evolution until the documentation of the decoupling of a specific need and a tool for its 
satisfaction between 500,000 and 300,000 years ago. The cognitive separation of problem and 
solution has numerous far-reaching consequences that were already demonstrated using the 
spear as a tool with an independent function, aesthetic tools for new problem recognition and 
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composite tools for as yet unknown solution approaches. It is possible to present numerous 
additional details to reconstruct the newest developments, however this would lead to the 
description of increasingly complex but generally similar processes. The principle of the 
expansion of the problem-solution distance as a cognitive marker of human evolution has been 
sufficiently exemplified so that it is not necessary to go into any more details in the outlook.  
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21 Outlook: Of Tools and Humans, Of Innovations and 
Traditions 
Beside the independence of tools, kept ready and reused in a number of different situations, and 
the development of aesthetic, symbolic tools and new composite tools, a wide array of new 
innovative elements in human tool behavior were able to develop due to the decoupling of a 
specific need from its direct satisfaction. The foundation for an increasing problem-solution 
distance in more and more complex processes is build upon independent tool elements, the 
expansion of problem recognition above and beyond immediate basic needs and the ability to 
imagine a combination of various tools with different functions into one more effective tool. 
The very complex thought and action chains become manageable when the individual elements 
can be broken down into smaller thinkable and manageable elements – following the 
decoupling principle. When we plan the course or chain of action for such a process, these 
elements are combined into larger sequences; the volume of the individual elements remains 
small and manageable. The thought and action chains are sorted according to hierarchies; 
depending on which elements need to be planned or coordinated, different hierarchical levels 
will be examined. 
The momentary maximum problem solution distance is manifested in global industrial 
production. Take, for example the production of an electric toothbrush and its packaging: Circa 
4500 employees in ten countries on three continents are involved in the production (Hoppe 
2005), this does not include the supply of raw materials, production of the required machines, 
tools or energy, logistics and markets. Each person involved is responsible for one tiny element 
of the thought and action chain involved in the production of the tool, without knowing what the 
end product looks like or satisfying his own or, at least a recognizable, basic need for an electric 
toothbrush. Simple things, such as the bread I buy from the bakery down the street, are 
produced on the basis of dozens of people’s actions, none of whom are aware of my own acute 
need.  
We live in symbiotic relationships with artificial objects that are independent of our specific 
needs. Their tool characteristic, in close sense of the word – the external application of a freely 
movable object from the surrounding environment, in order to more efficiently alter the form, 
position or state of another object, another organism or the user himself, where the user holds or 
carries the tool prior to its application and is responsible for the correct and effective orientation 
of the tool (comp. Chapter 14) - is often limited or no longer given. The improved production 
and use of true tools, in combination with an increasing development of independent elements, 
leads to a growing production of proto-tools. The world of artifacts, built up out of these true 
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and proto-tools, later also by machines, constitutes the cultural aspect of our environment. It 
was created, accumulated and developed across millennia. Its elements were assigned function 
and meaning during their production, yet like elements of the natural world, they also serve as 
material and theoretical raw materials for the development of additional tools. Tools can be used 
for activities other than those they were intended for, can be disassembled and recombined or 
individual parts altered and improved. Besides comprehending that another individual can act 
intentionally, the decoupling of problem and solution is an important process for the 
development of the Wagenhebereffekt (car-jack effect) in cultural evolution, defined by 
Tomasello (2002, comp. Chapter 9). 
The expansion of the problem-solution distance is a very slow process (comp. Chapters 18-20) 
that first appeared in a number of instances of animal tool behavior and continued to develop 
and increase slowly throughout human evolution. Cognitive steps that can be correlated with 
relative abrupt and clearly defined features attributed to genetic changes have not been 
identified. If we search for a physical or genetic basis, we should think of the general expansion 
of cognitive capacities – such as the yet unknown implications of an increase in brain size or 
improved genetic activity in the human brain (comp. Chapter 6). Language as the source can be 
discounted; however, the ability to speak and the cognitive bases of the expansion of the 
problem-solution distance can have influenced and amplified each other. Generally, we should 
also discuss whether language could also be viewed as a non-material tool. A multifactorial 
basis for the expansion of the problem-solution distance seems most likely, whereby it is 
possible that this development also includes the development of the organization of cognitive 
processes, exapted or copied from other areas. It is not yet possible to extrapolate a direct 
correlation with the current theses on the organization of thinking, presented in Chapter 7. Only 
Bickerton’s model (1995) of off-line thinking could possibly correlate to the increased 
decoupling of an acute problem and its immediate solution. The developmental process in 
Bickerton’s model would need to be significantly altered. 
Archaeological models of the development of human thought show a break in cognitive 
development or postulate an evolutionary leap that took place between 60,000 and 35,000 years 
ago and is interpreted as the beginning of mental modernity (comp. Chapters 12 and 13). 
Manifestations of modern human cognition connected to behavioral aspects are language, 
symbolic and religious actions, planning and reflection and the freedom to combine all areas of 
knowledge and skills. These behavioral aspects are best identified in non-functional artifacts 
such as jewelry, art and musical instruments as well as in the Upper Paleolithic blade industry, 
in bone tools and in burials with burial goods. From the perspective of an increased problem-
solution distance, these markers of modern behavior and thought either do not represent specific 
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indicators of cognitive progress or they significantly pre-date the early evidences for increased 
problem-awareness in the form of aesthetic objects.
The increasing use of tools made out of bone, antler or ivory in the Upper Paleolithic does not 
represent cognitive innovations as e.g. Steven Mithen (1996, 178) postulated for the use of 
organic materials. Neither the material, which has previously been used as digging tools in 
Swartkrans and the hand axes knapped out of bone, instead of rocks, nor the technique 
developed to carve or scrape with a tool, prepared especially for this task, which can be 
compared to the tertiary use of tools in e.g. the production of wooden tools, are novel in the 
time period between 60,000 and 35,000 years before present. Bone tools prepared in this 
fashion already exist from older African and European find sites such as Broken Hill / Kabwe, 
Zambia (Barham et al. 2002), Blombos Cave (Henshilwood et al. 2001), Katanda in the Upper 
Semliki Valley, Zaire (Yellen et al. 1995) or Salzgitter-Lebenstedt, Lower Saxony (Gaudzinski 
1999). 
 From the perspective of the increased problem-solution distance, the youngest cognitive step 
lies in the combination of independent tool elements into a composite tool, exemplified by the 
projectile points made out of antler, bone and ivory. This innovation is not limited to organic 
projectile points but can also be found in shafted tools, e.g. made out of stone and other 
materials. Early evidence of composite tools dates prior to the critical date – 40,000 years before 
present (comp. Chapter 20).  
The production of blades – long flakes whose length is at least twice as long as its breadth 
(length-width-index) – is documented for the late Lower Paleolithic as demonstrated by 
Monigal (2002) in a compilation for the Levant. A marker for modern thinking and behavior is 
core preparation, characteristic for the Upper Paleolithic, exemplified by the efficient reduction 
of even flake blanks. The simple knapping techniques of the Lower Paleolithic allowed for a 
vague predetermination of form and size of the flakes while the Middle Paleolithic Levallois 
technique, 300,000-250,000 years ago, allowed for much more control of the desired blank 
based on intensive core-preparation (e.g. Boëda 1990; Boëda et al. 1990; Schlanger 1996; White 
& Ashton 2003). The three dimensional shaping of the typical shield-shaped core requires a 
large amount of material debris before it is possible to fashion a small series of target flakes. 
The Upper Paleolithic blade technologies are characterized by the preparation of at least one 
striking platform and one flaking surface with one crest (Hahn 1993, 109-130). This type of 
preparation does not take up as much of the core’s volume and allows for serial reduction of 
increasingly standardized blanks with parallel edges. In contrast to the Levallois technology, the 
reduction phases in the Upper Paleolithic blade technology are expanded in comparison to the 
preparation phases.  
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From the perspective of the problem-solution distance, there are only small differences between 
the Levallois and Upper Paleolithic blade technologies. Both require a feedback loop in the 
thought and action chain, similar to the preparation of a carefully worked handaxe (comp. 
Chapter 19). The products of both technologies are, primarily, independent tool elements that 
are often produced, finished and combined without a clear specific need. If we compare the 
cognigrams of both elements from the perspective of the different phases, we do not observe 
significant differences in the attention foci, or in the phase types (search for raw material and 
tool, transport, preparation, use), the number of phases or sequence of phases. The innovation 
can be found in the lowest level of the thought and action chains, in the individual action steps. 
Every innovation in tool use does not have to represent a cognitive expansion. Innovation is 
when a known solution is implemented using new raw materials or when an existing solution is 
applied to a new problem. It can implement technological changes in production and 
application, but does not expand the cognitive aspect of the process. Systemic tools such as 
spear throwers (Stodiek 1993), bows and arrows and needle and thread represent an expansion 
of the cognitive aspect of the problem-solution distance, above and beyond bone tools and 
Upper Paleolithic blade technologies. These tool complexes first occurred in the glacial 
maximum about 18,000 year ago and can be viewed as the further development of composite 
tools. The combined tools discussed in Chapter 20 consisted of at least one element that could 
also function independently of the other elements – a javelin also works without the projectile 
point, Levallois points can be used as cutting tools or in combination with a spear. The elements 
of systemic tools coordinate with each other and only function correctly when they are used 
together. During the production of the element “spear thrower”, the builder must consider the 
throwing spear as another variable; the different elements are connected via a continuous 
feedback loop. 
A phase, which has heretofore not been introduced in the thought and action chains of the 
production and use of tools that can also be used as elements of another tool, is the production 
of raw materials and the alteration of the characteristics of raw materials. In animal and most 
forms of human tool behavior, the raw material for a tool is simply detached and its form altered 
mechanically by detaching or adding parts or changing its structure, e.g. crumpling leaves. An 
early form of changing the characteristics of a raw material may be observed in the hardening of 
wood using fire (Cosner 1956). The charred end of the spruce wood spear from Schöningen 13 
II-4 was probably used as a fire stoker or grill spit (Thieme 1999) and there is no evidence of 
the influence of fire for the Clacton point or the spears from Schöningen. Yet Veil (1991) 
discusses the possibility that the point of the Lehringen lance was intentionally fire hardened 
after its production to give it the final touch.  
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An alteration of the characteristics of raw materials prior to their application has been 
documented for the Middle Paleolithic in the form of glue, which is heated and probably mixed 
(comp. Chapter 20). Another improvement of the quality of a raw material prior to working 
with it, before tool production, is tempering of flint and similar stones. Targeted and controlled 
heating can significantly improve the fracture qualities of the material. Although evidence for 
the first isolated occurrences exist for the Middle Paleolithic (e.g. Häußer 1995), systematic 
tempering comes into fashion from the middle Upper Paleolithic, the Solutrean (Collins 1973) 
and becomes more and more common starting in the Mesolithic (e.g. Eriksen in print).  
While fire hardening and tempering of flint improves the existing characteristics of the raw 
material, burning ceramics completely alters the characteristics of the raw material clay. The 
earliest finds of non-intentional ceramics come from Gravettian find sites in Austria and 
Moravia in the shape of small burned ceramic sculptures (Klíma 1983; 1991; Einwögerer 2000). 
However, intentional burning of ceramics becomes more common starting with the Neolithic. 
The raw material must be formed prior to its transformation through heat. This subsequent 
alteration of the raw material qualities depends on the ability to freely combine independent 
elements of a thought and action chain. It is not only important to realize that raw material 
characteristics can principally be changed but also that raw material with specific qualities can 
be worked mechanically and afterwards the characteristics needed to be able to work with the 
material can be replaced with others that make the material more useful and stable. The raw 
material must be viewed as an independent element with its own focus of attention throughout 
the production process. Elements that are completely independent of the production of specific 
tools are the production of metal from iron ore, glass and other synthetics. 
If we look at the cognitive aspect of the problem-solution distance, it becomes clear that its 
expansion does not significantly increase with the postulated cognitive revolution between 
60,000 – 35,000 years ago, nor does it end with it. It is not possible to determine the prototype 
of a cognitive modern human using this feature. If we try to determine a key turning point in the 
development of human tool behavior, then it is most likely to be found in the decoupling of 
problem and solution. However, this marker does not occur selectively but is the developing 
result of continuous expansion. It can only be identified retrospectively by observing the 
consequences resulting from it.  
The expansion of the problem-solution distance, more specifically, the decoupling of the search 
and provision of an independent solution – in the shape of a true tool, a proto-tool or the raw 
material – from a specific need opens up lots of opportunities for innovation. They influence 
three factors in particular that support variable tool use (comp. Chapter 17, Figure 27): Breadth 
of problem recognition, insight into the problem solution and flexibility in the handling of 
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solutions (Fig. 83). These – beside ecological and physical aspects as well as primarily social 
factors of tolerant and active exchange of information e.g. teaching - make up the group of 
cognitive factors that allow, limit or cultivate tool use. 
ecological factors
physical capabilities
Foundations of multifaceted tool use
depth of problem
perception What is a problem, what is not?
intelligence
(insight into
problem solution)
flexibility
tolerant 
gregariousness
teaching +
exchange?
How can I solve the problem by other means?
(How) can I solve the problem?
Fig. 83 Factors that support variable tool use: Aspects that are strengthened by decoupling of 
specific needs and specific solutions are highlighted. 
Problems rarely make themselves. They are first and foremost subjective – they must be 
recognized and accepted by a subject before it is possible to begin searching for a solution. A 
zebra does not ask itself how it can climb a tree when a lion chases it. This concept is not part of 
the animal’s imagination. Problems can only make themselves known within a species-specific 
and individual framework of recognition.  
The distance between problem and solution makes it possible to “think outside the box” and 
include tools to solve a task. If we cannot decouple a specific need from its satisfaction, then our 
problem awareness remains limited to problems that can be solved immediately. The number of 
situations that are seen as problematic expands, when a subject is able to accept delayed 
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solutions, which requires an advance awareness of problem solutions. If a pool of solutions 
exists – independent tools, separated from a specific, concrete need – it becomes possible to 
recognize additional problems in new situations or that they could develop into problems in the 
near future. It is a very big step to develop a solution, possibly even a tool, for a problem that is 
not recognized as an immediate basic need and then apply these solutions without the promise 
of satisfaction. The development of new problem definitions, such as the production of aesthetic 
objects, becomes significantly simpler when specific solutions in the form of tools already exist 
and satisfaction is obtained through the application of these tools.  
Independent tools challenge the user to try them out – as part of a game, to overcome boredom, 
or in another problem situation. This effect can be observed in the increased tool behavior 
among animals in captivity, whose environment included numerous human tools. The basis for 
this expansion is, however, not fashioned by the animals themselves since humans make the 
solutions available as part of the environment; Animal solution behavior is still coupled to 
specific needs and their immediate fulfillment. Hominids, in contrast, have successively 
expanded their environment, which is a source of problems as well as solutions, through 
increased decoupling of specific need and immediate satisfaction. This process strengthens 
itself: New environmental elements such as tools are created, which are then applied to foreign 
situations or that can be further developed. The independent occurrences of problems and 
solutions allow for flexible recombination of different problem and solution elements. 
The factors influenced by the expansion of the problem solution distance, problem recognition, 
insight into problem solutions and flexibility, make up the cornerstones of innovation. The 
alteration of an existing element - e.g. using a different raw material, changing the context or the 
action chain or expanding on an action chain - and the consequential development of innovative 
behavior can be attributed to one or multiple individuals, but does not have to result from 
conscious decisions nor does it have to be recognized as being innovative by that individual. 
When these alterations of behavior become interesting to the subject and its relations or when 
the greater population reproduces these, then these behavior variations can be termed 
innovative. It is advantageous, although not necessary, to recognize intentional behavior in 
another individual when reproducing its behavior; this can also occur through simple forms of 
learning such as emulation or stimulus amplification (comp. Chapter 3). The conscious 
repetition of behavior variations is coupled with a cognitive process. It is not necessary that the 
consequences of the altered behavior are recognized in advance, but afterwards through a new 
focus or a shift in focus. The Grevy zebras from the Brookfield zoo are a perfect example for 
altered behavior (Beck 1980, 154-155; comp. Chapter 18): The game with the feed basket 
entertains the subject and, at the same time, frightens the other animals. When the subject 
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finally recognizes the side effect, it becomes the actual goal of its actions, which he attempts to 
reproduce. Therefore the altered behavior becomes an innovation through a shift in focus.  
Tradition is a complement and an antagonist of innovation. By making a variation a tradition – 
by passing it on for multiple generations - it becomes innovation and can be included in the 
behavioral repertoire of a group. Competing behavioral traditions can handicap or prevent the 
reproduction and expansion of an innovation. The interaction of traditions and innovations in a 
group is primarily a social question, not an individual decision, which is mirrored in the factors 
of tolerant sociability and an active exchange of information (Fig. 83). The different available 
channels of communication influence the acceptance of an innovation and its transmission 
within a group either positively or negatively, similar to the size of a group, the social system, 
decision-making processes in a group and external contacts to members of other groups. Many 
of these aspects differentiate late in human evolution. The increased potential of social factors in 
the development of variable tool use exponentiates the effect of the cognitive factors problem 
recognition, insight into problem solutions and flexibility, so that the development and 
expansion of tool use and artifact spectrums are slow processes, whose origin is not to be found 
in a genetic strike of lightning. The meaning of the expansion of the problem-solution distance 
in the cognitive evolution of human kind and as basis of the creation and expansion of our 
cultural environment was demonstrated and discussed in detail in this study; a detailed 
discussion of the development of social factors that influenced the human artifact spectrum is a 
topic for another study. 
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Appendix I Animal Tool Behaviour 
The next pages contain an as complete compilation of all current known animal tool behaviour 
as possible. Due to a better clarity the data was tabulated. The table is sorted after animal 
groups, in which the species are listed alphabetically after their Latin names. The sequence of 
the different tool behaviours of each species is not in any particular order. The following data 
was documented, partially coded: 
Structure of the Data base 
Animal species 
Animal group 
1 Gastropods 
2 Insects 
3 Fishes 
4 Amphibians 
5 Reptiles 
6 Birds 
7 Mammals 
8 Primates 
9 Hominids 
Situation 
1 free and unaffected  
2 free and affected  
3 free and experiment  
4 in captivity 
5 in captivity and experiment 
6 in captivity and learned 
Artefact: Short term for the tool 
Description: Information on the condition, production and implementation of the tool, available  
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Modifications 
0 none 
1 severed/detached, broken off 
2 subtracted e.g. through decortication, defoliation etc. 
3 addition, e.g. combination 
4 transformed 
99 unclear 
Function: short description of the tool use context. 
RM1: primary raw material 
RM 2: complementary or alternative raw material 
RM 3: additional complementary or alternative raw material 
Literature: References for tool use 
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p
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p
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c
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ro
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c
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c
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c
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b
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 l
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 b
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 c
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 d
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c
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P
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P
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c
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c
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c
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a
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t 
a
l.
 1
9
9
9
; 
J
o
n
e
s
 &
 S
a
b
a
te
r 
P
i 
1
9
6
9
 i
n
 B
e
c
k
e
r 
1
9
9
3
 
P
a
n
 t
ro
g
lo
d
y
te
s
 
(C
h
im
p
a
n
z
e
e
) 
9
 
1
 
H
o
o
k
 
B
ra
n
c
h
 u
s
e
d
 t
o
 h
o
o
k
 o
th
e
r 
b
ra
n
c
h
e
s
. 
1
 
L
o
c
o
m
o
ti
o
n
, 
S
u
b
s
is
te
n
c
e
?
 
B
ra
n
c
h
 
W
h
it
e
n
 e
t 
a
l.
 1
9
9
9
, 
2
0
0
1
; 
S
u
g
iy
a
m
a
 &
 
K
o
m
a
n
 1
9
7
9
; 
S
u
g
iy
a
m
a
 &
 K
o
m
a
n
 1
9
7
9
 
in
 B
e
c
k
e
r 
1
9
9
3
 
P
a
n
 t
ro
g
lo
d
y
te
s
 
(C
h
im
p
a
n
z
e
e
) 
9
 
1
 
S
p
o
n
g
e
 
M
o
s
s
 c
o
lle
c
te
d
 a
n
d
 r
o
lle
d
 
to
g
e
th
e
r 
(f
e
w
 c
m
) 
to
 s
c
o
o
p
 w
a
te
r 
fr
o
m
 h
o
le
s
 i
n
 t
re
e
s
. 
 
1
, 
4
 
S
u
b
s
is
te
n
c
e
 
L
e
a
f 
L
a
n
jo
u
w
 2
0
0
2
 
P
a
n
 t
ro
g
lo
d
y
te
s
 
(C
h
im
p
a
n
z
e
e
) 
9
 
1
 
C
o
n
ta
in
e
r 
L
e
a
v
e
s
 h
e
ld
 i
n
 h
a
n
d
, 
u
s
e
d
 t
o
 
c
a
tc
h
 f
e
c
e
s
 -
 c
o
n
ta
in
e
r.
  
1
?
 
E
x
p
lo
ra
ti
o
n
, 
P
e
rs
o
n
a
l 
H
y
g
ie
n
e
 
L
e
a
f 
W
h
it
e
n
 e
t 
a
l.
 1
9
9
9
, 
2
0
0
1
 
P
a
n
 t
ro
g
lo
d
y
te
s
 
(C
h
im
p
a
n
z
e
e
) 
9
 
1
 
F
ro
n
d
 
L
e
a
f 
u
s
e
d
 t
o
 b
ru
s
h
 a
w
a
y
 b
e
e
s
 -
 
le
a
f-
b
ru
s
h
. 
1
?
 
S
u
b
s
is
te
n
c
e
 
L
e
a
f 
W
h
it
e
n
 e
t 
a
l.
 1
9
9
9
, 
2
0
0
1
 
P
a
n
 t
ro
g
lo
d
y
te
s
 
(C
h
im
p
a
n
z
e
e
) 
9
 
1
 
R
a
g
 
L
e
a
v
e
s
 u
s
e
d
 t
o
 m
o
p
 u
p
 i
n
s
e
c
ts
 -
 
le
a
f-
m
o
p
. 
L
e
a
v
e
s
 p
lu
c
k
e
d
 a
n
d
 
c
ru
m
p
le
d
. 
 
1
, 
4
 
S
u
b
s
is
te
n
c
e
 
L
e
a
f 
N
is
h
id
a
 1
9
7
3
; 
W
h
it
e
n
 e
t 
a
l.
 1
9
9
9
, 
2
0
0
1
; 
B
e
c
k
 1
9
8
0
; 
N
is
h
id
a
 1
9
7
3
 i
n
 B
e
c
k
e
r 
1
9
9
3
 
P
a
n
 t
ro
g
lo
d
y
te
s
 
(C
h
im
p
a
n
z
e
e
) 
9
 
1
 
R
a
g
 
L
e
a
v
e
s
 u
s
e
d
 t
o
 w
ip
e
 f
o
o
d
 f
ro
m
 
s
k
u
ll 
a
n
d
 f
ru
it
s
. 
 
1
?
, 
4
 
S
u
b
s
is
te
n
c
e
 
L
e
a
f 
T
e
le
k
i 
1
9
7
4
; 
W
h
it
e
n
 e
t 
a
l.
 1
9
9
9
, 
2
0
0
1
; 
T
e
le
k
i 
1
9
7
3
a
, 
1
9
7
3
b
, 
W
ra
n
g
h
a
m
 1
9
7
7
 i
n
 
B
e
c
k
 1
9
8
0
; 
T
e
le
k
i 
1
9
7
4
, 
W
ra
n
g
h
a
m
 1
9
7
7
 
in
 B
e
c
k
e
r 
1
9
9
3
 
334                     Appendix I   Animal Tool Behaviour 
A
n
im
al
 s
p
e
c
ie
s 
G
ro
u
p
S
it
u
at
io
n
A
rt
if
ac
t 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
o
n
 
M
o
d
if
ic
at
io
n
F
u
n
c
ti
o
n
 
R
M
 1
 
R
M
 2
 
R
M
 3
 
L
it
er
at
u
re
 
P
a
n
 t
ro
g
lo
d
y
te
s
 
(C
h
im
p
a
n
z
e
e
) 
9
 
1
 
H
a
m
m
e
r 
S
to
n
e
 o
r 
s
ti
c
k
 u
s
e
d
 t
o
 c
ra
c
k
 o
p
e
n
 
n
u
ts
, 
u
s
e
d
 i
n
 c
o
m
b
in
a
ti
o
n
 w
it
h
 
a
n
v
il,
 r
o
o
ts
 o
r 
g
ro
u
n
d
. 
W
e
ig
h
t 
o
f 
s
to
n
e
 1
 t
o
 >
5
k
g
 (
d
e
p
e
n
d
in
g
 o
n
 
n
u
t 
ty
p
e
, 
m
a
x
. 
1
6
k
g
.)
, 
tr
a
n
s
p
o
rt
e
d
 
u
p
 t
o
 1
0
0
m
. 
R
a
re
 i
n
 c
a
p
ti
v
it
y
. 
1
, 
2
 
S
u
b
s
is
te
n
c
e
 
S
to
n
e
 
S
ti
c
k
 
S
u
g
iy
a
m
a
 &
 K
o
m
a
n
 1
9
7
9
; 
B
o
e
s
c
h
 &
 
B
o
e
s
c
h
 1
9
8
1
, 
1
9
8
3
, 
1
9
8
4
a
, 
1
9
8
4
b
; 
W
h
it
e
n
 e
t 
a
l.
 1
9
9
9
, 
2
0
0
1
; 
B
e
a
tt
y
 1
9
5
1
, 
R
a
h
m
 1
9
7
1
, 
S
tr
u
h
s
a
c
k
e
r 
&
 H
u
n
k
e
le
r 
1
9
7
1
, 
B
re
w
e
r 
1
9
7
6
, 
A
z
u
m
a
 &
 T
o
y
o
s
h
im
a
 
in
 I
ta
n
i 
&
 S
u
z
u
k
i 
1
9
6
7
 i
n
 B
e
c
k
 1
9
8
0
; 
A
n
d
e
rs
o
n
 e
t 
a
l.
 1
9
8
3
 i
n
 B
e
c
k
e
r 
1
9
9
3
 
P
a
n
 t
ro
g
lo
d
y
te
s
 
(C
h
im
p
a
n
z
e
e
) 
9
 
4
 
P
ro
b
e
 
E
x
tr
a
c
ti
o
n
 s
ti
c
k
 o
r 
s
te
m
 u
s
e
d
 t
o
 
e
x
tr
a
c
t 
liq
u
id
s
 s
u
c
h
 a
s
 w
a
te
r.
  
9
9
 
G
a
m
e
 
S
ti
c
k
 
T
w
ig
 
S
tr
a
w
 
H
o
b
h
o
u
s
e
 1
9
2
6
, 
K
ö
h
le
r 
1
9
2
7
, 
K
o
lla
r 
1
9
7
2
, 
S
c
h
ill
e
r 
1
9
5
7
, 
v
a
n
 L
a
w
ic
k
-G
o
o
d
a
ll 
1
9
7
0
 i
n
 B
e
c
k
 1
9
8
0
 
P
a
n
 t
ro
g
lo
d
y
te
s
 
(C
h
im
p
a
n
z
e
e
) 
9
 
1
 
F
is
h
in
g
 r
o
d
 
S
te
m
 u
s
e
d
 t
o
 s
c
o
o
p
 a
lg
a
e
 f
ro
m
 
th
e
 w
a
te
r 
s
u
rf
a
c
e
. 
S
im
ila
r 
b
e
h
a
v
io
r 
in
 c
a
p
ti
v
it
y
: 
fi
s
h
 o
b
je
c
ts
 
fr
o
m
 t
h
e
 w
a
te
r 
d
it
c
h
. 
B
ro
k
e
n
 o
ff
?
 
D
e
fo
lia
te
d
. 
 
1
?
, 
2
 
S
u
b
s
is
te
n
c
e
 
S
te
m
 
W
h
it
e
n
 e
t 
a
l.
 1
9
9
9
, 
2
0
0
1
; 
v
a
n
 H
o
o
ff
 1
9
7
3
, 
K
o
lla
r 
1
9
7
2
 i
n
 B
e
c
k
 1
9
8
0
 
P
a
n
 t
ro
g
lo
d
y
te
s
 
(C
h
im
p
a
n
z
e
e
) 
9
 
1
 
W
e
d
g
e
 
S
m
a
ll 
s
to
n
e
 u
s
e
d
 t
o
 a
d
ju
s
t 
a
n
d
 
le
v
e
l 
o
u
t 
th
e
 a
n
v
il.
  
0
 
T
o
o
l 
p
ro
d
u
c
ti
o
n
, 
S
u
b
s
is
te
n
c
e
 
S
to
n
e
 
W
h
it
e
n
 e
t 
a
l.
 1
9
9
9
, 
2
0
0
1
 
P
a
n
 t
ro
g
lo
d
y
te
s
 
(C
h
im
p
a
n
z
e
e
) 
9
 
1
 
P
e
s
tl
e
 
U
s
e
 p
a
lm
 l
e
a
f 
s
te
m
 t
o
 p
o
u
n
d
 
p
a
lm
 p
e
ti
o
le
 u
n
ti
l 
s
o
ft
, 
to
 a
llo
w
 
a
c
c
e
s
s
 t
o
 t
h
e
 p
a
lm
 h
e
a
rt
s
. 
T
w
o
 
h
a
n
d
e
d
 u
s
e
 o
f 
th
e
 p
e
s
tl
e
 s
im
ila
r 
to
 g
ri
n
d
in
g
 g
ra
in
s
. 
 
1
 
S
u
b
s
is
te
n
c
e
 
P
a
lm
 l
e
a
f 
s
te
m
 
Y
a
m
a
k
o
s
h
i 
&
 S
u
g
iy
a
m
a
 1
9
9
5
; 
W
h
it
e
n
 e
t 
a
l.
 1
9
9
9
, 
2
0
0
1
 
P
a
n
 t
ro
g
lo
d
y
te
s
 
(C
h
im
p
a
n
z
e
e
) 
9
 
4
 
S
c
ra
p
e
r 
S
c
ra
tc
h
 o
r 
s
e
lf
-g
ro
o
m
 w
it
h
 a
 s
ti
c
k
 
o
r 
s
tr
a
w
. 
D
e
ta
c
h
e
d
 a
n
d
 t
a
p
e
re
d
. 
 
1
, 
4
 
P
e
rs
o
n
a
l 
h
y
g
ie
n
e
 
S
ti
c
k
 
S
tr
a
w
 
K
in
g
 e
t 
a
l.
 1
9
7
8
, 
K
ö
h
le
r 
1
9
2
7
 i
n
 B
e
c
k
 
1
9
8
0
 
P
a
n
 t
ro
g
lo
d
y
te
s
 
(C
h
im
p
a
n
z
e
e
) 
9
 
4
 
P
e
s
tl
e
 
P
o
k
e
 i
n
to
 a
n
d
 l
e
v
e
r 
in
to
 c
ra
c
k
s
 -
 
p
la
y
fu
l 
e
x
p
lo
ra
ti
o
n
. 
9
9
 
G
a
m
e
, 
E
x
p
lo
ra
ti
o
n
  
S
ti
c
k
 
S
c
h
ill
e
r 
1
9
5
7
 i
n
 B
e
c
k
 1
9
8
0
 
P
a
n
 t
ro
g
lo
d
y
te
s
 
(C
h
im
p
a
n
z
e
e
) 
8
 
1
 
S
c
o
o
p
 
U
s
e
 a
 l
e
a
f-
s
p
o
o
n
 t
o
 s
c
o
o
p
 w
a
te
r 
fr
o
m
 h
o
le
s
 i
n
 t
re
e
s
. 
 
1
 
S
u
b
s
is
te
n
c
e
 
L
e
a
f 
M
a
ts
u
s
a
k
a
 e
t 
a
l.
 2
0
0
5
; 
W
h
it
e
n
 e
t 
a
l.
 1
9
9
9
P
a
n
 t
ro
g
lo
d
y
te
s
 
(C
h
im
p
a
n
z
e
e
) 
9
 
4
 
C
o
n
ta
in
e
r 
S
c
o
o
p
 w
a
te
r 
fr
o
m
 d
it
c
h
 w
h
ile
 
p
la
y
in
g
. 
0
 
G
a
m
e
 
O
b
je
c
ts
 
v
a
n
 H
o
o
ff
 1
9
7
3
 i
n
 B
e
c
k
 1
9
8
0
 
P
a
n
 t
ro
g
lo
d
y
te
s
 
(C
h
im
p
a
n
z
e
e
) 
9
 
4
 
B
a
it
 
B
a
it
 c
h
ic
k
e
n
s
 w
it
h
 b
re
a
d
, 
th
e
n
 
p
o
k
e
 t
h
e
m
 a
ft
e
rw
a
rd
s
. 
9
9
 
G
a
m
e
 
B
re
a
d
 
K
ö
h
le
r 
1
9
2
7
 i
n
 B
e
c
k
 1
9
8
0
 
P
a
n
 t
ro
g
lo
d
y
te
s
 
(C
h
im
p
a
n
z
e
e
) 
9
 
1
 
P
ro
je
c
ti
le
 
D
ro
p
 o
r 
th
ro
w
 d
o
w
n
 b
ra
n
c
h
e
s
, 
tw
ig
s
, 
a
n
d
 t
e
n
d
ri
ls
 o
n
to
 p
u
rs
u
e
rs
, 
o
n
to
 l
e
o
p
a
rd
 (
le
o
p
a
rd
 m
o
d
e
l)
 
R
a
re
 i
n
 c
a
p
ti
v
it
y
 (
s
to
n
e
).
 B
re
a
k
 o
ff
 
b
ra
n
c
h
e
s
 t
w
ig
s
 a
n
d
 l
e
a
v
e
s
. 
1
 
T
h
re
a
t,
 
D
e
fe
n
s
e
 
B
ra
n
c
h
 
P
la
n
t 
te
n
d
ri
l 
o
th
e
r 
o
b
je
c
ts
 
Iz
a
w
a
 &
 I
ta
n
i 
1
9
6
6
, 
N
is
h
id
a
 1
9
6
8
, 
1
9
7
0
, 
O
w
e
n
 /
R
e
y
n
o
ld
s
 i
n
 K
o
rt
la
n
d
t 
&
 K
o
o
ij 
1
9
6
3
, 
S
a
b
a
te
r 
P
i 
1
9
7
2
, 
1
9
7
4
, 
S
u
g
iy
a
m
a
 
1
9
6
9
, 
A
lb
re
c
h
t 
&
 D
u
n
n
e
tt
 1
9
7
1
, 
K
ö
h
le
r 
1
9
2
7
 i
n
 B
e
c
k
 1
9
8
0
 
Appendix I  Animal Tool Behaviour             335 
A
n
im
al
 s
p
e
c
ie
s 
G
ro
u
p
S
it
u
at
io
n
A
rt
if
ac
t 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
o
n
 
M
o
d
if
ic
at
io
n
F
u
n
c
ti
o
n
 
R
M
 1
 
R
M
 2
 
R
M
 3
 
L
it
er
at
u
re
 
P
a
n
 t
ro
g
lo
d
y
te
s
 
(C
h
im
p
a
n
z
e
e
) 
9
 
1
 
P
ro
b
e
 
P
ro
b
e
 u
s
e
d
 t
o
 i
n
s
p
e
c
t 
u
n
k
n
o
w
n
, 
in
te
re
s
ti
n
g
 o
r 
s
c
a
ry
 o
b
je
c
ts
 
(h
o
le
s
, 
n
e
w
 s
ib
lin
g
s
, 
re
p
ti
le
, 
s
ti
c
k
y
 
b
a
n
a
n
a
 e
tc
) 
b
y
 p
o
k
in
g
 i
t,
 s
ti
c
k
in
g
 
in
to
 i
t 
a
n
d
 t
h
e
n
 s
n
if
fi
n
g
 t
h
e
 p
ro
b
e
 
(s
ti
c
k
, 
tw
ig
, 
b
la
d
e
 o
f 
g
ra
s
s
, 
te
n
d
ri
l?
).
 
1
?
 
E
x
p
lo
ra
ti
o
n
 
T
w
ig
 
S
ti
c
k
 
o
th
e
r 
o
b
je
c
ts
 
W
h
it
e
n
 e
t 
a
l.
 1
9
9
9
, 
2
0
0
1
; 
v
a
n
 L
a
w
ic
k
-
G
o
o
d
a
ll 
1
9
6
8
, 
1
9
7
0
, 
1
9
7
1
, 
1
9
7
3
, 
K
ö
h
le
r 
1
9
2
7
, 
M
o
tt
e
rs
h
e
a
d
 1
9
6
3
, 
M
e
n
z
e
l 
1
9
7
1
, 
H
. 
v
a
n
 L
a
w
ic
k
 i
n
 v
a
n
 L
a
w
ic
k
-G
o
o
d
a
ll 
1
9
7
0
; 
A
lb
re
c
h
t 
&
 D
u
n
n
e
tt
 1
9
7
1
, 
B
re
w
e
r 
&
 
B
re
w
e
r 
in
 v
a
n
 L
a
w
ic
k
-G
o
o
d
a
ll 
1
9
7
3
 i
n
 
B
e
c
k
 1
9
8
0
 
P
a
n
 t
ro
g
lo
d
y
te
s
 
(C
h
im
p
a
n
z
e
e
) 
9
 
1
 
C
o
m
b
 
U
s
e
 l
e
a
f 
s
te
m
 t
o
 c
o
m
b
 t
h
ro
u
g
h
 
h
a
ir
. 
 
1
?
 
P
e
rs
o
n
a
l 
h
y
g
ie
n
e
 
L
e
a
f 
W
h
it
e
n
 e
t 
a
l.
 1
9
9
9
, 
2
0
0
1
 
P
a
n
 t
ro
g
lo
d
y
te
s
 
(C
h
im
p
a
n
z
e
e
) 
9
 
1
 
T
o
y
 
O
b
je
c
t 
u
s
e
d
 t
o
 i
n
it
ia
te
 a
n
d
 t
ri
g
g
e
r 
g
a
m
e
, 
b
ra
n
c
h
 b
ro
k
e
n
 o
ff
 o
r 
o
th
e
r 
o
b
je
c
ts
. 
 
1
 
G
a
m
e
 
T
w
ig
 
P
a
lm
 
W
h
it
e
n
 e
t 
a
l.
 1
9
9
9
, 
2
0
0
1
 
P
a
n
 t
ro
g
lo
d
y
te
s
 
(C
h
im
p
a
n
z
e
e
) 
9
 
4
 
R
a
g
 
W
ip
e
 c
a
g
e
 w
it
h
 p
a
p
e
r,
 b
u
rl
a
p
 
s
a
c
k
, 
s
tr
a
w
 a
n
d
 l
e
a
v
e
s
 (
im
it
a
te
 
c
a
re
ta
k
e
r?
).
 
9
9
 
u
n
c
le
a
r,
 
G
a
m
e
?
 
P
a
p
e
r 
S
tr
a
w
 
o
th
e
r 
o
b
je
c
ts
 
B
e
rn
s
te
in
 1
9
6
2
, 
K
in
g
 e
t 
a
l.
 1
9
7
8
, 
K
o
lla
r 
1
9
7
2
 i
n
 B
e
c
k
 1
9
8
0
 
P
a
n
 t
ro
g
lo
d
y
te
s
 
(C
h
im
p
a
n
z
e
e
) 
9
 
1
 
O
p
ti
c
a
l 
a
n
d
 
a
u
d
io
 s
ti
m
u
lu
s
 
D
ra
g
 l
a
rg
e
 b
ra
n
c
h
 w
h
ile
 r
u
n
n
in
g
, 
d
e
m
o
n
s
tr
a
te
 a
g
g
re
s
s
iv
e
n
e
s
s
, 
in
ti
m
id
a
ti
o
n
. 
A
ls
o
, 
d
ra
g
 s
m
a
ll 
tr
e
e
s
, 
ra
re
ly
 y
o
u
n
g
e
r 
in
d
iv
id
u
a
ls
. 
A
ls
o
 w
h
e
n
 i
rr
it
a
te
d
 o
r 
d
u
ri
n
g
 a
 
th
u
n
d
e
rs
to
rm
. 
 
1
 
Im
p
re
s
s
, 
T
h
re
a
t
B
ra
n
c
h
 
S
m
a
ll 
tr
e
e
Y
o
u
n
g
 
a
n
im
a
l 
N
is
h
id
a
 &
 H
ir
a
iw
a
 1
9
8
2
, 
W
h
it
e
n
 e
t 
a
l.
 
1
9
9
9
, 
2
0
0
1
; 
v
a
n
 L
a
w
ic
k
-G
o
o
d
a
ll 
1
9
7
1
, 
v
a
n
 H
o
o
ff
 1
9
7
3
, 
T
e
le
k
i 
1
9
7
3
c
 i
n
 B
e
c
k
 
1
9
8
0
 
P
a
n
 t
ro
g
lo
d
y
te
s
 
(C
h
im
p
a
n
z
e
e
) 
9
 
1
 
S
p
o
n
g
e
 
U
s
e
 u
n
-c
h
e
w
e
d
, 
p
a
rt
ia
lly
 
c
ru
m
p
le
d
 l
e
a
v
e
s
/ 
v
e
g
e
ta
ti
o
n
 t
o
 
s
c
o
o
p
 w
a
te
r 
a
n
d
 s
q
u
e
e
z
e
 i
t 
in
to
 
m
o
u
th
, 
le
a
f 
s
p
o
n
g
e
. 
In
 c
a
p
ti
v
it
y
: 
a
ls
o
 u
s
e
 s
tr
a
w
 o
r 
b
re
a
d
, 
in
 
e
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
ts
 p
la
c
e
 r
o
p
e
 i
n
to
 
b
a
n
a
n
a
 m
a
s
h
. 
2
0
-3
0
 t
im
e
s
, 
>
 1
0
 
m
in
. 
lo
n
g
. 
8
 t
im
e
s
 a
s
 m
u
c
h
 w
a
te
r 
a
s
 w
h
e
n
 u
s
in
g
 f
in
g
e
rs
. 
 
1
, 
4
 
S
u
b
s
is
te
n
c
e
 
L
e
a
f 
B
re
a
d
 
o
th
e
r 
o
b
je
c
ts
 
W
h
it
e
n
 e
t 
a
l.
 1
9
9
9
, 
2
0
0
1
; 
G
o
o
d
a
ll 
1
9
6
4
, 
M
c
G
re
w
 1
9
7
7
, 
v
a
n
 L
a
w
ic
k
-G
o
o
d
a
ll 
1
9
6
5
, 
1
9
6
8
, 
1
9
7
0
, 
1
9
7
1
, 
1
9
7
3
, 
B
re
w
e
r 
&
 
B
re
w
e
r 
in
 v
a
n
 L
a
w
ic
k
-G
o
o
d
a
ll 
1
9
7
0
, 
C
o
w
p
e
r 
1
9
7
1
, 
H
o
b
h
o
u
s
e
 1
9
2
6
, 
K
ö
h
le
r 
1
9
2
7
, 
P
a
rk
e
r 
1
9
6
8
a
, 
1
9
6
9
 i
n
 B
e
c
k
 1
9
8
0
; 
S
u
g
iy
a
m
a
 &
 K
o
m
a
n
 1
9
7
9
 i
n
 B
e
c
k
e
r 
1
9
9
3
P
a
n
 t
ro
g
lo
d
y
te
s
 
(C
h
im
p
a
n
z
e
e
) 
9
 
1
 
F
ro
n
d
 
B
ra
n
c
h
 w
it
h
 l
e
a
v
e
s
 u
s
e
d
 t
o
 s
h
o
o
 
a
w
a
y
 f
ly
in
g
 i
n
s
e
c
ts
 -
 f
ly
 w
h
is
t,
 
b
ra
n
c
h
 b
ro
k
e
n
 o
ff
. 
 
1
 
P
e
rs
o
n
a
l 
h
y
g
ie
n
e
 
B
ra
n
c
h
 
W
h
it
e
n
 e
t 
a
l.
 1
9
9
9
, 
2
0
0
1
; 
S
u
g
iy
a
m
a
 1
9
6
9
 
in
 B
e
c
k
 1
9
8
0
; 
S
u
g
iy
a
m
a
 1
9
6
9
, 
1
9
8
1
 i
n
 
B
e
c
k
e
r 
1
9
9
3
 
P
a
n
 t
ro
g
lo
d
y
te
s
 
(C
h
im
p
a
n
z
e
e
) 
9
 
1
 
P
ro
b
e
 
S
m
a
ll 
s
ti
c
k
 u
s
e
d
 t
o
 c
le
a
r 
n
o
s
e
. 
 
9
9
 
P
e
rs
o
n
a
l 
h
y
g
ie
n
e
 
B
ra
n
c
h
 
W
h
it
e
n
 e
t 
a
l.
 1
9
9
9
, 
2
0
0
1
 
336                     Appendix I   Animal Tool Behaviour 
A
n
im
al
 s
p
e
c
ie
s 
G
ro
u
p
S
it
u
at
io
n
A
rt
if
ac
t 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
o
n
 
M
o
d
if
ic
at
io
n
F
u
n
c
ti
o
n
 
R
M
 1
 
R
M
 2
 
R
M
 3
 
L
it
er
at
u
re
 
P
a
n
 t
ro
g
lo
d
y
te
s
 
(C
h
im
p
a
n
z
e
e
) 
9
 
1
 
C
lu
b
 
S
ti
c
k
 u
s
e
d
 t
o
 h
it
 o
th
e
r 
c
h
im
p
a
n
z
e
e
s
, 
b
a
b
o
o
n
s
, 
a
n
d
 
le
o
p
a
rd
 m
o
d
e
l.
 I
n
 c
a
p
ti
v
it
y
: 
s
tr
ik
e
 
h
u
m
a
n
s
, 
re
p
ti
le
s
, 
m
a
m
m
a
ls
, 
a
n
d
 
g
o
ri
lla
 w
it
h
 s
ti
c
k
, 
b
u
c
k
e
t 
o
r 
ra
g
s
. 
9
9
 
T
h
re
a
t,
 
D
e
fe
n
s
e
 
S
ti
c
k
 
B
u
c
k
e
t 
W
h
it
e
n
 e
t 
a
l.
 1
9
9
9
, 
2
0
0
1
; 
v
a
n
 L
a
w
ic
k
-
G
o
o
d
a
ll 
1
9
6
8
, 
1
9
7
0
, 
It
a
n
i 
&
 S
u
z
u
k
i 
1
9
6
7
, 
K
ö
h
le
r 
1
9
2
7
, 
K
o
lla
r 
1
9
7
2
, 
S
a
v
a
g
e
 1
9
7
6
, 
v
a
n
 H
o
o
ff
 1
9
7
3
, 
W
ils
o
n
 &
 W
ils
o
n
 1
9
6
8
, 
K
o
rt
la
n
d
t 
1
9
6
5
, 
1
9
6
7
a
, 
S
h
e
a
k
 1
9
2
4
 i
n
 
B
e
c
k
 1
9
8
0
; 
v
a
n
 Z
o
n
 &
 v
a
n
 O
rs
h
o
v
e
n
 
1
9
6
7
, 
A
lb
re
c
h
t 
in
 B
e
c
k
e
r 
1
9
9
3
 
P
a
n
 t
ro
g
lo
d
y
te
s
 
(C
h
im
p
a
n
z
e
e
) 
9
 
1
 
L
e
v
e
r 
U
s
e
 s
ti
c
k
 a
s
 l
e
v
e
r 
to
 r
e
a
c
h
 a
n
t 
n
e
s
ts
 i
n
 t
re
e
s
, 
to
 o
p
e
n
 
u
n
d
e
rg
ro
u
n
d
 b
e
e
s
' n
e
s
ts
, 
o
p
e
n
 
b
a
n
a
n
a
 c
ra
te
s
, 
w
id
e
n
 h
o
le
s
 i
n
 
fe
n
c
e
 o
r 
o
p
e
n
 f
o
o
d
 d
is
p
e
n
s
e
r.
  
9
9
 
S
u
b
s
is
te
n
c
e
 
S
ti
c
k
 
T
e
le
k
i 
1
9
7
4
, 
G
o
o
d
a
ll 
1
9
6
4
, 
v
a
n
 L
a
w
ic
k
-
G
o
o
d
a
ll 
1
9
6
8
, 
1
9
7
0
, 
1
9
7
1
, 
1
9
7
3
, 
W
ra
n
g
h
a
m
 1
9
7
4
, 
B
rw
e
r 
&
 B
re
w
e
r 
p
e
rs
. 
c
o
m
. 
In
 v
a
n
 L
a
w
ic
k
-G
o
o
d
a
ll 
1
9
7
3
, 
K
ö
h
le
r 
1
9
2
7
, 
K
o
lla
r 
1
9
7
2
, 
H
o
b
h
o
u
s
e
 1
9
2
6
, 
M
c
G
re
w
 e
t 
a
l.
 1
9
7
5
 i
n
 B
e
c
k
 1
9
8
0
;G
o
o
d
a
ll 
1
9
6
4
 i
n
 B
e
c
k
e
r 
1
9
9
3
 
P
a
n
 t
ro
g
lo
d
y
te
s
 
(C
h
im
p
a
n
z
e
e
) 
9
 
4
 
S
p
it
 
S
p
it
 i
n
s
e
c
ts
 u
s
in
g
 p
o
in
te
d
 s
tr
a
w
. 
 
4
 
u
n
c
le
a
r?
 
S
tr
a
w
 
K
in
g
 e
t 
a
l.
 1
9
7
8
 i
n
 B
e
c
k
 1
9
8
0
 
P
a
n
 t
ro
g
lo
d
y
te
s
 
(C
h
im
p
a
n
z
e
e
) 
9
 
1
 
A
u
d
io
 s
ti
m
u
lu
s
R
ip
 l
e
a
v
e
s
 o
ff
 s
te
m
, 
a
s
 t
h
re
a
t.
 
2
 
Im
p
re
s
s
, 
T
h
re
a
t?
 
B
ra
n
c
h
 
W
h
it
e
n
 e
t 
a
l.
 1
9
9
9
, 
2
0
0
1
 
P
a
n
 t
ro
g
lo
d
y
te
s
 
(C
h
im
p
a
n
z
e
e
) 
9
 
1
 
S
p
o
n
g
e
 
U
s
e
 c
h
e
w
e
d
 l
e
a
v
e
s
 t
o
 s
c
o
o
p
 u
p
 
w
a
te
r,
 s
q
u
e
e
z
e
 i
n
to
 m
o
u
th
 a
n
d
 
s
o
a
k
 u
p
 m
o
re
 w
a
te
r.
  
1
, 
4
 
S
u
b
s
is
te
n
c
e
 
L
e
a
f 
W
h
it
e
n
 e
t 
a
l.
 1
9
9
9
, 
2
0
0
1
; 
M
a
ts
u
s
a
k
a
 e
t 
a
l.
 2
0
0
5
 
P
a
n
 t
ro
g
lo
d
y
te
s
 
(C
h
im
p
a
n
z
e
e
) 
9
 
1
 
E
x
tr
a
c
ti
o
n
 s
e
t 
S
e
t 
o
f 
tw
o
 t
o
o
ls
 f
o
r 
te
rm
it
e
 h
ill
. 
1
) 
tw
ig
 u
s
e
d
 t
o
 o
p
e
n
 e
n
tr
a
n
c
e
 
p
re
v
io
u
s
ly
 c
lo
s
e
d
 b
y
 t
e
rm
it
e
s
. 
2
) 
fl
e
x
ib
le
 p
ro
b
e
 w
it
h
 b
ru
s
h
 e
n
d
 
u
s
e
d
 t
o
 f
is
h
 f
o
r 
te
rm
it
e
s
. 
S
te
m
 
s
h
o
rt
e
n
e
d
, 
d
e
c
o
rt
ic
a
te
d
 a
n
d
 
c
h
e
w
e
d
 w
it
h
 t
e
e
th
. 
 
1
, 
2
, 
3
, 
4
 
S
u
b
s
is
te
n
c
e
 
T
w
ig
 
S
te
m
 
S
a
n
z
 e
t 
a
l.
 2
0
0
4
 
P
a
n
 t
ro
g
lo
d
y
te
s
 
(C
h
im
p
a
n
z
e
e
) 
9
 
1
 
F
ro
n
d
 
W
a
v
e
 b
ra
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 b
e
g
 f
o
r 
fo
o
d
. 
 
1
 
A
tt
e
n
ti
o
n
, 
S
u
b
s
is
te
n
c
e
 
B
ra
n
c
h
 
N
is
h
id
a
 &
 H
ir
a
iw
a
 1
9
8
2
 
P
a
n
 t
ro
g
lo
d
y
te
s
 
(C
h
im
p
a
n
z
e
e
) 
9
 
1
 
A
u
d
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c
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 l
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 b
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c
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c
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 l
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c
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c
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c
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c
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a
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. 
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 c
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v
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y
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n
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 d
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n
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p
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c
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c
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a
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c
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d
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 s
ti
m
u
lu
s
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e
a
r 
o
ff
 t
h
e
 l
e
a
fy
 p
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s
 u
s
in
g
 
h
a
n
d
s
 a
n
d
 m
o
u
th
, 
le
a
v
e
 t
h
e
 r
is
p
s
 
o
f 
a
 l
e
a
f.
  
1
 
A
tt
e
n
ti
o
n
 
L
e
a
f 
N
is
h
id
a
 &
 H
ir
a
iw
a
 1
9
8
2
, 
W
h
it
e
n
 e
t 
a
l.
 
1
9
9
9
, 
2
0
0
1
 
P
a
n
 t
ro
g
lo
d
y
te
s
 
(C
h
im
p
a
n
z
e
e
) 
9
 
1
 
N
e
s
t 
B
u
ild
 n
e
s
t 
(f
o
r 
s
le
e
p
in
g
) 
o
u
t 
o
f 
le
a
fy
 b
ra
n
c
h
e
s
 (
o
n
 t
h
e
 g
ro
u
n
d
).
 
1
?
 
N
e
s
t 
b
u
ild
in
g
 
B
ra
n
c
h
 
W
h
it
e
n
 e
t 
a
l.
 1
9
9
9
, 
2
0
0
1
 
P
a
n
 t
ro
g
lo
d
y
te
s
 
(C
h
im
p
a
n
z
e
e
) 
9
 
1
 
S
ti
m
u
la
ti
o
n
 
L
a
rg
e
 s
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n
e
 o
r 
s
o
lid
 s
ti
c
k
 t
o
 t
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k
le
, 
s
a
ti
s
fy
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e
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 s
o
c
ia
l 
a
c
ti
v
it
y
 
w
it
h
o
u
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 s
o
c
ia
l 
p
a
rt
n
e
r.
  
9
9
 
S
ti
m
u
la
ti
o
n
 
S
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n
e
 
S
ti
c
k
 
W
h
it
e
n
 e
t 
a
l.
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9
9
9
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2
0
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1
 
P
a
n
 t
ro
g
lo
d
y
te
s
 
(C
h
im
p
a
n
z
e
e
) 
9
 
1
 
P
ro
b
e
 
F
is
h
 f
o
r 
te
rm
it
e
s
 a
n
d
 t
re
e
-d
w
e
lli
n
g
 
a
n
ts
 u
s
in
g
 b
la
d
e
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f 
g
ra
s
s
, 
tw
ig
 o
r 
te
n
d
ri
l,
 M
a
h
a
le
: 
m
a
x
 t
ra
n
s
p
o
rt
 
d
is
ta
n
c
e
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0
0
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O
b
je
c
t 
b
ro
k
e
n
 o
r 
b
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te
n
 o
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d
e
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lia
te
d
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s
h
o
rt
e
n
e
d
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e
c
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a
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n
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c
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d
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a
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P
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P
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z
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T
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4
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a
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c
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c
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 b
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 b
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p
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 p
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 c
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c
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c
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c
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c
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c
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b
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c
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e
n
 e
t 
a
l 
1
9
9
9
, 
2
0
0
1
 
P
a
n
 t
ro
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c
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 l
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c
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c
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c
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c
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c
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c
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 p
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c
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 m
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 p
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b
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 b
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c
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b
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c
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c
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 c
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 d
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 p
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c
k
 
S
te
m
 
N
is
h
id
a
 &
 H
ir
a
iw
a
 1
9
8
2
; 
W
h
it
e
n
 e
t 
a
l.
 
1
9
9
9
, 
2
0
0
1
; 
S
a
v
a
g
e
 &
 W
y
m
a
n
 1
8
4
3
-
1
8
4
4
, 
M
e
rf
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e
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a
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b
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c
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c
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 p
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 b
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 b
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 c
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c
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 p
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 c
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